A Framework for Active Learning in International Relations: The Case of the Challenge Game

Abstract

This paper focuses on an analysis of an application of active learning in the international relations (IR) classroom. We present an experience of the so-called Challenge Game that allows the professor to explore analytical categories and basic assumptions of realist theory of IR. In addition, describing the operation of the game in its basic modality, several variations are also presented in order to help explore realism, both in its classic and structural version. We show that key concepts found in realist and neorealist theories, such as the elements that influence the behavior of states in the international system, different conceptions of power and interests, aspects of competition, the centrality of the rationality of the state, alliances building, balance of power, the anarchy of the system, and the idea of hegemony can be either introduced or revised in a dynamic fashion in an IR theory class. The game has been thought to provide means to promote active (instead of passive) learning. As a result, the class can become more dynamic, with the consequent increase of the students interest on the issue. Besides, the activity can provide an environment for discussion, boosting students’ potential to think about the content.

Keywords:

• Active learning
• Challenge Game
• realism

Notes

1 We would like to gratefully acknowledge the time and effort devoted by the reviewers to this work. We appreciate the detailed and useful comments which were crucial to improve the quality of this article. Regarding the important comments provided by our reviewers, we acknowledge the relevance of testing the effectiveness of the activity, either concerning participation of students in class, their comprehension (Jensen 1998), and greater retention of content or verifying it through other indicators, especially in terms of assessment (Gibson and Shaw 2010). Nevertheless, our goal with this paper is limited to presenting the operation of the game and some possible links that may be established with realist theory. Surely, as inspiring works such as Krain and Lantis (2006) have shown, establishing the benefits of the activity is of great relevance and is among the goals of our future research.

2 In IR, the term realism emerged in the late 1930s and early 1940s as a critical positioning from political liberals and idealism.

3 It is worth noting that Herz (1950) argues that the social condition—and the human nature (either cooperative or conflictual), as Morgenthau (1950) holds—is imperative for the understanding of international politics. Herz (1950) and Carr (1946) also stand out for developing an ethical and normative approach. Although they both depart from central realist concerns of power and security, these authors argue that the two theories at the extreme points of the spectrum (utopian idealism and pure realism) do not hold. Herz (1950) claims that the facts found by realism must be combined with idealism’s assumptions, to provide a transformative project of reality. Similarly, Carr (1946) argues that the non-incorporation of idealistic elements in the analysis and practice of international politics can lead to an extreme, resulting in the sterilization of thought and in non-action.

4 It should be emphasized that although structural realism rejects human nature or any other attributes of the states as an explanatory variable in IR, it is grounded in the aforementioned basic realist premises.

5 The 1970s are marked by strong criticism of realist theory and particularly its failure to explain the economic dynamics and the role of non-state actors. This is one of the reasons that Waltz (2010) strongly highlighted the need to build a scientifically robust and efficient theory of explanatory point of view and to allow researchers and political leaders predict what is to come.

6 Waltz (2010) argues that theories based on the domestic level have limited scope once they do not consider the level of the structure.

7 For Waltz (2010), a bipolar system is more stable than a multipolar one, since the uncertainties are smaller when there are fewer poles of power and it is easier to monitor only one pole. Mearsheimer (2010), by contrast, argues that deterrence is easier when the number of poles increases, since there are more states that can unite against a possible aggressor, and hostilities between the great powers are reduced because they concentrate less attention on each other than when there are only two poles.

8 The comments from the students report only personal impressions related to the greater interest in the topic and not specifically on the method per se. In our institution, there is no formal Institutional Review Board requirement specifically for this kind of research. Nevertheless, we have followed the research ethics guidelines of our institution, including adequate human subject protections consistent with their institutional standards and in compliance with the APSA Ethical Guidelines.

9 It is important to mention that to develop the game in a regular class, there is no need to have as many professors as we had during the activity. Those professors involved were the ones part of the study group.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Elia Elisa Cia Alves

Elia Elisa Cia Alves is an Adjunct Professor in the Political Science Department of the Federal University of Pernambuco (UFPE). She holds a PhD in Political Science from the same institution and a master’s degree in Economics from the State University of Campinas (Unicamp). She has been teaching International Relations (IR) subjects since 2013 and has as main interest areas International Political Economy subjects and Active Learning. She is a member of the Center for Comparative Policy Studies and IR (NEPI/UFPE) and at the Applied Research Group on Teaching and Active Learning in IR (Ensino LabRI) at the State University of Paraíba (UEPB).

Ana Paula Maielo Silva

Ana Paula Maielo Silva is a Professor in the IR Department at UEPB. She holds a PhD in Political Science from Unicamp and she has currently been conferred an honorary title of Visiting Fellow with Macquarie University, Australia, in the Department of Modern History, Politics, and IR. Silva is the coordinator of the Ensino LabRI at UEPB. She is also the coordinator of the Research Group on Gender and Spirituality, in which Silva conducts research on epistemologies, gender, and religion.

Gabriela Gonçalves Barbosa

Gabriela Gonçalves Barbosa is a PhD candidate (2015–2019) in Political Science and IR in UFPE and holds a master’s degree in IR and graduation in Law, both from UEPB. She has been teaching IR subjects since 2009 and has as main interest areas Energy Politics, Regional Integration, Brazilian Foreign Policy, and Active Learning. She is a member of NEPI/UFPE and at the Ensino LabRI at UEPB.