The perceptive imperative: Connoisseurship and the temptation of rubrics

ABSTRACT

We examine the reliance on rubrics for educational evaluation and explore whether such tools fulfill their promise. Following Wittgensteinian critical strategies, we explore what “the application of the [rubric] picture looks like” and then evaluate (a) whether those benefits are attributable to rubric use at all, and (b) whether any of those benefits are unique to rubric use. Rubric advocates claim specifically that rubrics offer both the sheen of objectivity and time-saving benefits involved in streamlining the feedback process. Against these two main claims, we argue that even if rubrics can be used in beneficial ways, they fall short of achieving any robust sense of objectivity, and that engaging in real and difficult judgment from case to case of student work remains inescapably a teacher's time-consuming, yet necessary, responsibility. In instances where rubric use claims come up short, we will suggest an alternative framework, based upon Elliot Eisner's notion of educational connoisseurship and criticism, arguing for the development of perceptive abilities in teachers and students alike.

Contributors

Derek Gottlieb is a postdoctoral research fellow at the University of Basel, Switzerland.

Christy M. Moroye is an Associate Professor in Educational Foundations and Curriculum Studies at the University of Northern Colorado.

Notes

1. We acknowledge that rubrics are also used in other settings and for other educational purposes, such as teacher evaluation. While we believe our argument can be extended to such uses, our present focus is on the classroom environment.

2. We refer heavily to the work of Heidi Andrade as she is one of the preeminent scholars in the area and is heavily cited. According to Google Scholar, Andrade's (2002) article “Using rubrics to promote thinking and learning” has been cited 317 times.

3. “External criteria” include any criteria delivered from on high, without openness to discussion or explanation in classroom use. ACT and state-assessment rubrics are perfect examples of this, as neither an individual teacher nor his/her students can argue in a meaningful way with the rubric's construction. But it need not be so external: an individual classroom teacher could simply construct or borrow a writing rubric, announce that this is the evaluation and instruction tool that the class will be using, and refuse to entertain any challenges to its comprehensiveness or offer pertinent examples.

4. The example is available at http://educationnorthwest.org/sites/default/files/6pt-rubric-3-12.pdf.

5. Though we have used the example of the six-trait writing rubric, which is meant to be applied by human graders, it is crucial to understand that no amount of mechanization or automation or definition would suffice to remove human bias or the possibility of error. This is so in two ways. First, replacing reasonably vague qualifiers, such as “few” with a number (e.g., 3) is itself a subjective intervention, rather than a reflection of natural fact, and from case to case of application, it might be obvious that 3 is or is not the correct definition of “few.” Second, defining what counts as an “error” requires a surprising amount of subjectivity. “Three men was here” is as clear a violation of grammatical rules. But it is not an error if the student is quoting a piece of writing. And if a student were quoting Cormac McCarthy, there wouldn't even be quotation marks to signal to a computer, say, that it was a quotation, though it would be immediately obvious to a human reader. Applying a rubric is just following a series of rules. But it is a major finding of Wittgenstein's (cf., PI §§193–201) that rules require rules for their own application. And these rules can be followed either correctly or incorrectly. So one might specify a rule for applying the rule for applying a rule, but this can also be followed either correctly or incorrectly. It is an infinite regress. There is no level of definition or specificity sufficient to close the gap between the rubric and its application. It is not a failure of current technology, but a logical impossibility. See also (Dreyfus, 1992).

6. Cf., PI §288.

7. Compare this to Cavell's (2013) reading of Emerson's “founding as finding” in This New Yet Unapproachable America: “At each step, or level, explanation comes to an end; there is no level to which all explanations come, at which all end” (p. 116).