When i’m right you’re wrong: attitude correctness facilitates anger and approach motivation toward opposing individuals

ABSTRACT

Attitude correctness and attitude clarity define the broader concept, attitude certainty. Repeating one’s attitude to oneself causes attitude clarity, while learning that the majority of others agree with you causes attitude correctness. The current research tests how attitude correctness influences emotions and behavioral intentions toward individuals with opposing attitudes. We predicted that compared to clarity, those high in attitude correctness would feel more anger toward an opposing individual and a stronger desire to confront, oppose, and argue with them. Results across two studies supported predictions; believing that you hold the same attitude as the majority sparks feelings of anger toward individuals with differing viewpoints. The current work contributes to our understanding of heated debates and ugly confrontations.

KEYWORDS:

• Attitude correctness
• social consensus
• anger
• approach motivation

Conversations between individuals holding opposing attitudes take different forms – discussions can be civil and cooperative, conflicting but respectful, or angry and hostile. Previous research points to attitude correctness as a factor driving conflict, but the emotional and motivational consequences of attitude correctness have yet to be tested. The current study proposes that feeling that one’s attitude is correct will cause anger and a desire to confront those with opposing views.

Attitude certainty is the subjective feeling of confidence or conviction in one’s attitude (Abelson, 1998; Gross, Holtz, & Miller, 1995). Being certain of one’s attitude contributes to the strength of the attitude – those who are more certain of their attitudes show more resistance to persuasion (Tormala & Petty, 2002; Wu & Shaffer, 1987), greater persistence in their attitudes (Bassili, 1996) and higher attitude-behavior correspondence (Fazio & Zanna, 1978; Tormala & Petty, 2004). Attitude certainty is comprised of two separate elements – correctness and clarity (Petrocelli, Tormala, & Rucker, 2007). Attitude correctness is the sense that one’s attitude is valid and justified (Petrocelli et al., 2007), and is fulfilled by confirming one’s attitude is the objectively ‘right’ one to hold (Rucker, Tormala, Petty, & Briñol, 2014). Comparing one’s attitude to environmental information or to the attitudes of others are ways to reinforce a sense of correctness (Rucker et al., 2014). Attitude clarity is knowing and being aware of what one’s true attitude is (Petrocelli et al., 2007). Having a clear attitude involves feeling that one has successfully identified their attitude and being able to accurately express their beliefs (Petrocelli et al., 2007). Unlike attitude correctness, those who are high in clarity do not necessarily feel that others should hold their opinion (Cheatham & Tormala, 2015).

While both dimensions define attitude certainty, correctness and clarity are caused by distinct antecedents. Due to social comparison processes (e.g., Fazio, 1979; Festinger, 1954), one believes their attitude is correct when they learn that most other people share their opinion. Manipulating perceived social consensus increases one’s belief that their opinion is valid and that others should also hold that attitude (Cheatham & Tormala, 2015; Petrocelli et al., 2007). On the other hand, one feels clarity in their attitude when they feel they have identified their attitude. Repeating one’s attitude over time increases clarity and the subjective feeling that one knows what one believes (Petrocelli et al., 2007).

Feelings of correctness and clarity also cause distinct behaviors. A study on advocacy behaviors by Cheatham and Tormala (2015) showed that those who were made to feel high attitude clarity expressed intentions to share their opinions with others, while those who were made to feel that their attitude was correct reported intentions to both share their opinions and try to persuade others to hold their same opinion. Another study by Rios, DeMarree, and Statzer (2014) demonstrated that attitude correctness, but not clarity, caused participants to hold a competitive conflict style during a debate. These studies show that attitude correctness can cause more effortful persuasion of and competition with opposing individuals, but the underlying process motivating persuasion and competition has yet to be explored.

It is possible that confrontational advocacy behavior and competitive conflict style are motivated by anger toward the opposing side. Anger decreases information processing in social situations (Bodenhausen, Shepard, & Kramer, 1994; Lerner, Goldberg, & Tetlock, 1998; Tiedens, 2001), causes more lenient perceptions of risk (Fischhoff, Gonzalez, Lerner, & Small, 2005; Lerner & Keltner, 2001), and motivates aggression (Harmon-Jones & Sigelman, 2001). Because anger can lead to negative cognitive and behavioral outcomes, it is crucial to test if attitude correctness causes anger and a desire to confront individuals with opposing attitudes.

1. Social consensus and intergroup anger

We speculate that attitude correctness could lead to anger and conflict because feeling one’s attitude is correct places the individual in a relative position of power. Individuals feel that their attitudes are objectively valid and correct when they learn that the majority of other people share their opinion (Festinger, 1954; Gerard & Orive, 1987; Orive, 1988). During an argument, if an individual knows that his side is in the majority, he will feel that his attitude is the ‘correct’ one to hold. Feeling validated and backed up by the majority may make him feel he is in a position of power over the individual arguing the other side (Sachdev & Bourhis, 1991). Both interpersonal and intergroup theories suggest power motivates anger and approach-oriented behavior. For instance, appraisal theories of emotion predict how individuals feel and behave in response to situations at the interpersonal level (see Frijda, 1986; Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 1988; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Approach and avoidance behavior are considered fundamental action tendencies (Carver, 2001; Higgins, 1997; Miller, 1944), and research shows that possessing more power motivates approach behavior (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003; Smith & Bargh, 2008). Similarly, at the group level, intergroup emotion theory (i.e., IET; Smith, 1993) demonstrates that self-categorizing into a social group influences one’s emotional experience, whereby group members take on their group’s emotions in response to group-relevant events (Mackie & Smith, 2015; Smith, 1993). When a group’s core values or beliefs are threatened, group members react with emotions that anticipate their behavioral responses (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000). When one appraises their group to be in a relative position of power, the group member experiences anger toward the opposing group and reports a desire to oppose, confront, and argue with them (Mackie et al., 2000; Maitner, Mackie, & Smith, 2006). When individuals are processing an attitude disagreement at the interpersonal or intergroup level, feeling as if one’s side has more power should trigger anger and approach motivation.

Importantly, the focus of the current study is not on power, although we submit that power may be an important explanation for why social consensus (and, accordingly, attitude correctness) leads to conflict with those holding opposing attitudes. Instead, the purpose of this research is to measure the affective and motivational consequences of attitude correctness and clarity in an argumentative setting. We believe that anger is the underlying process that motivates approach-style conflict when one feels their attitude is correct. Because previous research demonstrates that attitude clarity does not cause effortful persuasion of and competitive conflict style with others (e.g., Cheatham & Tormala, 2015; Rios et al., 2014), we would not expect to see anger or approach intentions associated with attitude clarity. Attitude clarity does not involve feeling that others should share the same opinion (Cheatham & Tormala, 2015), so those high in clarity should be more receptive of opposing attitudes and should be less reactive (i.e., angered) when their opinions are challenged. Moreover, those who are high in clarity do not necessarily feel that they are validated or backed up by the majority, which should prevent them from feeling emboldened or justified in approaching others to argue. The current research will test these hypotheses. We predict that attitude correctness will lead participants to report more anger and stronger intentions to approach (oppose, confront, argue with) an individual with an opposing attitude. We predict that attitude clarity, on the other hand, will not cause anger or approach motivation.

2. Study 1

Study 1 tested the correlation between attitude correctness/attitude clarity and anger and approach motivation. Participants reported their attitude toward U.S. involvement in a fabricated disease outbreak and then reported the extent to which they felt their attitude was correct and clear. Participants then reported anger and the desire to approach an individual who held an opposing opinion. We hypothesized that high attitude correctness would predict (H1) more anger and (H2) greater intentions to approach the opposing individual, while attitude clarity would not. Following previous research (Mackie et al., 2000), we also predicted that (H3) anger would mediate the relationship between attitude correctness and approach intentions.

3. Method

3.1. Participants and procedure

Data was collected during the summer of 2017. Survey responses were collected from 384 American Mturk workers (180 male, 204 female, M_age = 35.44, SD_age = 11.78). Most participants were Caucasian (76.8% Caucasian, 6.2% African American, 7.0% Asian/Pacific Islander, 6.7% Hispanic, 2.2% Multi-Racial, 1.1% Native American). Participants read about a fabricated outbreak of the avian flu virus in Indonesia, reported their attitudes toward U.S. involvement in the outbreak, and then viewed a fake profile of another participant in the study who ostensibly held an opposing attitude. Then, participants reported their anger and approach intentions toward the participant.

3.2. Attitude toward U.S. involvement

Participants were told that the purpose of the study was to understand how Americans believe the U.S. should respond to a recent avian influenza virus outbreak in Indonesia. Participants read a short passage about the fabricated outbreak and were told that the Indonesian government is uncertain if they will be able to contain the outbreak because they are short on medical resources. It was highlighted that it would cost billions of dollars for the U.S. to aid in the outbreak. On a scale from 1 (negative) to 8 (positive), participants were asked, ‘What is your attitude toward the United States spending several billion dollars to aid the outbreak?’ Following previous research (Petrocelli et al., 2007), participants who reported scores of 1 through 4 were given feedback that they hold a relatively unfavorable attitude toward the U.S. aiding in the outbreak, and those who reported scores of 5 through 8 were told that they hold a relatively favorable attitude toward the U.S. aiding in the outbreak. As a check, participants were asked if they agreed with the feedback (‘Yes’ or ‘No’). Participants who did not agree with the feedback were excluded from analyses (n = 12).

3.3. Attitude correctness, attitude clarity, and attitude certainty

On scales from 1 (not certain at all) to 9 (very certain), participants then reported the extent to which they felt their attitude was correct (three items, e.g., ‘How certain are you that your attitude toward the U.S. aiding the outbreak is the correct attitude to have?’ α = .857), clear (four items, e.g., ‘How certain are you that you know what your true attitude toward the U.S. aiding the outbreak really is?’ α = .932), and their overall attitude certainty (one item: ‘How certain are you of your attitude toward the U.S. aiding the outbreak?’) (Petrocelli et al., 2007). The attitude correctness items and attitude clarity items were averaged together to form composite measures of correctness and clarity.

3.4. Fake profile of opposing participant

Participants were then told, ‘In addition to understanding your attitude toward the U.S. spending billions of dollars to aid the outbreak, we are also interested in your perception of other Americans who have opinions of the issue. We will show you a profile of another American who has taken this survey, and then we will ask you questions about them.’ On the next page, it said ‘Participant 1,209’ at the top of the page, and there was an image of the previous survey question, ‘What is your attitude toward the United States spending several billion dollars to aid the outbreak?’ and the same scale from 1 (negative) to 8 (positive). The scale had ostensibly been filled in by Participant 1,209, which showed an opposing attitude to the participant’s own (participants who previously reported a relatively favorable attitude viewed Participant 1,209’s response as a 2, and participants who previously indicated a relatively unfavorable attitude viewed Participant 1,209’s response as a 7). This way, all participants believed that Participant 1,209 held an opposing attitude toward the issue.

3.5. Anger and approach intentions

Next, participants reported how angry Participant 1,209 makes them feel and how much they want to approach (confront, oppose, argue with; Maitner et al., 2006; α = .812) them on scales from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely). The approach items were averaged together to create a composite score of approach intentions. An attention check was included within the dependent measures (‘If you are reading this question, please select 3’), and participants were excluded from analyses if they did not pass the attention check (n = 15). Finally, participants reported demographic information and were debriefed. After excluding participants through both checks, the final sample size was N = 357.

4. Results

4.1. Attitude descriptives

The distribution of attitudes was 77.6% of participants reported a relatively favorable attitude and 22.4% reported a relatively unfavorable attitude toward the U.S. aiding in the outbreak (M = 5.72, SD = 1.91).

Anger. We ran a multiple regression to predict anger toward the opposing participant using attitude correctness and attitude clarity¹. The overall model was significant, F(2, 353) = 15.00, MSE = 52.92, p < .001, adjusted R² = .073. Attitude correctness was the only significant predictor in the model (β = .335, p < .001). The more that participants felt their attitude was correct, the more anger they reported toward Participant 1,209. Attitude clarity (β = -.083, p = .268) did not significantly predict anger. These results support Hypothesis 1 – feelings of correctness, but not clarity, predict anger toward opposing individuals.

4.2. Approach intentions

Using the same predictors, we ran a multiple regression to predict approach intentions toward the opposing participant². The overall model was significant, F(2, 353) = 24.84, MSE = 47.66, p < .001, adjusted R² = .118. Attitude correctness significantly predicted approach intentions (β = .439, p < .001), such that higher feelings of correctness predicted greater intentions to approach Participant 1,209. Attitude clarity was a nonsignificant marginal predictor (β = -.138, p = .061), such that higher feelings of clarity predicted lower approach intentions, although this relationship did not reach conventional levels of significance so should be interpreted with caution. Supporting Hypothesis 2, higher correctness predicts more intentions to approach (confront, oppose, argue with) a disagreeing individual.

4.3. Mediation analysis

Because past research shows that anger predicts approach intentions (Mackie et al., 2000), we tested the mediating effect of anger on the relationship between attitude correctness and approach intentions including attitude clarity and global attitude certainty as covariates. We used Model 4 in the Process Macro (Hayes, 2013) in SPSS with 50,000 bootstrapped samples. Results from the mediation analysis indicated that the indirect effect was significant, b = .293, SE = .128, 95% bias-corrected CI [.054, .561]. Greater feelings of attitude correctness predicted more anger, which then predicted more approach intentions. Approximately 12% of the variance was accounted for by the predictors (R² = .123). These data support Hypothesis 3 – anger mediates the relationship between attitude correctness and intentions to approach an individual with an opposing attitude.

5. Discussion

Study 1 offers preliminary evidence that attitude correctness is associated with more anger and approach intentions toward individuals with opposing attitudes, while attitude clarity is not. Importantly, Study 1 did not test the causal relationship between these variables, nor was social consensus used to increase attitude correctness. These are both limitations that will be addressed in Study 2.

6. Study 2

Study 2 manipulated attitude correctness and attitude clarity to test the causal relationship between attitude variables and feelings of anger and approach motivation. Participants reported their attitude toward a new ID card policy at their university, and were then randomly assigned to feel that their attitude was high or low in clarity and high or low in correctness. Participants then reported anger and the desire to approach a student who held an opposing opinion toward the ID card policy. This study was a 2 (attitude clarity: high vs. low) x 2 (attitude correctness: high vs. low) between-subjects experimental design. We employed a factorial design to explore possible interactions between the clarity and correctness manipulations, which have not been tested for in previous research. However, our exploratory interest in interaction effects was secondary to our specific hypotheses: we hypothesized that manipulating high correctness would cause (H1) more anger and (H2) greater intentions to approach the opposing individual, while manipulating high clarity would not. We also predicted that (H3) anger would mediate the relationship between correctness and approach intentions.

6.1. Participants and procedure

Data was collected during the fall of 2017. Three hundred and eighty-eight Texas Tech University students (98 male, 279 female, 11 other/did not disclose, M_age = 19.07, SD_age = 2.89) participated in this experiment. Most participants were Caucasian (64.8% Caucasian, 7.4% African American, 5.1% Asian/Pacific Islander, 16.8% Hispanic, 4.8% Multi-Racial, .6% Native American, .6% Other). This study used a 2 (clarity: high vs. low) x 2 (correctness: high vs. low) between-subjects factorial design. Participants read about a fake ID card policy that Texas Tech was considering, reported their attitudes toward the new policy, and were then randomly assigned to feel that their attitude was high or low in clarity, and then randomly assigned to feel that their attitude was high or low in correctness. Participants then viewed a fake profile of another student that ostensibly held an opposing attitude and reported their anger and approach intentions toward the student.

6.2. Attitude toward new policy

All participants were led to believe that Texas Tech University was considering adopting a new identification card policy (adapted from Petrocelli et al., 2007). Participants were told that the new policy would be implemented within the next 12 months and would require all students to scan an ID card before entering any university building. After reading about the policy, participants reported their attitudes toward the plan on a scale from 1 (negative) to 8 (positive). Using the same method in Study 1, participants were then given feedback that they held a relatively favorable or relatively unfavorable attitude toward the policy. Participants were excluded from analyses if they did not agree with the feedback (n = 13).

6.3. Clarity manipulation

Next, participants were randomly assigned to a high or low clarity condition. High clarity participants reported their attitudes toward the policy on five semantic differential scale items: Bad/good, favorable/unfavorable, harmful/beneficial, foolish/wise, positive/negative. Low clarity participants reported their attitudes only on the positive/negative item. This repetition manipulation has been used in previous research (Petrocelli et al., 2007).

6.4. Correctness manipulation

Next, participants were randomly assigned into a high or low correctness condition. High correctness participants were told that 89.37% of Texas Tech students reported an attitude score in the same range as their own. Low correctness participants were told that 20.63% of Texas Tech students reported an attitude score in the same range as their own. Manipulating attitude correctness with social consensus feedback has been used in previous research (Petrocelli et al., 2007).

6.5. Attitude correctness, attitude clarity, and attitude certainty

Participants then completed the same attitude correctness (α = .818), attitude clarity (α = .940), and attitude certainty measures used in Study 1.

6.6. Fake profile of opposing participant

Participants then viewed the same fake profile as in Study 1 – all participants believed that Participant 1,209 held an opposing attitude to their own.

6.7. Anger and approach intentions

Participants completed the same anger and approach intention (α = .813) measures as in Study 1. The same attention check as in Study 1 was included within the dependent measures, and participants were excluded from analyses if they did not pass the check (n = 23). Finally, participants reported demographic information and were debriefed. After excluding participants through both checks in the survey, the final sample size was N = 352.

7. Results

7.1. Attitude descriptives

The distribution of attitudes was 76.1% of participants reported a relatively favorable attitude and 23.9% reported a relatively unfavorable attitude toward the new ID policy (M = 5.84, SD = 2.13).

7.2. Attitude clarity manipulation check

To test the effectiveness of our clarity manipulation, we conducted a 2 (correctness) x 2 (clarity) ANOVA on measured clarity. There was a nonsignificant marginal effect of manipulated correctness on measured clarity, F(1, 348) = 3.55, MSE = 8.86, p = .060, η_p² = .010. Participants in the high correctness condition showed a pattern of reporting more clarity (M = 7.41, SE = .120) compared to the low correctness condition (M = 7.09, SE = .119), which is congruent with some previous research (e.g., Petrocelli et al., 2007; Rios et al., 2014). There was no main effect for manipulated clarity on measured clarity (F(1, 348) = .620, MSE = 1.55, p = .432, η_p² = .002), nor was there a significant interaction between manipulated correctness and manipulated clarity (F(1, 348) = .291, MSE = .727, p = .590, η_p² = .001). Unfortunately, the attitude clarity manipulation failed. High repetition of one’s attitude did not cause significantly higher feelings of clarity, as has been demonstrated in past research (e.g., Petrocelli et al., 2007).

7.3. Attitude correctness manipulation check

The correctness manipulation, however, was successful. A 2 (correctness) x 2 (clarity) ANOVA on measured correctness revealed a significant main effect of manipulated correctness on measured correctness, F(1, 348) = 4.10, MSE = 11.09, p = .044, η_p² = .012. Participants in the high correctness condition reported significantly more correctness (M = 6.58, SE = .124) compared to the low correctness condition (M = 6.23, SE = .124). There was no main effect for manipulated clarity on correctness (F(1, 348) = .013, MSE = .035, p = .910, η_p² < .001), nor was there an interaction between manipulated correctness and manipulated clarity (F(1, 348) = 2.31, MSE = 6.26, p = .129, η_p² = .007). Manipulating social consensus successfully caused higher feelings of attitude correctness.

7.4. Global attitude certainty

To explore if manipulating correctness and clarity cause higher global attitude certainty, we conducted a 2 (correctness) x 2 (clarity) ANOVA on measured global certainty. There was no main effect for manipulated correctness (F(1, 348) = 1.24, MSE = 3.53, p = .266, η_p² = .004), no main effect for manipulated clarity (F(1, 348) = .099, MSE = .282, p = .753, η_p² < .001), and no interaction between correctness and clarity (F(1, 348) = .027, MSE = .078, p = .869, η_p² < .001).

Anger. A 2 (correctness) x 2 (clarity) ANOVA on anger showed a main effect for correctness, F(1, 347) = 3.99, MSE = 6.23, p = .046, η_p² = .011. As predicted, high correctness caused significantly more anger toward the opposing student (M = 1.89, SE = .095) compared to low correctness (M = 1.62, SE = .094). There was no main effect for clarity on anger (F(1, 347) = .002, MSE = .002, p = .968, η_p² < .001), nor was there a significant interaction between correctness and clarity on anger (F(1, 347) = .002, MSE = .003, p = .965, η_p² < .001). Supporting Hypothesis 1, manipulating high attitude correctness causes significantly more anger towards an opposing individual.

Approach intentions. A 2 (correctness) x 2 (clarity) ANOVA on approach intentions showed no main effect for correctness (F(1, 348) = .081, MSE = .163, p = .776, η_p² < .001), no main effect for clarity (F(1, 348) = .114, MSE = .229, p = .736, η_p² < .001), and no interaction between correctness and clarity (F(1, 348) = .051, MSE = .102, p = .822, η_p² < .001). Contrary to Hypothesis 2, high attitude correctness did not cause more intentions to approach (confront, oppose, argue with) the opposing student.

Mediation analysis. We tested the mediating effect of anger on the relationship between manipulated correctness and approach intentions including manipulated attitude clarity as a covariate. We used Model 4 in the Process Macro (Hayes, 2013) in SPSS with 50,000 bootstrapped samples. Results from the mediation analysis indicated that the indirect effect was significant, b = .107, SE = .058, 95% bias-corrected CI [.005, .235]. Manipulating high correctness caused greater anger, which then was associated with more intentions to approach the opposing student. Approximately 13% of the variance was accounted for by the predictors (R² = .126). Thus, the relationship between attitude correctness and approach intentions toward the opposing student is mediated by feelings of anger.³

8. Discussion

Study 2 manipulated feelings of attitude correctness and attitude clarity to test the causal relationship between attitude correctness, anger, and approach motivation toward an opposing student. As predicted, attitude correctness caused significantly higher anger toward the student, which then mediated the relationship between attitude correctness and approach intentions. Unfortunately, our attitude clarity manipulation failed, so we cannot draw firm conclusions about the causal relationship between attitude clarity and responses to an opposing individual in this study.

9. General discussion

The current study extends literature on attitude certainty by demonstrating that correctness and clarity differentially predict negative emotion and motivation toward those who oppose one’s attitude. Study 1 showed that higher attitude correctness significantly predicted more anger and approach intentions toward opposing individuals. Study 2 manipulated attitude correctness using social consensus feedback and showed that high correctness caused significantly more anger toward a student with opposing attitudes compared to low correctness, and that anger significantly predicted greater approach intentions.

Previous research documents that manipulating attitude correctness causes a more competitive conflict style during debate (Rios et al., 2014) and more intense advocacy for one’s beliefs (Cheatham & Tormala, 2015), and the current research shows that it can also cause more anger toward opposing individuals. Following intergroup and interpersonal theories of emotion, we speculate that individuals in the majority feel that their side has more power, motivating them to react with anger and approach motivation when confronted by those with opposing views. Future research should measure if social consensus manipulations increase perceived power to test if power drives anger and conflict in argumentative situations.

Relatedly, future research should test if social consensus manipulations motivate interpersonal or intergroup processes. Some argue that attitudes and group membership are intertwined, such that social identification precedes attitude expression (Smith & Hogg, 2008). Through this approach, it could be argued that manipulating social consensus makes an individual perceive an argument through the lens of one’s attitude ‘group’ rather than one’s personal beliefs. Those with opposing attitudes would then be considered outgroup members and subject to other negative intergroup processes such as stereotyping and prejudice. In this case, group-based theories like intergroup emotion theory would be valuable in predicting the emotions and behaviors toward those with opposing attitudes.

One limitation of this research is that the attitude clarity manipulation in Study 2 failed. Because of this, we cannot conclude that high attitude clarity had zero impact on anger or approach motivation. However, because prior research shows that attitude clarity did not cause competitive conflict styles (Rios et al., 2014), we believe that in our study, high attitude clarity would not have caused increased anger and approach motivation if the manipulation had been successful. However, this remains to be retested.

Novel to attitude certainty research, Study 2 explored possible interactions between attitude clarity and correctness by using a 2 × 2 factorial design. We did not find an interactive effect of clarity and correctness on anger or approach motivation, strengthening the position that attitude correctness and clarity were acting independently in the current study. However, this factorial design may have unintentionally muddied the waters of our manipulations in Study 2. If we instead designed four separate conditions (high/low clarity, high/low correctness), perhaps the attitude clarity manipulation would have been successful. Further, Study 2 failed to find a causal relationship between correctness and approach intentions, which is inconsistent with prior research showing that correctness causes competitive conflict styles (Rios et al., 2014). This discrepancy may be a product of the experimental design used in Study 2.

Another limitation of the current research is that analyses yielded small effects. While these data contribute to our basic understanding that attitude correctness can influence emotion and motivation, we cannot claim that these findings apply to extreme situations of aggression or violence. On the other hand, these studies measured anger in a relatively benign situation. If participants had been aggressively confronted by the opposing individual, it is possible that our effects would have been stronger. Moreover, the issues chosen for the current research (disease outbreak, ID card policy) were intended to be self-relevant but not politically or morally charged. Future research should test the emotional and motivational consequences of attitude correctness using highly significant issues during more confrontational situations.

Future research should also consider testing if the anger caused by attitude correctness is physiologically arousing. The arousing nature of anger decreases information processing in social situations (Bodenhausen et al., 1994; Lerner et al., 1998; Tiedens, 2001), and anger caused by threat decreases perceptions of risk (Fischhoff et al., 2005; Lerner & Keltner, 2001). If attitude correctness promotes angry reactions that are intense enough to decreases information processing, these individuals would be more likely to engage in harmful behavior toward others. Future research should test this hypothesis.

The current research uncovered a relationship between attitude correctness, anger, and approach motivation. Knowing that attitude correctness can spark anger will hopefully inspire future research on this topic to better understand emotional reactions toward people with different beliefs. With extended research we can investigate solutions that mitigate the emotional consequences of attitude correctness and prevent disagreements from turning hostile.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Additional information

Funding

This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. 1559393.

Notes

1. We also ran the regression including global attitude certainty in the model. The overall model was significant, F(3, 352) = 10.50, MSE = 37.10, p < .001, adjusted R² = .074. Attitude correctness was the only significant predictor in the model (β = .704, p = .022). Attitude clarity (β = .429, p = .307) and global attitude certainty (β = – .824, p = .215) did not significantly predict anger.

2. We also ran the regression including global attitude certainty in the model. The overall model was significant, F(3, 352) = 16.55, MSE = 31.83, p < .001, adjusted R² = .116. Attitude correctness was a nonsignificant marginal predictor for approach intentions (β = .527, p = .078). Attitude clarity (β = – .016, p = .970) and global attitude certainty (β = – .197, p = .761) were not significant predictors of approach intentions.

3. Because the correctness manipulation showed a nonsignificant marginal increase in measured clarity, it is possible that approach motivation is partially motivated by clarity. To test if correctness independently motivates approach motivation through anger, we ran the mediation model while adding measured correctness as a covariate (in addition to manipulated clarity). The indirect effect was nonsignificant, b = .087, SE = .053, 95% bias-corrected CI [-.007, .202]. The mediation did not hold up when removing the variance associated with measured correctness, suggesting that attitude correctness independently motivates approach motivation through increased anger.