The GPH-MILF Peace Process in the Philippines to Prevent and Transform Violent Extremism in Mindanao

Keywords:

• Philippines
• Mindanao
• peace process
• peacebuilding
• violent extremism

Introduction

The Philippine archipelagos of Mindanao, Sulu, Basilan and Tawi-Tawi have been prey to a variety of types of violence, including insurrections, inter-communal violence and, recently, violent extremism Violent extremism refers to the use, or the justification of the use of violence to ‘further social, economic and political objectives’ (USAID 2011, 2) In 2015, a faction of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), as well as leaders of the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), the major extremist actors of the region, pledged allegiance to the Islamic State (IS) On Christmas Eve, the same year, the BIFF launched eight simultaneous attacks, leaving 16 dead, and displacing up to 6,000 people In June 2016, the ASG beheaded a Canadian hostage Two months later, a bombing attack killed 14 and wounded more than 60 in Davao city It was later claimed by the self-proclaimed ‘Islamic State in Lanao’, also known as Maute group A constellation of smaller groups, such as the Black Flag Movement of the Philippines, has also declared affiliation to IS.

The development of violent extremism poses a serious security threat to the Philippines, in particular the people of Mindanao. It furthermore impinges on the ongoing regional peace process between the government of the Philippines (GPH) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), as it delays the stabilisation of the island.

The GPH-MILF peace process aims to resolve a four-decade-long armed conflict, between the Moros — the usual denomination of the Muslim inhabitants of Mindanao — and the military. It began in 1996, and reached a milestone with the signature, in 2014, of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB). The agreement foresees the creation, by the Philippine Congress, of a truly autonomous, democratic, and Islamic ‘Bangsamoro’ (Land of the Moros). It is complemented by several annexes, which organise the ‘formal’ peacebuilding phase of the peace process (referred to in this briefing as the normalisation process, based on the terminology used by the negotiating parties), which constitutes the decommissioning and rehabilitation of MILF combatants, socio-economic development programmes and a transitional justice process.¹

Supporters of the peace process on the other hand argue that furthering the process can help prevent and transform violent extremism in Mindanao. The Presidential Peace Adviser affirms that efforts to ‘bring sustainable peace will help curb religious extremism’ (Romero 2016). Miriam Coronel-Ferrer, former chairwoman of the governmental peace panel, insists that ‘the peace process … serves as a counter to violent movements’ (Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process [OPAPP] 2016). A Moro youth leader similarly assured the author in an email exchange that ‘the peace process can address violent extremism in Mindanao because it will give the Bangsamoro people an opportunity to govern themselves’, through the establishment of the Bangsamoro, thus minimising incentives to use violence to establish an Islamic region.

Exploring the Philippine case, this briefing examines whether peacebuilding efforts can indeed help prevent and transform violent extremism. It finds out that the GPH-MILF peace process (and specifically the normalisation process) has not produced tangible results regarding the factors of violent extremism in Mindanao. It however argues that the government, the MILF and the people of Mindanao would benefit from the extension of the decommissioning process to include violent extremist groups, which can be achieved either by a new annex to the peace agreement, or by the signature of presidential executive orders, and presidential amnesties.

The Push and Pull Factors of Violent Extremism in Mindanao

Violent extremism is said to result from processes ‘by which people come to adopt beliefs that not only justify violence but compel it’ and, later, ‘progress — or not — from thinking to action’ (Borum 2011, 4). The process of evolving into violent extremism is triggered by ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors. Push factors, which are ‘socioeconomic, political, and cultural in nature’ contribute to creating the ‘conditions that favour the rise or spread in appeal of violent extremism’ (USAID 2011, 3). Pull factors, on the other hand, are ‘necessary for push factors to have a direct influence on individual level radicalization and recruitment’. They can be in the form of ‘personal [social and psychological] rewards’, ‘social networks’, ‘the presence of radical institutions or venues’, ‘service provision by extremist groups’ and ‘extremist involvement in illegal economic activity’ (USAID 2011, 4).

The historical background of the Moro conflict — socio-economic marginalisation, ethno-religious discrimination, lack of political representation — clearly establishes conditions conducive to the rise of violent extremism, which are in turn activated by at least three pull factors.

First, Moros — and more broadly Mindanaoans — join violent extremist groups because of financial incentives. The monthly salary paid by the ASG to its members is indeed an incentive for the numerous youth and poor people of Mindanao. Some may even have no other alternative for survival than joining the ASG. Financial incentives also play a role in actual violence. This is illustrated by the prevalence of ransom-kidnapping among ASG’s activities.

A second pull factor is family or clan ties. Family is the first circle of allegiance in Mindanao, and many individuals are related by either blood or marriage. It is thus common to see a person providing support to a violent extremist group, because s/he counts relatives among its members. The BIFF for instance capitalised on the family ties factor during the 2015 Christmas Eve attacks, which involved 200 to 300 fighters, among whom only 100 were core BIFF members. On the other hand, an extremist group will be enticed to use violence to support family members. Franco (2014, 2) observes that the BIFF’s attacks correspond more to a ‘pattern of parochial disputes’ than to a premeditated agenda.

The third pull factor is recruitment by extremist preachers, as indicated by a Moro youth leader. This information is corroborated by the deportation in 2014 of two foreign preachers and the killing in 2015 and 2016 of extremists coming from Morocco and Malaysia. The literature however does not specify whether local figures were involved.

Assessing the Influence of the Peace Process on the Pull Factors of Violent Extremism in Mindanao

Notwithstanding the significant role of push factors in the process leading toward violent extremism, pull factors are key in the passage from thinking to action. This briefing consequently focuses on such pull factors, namely financial incentives, family ties, and recruitment, to assess the impact of the peace process on violent extremism in Mindanao.

Financial incentives

Some of the measures implemented under the CAB provide direct assistance to poverty-stricken and conflict-affected communities. Notably, the ‘Bangsamoro ADVANCE’ programme, and the ‘Farmers’ Advance’ programme permitted the realisation of livelihood, infrastructure and Alternative Learning System projects, including the provision of agricultural equipment and materials, as well as capacity-building workshops. The Sajahatra programme, a government initiative preceding the conclusion of the CAB, also supervised the provision of healthcare support, study grants and vocational training, as well as cash-for-work, supplemental feeding for children and the construction of health and agricultural infrastructure. The normalisation process otherwise entails the provision of a ‘rehabilitation package’ to decommissioned combatants, which already benefits the 145 MILF fighters who agreed to decommission. These measures concretely address the financial incentives of violent extremism, because they offer either immediate cash assistance, or opportunities to earn a salary. Their implementation nonetheless remains incomplete, thus limiting their potential impact on violent extremism.

The Third-Party Monitoring Team reports that, as of January 2016, the Sajahatra programme has only utilised 59% of its total budget, and the support for the 145 decommissioned combatants has been delayed. The decommission procedure has also been stalled since June 2015, due to the postponement of the creation of the Bangsamoro, which is an explicit condition to the pursuit of the normalisation process. Moreover, these projects focus on MILF communities, and de facto exclude a significant part of the population of Mindanao. This observation underlines that countering violent extremism through socio-economic empowerment cannot be exclusively supported by the peace process, which depends on political considerations and might not be fully inclusive.

Family ties

Incentives based on family ties are countered when family members do not feel compelled to support an extremist relative anymore. This happens in two cases: the violent extremist has either been killed or captured, or s/he is no longer part of an extremist group. The first ‘solution’, though currently implemented by the military, goes against the provisions of the peace agreement, which envisions the redeployment of the armed forces. It has also proven to be relatively ineffective, in addition to being morally reprehensible and contrary to the law.² The arrest and prosecution of violent extremists does not seem feasible either, given the capacities of the Philippine police force and of the judiciary. The agreement foresees the creation of a future Bangsamoro police, as well as local courts, which could supplement their national counterparts in the future. They do not yet exist however.

Recruitment

The current state of the peace process also does not address violent extremist preaching: the future Bangsamoro government will have power over (Islamic) education, and could become a vehicle for counter-narratives, but it does not exist yet.

The implementation of the peace agreement does not yet satisfactorily address the pull factors of violent extremism. However, the imminent nature of the threat posed by violent extremism does not allow for any delay. Should the military pursue its operations, despite its obvious opposition to the normalisation process? This briefing argues that the normalisation process, and specifically the decommissioning component, provides a working basis of an effective alternative solution to transform violent extremism.

Decommissioning Violent Extremists through the Structures of the Peace Process

With regard to the importance of family ties as a pull factor of violent extremism in Mindanao, drawing violent extremists away from their illegal activities should be made a priority of transforming violent extremism policies. Since killing, arresting or prosecuting them are not satisfactory options, a third way, although controversial, would be to encourage the return of violent extremists to a normal life. This could be achieved through a decommission and rehabilitation process, based on an extension of the procedure originally intended for MILF combatants.

The peace agreement foresees the decommissioning of MILF combatants, in exchange for a rehabilitation package and a de facto immunity from prosecution, which should later transform into an amnesty. The procedure, launched in June 2015, is supervised by the Independent Decommissioning Body (IDB), whose creation is provided for by the Annex on Normalisation. It is gradual and contingent on the creation of the Bangsamoro.

This briefing argues that the government, the MILF and the people of Mindanao would benefit from the extension of this procedure to include violent extremist groups, which can be achieved either by a new annex to the peace agreement, or by the signature of presidential executive orders, and presidential amnesties. The IDB-led procedure is indeed the ideal working basis for the decommissioning of violent extremists. First, and above all, the framework already exists, which means that the structures and staff, as well as good practices, can be extended to encompass violent extremists, instead of creating an entirely different mechanism. Second, this framework creates a temporal and geographical space where violence is dealt with through extraordinary, non-legal means. This brings consequences at the psychological, socio-economic and legal levels that will facilitate the decommissioning and rehabilitation of violent extremists.

At the psychological level, the decommission process is facilitated by the absence of the threat of prosecution and, also, because it does not equate to a surrender, since the weapons are turned over to an independent body. MILF executives acknowledged that this latter aspect played a significant role in the decision of the 145 combatants who agreed to be decommissioned. At the socio-economic level, the rehabilitation package allocated to decommissioned violent extremists will help them return to a normal life and support their families, thus lowering financial incentives to take up violent extremism and the risk of recidivism. It should also be noted that the reintegration of former violent extremists into their communities, as opposed to incarcerating them, minimises the chance of in-prison radicalisation and recruitment. Finally, linking the decommissioning of violent extremists with the ongoing post-conflict transitional period, in which legal procedures are loosened, makes the non-prosecution of violent extremists both legally and socially more acceptable.

This proposition of course faces practical and political issues. The IDB staff will encounter difficulties assessing whether someone is a member of a violent extremist group, or claiming to be so in order to obtain the rehabilitation package. The amnesty also raises a series of questions: should it be granted to all violent extremists or only to those who have committed minor violent offences? And who would be judging the gravity of the offences? Finally, extending the decommission process to violent extremists will certainly encounter resistance from both the government and the MILF, since any change would also mean altering the fragile equilibrium achieved through an 18-year-long negotiating process. The MILF will be particularly hesitant to open the process to individuals it considers to be ‘breakaway’ elements, or not representative of the Moro cause.

Nevertheless, the peace process may not be sustainable if violent extremists are not included. The government should therefore consider this solution, if it wants to ensure the security of the Philippines and the success of the peace process, and should encourage the MILF to do the same. The latter would, for its part, benefit from the stabilisation of the region, and gain in popularity from its successful collaboration in the management of the violent extremist threat.

Conclusion

This briefing brings some nuance to assumptions of peace stakeholders that progress in the peace process will address violent extremism. It demonstrates that the measures implemented until now do not plainly address the pull factors of violent extremism. It however argues that the decommissioning procedure of MILF combatants can become an effective tool to counter violent extremism, if extended to members of violent extremist groups.

The briefing does not explore the influence of the peace process on the push factors of violent extremism, mainly due to time and resource constraints. A systematic, long-term evaluation of the impact of the peace process on the evolution of violent extremism in the region should consequently be considered by future research.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Juliette Loesch

JULIETTE LOESCH is a specialist in security issues in transitional settings. She studies Crisis and Security Management at the Leiden University. She holds a MA in Political Science from Sciences-Po Aix, and a LLM in Public Law from Aix-Marseille University (France). She has worked for several peace organisations in the Philippines.

Notes

1 This process was backed by numerous initiatives of civil society and the international community. Owing to space constraints, their actions are however not reviewed in this briefing.

2 The Human Security Act of 2007 foresees the prosecution of violent extremist offenders.