The Cypriot Civil Society movement: a legitimate player in the peace process?

Abstract

Efforts to resolve Cyprus's frozen conflict have frustrated the international community for nearly forty years. One of the causes of this lack of progress is a fundamental ‘democratic deficit’ in previous efforts at peacebuilding. In response to this deficit, a civil society movement for peace has slowly but inexorably emerged in the last few decades, engaging in a wide range of reconciliation efforts. In light of an ever-evolving enabling environment, this paper asks if this civil society movement has acquired the capacity and the constituency that could establish it as a legitimate interlocutor within an expanded peace process.

Keywords:

• reconciliation
• peacebuilding
• Cyprus
• conflict prevention
• participatory peacemaking
• civil society

Introduction: The Participatory Deficit in the Cyprus Peace Process

Since the final partition of the island in 1974 (effected by a Turkish invasion, which followed a coup inspired by the Greek junta), after more than a decade of inter-communal conflict, attempts to find accommodation between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leadership have frustrated the peacemaking efforts of successive professional mediators and the division of Cyprus has become synonymous with intractability (Ker-Lindsay 2011; Kanol 2010, 26–45).

The apparent insolubility of the Cyprus problem has drawn various critiques of the traditionally limited nature of a negotiation process that, led by small elites in both communities, has never meaningfully involved the wider public (Lordos 2009, 163–179; Kaymak et al. 2008, i; Jarraud et al. 2010, 23; Jarraud & Lordos 2012, 271; Jarraud 2012, 438–445). Critics of previous peacemaking efforts point to an inherent democratic deficit whereby attempts at negotiated settlements neither gained public legitimisation (e.g. Lordos 2009, 163–179) nor reflected the changing preferences of constituents, despite opinion polls revealing strong public demands for greater inclusion (Cyprus 2015, 2010, 9; United Nations Development Programme [UNDP] 2012a). Ironically, the power of bottom-up approaches to conflict resolution had been identified from the onset of the inter-communal troubles in 1963–1964 but such approaches were soon abandoned (Packard 2008, 11).

Half a century later, participatory approaches remain one of the only untried methods for unlocking the Cyprus conflict stalemate.

Half a century later, participatory approaches remain one of the only untried methods for unlocking the Cyprus conflict stalemate. Yet despite widespread awareness of these challenges in the process, negotiators in Cyprus have repeatedly operated on the assumption that signing an agreement is synonymous with solving a conflict, failing to directly involve the wider public (Jarraud & Lordos 2012, 271; Jarraud et al. 2010, 23; Louise 2009, 25; Kaymak et al. 2008, i; Jarraud 2012, 440; Hadjipavlou 2004, 197).

Political elites in Cyprus have often justified this exclusive negotiating style with the fact that a closed-door approach allows for ‘greater flexibility and openness to compromise’ (Kaymak et al. 2008, 3). Some officials think that, since they are popularly elected, they are entitled to speak on behalf of constituents without further consultation. This was exemplified in recent research among local community councils, in which some participants argued that there was no need for public consultation, since ‘the council is elected by citizens and decisions are taken by the majority, therefore citizens’ desires and demands are democratically represented' (UNDP 2012b).

Forty years of a closed-door approach yielding such poor results should be evidence enough that the time has come to re-think the entire paradigm underpinning the process.

Forty years of a closed-door approach yielding such poor results should be evidence enough that the time has come to re-think the entire paradigm underpinning the process. It is against this background that this paper examines the emerging role of civil society in their efforts to support formal negotiations to resolve the Cyprus conflict.

Indeed, survey results reveal that the overwhelming majority of people in both communities believe that their leaders ignore citizens' opinions (see figure 1) regarding the negotiation process, despite their desire to be consulted (see figure 2) on such major policy decisions (UNDP 2012a).

Figure 1 Extent to Which the Voice of Citizens Is Heard by the Leaders in the Negotiation Process.8 Source: UNDP 2012a.

Figure 2 Opinion on Whether Citizens Should Be Consulted about Major Policy Decisions. Source: UNDP 2012a.

The need for citizens to be partners in the peace process has also been championed by successive United Nations secretary generals, who have made direct requests to the island's leaders to fully involve civil society in the peacemaking process (UN Security Council 2011, 4). The prerogative of Cypriot civil society and citizens at large to participate in the process to resolve the Cyprus conflict is enshrined in international law, in particular in instruments such the UN's 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1976 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ratified by the Republic of Cyprus in 1969). Such instruments protect the right to political participation, which ‘refers to citizens’ right to seek to influence public affairs' (Klein 2005, 1). The Covenant makes clear that ‘Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without … unreasonable restrictions: To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives’ (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1976, Article 251).

The 2000 UNDP Human Development Report further frames the role of citizens to engage with leaders and decision-makers in policymaking, by juxtaposing the right to participate in the body politic with the ‘duties imposed — without fail — on specified persons or agents who would make sure that these rights are fulfilled’ (UNDP 2000, 24). This concept of agency, which bears a duty to fulfil rights, usually in the form of the state, establishes legal entitlements of rights holders (usually citizens). In this setting the concept and practice of ‘duty bearer’–‘rights holder’ relations demands that both parties have the requisite capacities, willingness and skills to fulfil their respective roles.

In this setting the concept and practice of ‘duty bearer’–‘rights holder’ relations demands that both parties have the requisite capacities, willingness and skills to fulfil their respective roles.

In the context of the non-resolution of the Cyprus conflict, the ‘duty bearer’–‘rights holder’ relationship translates into an examination of the capabilities exhibited and practised, on the one hand, by successive Cypriot leaderships and, on the other hand, by citizens, either directly or through the formation of civic organisations, groups and associations. While much has been written about the failures of peace talks conducted by political elites, little attention has been paid to the role of Cypriot civil society in creating a space at the table for its constituency, the wider public.

With this background in mind, this article focuses on how a civil society peacebuilding movement has emerged on the island over the last few decades with the intention of participating in and influencing this process. It explores the ways in which this movement has established itself as a legitimate bridge between citizens and the country's leadership with regard to the peace process, in particular examining if it has built enough of a constituency to ensure a seat at the table.

The Emergence and Growth of a Civil Society Peacebuilding Movement (1974–2008)

Despite the arguments set forth in the introduction, the emergence of a cohesive civil society peacebuilding movement that could potentially address this ‘democratic deficit’ is only a recent phenomenon and has traditionally had a low impact on the formal peace process (CIVICUS 2005; Kanol 2010, 36).

An emerging peace consciousness (1974–1997)

Following the conflict in 1974, there were very few bi-communal meetings between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriots, and certainly up to the 1990s the civil-society-based peace movement was ‘weak and marginal’ (Anastasiou 2008, 182). This was partly because the burden of dominant nationalist rhetoric in both communities gave little room for a vibrant civil society, or constructive citizen-led reconciliation efforts (Broome 2005a, 268; Çuhadar & Kotelis 2010, 197; Anastasiou 2008, 56–57). The few confidence-building measures that did exist in the 1970s, such as the reconnection of the Nicosia Sewerage Network in 1978, which eventually morphed into the inter-communal Nicosia Master Plan (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR] 1996; Broome 2005a, 271; 2005b, 18), were functional efforts led by local authorities, born out of necessity and not truly civil society efforts. The de facto partition of the island meant that civil society movements on either side of the divide developed independently from each other (CIVICUS 2005, 20; Hadjipavlou 2004, 209), which has created a structural impediment to the evolution of a cohesive inter-communal civil society movement for peace.

In 1984 there were attempts to start meetings between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot business people (Carras 2009, 57), but it wasn't until the early 1990s that individual Cypriot civil society activists and academics began to find creative ways to start a dialogue on how they could support a solution to the Cyprus question (Hadjipavlou 2004, 202). At the time many felt they were operating in an unfavourable environment. According to one of the activists, ‘In the early days you needed to be brave to get involved as anyone from the other community was considered the enemy. There was no easy way of meeting and the authorities had to grant us permission to enter the UN buffer zone.’ At that time the first Cypriots who ventured across the Buffer Zone faced huge obstacles in making any impact on the status quo. As one activist noted, ‘It was very exciting to be part of a meaningful action that had to do with the future of Cyprus, however external forces were continuously discrediting our work’ (personal communication). Indeed, contacts between civil society organisations (CSOs) across the Buffer Zone were almost impossible, because Cypriots were not able to physically cross to the other side at the time. Nevertheless, some pioneers found ways to meet, for example by attending workshops abroad.

One such founding event was a bi-communal conflict resolution workshop organised in the US by the Fulbright Commission in 1993 (Laouris 2011, 41). In 1994 the Fulbright Commission organised workshops in the Buffer Zone but initially the civil society activists from both sides had to meet separately. Only in 1995 were they allowed to meet and work together (Laouris 2011, 73). Through these local workshops, the first glimpses of a vision for a role of civil society in the peace process emerged, with participants arguing for ‘the establishment of an effective peacebuilding movement with a clear vision and a more effective practice’ (Laouris 2011, 88, 92), both of which became reality in the following years. Civil society activists started to recognise that they needed to be at the heart of the peace process. As the Fulbright scholar Ben Broome, who facilitated inter-communal workshops recalls, one of the recommendations from participants was, ‘Never forget that rapprochement is for civil society to sustain … and no matter who holds positions of power, the push for better relations must be centred on the citizens and citizen groups that are involved in cross-community activities’ (Broome 2005b, 105). The period between 1995 and 1997 saw a blossoming of people-to-people contacts as thousands of Cypriots from across the island took part in bi-communal activities (Broome 2005b, 12). During 1997 US diplomat Richard Holbrooke convened inter-communal meetings of business leaders, thus helping to energise Track 2 diplomacy efforts on the island (Carras 2009, 57; Broome 2005a, 272). At the same time, trade unions from both communities submitted a joint declaration to the UN urging ‘the international community and the island's leadership to hear the voice of the majority of the people and work towards a fair solution which will bring peace to the island’ (Broome 2005a, 271).

Despite these ad hoc efforts, the peacebuilding and conflict resolution focused civil society community struggled to find its place in the decades following partition.

Despite these ad hoc efforts, the peacebuilding and conflict resolution focused civil society community struggled to find its place in the decades following partition. The period witnessed the consolidation of the island's division, marked most profoundly by the unilateral declaration of independence of the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (TRNC) in November 1983. Even though the space for Cypriot peacebuilders was limited, international donors did gradually invest in supporting activities that created contacts across the Buffer Zone. However, the focus of donors was still very much on the development angle, as evidenced by the mandate of UNHCR, the torch-bearer of inter-communal reconciliation support between 1974 and 1997. They operated programmes for internally displaced people, including housing and support to small industries, as well as promoting bi-communal activities that addressed the shortages created due to population displacements, and encouraging cooperation between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots on issues of common concern,2 many of which were development issues (public health, reforestation, etc.).

Like the funding environment, the policy environment for the development of a civil-society-led peacebuilding movement was not favourable and became even more restrictive when the Turkish Cypriot authorities banned all peacebuilding activities in 1997, despite the strategic opportunity presented by the launch of the European Union accession talks (Laouris 2011, 99,117). As this period came to a close, and even for some years to come, it was clear that although a large amount of groundwork had been conducted at the grassroots and community levels, the impact at the decision-making level was not clearly visible (Hadjipavlou 2004, 193, 208).

Renaissance and collapse (1998–2004)

The period 1998 to 2004 saw the first concerted external investment in the island's nascent civil society as a force for peacebuilding. This effort coincided with fresh attempts to bring a settlement to Cyprus, initiated by Security Council Resolution 1250 (UN Security Council 1999), which requested the Secretary-General to invite the two leaders of the island's two communities to negotiations, and emerged as a response to Cyprus's impending accession to the EU. In theory, the changed political environment should have created opportunities for civil society to capture the societal ground for peacebuilding. In reality the period witnessed the establishment of a particular kind of citizen-led bi-communal activity, which involved cooperation across the divide, but focused on politically ‘safe’ thematic interests (e.g. environment and public health) rather than peacebuilding per se (Blue et al. 2004). Though safe, this type of functional cooperation failed to have any impact at the political level (Blue et al. 2004; Hadjipavlou 2004, 193). This was partly due to the limited capacity of the CSOs themselves, which by 2004 were still considered to be ‘small, fragile, and dependent on volunteers and in-kind donations from members’, although there were already a few notable exceptions (Blue et al. 2004).

The cornerstone of civil society peacebuilding during these years rested with the Bi-Communal Development Programme (BDP) (1998–20053), implemented by the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS), and supported by the UNDP and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The availability of significant funds for bi-communal activities from the international community allowed civil society leaders, groups and organisations to implement many of the ideas developed in the previous years and take advantage of the new funding scheme that helped realise small-scale confidence-building measures. However, the investment patterns of that programme highlighted the continued weakness of civil society, the majority of the BDP funds being invested in classic development issues, such infrastructure projects led by the authorities (Blue et al. 2004).

Faced with a fragmented civil society, with contact across the divide at a standstill and with a hostile political environment, the BDP opted to stimulate inter-communal interaction by supporting hundreds of medium- and small-scale initiatives involving different sectors of society (Blue et al. 2004). Although there was some capacity-building of civil society in the 1998–2004 period, ‘there was a lack of agreement between stakeholders on the role of civil society capacity building in fostering bi-communal peace and understanding’ (Blue et al. 2004).

Nevertheless, what support was available helped civil society gain traction and forge an independently visible and tangible presence. One observer of the peace process asserted that ‘by the year 2000, a bi-communal citizen peace movement, vaguely noticeable in the early 1990s, reached maturity as it developed a recognizable voice’ (Anastasiou 2008, 15). By September 2003 70% of BDP projects had succeeded in achieving some form of face-to-face contact (either on the island or off island) between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. This period saw the first steps to create organisational structures for peace, starting with the creation of the NGO-Support Centre in the Greek Cypriot community in 1999, and the creation of the Management Centre in the Turkish Cypriot community in 2001.

In 2002 the resumption of formal peace talks, which would lead to the 2004 referendum in both communities on the ‘Annan Plan’, provided a new frame for civil society reconciliation efforts.

In 2002 the resumption of formal peace talks, which would lead to the 2004 referendum in both communities on the ‘Annan Plan’, provided a new frame for civil society reconciliation efforts. This was quickly followed by two major events in 2003. The Republic of Cyprus signed the European Union Treaty of Accession, paving the way for it to join the EU as a divided island (with the acquis communautaire suspended in the Turkish Cypriot community4), and the Turkish Cypriot authorities decided to open the first crossing point across the Buffer Zone (Carras 2009, 62–63). Accession to the EU had a complex series of implications. While, it removed one of the incentives for the Greek Cypriot leadership to sign on to the ongoing peace process, the acquis communautaire reinforced international obligations to involve civil society in policymaking. In the Turkish Cypriot community, supporters of the peace talks pointed to the potential benefits of EU membership, as well as the tantalising prospect of ending their community's isolation (Ker-Lindsay 2011, 67).

With the prospect of a settlement on the horizon, the 12 months from the opening of the Ledra Palace crossing point in April 2003 to the referendum on the Annan Plan in April 2004 saw an unprecedented blooming of civil society efforts to promote reconciliation across the divide. This period would prove to be a major test for pro-peace civil society actors on the island, however. The fragmented and fractious nature of the Greek Cypriot civil society response to the Annan Plan before the referendum made it difficult for the pro-peace civil society movement to organise a coherent campaign (Çuhadar & Kotelis 2010, 203). In the Greek Cypriot community, civil society actors such as the Church strongly opposed the Annan Plan (International Crisis Group 2006; Kanol 2010, 39), as well as several political parties (Taki 2009, 186). This was in contrast to events in the Turkish Cypriot community, where an unprecedented mobilisation of civil society in favour of the peace process marked ‘one of the most impressive civil society efforts in Cypriot peacebuilding’ (Lönnqvist 2008, 8).

The Annan Plan was approved by 65% of Turkish Cypriots and rejected by 76% of Greek Cypriots. The result exposed the weaknesses of the structure of the formal peacemaking process, as well as demonstrating that the Greek Cypriot civil-society-based peace movement was in disarray and at the crucial moment was incapable of mounting a coherent challenge to the nationalist forces in its own community. The content of the plan itself certainly played a part, by not addressing the fears of the Greek Cypriot public (Taki 2009, 189; International Crisis Group 2006), as did the overall climate, the Greek Cypriot peace movement operating in a political and media environment that was biased towards the ‘no’ camp (Taki 2009, 180–193). Some of this may be attributed to the media bias against the plan (International Crisis Group 2006, 8; Taki 2009, 180–193). However, it seems the failure of the Annan Plan in the Greek Cypriot community was also firmly rooted in the fact that citizens remained on the margins of the negotiations (Lordos 2009, 163–179; Kaymak et al. 2008, i), highlighting ‘the need to engage the public in the peace process’ (Kaymak et al. 2008, i). The 2003–2004 period was ultimately a missed opportunity for civil society to bridge the gap between the negotiators and the wider public.

Following the referendum there was a huge sense of disappointment among Turkish Cypriot civil society leaders, who had pushed so hard for, and secured, a positive vote. Certainly, the result showed two civil societies, on each side of the divide, operating in completely different contexts and certainly not synchronised in terms of impact. For the Greek Cypriot community, the 2005 CIVICUS report asserts that, ‘on the whole, civil society is not considered to be very active in holding the state or private corporations accountable. Furthermore, it does not seem to be a generator of positive social norms, such as tolerance, trust and public spiritedness’ (CIVICUS 2005). Indeed one of the most critical findings in the immediate aftermath of the Annan Plan period was that Greek Cypriot NGOs were less trusted by the public than the President, police, army and Church, while less than 20% of CSOs had jointly organised bi-communal activities with partners from the other community (CIVICUS 2005, 13–14). For the Turkish Cypriot community, the same report states, ‘Whereas CSOs played an extraordinary role in galvanizing support for the aforementioned “Annan Plan”, impact in other areas remains limited’ (CIVICUS 2005, 18). Thus, in spite of the renaissance in civil society's peace activities, its capacity to forge a peace constituency across the divide has been restricted by its limited legitimacy among the general public.

Thus, in spite of the renaissance in civil society's peace activities, its capacity to forge a peace constituency across the divide has been restricted by its limited legitimacy among the general public.

A review conducted at the end of the BDP programme concluded that, despite successes in creating bi-communal contact among CSOs and fostering an active civil society, certain gaps remained. The main recommendation was to move from myriads of ad hoc CSO peacebuilding activities to focus more on building the capacity of key organisations to have an impact on the peace process, as well as focusing more on advocacy. The same review mentioned that the large amounts of funds provided by the international community to CSOs in that period may have actually been premature, given the negative political environment and the limited absorptive capacity of NGOs at the time (Blue et al. 2004).

In the opinion of these authors, the limited impact of civil society on the peace process in that period was also due to two major deficits inherent to the civil society movement: the inability of civil society to forge a publicly owned, credible vision of a united Cyprus and a failure to maximise the opportunities available to challenge the island's political elites to expand the space for peacemaking. Ultimately the civil society peace movement lacked the constituency base to effectively challenge the dominant socio-political narrative of division.

The post-referendum period (2004–2008)

The failure of the Annan Plan forced a period of introspection by advocates and supporters of a Cyprus settlement, and civil society organisations started to address the issues that many began to understand as being integral to that failure. Thus while some organisations began to work to create a more favourable enabling legal environment for civil society, others concentrated on building organisational capacity, and a number of influential academics started to publicly challenge the elitist paradigm for negotiating a settlement (e.g. Lordos 2009, 163–179; Kaymak et al. 2008; etc.). In spite of a number of major successes, civil society organisations' peacebuilding work continued to be treated with a degree of ambivalence by the public at large (UNDP 2012a). Herein lay civil society's biggest challenge — to gain legitimacy from and to be representative of the wider Cypriot public.

The immediate period after the failure of the Annan Plan referendum was a difficult one for Greek Cypriot civil society organisations. Amid an already fractious media environment, Greek Cypriot civil society organisations were accused of being willing accomplices of international organisations in bankrolling the ‘yes’ campaign. Things came to a head in October 2006, when the Parliamentary Committee on Institutions and Values requested testimony from non-governmental organisations that had received funds to implement bi-communal projects under the BDP (Drousiotis 2006). In this prevailing atmosphere the ferocity of the public attacks against the civil society peacebuilding movement was such that the UN Special Representative to the Secretary General, Michael Møller, felt obliged to respond, stating that ‘It concerns us because it may undermine the commitment and willingness of Cypriots from both communities to strengthen relationships and bi-communal cooperation in Cyprus’ (Møller 2006).

Over time the antagonism targeted at peacebuilding CSOs subsided, and the post-referendum period did see an improvement in the general enabling environment for civil society. According to the 2005 CIVICUS report ‘the constitutional and legal safeguards, the institutions, mechanisms, fora as well as the socio-economic conditions that would constitute an “enabling” environment for civil society are in place’ although these mechanisms are not always enforced (CIVICUS 2005, 56). Similarly, in the Turkish Cypriot Community, ‘the external conditions for civil society are not as detrimental as is often assumed’ (CIVICUS 2005, 146–147). By 2008, the overall political environment had also shifted, with the restart of negotiations between the Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat and Greek Cypriot leader Demetris Christofias (UN Security Council 2008). By this time UNDP, USAID and the EU had already launched a new set of civil-society-strengthening and peacebuilding programmes. The challenge would be how Cypriot civil society would take advantage of these new opportunities.

Moving Forward: From Capacity-Building to Constituency-Building

The historical analysis above demonstrates how far Cypriot civil society has travelled in terms of its potential to influence the peacebuilding debate; yet, to date, transforming the conflict remains out of reach.

Through this journey it is possible to identify the maturing of capabilities assumed by CSO ‘rights holders’ and the deficits that restrict greater policy impact on decision-making in the peace process.

Through this journey it is possible to identify the maturing of capabilities assumed by CSO ‘rights holders’ and the deficits that restrict greater policy impact on decision-making in the peace process. These capabilities and deficits can be seen through three distinct but interrelated dimensions: the enabling environment, which allows civil society to engage meaningfully in the public sphere; the capacity of civil society to influence policymaking on the Cyprus problem; and the movement's legitimacy among the wider public to earn a seat at the peacemaking table.

The last five years have been a period of significant progress in terms of an enabling legal and financial environment for civil society. Today there are, with some important caveats, fewer legal restrictions to Greek Cypriot civil society organisations pursuing peace and reconciliation objectives (CIVICUS 63, 97). However, ‘the barriers for common interest NGOs to work “across the line” are high: there are no formal registration possibilities for bi-communal networks; financial transactions in the TCC are complex, transport to meetings is cumbersome — and in addition there are the psychological and historical issues that each individual has to overcome’ (Lönnqvist 2008, 9). Meanwhile, the legal environment for CSOs, even in the Greek Cypriot Community, remains complex, bureaucratic and opaque, with serious gaps (Gillespie et al. 2011: 7; Vasilara & Piaton 2007, 116). Civil society in both communities is still not entirely independent from the authorities (Gillespie et al. 2011, 7; Çuhadar & Kotelis 2010; Kanol 2010, 38), a situation exacerbated by recent attempts in the Turkish Cypriot community to extend control over CSOs (Gillespie et al. 2011, 7; Kanol 2010, 38). In addition, ‘the prevailing political culture and attitudes to civil society in Cyprus are not conducive to providing platforms for civil society (or citizens in general) in the wider political or policy development process — including the peace process’ (Gillespie et al. 2011, 17).

The financial opportunities for developing a civil society peacebuilding movement were, until recently, relatively favourable. This included EU funding for civil society, totalling just under €5 million since 2007, which was mainly focused on the Turkish Cypriot community (European Commission, 2012) and the extension of USAID/UNDP support for peacebuilding efforts (US$60 million from between 2005 and 2013). For a small island of under 1 million inhabitants with a gross national income per capita of just under US$25,000 (UNDP 2013, 144), such sector-specific donor assistance is unique. However, most peacebuilding activities continue to depend on external funding, while local-based sources, including from corporate social responsibility, have been limited (UNDP 2008, 22, 27, 40–42; Vasilara & Piaton 2007, 112; CIVICUS 2005, 75). This is due to become a serious problem in the post-2013 period, because international donor funding for inter-communal civil society efforts is set to dwindle. For example, as of September 2013 the main source of financial support for an inter-communal civil society peace movement, UNDP-ACT (Action for Cooperation and Trust), will come to an end. Meanwhile, EU support to the Turkish Cypriot Community is currently geared more towards social and economic development than the creation of an island-wide peace movement (European Commission 2012).

This poses a critical question: how will the emerging civil society peacebuilding movement navigate the new realities of decreased funding yet improved enabling environment? A first step is to join forces. Between 2008 and 2012, organisational strengthening and networking efforts (many of them supported by UNDP/USAID's peacebuilding initiative, UNDP-ACT and the EU's Civil Society in Action programme) helped define a core network of well-structured civil society organisations that possessed the institutional knowledge and capacity to lead the sector into a new, higher-impact phase of their peacebuilding work. By the end of 2009, over 350 NGOs had been involved in the UNDP-ACT programme, over 70,000 people had participated in over 600 events and activities and 120 projects had been implemented. The whole period was one of consolidation as CSOs coalesced into more coherent movements, evidenced by the emergence of several inter-communal CSO networks: Cyprus Environmental Stakeholder Forum (CESF5) in 2007, The Cyprus Island Wide NGO Development Platform (CYINDEP)6 in 2009 and the Peace It Together7 network of peacebuilding organisations in 2012.

However, joining forces is not enough: despite the resumption of formal peace talks since 2008, and despite increased consolidation, greater organisational capacity and the opening of more crossing points, the impact of civil society at the Track 1 level has remained imperceptible to this day. Despite some inroads (some of the members of the CESF now sit on the Environment Technical Committee, while the Cyprus Community Media Centre (CCMC) has had an influence on upcoming community media legislation in both communities), there seems to still be little impact in influencing public policy. Similarly, public polling shows that 65% of Greek Cypriots still believe that organized citizens' groups have a limited or no impact at all at the policy level, while in the Turkish Cypriot community only 48% believe that organised citizen's groups have some impact. More importantly, the number of people believing that these civil society groups have no impact at all has increased since 2011, possibly because of the stalling of the formal peace talks (UNDP 2012a).

The problem of impact is related to the challenges surrounding the perceived legitimacy and representativeness of the civil society peacebuilding movement and its leaders. According to the 2011 CIVICUS report, ‘the attitudes of civil society and external stakeholders towards bi-communal activities and the reconciliation process deviate significantly from that of society at large in both communities’. For example, ‘while the public's participation in bi-communal activities has dropped, the depth of involvement of CSOs which undertake such activities increased substantially’ (CIVICUS 2011, 17). This is confirmed by a recent UNDP-commissioned evaluation of peacebuilding civil society programming, which concluded that such organisations still have a weak constituency base. In other words, the civil society peacebuilding movement suffers from a similar deficit in legitimacy surrounding its democratic credentials and ability to represent the public as does the formal peace process.

In other words, the civil society peacebuilding movement suffers from a similar deficit in legitimacy surrounding its democratic credentials and ability to represent the public as does the formal peace process.

One reason may be that peacebuilding projects implemented by CSOs are still often perceived by certain segments of the population as limited to English-speaking elites (Kanol 2010, 40) while 46% of Greek Cypriots and 34% of Turkish Cypriots believe that citizens' groups promote the interests of foreign institutions/powers rather than the communities' interests (UNDP 2012a).

Nevertheless, there is growing support for the idea of citizen-led reconciliation efforts. Compared with 2011, there is a considerable change in the views of Turkish Cypriots in particular, with support for such citizens' movements increasing from 35% to 50%. For Greek Cypriots, there was a slight increase from 54% to 59% (UNDP 2012a). The evidence demonstrates that the Cypriot public wishes to see and would be inclined to participate in peace and reconciliation efforts that they deemed relevant to their lives and where the leaders of those efforts were representative of the broader society. Thus, a poll finding from Cyprus 2015 (see Figure 3) shows that 80% of Greek Cypriots and 78% of Turkish Cypriots believe that civil society organisations should become representative of the wider public as a prerequisite to playing a meaningful role in the peace process (Cyprus 2015 2012b). The convergence of citizens' views across the divide on the issue of the role for civil society also makes a convincing case for an island-wide approach to the issue of a more inclusive process, despite the continued fragmentation of civil society across the divide.

Figure 3 Responses to the Statement, ‘Civil Society Organizations to become more representative of the wider public, and then be empowered to have a meaningful role in the peace process’.9 Source: Cyprus 2015 2012b.

There is therefore a mandate for a civil society peace movement, but only if that movement is inclusive and owned by citizens, rather than a small elite: ‘peacebuilding also requires the involvement of more people, especially hard-to-reach people’ (Gillespie et al. 2011, 4).

Conclusion

Over the years almost every known form of conflict resolution has been attempted in Cyprus: arbitration, mediation, peacekeeping, proximity talks, shuttle diplomacy, face-to-face talks by the leadership, convening of Technical Committees and Working Groups. One exception is the participatory approach, which could provide a voice to citizens and civil society at large, and thereby enable ownership by the wider public of the ongoing process for a political settlement married to the process of societal reconciliation.

Though all parties involved agree that the peace process should be ‘Cypriot-owned and Cypriot-led’, a scenario where a wider cross-section of society can be part of the peacemaking project still needs to be designed and adopted.

Though all parties involved agree that the peace process should be ‘Cypriot-owned and Cypriot-led’, a scenario where a wider cross-section of society can be part of the peacemaking project still needs to be designed and adopted. ‘Societal ownership seems to be the only possible basis for long term political stability, both in seeking a settlement but also in the post solution era. Without such ownership, which can only come about through the effective engagement of society at large in a transparent peace process, blame games, information distortion and spoiling through maximal positions will predominate’ (Cyprus 2015 2012a).

However, if the emerging civil-society-led peacebuilding movement is to be the champion of a more inclusive approach to peacemaking, it must illustrates its own credentials in this area and be perceived as legitimate in the eyes of both the leadership and the Cypriot public. Of the three elements required for this to happen, the capacity-building of the movement is well on course to being achieved, while the enabling environment has progressed, despite civil society empowerment still being low on the political agenda. Indeed, according to a recent poll ahead of the February 2013 elections in the Republic of Cyprus, it became clear that people's vote would be influenced mainly by the economic crisis (Pantelides 2013a), confirming that the Cyprus problem is now relegated to second place in people's minds (UNDP 2012a). The emerging civil society peacebuilding movement is thus facing a major challenge. In 2013 a window of opportunity is closing in terms of donor funding, as discussed earlier, while people are losing interest in the Cyprus problem. New windows of opportunity may be opening, such as the improved enabling environment, some candidates for the 2013 elections promising ‘increased citizen participation in legislating’ (Pantelides 2013b). However, the challenge for civil society organisations is the following: the legitimacy of the CSO-driven peace movement in the eyes of the grassroots remains elusive, and without it Cypriot civil society will be unable to face future challenges, nor will it be able to grasp opportunities as they emerge. Positively, however, civil society leaders acknowledge the need ‘to engage the wider society in peacebuilding processes’ (Kanol 2010, 43) while finding ways to link their efforts to the Track 1 process (Gillespie et al. 2011, 4). Failure to navigate this route will mean civil society's influence on the peace process will remain minimal.

Notes

¹ http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm

² http://unhcr-cyprus.blogspot.com/2008/10/history-of-unhcr-representation-in.html

³ The comprehensive list of activities funded by this programme can be found at http://mirror.undp.org/cyprus/projects/search.asp

⁴ It joined on 1 May 2004, a few days after the rejection by Greek Cypriots of the Annan Plan in the 24 April referendum.

⁵ www.cyef.net

⁶ http://www.cyindep.eu/

⁷ http://peace-it-together.net/