The world more than ever before is aware of the role of peace as sine qua non for national and global development as well as for achieving a better quality of life for citizens. This is a crucial condition for sustained peace and peacebuilding. The Millennium Declaration and the subsequent adoption of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by world leaders was probably the single most important universal agreement and commitment to a better life for all in the whole history of humankind. The most significant aspect of this declaration was the commitment, first, to a set of goals and associated measurable indicators that aimed to address the most critical aspects of ensuring decent and dignified human life and, second, to achieve these goals within a predetermined time, by 2015. Thus the content of the goals was defined and the time within which they had to be achieved was set. The eight MDGs and their 48 indicators involve heroic and major presumptions necessary to their achievement. These heroic assumptions are not explicit but are rather implied. First, the goals assume conditions of peace exist and, second, regarding indicators, the assumption is that these goals can be measured because conditions for and instruments of measurement do exist.
The world at the beginning of 2013, a mere two-and-a-half years from 2015, is aware that progress towards measurement has been made, particularly in developing countries, where measurement has been at the best of times a most challenging endeavour. The world is also aware that the MDGs were critical catalysts for improving both public awareness of, and interest in, measurement, thereby improving the practice of measurement itself.
However, the goals remain far from being achieved as (i) youth unemployment increases, (ii) inequities in countries yawn wider, (iii) migration and urbanisation intensify, (iv) fuel and food prices increase, thereby threatening food security, (v) finances to fund development have remained elusive during the post-2008 financial crisis and economic recession period and (vi) the lingering spectre of political fragility and deepening political crisis in some parts of the world and in particular the g7+ countries remains — which is the subject of this contribution.
In all this, it is also recognised that, despite the difficult economic conditions, in recent times there have been fewer conflicts than in previous decades. This can be attributed to deepening détente and multilateralism even in an increasingly unipolar world. Despite a declining amount of open warfare in the world, a more worrisome trend, becoming increasingly prominent in the 21st century, is that of is deepening inequality, conflict and fragility.
The question we can pose is: had the world not adopted the MDGs 13 years ago, what kind of world would we have today? The question, however, leaves us with an Occam's Razor dilemma, since it is impossible to wind the clock back in order to experience a world without MDGs now that we have lived for 13 or so years in a world where MDGs have been progressively implemented and measured. So it might be proper to conclude that the world without MDGs would have been one with worse outcomes. In fact in the world today there are theatres that have acted out war, and from these we have acquired lessons and knowledge about the courses and consequences of war. There are also places in the world where we have seen peace, and there too we have knowledge and lessons on the consequences of peace. A close look at the places referred to hitherto reveals them to be countries that are defined as fragile, in conflict, or emerging out of conflict. Open war, militarisation and the existence of private armies and bandits ensnarl these countries in endemic conflict and thereby militate against any prospect of development.
Thus as the world progressed towards meeting the MDGs, it is perhaps this trend — of being in, or emerging out of conflict — that gave rise to new questions when cracks and challenges became apparent and a new community of practice recognised the difficulties of achieving the MDGs in countries ravaged by conflict. The g7+— a self-identified group of conflict-affected and fragile states — established the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (ID) to address the special needs of their countries. Through its programme of work, the ID has brought international partners together with the g7+, creating a space for (i) g7+ countries to share experiences and establish a common understanding on the causes and consequences of their fragility, (ii) g7+ countries to establish tools and instruments for their journey out of conflict, (iii) the world's attention to focus on the conditions under which citizens of fragile states live and (iv) the provision of a platform for a common programme of work and resource mobilisation to support the journey of conflict-ravaged countries towards peacebuilding and statebuilding.
For a concerted course of action to get underway and successfully reverse political fragility, a set of common goals for peacebuilding and statebuilding (PSGs) were developed to guide the journey under what is now commonly known as the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States. This was endorsed at the Busan High Level Forum in December 2011. The PSGs are identified as (i) legitimate politics, (ii) people's security, (iii) people's justice, (iv) economic foundations and (v) revenues and fair services. Presently, an ID working group on indicators, mandated by the New Deal, is developing a set of common indicators to support the measuring of progress against these PSGs.
The purpose of this short paper is to explore the prospect of measurement of peacebuilding and statebuilding in countries that are in conflict or emerging out of conflict — in an effort to engage the very issues and debates that inform the work of these countries. It considers the reasons for measurement under those conditions, and more importantly the paper argues that measurement not only counts but should be seen to count. If measurement counts then at what point does it really count in situations of conflict?
The paper posits that measurement is important at all times and in fact measurement is a critical risk management tool. Therefore a measurement culture that is embraced and used appropriately can signal in more profound ways the imminence of conflict and war. Interpreted and acted upon in time, measurement can lead to the aversion and mitigation of risks of open conflict. To date, measurement has been used largely to understand the past rather than to provide a crystal ball through which the future can be foretold and seen unfolding. Measurement, especially in the field of official statistics, is like driving forwards with one's eyes set only on the rear mirror as though to observe what is happening behind.
Historical data are useful and facilitate understanding, and when they are prudently and optimally used and applied scientifically they can significantly influence future outcomes. When measurement is used in this way as a risk prediction and mitigation tool, it can help societies to avert undesirable encounters as well as undesirable outcomes. However, that being the case, there is a real world out there and that world happens to be one where conflict and fragility dictate the pace of development outcomes. For instance, nowhere are outcomes as severely counterproductive and generationally reinforcing as in situations of war and mutiny. The first victims of war are children who lose parents, children who fail to be socialised and educated through schooling, children who enlist in war and reproduce through themselves a culture of war and therefore perpetuate the absence of peace. The second victims of war are women who are prevented by war from tending and raising their children, mothers who cannot engage in chores that bring about productive and fulfilling lives. In all situations of conflict the overwhelming majority of those engaged in the physical conflict are men. They become immediate and direct victims of war as they ply their trade in this arena and display their bravery in often unnecessary combat.
What then should be the properties of indicators of peacebuilding? I would argue that (i) they should be a diagnostic platform that presents the nature, form, cause and consequence of conflict, (ii) they should enable those in conflict to understand what steps can be taken to journey out of conflict and (iii) it is in understanding morbidity and what has killed the dead that the living can be saved. In similar ways, those who are living in peace can learn from those living in conflict in order to protect their peace. Ideally the indicators of peacebuilding should, in the first instance, ensure that information gathered about conditions of conflict and war is available, because it could explain, first, the form and content and, second, the cause and effect of fragility and conflict. This could be the key to bringing about a common understanding that would enable the navigation and negotiation of peacebuilding. In the second instance, the indicator dashboard could also be used as an early warning system by those who are living in peace. In this case the dashboard may serve as a deterrant to conflict and war. For example, some of the suggested indicators of peace are forward-looking and could potentially work as deterrents. The goal of legitimate politics has as one of its indicators the participation of citizens in the electoral process. This could provide the basis for confidence in free choice. The absence of participation foretells the emergence of instability.
These PSGs in addition have a number of indicators that embed the potential for refocusing actions and actors upon outcomes that correspond to the notions of sustainable development, inclusive growth, peaceful coexistence, and gender-sensitive measurement, emanating from excesses of conflict and war. Fragility and/or conflict generally create these social and economic conditions. For instance, under the goal of economic foundations, the indicator on natural resource management implies taking account of sustainability. It is also encouraging to note that the indicators suggested also form a raft of knowledge bases in countries whose statistical and data collection systems are moderately endowed. Africa has adopted a Strategy for the Harmonisation of Statistics in Africa (SHaSA), and amongst its key priorities is the focus on measurement of Governance, Peace and Security (GPS). Some countries have started piloting these indicators. Perhaps the lingering scepticism as regards the general feasibility of compilation of these indicators in conflict situations can be discarded. The fact that they are already part of the national system of knowledge bases is a major breakthrough. More importantly, the ID process of developing indicators has conceivably supported an increase in the exposure of country data and information systems and is thereby potentially sharpening and enriching the extent to which country data and information systems are known, understood and used.
How these data can be collected under conditions of anxiety, strife and war is yet to be explored and methodologies for doing so have yet to be established. There are instances where reporting has been successful under conditions that are fragile. Accurate reporting has largely been on refugee counts including accounting for internally displaced people. The quality of the information, however, may be doubtful at times because of moral hazards created by conflicts of interest. That notwithstanding, the data and collection methods are well established for these kinds of data systems.
Conflicts almost invariably seem to be created by strife over resources. Oil has become synonymous with conflict. On the African continent in particular, countries that have been considered oil rich have experienced unabating conflict. Countries such as Angola, Sudan and South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) have been embroiled in conflicts among whose causes oil appears to be one of the most important. Nigeria has experienced continuing conflict over oil resources. The uprising in Libya and intervention by European forces is associated by a number of African scholars with the interest that the French and British have in Libya's oil. Africa appears to suffer from a resource curse, although good practices that buck this trend are observable in economies as small as Botswana. The question is what enables Botswana to succeed.
Having explored some of the possibilities that generate hostilities, the parties involved and the victims generated by conflict, it is then possible to classify and map out a value chain of indicators of war or peacebuilding. It appears that peacebuilding indicators should in large part concern (i) the natural resources and endowments countries possess, (ii) the ownership and shareholder models that are in place for such resources, (iii) those who work and extract the resources, (iv) the beneficiaries, contesting parties, victims of war and the perpetrators of war, (v) the extent to which citizens exercise freedom of choice of political leadership and (vi) the extent of the rule of law and democratic practices. All these indicators can (i) assist in advancing the agenda for universal achievement of MDGs, and in particular for g7+ countries, (ii) shape the post-2015 MDG agenda and (iii), more importantly because of the goals' clear articulation with regard to natural capital, play a crystal clear role in the Rio+20 agenda.
‘Prevention is better than cure’ is a well-known maxim with which all agree, but often very little is done about prevention, and preference is given to the cure and emergency interventions. Peacebuilding indicators have to strive to function like early warning systems that should act as evidence, thus suggesting to policy what necessary intervention will assist communities to resolve conflict amicably and thereby avoid open war.
The global system of measurement is managed through the United Nations Statistics Commission (UNSC). This body has to be alive to the g7+ and their quest for development and their plight of developing frameworks for measurement under abnormal circumstances. An ally of the UNSC is Partners for Statistical Development in the 21st Century (PARIS21). This structure PARIS21 at one stage was charged to deal with indicators of governance. It is important to resuscitate such programmes and lodge them with PARIS21 which in turn could facilitate and escalate the notion of measurement in these important areas of need, such as countries that are fragile, in conflict or emerging out of conflict. The measurement practice arising out of such a body could raise knowledge and nurture a community of practice that could lead and manage indicators of peacebuilding. We have scored successes in other areas of measurement using PARIS21 as a catalyst for such actions.
The countries that are in conflict, fragile or emerging out of conflict are the theatre that the world is watching. However, like all things in the world, conflict and war are not necessarily issues unique to the countries that are currently being torn apart by them. History is replete with examples where conflict has visited the best of families in the community of nations. Thus it is important to know and understand the causes of war in order to mitigate potential for war. Failure on the part of the world to pay attention to conflict and indicators of this phenomenon would also mean failure in its most critical challenge in the 21st century: the mission for a better world and a better life for all. Rio+20 discusses sustainable development and sustainable development is about a peaceful world. The world therefore owes it to itself to ensure that it is understood that the existence of war anywhere in the world implies existence of war throughout the world. Therefore the management and implementation of peacebuilding indicators is a matter for the world and has to be observed and measured. Therefore peace counts, particularly in achieving sustainable development in the future, and discussions are afoot regarding possible post-2015 MDGs, and what the Rio + 20 agenda will look like. Peacebuilding should be part of such an agenda. The g7+ will be better positioned to make the case for peacebuilding indicators as part of an arsenal of statistical tools for measuring peace and peacebuilding. These indicators should be forward-looking and aim to manage and mitigate the risk of conflict rather than being indicators that define the state of being in conflict. The job is about resolving and preventing conflicts that could seize the world rather than about getting out of war. The Rio+20 agenda should more specifically and explicitly take into account fragile states, as they are in large part the theatre of what represents and defines anti-development, and thus should, unlike the MDGs, not assume the existence of a measurement capacity and a peaceful world. Rather the agenda should be about a world that has whole areas that are troubled and whole areas where the science of measurement may still be woefully deficient. If you would like to know where they are, it is in the countries that are fragile, in conflict or emerging out of conflict. A special case has to be made for these. What gets measured gets done.