Confronting Anti-Muslim Racism and Islamism: An Intersectional Perspective on Muslim Women’s Activism in Germany

ABSTRACT

This article explores how Muslim women’s activism unfolds in the context of anti-Muslim racism and Islamism in contemporary Germany. In particular, it identifies both gendered forms of anti-Muslim racism and Islamism encountered by Muslim women’s organizations and ways they respond to it. Drawing on theories of intersectionality and boundary making, this study identifies the most common strategies used to confront anti-Muslim racism and Islamism and their implications for intersectional boundary making. For this purpose, six expert interviews with representatives of major Muslim women’s organizations were conducted and supplemented by data from internet research and participatory observation. Based on a Grounded Theory-inspired approach, the findings show that the responses of Muslim women’s organizations to anti-Muslim racism and Islamism reconfigure group boundaries. They create more inclusive spaces in which boundary formations by religion, race, and ethnicity and gender are transcended.

KEYWORDS:

• Muslim women
• anti-Muslim racism
• Islamism
• boundaries
• Germany

Introduction

Pressures on Muslims in Germany have increased both on an individual level as well as on collective actors, such as mosque communities and Muslim organizations (Amiraux and Jonker 2006; Jonker 2006; Peucker 2019). While Islam and Muslims have been a contentious topic within public discourse in Germany for more than two decades (Cesari 2013), the spread of right-wing populism in recent years has sparked anti-Islamic sentiments all over Europe (Kaya and Tecmen 2019). Terrorist attacks carried out by Muslim radicals in several European countries and the US have sustained anti-Muslim attitudes and nourished the image of Muslims as a security threat (Cesari 2010). Consequently, suspicion toward Muslims and Muslim communities has grown and created a climate of mistrust and hostility (Ajala 2014). Despite repeated assertions by German politicians and state officials that they do not confuse Islamists with “ordinary” Muslims (Shooman and Spielhaus 2010), policy measures adopted within the framework of the war against terror have indiscriminately harmed Muslims as a whole (Monshipouri 2010). Several studies have indicated detrimental effects of counter-terrorism measures that put Muslims under general suspicion (Blakemore and Awan 2013; Kundnani 2014; Spalek 2012). Similarly, scholars have stressed the effects of anti-Muslim discourses on social cohesion within Western societies as they have contributed to an alienation and discrimination of Muslims and inhibited their active and equal participation in public, social, and political life (Peucker and Akbarzadeh 2014).

Simultaneously, Islamist actors have sought to spread their ideologies within Muslim communities and promote a uniform version of Islam. They have accused communities of blasphemy for not complying with this singular interpretation of Islam (Akbarzadeh 2020; Ceylan and Kiefer 2018). In some instances, Islamist groups have actively recruited individuals for their political purposes and have instigated them to commit violent acts (Abou Taam et al. 2016).

A recurring trope that has been used both within anti-Muslim discourse and Islamist rhetoric is the image of the powerless and submissive Muslim woman. While Islamists abide by strict gender norms that disadvantage women and promote patriarchal interpretations of Islam, public debates about Islam and Muslims in Europe reinforce gendered/intersectional Islamophobia along the axes of gender, race and ethnicity and religion by reproducing stereotypical images of Muslim women (Alimahomed-Wilson 2020; Van and Margaretha 2016; Zahedi 2011). Both discourses depict Muslim women as passive, powerless subjects who either need rescuing from allegedly violent and oppressive Muslim men or protection from a hostile, non-Muslim majority society and Western ideologies. Consequently, Muslim women’s agency has been neglected and their activism and social contribution has been invisibilized (Korteweg and Yurdakul 2021). This is despite the fact that voluntary work within religious facilities in Germany is carried out mostly by women (Kausmann et al. 2017). However, women are rarely in positions of power and decision making (Kausmann et al. 2022; Zahedi 2011). This also applies to Muslim women who have been actively involved in community work but have often been marginalized within conventional structures such as mosques and major umbrella organizations (Spielhaus 2012). While some women have created space for themselves within established structures, others have founded their own organizations to represent their specific interests and needs, both within majority society and their own communities (Kuppinger 2012).

In both cases, Muslim women have actively engaged in community building and contributed to a diversification of Muslim civil society in Germany. While they have challenged mainstream discourse about Islam and Muslims within mainstream society, they have also initiated critical debates within Muslim communities (Kuppinger 2012). As such, they have become significant actors of social change in a gendered way. To understand how Muslim women’s activism unfolds in contemporary Germany, I focus on their experience of anti-Muslim racism and Islamism and their response strategies to both. More specifically, I look at the extent to which Muslim women’s organizations are concerned with Islamism and anti-Muslim racism, what strategies they have developed vis-à-vis these two forces, and what their strategies tell us about identity and belonging in Germany.

In this article, I aim to contribute to the existing literature on Muslim women’s activism in two ways. First, I explain how Muslim women are in a double-bind as gender has become a contentious issue that has seen increasing political instrumentalization by proponents of anti-Muslim racism and Islamism alike (Joly and Wadia 2017; Spielhaus 2019). To understand dynamics within Muslim communities that shape the recognition of Islam and Muslim life in Europe, particularly Germany, I provide a closer examination of Muslim women’s activism as part of Muslim community building. Since most academic research has predominantly focused on major Turkish umbrella organizations as representatives of Islam and Muslims in Germany, the diversity and heterogeneity of Muslim actors has been overlooked, specifically from a gendered lens. Therefore, I respond to the repeated scholarly critique of the homogenization and essentialization of Islam that conceals the heterogeneity of Muslim lives in Germany focusing on Muslim women’s activism (Peucker 2017; Shooman and Spielhaus 2010).

My second contribution is to show how Muslim communities, particularly Muslim women’s organizations, experience the social pressures of anti-Muslim racism and Islamism and how these pressures shape their identity formation, positioning, and Muslim community building in general. This is an unexplored field, which justifies the novelty of my work.

This article is structured as follows: I will first give a broad overview of Muslim women’s activism in Western societies. Following a brief definition of the terms “anti-Muslim racism” and “Islamism,” I will explain how both forces shape Muslim women‘s activism. I will then introduce my theoretical framework of boundary making and, more specifically, intersectional boundary making. In the data and methods section, I provide detailed information about the sample, the data gathering process, and the evaluation method. Based on the theoretical framework I previously outlined, I will analyze the response strategies of Muslim women’s organizations and the implications for their boundary making. In conclusion, I will discuss my main findings and offer suggestions for future research.

Muslim women’s activism in western societies

Several studies from the Netherlands (Van Es and Van den Brandt 2020), Britain (Joly and Wadia 2017; Lewicki and O’Toole 2017; Wadia 2015), France (Amir-Moazami, Jacobsen, and Malik 2011; Joly and Wadia 2017; Jouili 2011, 2015; Jouili and Amir-Moazami 2006; Pojmann 2010), the US (Bullock 2005; Wang 2017; Zahedi 2011), and Canada (Bullock 2012; Jafri 2006; Zine 2012) demonstrate the long history of Muslim women’s activism and engagement in the social, political, and religious sphere. As these studies show, Muslim women’s social activism has mainly evolved out of a desire to represent Muslim women’s interests, to promote a better understanding of Islam, or to serve the community and/or general society. A key issue around which Muslim women have (been) mobilized is the headscarf controversy that has unfolded, particularly in France, Germany (Korteweg and Yurdakul 2021), and parts of Canada (Lépinard 2020). However, the issue of the Islamic veil and related stereotypes and stigmatization seem to transgress national borders of Western nations, as examples from the US or Great Britain suggest (Alimahomed-Wilson 2020; Chakraborti and Zempi 2012). In addition, Muslim women have been critically engaged in theological debates, sometimes advocating for feminist or gender-sensitive readings of the Quran (Hammer 2020). The attacks of 9/11 and the subsequent securitizing discourse that raised political awareness among Muslim women across Western countries have been a major catalyst for the growth in Muslim women’s community organizing (Wadia 2015; Zahedi 2011). This resonates with other studies on Muslim civic engagement that note a growing number of new organizations following 9/11 (Amath 2015; Cheikh Husain 2020).

In Germany, scholars have only recently paid attention to the diverse landscape of Muslim organizing beyond the major Turkish umbrella organizations and their associated mosque congregations (Ceylan 2006; Halm 2013; Peucker 2017). As recent studies show, Muslim civil engagement in Germany is heterogeneous in terms of both organizational forms and ethnic backgrounds (Mykytjuk-Hitz 2015; Peucker 2017), and it has professionalized (Peucker and Akbarzadeh 2014). Forming a vital part of Muslim community life, Muslim women have been active within mosque congregations and major umbrella organizations but have also founded their own organizations and initiatives (Spielhaus 2012). Although some organizations were already established in the 1990s, little systematic research on Muslim women’s activism has been conducted in Germany. This study aims to fill this gap by contributing to the scholarly understanding of Muslim women’s activism under the particular conditions of Islamism and anti-Muslim racism.

Muslim women‘s activism between anti-Muslim racism and Islamism

Research on anti-Muslim racism has expanded in recent years, generating a variety of empirical studies in Muslim-minority countries and provoking academic debates on the adequate terminology and its definitions (Bleich 2011; Bravo López 2011; Çakir 2014; Hafez 2019; Pfahl-Traughber 2012). While Islamophobia has become a common term to describe the exclusion of and discrimination against Muslims on the grounds of their assumed religious affiliation, some scholars have criticized the term as misleading for several reasons. First, the suffix “phobia” is associated with psychological illness and only addresses a general fear of Islam. Second, by focusing on the non-Muslim subject’s fear, it gives precedence to this perspective and neglects that of those affected by it. Third, the term implies fear of and hostility toward the religion of Islam and not Muslims themselves (Attia 2015). Finally, the term does not explicitly imply a recognition of the structural and institutional dimensions of Islamophobia (Shooman 2011).

An alternative term that has gained popularity, especially in the German context, is anti-Muslim racism. In comparison to Islamophobia, anti-Muslim racism is more all-encompassing as it refers to the structural and institutional implications of anti-Muslim hatred and discrimination. As such, it directs attention toward different levels of its manifestation and is more adequate for the study of organization’s experiences. Building on the definitions of scholars such as Attia (2009, 2013, 2018), Yasemin Shooman (2014, 2010) and Mario Peucker (2019), I define anti-Muslim racism as the stigmatization, discrimination, marginalization, and social exclusion of Muslims or those perceived as such. As a “structural feature of [German] society” (Attia 2013, 4) anti-Muslim racism manifests on four different levels: “the structural level, the level of institutional discrimination, the discursive level, and the subjective level” (Attia 2013, 6). While most incidents of anti-Muslim racism that organizations experience might be mediated through interpersonal interaction, the underlying logic is usually structural, institutional, or discursive in nature.

While discourses on Islamism have been described to have had detrimental effects on Muslim communities as they have fueled anti-Muslim sentiments and led to general suspicion and mistrust toward Muslims (Amiraux and Beauchesne 2020; Fekete 2009), there is evidence that Islamism or Islamic extremism itself has exerted pressure on Muslim communities in Western countries (Pfaff and Gill 2016).

A variety of terms have been used in academic literature to describe the phenomenon of the politicization of Islam and related activities and movements (Akbarzadeh 2020; Esposito and El-Din Shahin 2013; Pfahl-Traughber 2008; Roy 1994; Tietze 2003). The most common ones are Islamism and Political Islam. While both terms are often used as synonyms, some scholars, such as the political scientists Cesari (2021) and Mandaville (2014), argue for a more differentiated approach to these two concepts. According to Cesari (2021, 2), Political Islam might be defined “[…] as a political culture that is the outcome of the dual processes of nationalization and reformation of the Islamic tradition.” As such, it represents a “governmentality” of which Islamism, understood “[…] as the religiously based form of political mobilization […] is one of the many outcomes […] (Cesari 2021, 2). In line with Cesari, Mandaville (2014, 22) describes Islamism as a subset of Muslim politics, “[…] one that seeks to create a political order defined in terms of Islam (usually a shar’iah-based state).” As such, Islamism represents a challenge to democratic and secular orders that reject the primacy of a certain religion in the public and political sphere and guarantee equal treatment to all citizens regardless of their religion or worldview (Cesari 2015).

What continues to be ambiguous with regard to the identification of Islamist actors is whether the assumed intentionality is sufficient to qualify an actor as Islamist and how evidence about this intentionality could be provided (if it is not revealed by the respective actor itself). As some scholars have pointed out, this ambiguity and lack of clear criteria has often resulted in an arbitrary labeling of Muslim groups, activities and religious practices considered to be at odds with “Western values” as Islamist. Furthermore, it has legitimized measures taken within a security policy framework such as surveillance, ideological interventions, and the funding of radicalization prevention (Abbas 2011; De Koning 2020; Fekete 2009; Fox and Akbaba 2015).

Aware of the controversies surrounding the term Islamism, I use it for the purpose of this study as it is the most common term in academic literature and best captures the phenomenon explored. By the term Islamism, I refer to ideologies, movements and groups that reject Germany’s democratic system and seek to establish a political and social order based on an exclusivist interpretation of Islam (Akbarzadeh 2020; Esposito and El-Din Shahin 2013; Mandaville 2014; Pfahl-Traughber 2008).

Based on evidence from other Western countries such as the US, Australia, and Great Britain, Muslim women’s organizations in Germany are assumed to experience a highly gendered form of anti-Muslim racism and Islamism (Alimahomed-Wilson 2020; Povey 2009; Zahedi 2011). In this context, Islamism manifests in the support for patriarchal order and conservative social mores that neglect Muslim women’s agency and depict them as weak, passive, and in need of protection. Anti-Muslim racism is similarly expressed through Orientalist images that paint a homogenous picture of Muslim women along race and ethnicity and gender lines (Zahedi 2011). In both cases, Muslim women are denied agency and represented as victims who need to be rescued from allegedly violent and oppressive Muslim men or protected from a hostile, non-Muslim majority society and Western ideologies (Zahedi 2011). As I will show later, these discourses have symbolic and material consequences for Muslim women’s organizations. While anti-Muslim racism might manifest at the institutional level resulting in the exclusion or discrimination of Muslim women’s organizations, Islamism might express itself in verbal assaults of Muslim women’s organizations, the instrumentalization of their work, and the recruitment of Muslim women Islamists' political purposes (Termeer and Duyvesteyn 2022).

In this context, Muslim organizations have taken on a variety of new responsibilities and tasks (Cheikh Husain 2020). While they have had to defend themselves against accusations by political and media representatives (Mykytjuk-Hitz 2015), they have also had to assist their members in coping with the challenges of radicalism and anti-Muslim racism (Cheikh Husain 2020). On the other hand, they have been instrumentalized within Islamophobic discourses that label women’s organizations as progressive per se and in opposition to conventional, established male-dominated organizations or mosques (Brown 2008). What has been overlooked is the positioning and self-identification of Muslim women’s groups and organizations within the community and the social and political field, which is far more complex and transcends the simplified, dichotomous divide.

The following section will introduce the theoretical framework that will be used to analyze the strategies of Muslim women’s organizations and related boundary (de-)construction.

Boundary theory

As a highly politicized topic in Europe, Islam and Muslims have become a central issue within the boundary-making literature (Alba 2005; Bowen 2014; Foner 2015; Yurdakul and Korteweg 2021; Zolberg and Woon 1999). Muslim women’s organizations are key sites to understand how Muslims in Germany draw and transform social boundaries. Such boundary drawing and transformation emerge as a byproduct of their civic engagement against anti-Muslim racism and Islamism.

The central theoretical vantage point of this work is “boundary theory.” According to Lamont and Molnár (2002, 168), boundaries can be conceptualized as essential “symbolic resources […] in creating, maintaining, contesting, or even dissolving institutionalized social differences.” They differentiate between symbolic and social boundaries. Symbolic boundaries are considered “tools by which individuals and groups struggle over and come to agree upon definitions of reality” (Lamont and Molnár 2002, 168). As such, they form basic tenets for groupness and social cohesion and structure our affective social landscapes of similarity, closeness, and belonging and make processes of demarcation visible.

Social boundaries represent the manifestation of differentiations into material and non-material conditions. These boundaries are separating lines along which people acquire resources and define individual social status and access to social opportunities, rights, or institutions (Lamont and Molnár 2002). In contrast to symbolic boundaries, social boundaries presuppose a broad consensus and are reflected in stable behavioral patterns (Lamont and Molnár 2002). This speaks to another helpful conceptualization of boundary making by Alba (Alba 2005), who distinguishes between bright and blurred boundaries. While bright boundaries are widely agreed upon and are quite stable and clear, blurry ones are ambiguous and allow for more individualistic behavior, such as self-representation. Whether a boundary is classified as bright or blurry depends on its institutionalization within the social and political field (Alba 2005).

In my study, I make use of that body of literature focusing on symbolic boundary drawing to identify how boundaries are mediated through anti-Muslim racism and Islamism and how these boundaries influence the work of Muslim women’s organizations. Adopting an agency-centered perspective, I explore Muslim women’s response strategies and their implications for the (re-)construction of boundaries within Muslim communities, civil society, and broader society. To identify Muslim women’s organizational response strategies to anti-Muslim racism and Islamism, I draw on the work of Michèle Lamont et al. (2016). Rather than using it as a deductive theoretical framework, I adapt and expand the proposed framework according to the empirical findings. Following a description of Muslim women’s response strategies, I inquire what implications these strategies have for the organizations’ self-identification and positioning as well as community building and groupness, both in relation to broader society and Muslim communities in Germany.

Intersectional boundary making

Boundary construction is a matter of ethnic, racial, and/or religious identity as much as it is one of gender identity. Against the background of Muslim women’s embeddedness in unequal power hierarchies, which are mainly structured along the axis of gender, race, ethnicity, and religion, an analysis of their response strategies vis-à-vis anti-Muslim racism on the one hand, and Islamism on the other, requires the adoption of a multi-layered intersectional approach. Thus, intersectionality represents a further theoretical vantage point, both as an analytical tool as well as a methodological approach.

The term “intersectionality” was first introduced by the Black Feminist scholar and activist Kimberlé Crenshaw (1989, 1991) with the aim of problematizing the construction of marginalization within institutionalized discourses and took into account the unique and invisible specificity of overlapping systems of oppression. Intersectionality was defined as the “complex, irreducible, varied, and variable effects which ensue when multiple axis [sic] of differentiation – economic, political, cultural, psychic, subjective and experiential – intersect in historically specific contexts” (Brah and Phoenix 2004, 76).

To date, the studies on boundary making in the literature have only occasionally applied an intersectional approach. This is noteworthy since much of the scholarly literature has been concerned with the construction of minority groups and questions related to their (non-)belonging on the grounds of different identity markers. One of the few examples is the empirical study by Gökce Yurdakul and Anna C. Korteweg (2013) on “honor” killings and forced marriage debates in the Netherlands, Germany, and Britain. Through their careful analysis of different categories and their entanglement, they show how social divisions such as gender, sexual orientation, citizenship status, and religion play into boundary-making processes and determine actors’ preference for a certain strategy.

In this study, I use intersectionality both as methodology and analytical tool. Following Lutz (2015), intersectional methodology can be made productive in various steps in the qualitative research process. While it may serve as a valuable point of reflection of partiality in interview situations and allows the researcher to be attentive to which identity categories are being evoked at which point of the conversation, it further allows for an analysis that considers the contingent, simultaneous activation of multiple symbolic boundaries and identities of Muslim women organizations. Analyzing the strategies of Muslim women organizations against Islamism and anti-Muslim racism in Germany, special attention will be paid to the interplay of the identity categories of gender, ethnicity, race, and religion.¹

Methods & data

This study draws on six in-depth interviews with representatives of leading Muslim women’s organizations during June and December 2022 across Germany. The interview data is supplemented by information from the organizations’ websites and ethnographic data collected during a conference in November 2022.

Due to a lack of data on Muslim women’s organizations in Germany, a mapping of Muslim women’s organizations was devised. For this purpose, internet research was conducted. As many organizations are not easily identifiable as Muslim through their name, the results were rather limited. A further obstacle in identifying Muslim women’s organizations via internet search was outdated or lack of information on the organizations’ websites. The collected information on Muslim women’s organizations in Germany was substantiated and supplemented through personal networks and expert interviews with community leaders.

The sampling follows an explorative research design since Muslim collective organizing, particularly Muslim women’s activism in Germany, remains under-researched. The selection of Muslim women’s organizations was based on three criteria: (1) The organization self-identifies as Muslim and female; (2) The organization must be led by Muslim women and decision-making must lie in their hands, with the majority of members and/or constituency Muslim and female; (3) The organization is independent of other Muslim (umbrella) associations.

Using these criteria, I identified 21 formalized Muslim women’s organizations in 14 different cities. Most of them are located in western Germany, particularly in North-Rhine Westphalia, the most populous federal state, which also ranks among the regions as home to the highest migrant and Muslim populations in Germany (Pfündel, Stichs, and Tanis 2021). Only one organization was identified in eastern Germany, in the federal state of Saxony. This is hardly surprising as the proportion of migrants and racialized people, especially Muslims, is quite small in this region compared to the rest of Germany (Pfündel, Stichs, and Tanis 2021).

As previous studies have emphasized, most Muslim and particularly female Muslim engagement is not formalized and thus invisibilized (Kuppinger 2012; Spielhaus 2012). This could mainly be attributed to the lack of stable funding and reliable resources – a problem that is common to all Muslim organizations in Germany that do not receive funds from abroad. Compared to other Western countries, such as the US or Canada, Muslims in Germany mostly belong to socially disadvantaged segments of the population and lack the funds to finance their organizations (Chbib 2010; Foner and Alba 2008).

Another aspect that has been mentioned by the organizations’ representatives and came up during my ethnographic fieldwork are the high administrative barriers to eligibility for state funds. Even for those organizations that are formalized, securing funds represents a major obstacle. As a result, a considerable number of organizations relies upon donations and voluntary work (Muckel et al. 2018; Mykytjuk-Hitz 2015).

Initially, the identified Muslim women’s organizations of the sample were contacted via e-mail; however, the response rate was low. Another strategy was therefore chosen that proved more effective. In November 2022, I attended a conference in the city of Duisburg that was hosted by two Muslim women’s organizations and dealt with the topic of Muslim women’s organizations as civil society actors in Germany. This gave me the opportunity to converse with representatives of Muslim women’s organizations and Muslim female activists in person and to invite them for interviews.

In addition, I learned about the organizational landscape, the organizations’ histories, motivations, structures, financing, collaborations, and challenges. While the event was generally characterized by a trusting and cooperative atmosphere, discussions about resources and marginalization within Muslim women’s organizations revealed different experiences, positionalities, and interests. Issues that seemed to be relevant to all participating organizations were funding, professionalization, and the long-term perspectives for Muslim (women’s) organizations in Germany.

The final sample of this study consists of six organizations out of a total number of 21 (Table A1). One of them might be designated as an interest group, while the other five represent welfare organizations that are located in Berlin and in three large cities in the federal state of North-Rhine Westphalia. Two organizations operate on a federal level, while all the others work on a local and occasionally state level. The organizations researched vary considerably in size, degree of professionalization, and finances. However, they all report a lack of sustainable financial resources and rely on membership fees and project-based funding. It is worth noting that the majority of organizations have been established as a response to the specific exclusion and discrimination of (visibly) Muslim women. This corresponds with the study of Cheikh Husain (2020) and Peucker (2019) that observed an increase of Muslim activism due to the rise of anti-Muslim sentiments. Initially focusing on Muslim women’s empowerment through social services, advanced training programs, the provision of safer spaces and job opportunities, most organizations have extended their offers and target groups to include especially vulnerable minorities, such as (migrant) women of color and refugees. A shared goal of all Muslim women’s organizations is to combat gender inequality as well as all forms of discrimination based on religion, race, and ethnicity.

All the interviews were conducted in German and recorded; then I fully transcribed and partially translated them into English. All respondents who were interviewed on behalf of their organizations were chairwomen with decision-making powers and founding members of their respective groups, except for one, a prevention project leader. The interviewed representatives have all been active for over 10 years and have considerable knowledge and experience in community organizing. Half of them are German citizens of Turkish descent; the other half are white German Muslim converts. While nearly all of them wear headscarves and are thus visibly identifiable as Muslims, they differ in relation to their ethnic and racial identity, which shapes their varying positionalities and experiences as representatives of their organizations.

The women’s different standpoints are further influenced by their ages, which range between 35 and 67, as well as their educational level. Although all the organizations’ representatives have university degrees, they do not all have an academic background. This is particularly relevant with regard to the networks they are able to build, their self-image, and their positioning.

I acknowledge that my approach and method are significantly shaped by the theoretical perspective I adopted, as well as by my own social positioning. As an academic and visibly Muslim woman of color, I could relate to the experiences of discrimination that were reported in the interviews. Furthermore, my being perceived as a member of the Muslim community and my familiarity with internal issues and debates facilitated the conversations and created common ground. However, discussing the organization’s experiences of anti-Muslim racism and Islamism seemed to cause occasional discomfort. Due to the sensitive information shared, the disclosure of which might have harmful effects on the organization, most interview partners asked to remain anonymous. To protect their anonymity, direct quotations are not attributed to a particular organization’s representative since they might be easily identified. In cases where names are mentioned, pseudonyms are used. Drawing on the basic analytical tenets of the Grounded Theory approach, the original interview material, interpretive prior knowledge, and interpretations from the analysis entered into an iterative process of constituting, examining, and refining interpretive hypotheses. This process is enabled by using computer-assisted qualitative data analysis, namely the software MAXQDA. Coding of the corpus followed instructions formulated by Grounded Theory (Corbin and Strauss 1990). I started with open coding to identify main categories relating to experiences of and strategies against anti-Muslim racism and Islamism. Categories were built through comparisons across the whole corpus and refined through the creation of subtypes. Finally, I used axial coding to explore the relationships between different categories of experiences and response strategies and the implications for intersectional boundary making.

Findings

Response strategies of muslim women’s organizations against anti-Muslim racism

Muslim women’s organizations have developed a wide range of strategies to respond to the experiences of exclusion and stigmatization based on their gender, religious and racial/ethnic identities. While some of the described strategies relate to specific incidents of anti-Muslim racism, others are broader and more constant. These strategies include concrete actions as well as (counter-)narratives. The most common ones are trust and network building and the activation of existing contacts and networks. Further response strategies entail confrontation, showing attitude/authenticity and acting against stereotypes.

Trust and network building

Most Muslim women’s organizations in this study have a diverse network that consists of politicians, state authorities, academics, church representatives, civil society actors, and Muslim communities. While network building and cooperation are common strategies of civil society organizations, these strategies have proven to be of particular importance for Muslim women’s organizations in confronting anti-Muslim racism. As the findings show, trust and network building is the most frequent strategy that runs through all cases of the study. It includes personal meetings with stakeholders, participation in working groups, attendance of conferences and public events, (interreligious) dialogue work, (formalized) collaborations, and the staging of public events as well as inviting guests to visit the organization’s own facilities. A central goal of all these endeavors is to build trust and overcome suspicion that is often fed by anti-Muslim discourses and media coverage (Shooman 2014; Shooman and Spielhaus 2010). This is illustrated by the following statement:

I continue to try and clarify my concerns to people who know me – just raising awareness through meeting with people, exchanging views and explaining what’s going on, not apologetically, just (showing) that I am “normal” – so that they get to know me.

Another organization’s representative highlights the importance of establishing mutual trust and trustworthy networks, particularly with regard to the organization’s progress:

We invite as many people as possible to visit us and see us at work; then they leave with a positive impression. And the next time there’s a project, they say, “Oh, we know them; we might as well fund them.” This has always been our strategy.

As the quotation indicates, these partnerships are perceived as particularly important as they provide access to material resources such as state funds or facilities as well as non-material resources such as information, credibility, and legitimacy.

It is worth noting that most organizations have established long-standing ties to academics with whom they collaborate and stay in regular contact to exchange information. In one instance, for example, the materials used by the respective organization in its prevention work were developed by researchers from the University of Osnabrück in Lower Saxony.

However, as nearly all of the organization’s representatives mention, network building and maintaining is very time and resource consuming, including on an emotional level. This is reflected by the statement of one interviewee:

We bend over backwards by “inviting everyone,” especially the media if possible, and in general.

(…)

Relating to the networking with policy makers at the federal level, another organization’s representative states:

We can no longer afford to keep traveling at the organization’s expense to random meetings where you end up getting barely a word in with someone; it doesn’t pay.

Although trust and network building represent a strategy that requires both large material and non-material resources, in most cases it has proven successful in confronting anti-Muslim racism as it blurs existing symbolic boundaries that separate Muslim women’s organizations from other social and political actors. As a long-term strategy, building and maintaining relationships might result in reliable allyships that might transform the position of Muslim women’s organizations in the future.

Activation of networks and support by allies

While networks have a general merit to Muslim women’s organizations due to their position at the lower end of the social and political power hierarchy, they have proven to be especially important in instances of anti-Muslim racism.

Thus, another common response strategy vis-à-vis anti-Muslim racism is the activation of networks and support from allies. As the reports of organizations’ representatives indicate, networks are activated either in cases where organizations are denied funding, their credibility is questioned, or they are excluded from committees and memberships in majority institutions.

In some instances of anti-Muslim racism, such as the exclusion from working groups or the denial of membership in an umbrella organization, allies advocate for the respective organization and use their power position to exert pressure on involved institutions or persons. In other situations, allies share important information needed to confront the person or institution in charge. This is illustrated by the following case in which the respective organization was suspected of being Islamist and the organization’s representative contacted her allies for support:

(…) of course, those from the associations and within the administration who knew me went and had a word with the others to tell them off. So first I had to say, “Wait a minute! Let me have a look at what kind of network I have and how to get everyone involved so I can get some people behind me.”

As this quotation indicates, the interviewee seems to be aware of the organization’s rather weak discourse position and its limited power to influence or convince other actors (of its innocence) in the case of such allegation. Instead, the organization opts to activate its allies and to let them advocate for it. While this strategy seems more promising, it nevertheless reproduces existing power hierarchies as Muslim women’s organizations are dependent on other actors’ support and do not become visible as agents.

In another incident, a Muslim women’s organization was denied membership in one of Germany’s major social welfare umbrella organizations, which provides access to information, networks, training, and funds. As the chairwoman reports, the organization was only admitted as a member after an ally – a former member of the umbrella organization – complained:

I made quite a fuss about this, and then at some point I approached a former state executive (…) and said, “(…) I’m writing a press release that says we are not being admitted to the Paritätische (German Parity Welfare Association). Would you take a look at it?” Then he said he couldn’t imagine that it would be in the (federal) state’s interest to exclude us, and that he would speak with Mr. Sauer, the state secretary about it.

What the above examples show is that many Muslim women’s organizations have succeeded in building trustworthy relationships with actors from civil society, the administration, politics and academia that have proven essential in confronting anti-Muslim racism and its related impacts. While anti-Muslim racism has reaffirmed and strengthened already existing boundaries through othering that is expressed in suspicion, allegation, and other forms of stigmatization, it has similarly motivated Muslim women’s organizations to form new alliances. As Muslim women’s organizations have become members in German majority institutions and have collaborated with a variety of other (non-Muslim) actors, they have contested institutionalized social differences (Lamont et al. 2016). This has not only transformed the perception of Muslim women’s organizations by parts of majority society; it has also strengthened the organizations’ sense of belonging.

Confrontation

Another strategy that Muslim women’s organizations have deployed vis-à-vis anti-Muslim racism is confrontation, though to a lesser extent than the aforementioned strategies. As the interviews show, confrontation has only been used in cases of more explicit forms of anti-Muslim racism in which actors are assumed to have acted on bad intentions and/or their guilt could be proven. This has been the case in a false media report that was published about one organization, false allegations made by collaborating partners, and the prohibition of ritual prayer in the facilities used by the respective organization.

Although most organizations’ representatives refrain from using confrontation as a strategy – since they do not believe in its added value or positive long-term effect – there are single incidents in which they have felt the urgency to clearly set limits by confronting the actors involved.

This is illustrated by the example in which an organization’s representative was confronted with false allegations; she was asked by the partner organization whose facilities the organization was using to prohibit ritual prayer during its activities. Confronting the chair of the respective organization, she responded:

You know what? That’s discrimination. And if that’s the reason why we’re not allowed to be here, then I’ll go to the district mayor. Then I’ll go to [the] anti-discrimination office. This is discrimination. You can’t blame me for doing this.

Although the respective Muslim women’s organization eventually left the premises and terminated its partnership with the other organization, this confrontation seemed to be important in order to reaffirm the organization’s Muslim identity and claim its right to hold ritual prayer. While Muslim women’s organizations rely on the intervention by third parties to confront anti-Muslim racism in some instances, in others they directly interact with the person or institution themselves to regain their agency.

Especially in light of prevalent stereotypical images of Muslim women that portray them as passive and helpless, the need for Muslim women(’s organizations) to be more confrontational is stressed in this quotation:

I think we need to go on the offensive as Muslim women. This “I am friendly and patient and I can handle everything” stuff–nothing comes of it. (…) That’s why you need to become more assertive and develop some good arguments.

Showing attitude and “authenticity”

A closely related strategy of Muslim women’s organizations that aims at reaffirming intersectional identity and related positions and practices in the face of anti-Muslim racism is showing attitude. This strategy has been deployed both as a general strategy and in particular situations in which Muslim women’s organizations have been confronted with subtle allegations by other civil society actors or state authorities.

The following statement of one of the organization’s representatives highlights the importance to adhere to the organization’s intersectional identity by referring to both the religious and gender identity in its name:

For me as a convert, it’s particularly important that Islam has a place in Germany, that Islam becomes socially acceptable, and that with names such as “Meeting Center for Muslim Women,” “Muslim Academy,” and “Muslim Family Counseling,” we as Muslims show (…) that we are here, we belong here, and we are good people.

Although this chairwoman identifies as a (white) native German and race and ethnicity are expected to be less of an issue for her, it seems that her religious identity assigns her a position outside German society; she needs to reclaim her national affiliation and belonging to German society. This indicates that the boundaries toward adherences of Islam are considerably bright and may even be more salient than German ethnicity. However, the respective chairwoman points out that the discrimination experienced by her employees of color differ from hers because they are additionally targeted on the basis of their race and ethnicity.

While most organizations in the study adhere to the principle of showing attitude and authenticity regardless of the consequences, there have also been concrete instances in which they have applied this principle as a concrete strategy against anti-Muslim racism. This is illustrated in an instance in which a civil society actor repeatedly questioned a Muslim women’s organization about the image of women it promotes as a way of insinuating that it is too “emancipated” to be compatible with Islam in his view. The chairwoman responded by reiterating her organization’s position. She stated:

Man, I am sick of hearing this and I’m sick of responding to it. He got the same frigging answer from me every time: “[We stand for women’s] self-determination. What more can I tell you, Mr. Demirel? […] I have explained it to you so many times.”

As this example shows, in light of a hegemonic discourse that portrays Muslim women as oppressed, Muslim women’s positioning as autonomous and emancipated is frequently contested. By reaffirming their autonomy, Muslim women’s organizations reshape the boundaries between Islam and secular liberalism to accommodate their intersectional identities.

Acting against stereotypes

Evidence from other accounts similarly indicates that Muslim women’s organizations frequently attempt to overcome the discursively constructed binary between Islam and gender inequality that undermines the perception of Muslim women as autonomous and equal actors. While showing attitude and authenticity is rather a strategy with which Muslim women’s organizations try to remain true to themselves, the final strategy of acting against stereotypes that I will analyze is more preoccupied with changing others’ perceptions of Muslim women and their organizations. While in some instances, acting against stereotypes manifests in concrete actions, in others it is expressed through counter-narratives that aim to challenge widespread stereotypes of Muslim women.

A widely held stereotype confronted by the organizations interviewed is the image of the uneducated, unskilled, and unemancipated Muslim woman. While the portrayal of Muslim women as unemancipated und submissive women goes back to orientalist imaginings (Zine 2006), the perception of Muslim women as uneducated and unskilled is mainly shaped by the immigration of a considerable number of Turkish guest workers to Germany in the 1960s who were predominantly of Muslim origin (Spielhaus 2013). Due to the intersection of Turkish immigrants’ Islamic religion and their working-class background, Muslims and particularly Muslim women in Germany have been generally associated with low social class adherence (Nökel 2002).

To disprove this stereotype, Muslim women’s representatives often emphasize their high educational level and their academic background as well as the high level of professionalism in their organization. This is illustrated by the statement in which one chairwoman points to the professionality of existing Muslim women’s organizations:

We are empowering German society so it becomes more diverse. We offer expert intercultural training. We don’t need to empower ourselves, we are (already) emancipated women. (…) I find it silly that [Muslim women’s empowerment] is being propagated again like it was 20 years ago.

In accordance with this assertion of professionalism, the organization’s representative stresses the importance of rejecting any project proposal that reproduces this stereotype of Muslim women. She refers to the experience of her own organization that is recognized as a professionally working organization:

As Muslim women we really need to reject projects where we always [are requested] to emancipate ourselves further, etc. We should actually refuse to do so. Because [our organization] succeeded in earning a good reputation as [run by] professional Muslim women.

As the example indicates, the organization has invested many resources in becoming a professional organization, but also in being perceived as such. This seems to be a precondition to recognition as a serious actor in civil society, but also in fighting general stereotypes toward Muslims and Muslim women in particular.

Another incident in which one of the organization’s representatives felt the pressure to counteract the prevalent stereotype of the subaltern, helpless Muslim woman was at a public event to which she was invited. She expressed this as follows:

I thought to myself: “You are going to say something now. You’re not going to leave without saying a word. Otherwise they will have the wrong image of you.”

As the statement indicates, Muslim women’s organizations are greatly concerned with their external image since it is shaped by gendered anti-Muslim discourses that determine the organizations’ scope of action. With confident, articulate representation, they seek to redraw the boundaries that confine them to a powerless position in the social hierarchy. While such boundaries constructed along gender, race, ethnicity and religious lines are blurred, other boundaries such as social class might become more relevant.

Another common stereotype that Muslim women’s organizations try to overcome is the image of the narrow-minded, isolated Muslim woman. This is often accompanied by the perception of visibly Muslim women as being conservative and highly devout. As a consequence, Muslim women(’s organizations) tend to be perceived as homogeneous and monolithic entities. This image is particularly harmful in the case of welfare organizations as they aim to reach many diverse target groups. Aware of the predominant perception of the headscarf as a symbol of illiberalism and female submission, some Muslim women’s organizations intentionally place the headscarf in the background by portraying women of diverse appearances. This becomes evident through the account of one Muslim women’s organization whose representative describes how her group counteracts the monolithic image of visibly Muslim women:

Sometimes we observe [this prejudice] when we take people through the center here, so we introduce our staff like this: we have a number of female employees without headscarves, so we intentionally [say]: “This is Mrs. Mohammed, without a headscarf. And this is Mrs. So-and-So.” So they see [women] with and without headscarves. They actually see a diverse mix.

Although most organizations pay particular attention to Muslim women’s needs, they nonetheless stress their openness to all women (and families), regardless of their ethnic and racial or religious background. As a result of their experience of stigmatization and exclusion, Muslim women’s organizations seek to reconfigure boundaries that separate Muslim women from other women and broader society within the dimension of religion. By accommodating different intersectional identities and positioning, they aim to create inclusive spaces that take post-migrant reality in Germany into account.

Response strategies vis-à-vis Islamism

The coding of the interview data reveals a disproportionate reference to anti-Muslim racism in comparison to Islamism. Thus, Islamism appears to be of less concern to Muslim women’s organizations.

This may be attributed to several factors: first, Islamism is not a structural feature of European society, particularly in Germany. While Muslim women’s organizations are confronted with anti-Muslim racism through their interaction with state authorities and other civil society actors in their daily work, their exposure to Islamism is rather limited. Similarly, there is no dependent relationship from Islamist actors as it is the case with respect to actors who are involved in incidents of anti-Muslim racism. This reflects the social power hierarchies in which both phenomena of anti-Muslim racism and Islamism are embedded. The rise of social media has also opened new avenues for Islamists to disseminate their ideologies and intervene in public and theological discussions. Second, Muslim women’s organizations represent rather controlled spaces insofar as Muslim women decide on their members and constituencies and are able to exclude those who do not comply with their ethical values. However, while the analog public spaces may not be easily accessible for Islamists and their agitation within these spaces is rather limited, they have increasingly made use of new communication channels such as social media to spread their ideology and mobilize support.

Radicalization prevention

While two of the researched organizations report having been targeted directly by Islamist actors, nearly all organizations acknowledge the harmful effects of Islamist ideologies and rhetoric on their constituencies and/or the whole of Muslim communities. Four organizations, having had previous experience with Islamist recruitment in their social environment or being aware of the potential rise of radical tendencies in general, have been active in the field of prevention work. A particular feature of this work provided by Muslim women’s organizations is their extended target group that includes, and in some cases specializes in, women and girls.

As the examples of this study show, the organizations pay particular attention to gender-specific dimensions of Islamism by addressing the singular image of (a modest and respectable) Muslim woman that Islamists promote. This entails specific gender norms that relegate Muslim women to the private sphere and requires them to comply with particular regulations as well as codes of conduct and dress. Parallel to anti-Muslim discourses that make demands on how Muslim women should dress to be accepted as equal members of society, Islamists impose their image of a “proper” Muslim female on Muslim women. Through counter-narratives that emphasize the plurality of opinions and chosen lifestyles, Muslim women’s organizations seek to counteract Islamists’ claim of absoluteness. Rather than conveying a specific role model of (Muslim) women, they encourage their constituencies to develop their own views and critically engage with their religion. This is described in the following account:

[It is] a prevention program in the sense that extremely radical groups try to push women into a very specific framework with very clear assignments of gender roles that are also highly restrictive with regard to women, with the dictate that they [women] should not question their religion–or anything as a matter of principle–but just do what they’re told (…). And this is exactly what we intend to counteract so they [women] don’t fall for this, so that they are enabled to act autonomously and make decisions on their own.

Another cornerstone of Muslim women’s prevention work is to foster identification with German society through narratives of belonging, leisure activities and meetings with prominent figures who act as role models. However, as many of the organizations’ representatives state, strengthening Muslim women’s sense of belonging represents a particular challenge in the face of gendered anti-Muslim racism that reaffirms existing social boundaries along the axis of gender, ethnicity, and race. The interviews indicate that most Muslim women’s organizations assign a decisive role to anti-Muslim racism within processes of Islamist radicalization. According to them, experiences of discrimination reinforce alienation from broader society, which are then exploited by Islamist actors for their own purposes. This resonates with literature in that field that refers to anti-Muslim racism as one push factor for Islamist radicalization (Abbas 2019; Esposito and Iner 2018; Mansoob and Pavan 2011). Taking the correlation of Islamism and anti-Muslim racism into account, overcoming anti-Muslim racism becomes an important aim in countering Islamism. As a consequence, addressing experiences of discrimination represents an essential component of the organizations’ prevention work. However, what their representatives consider problematic is the general securitization of their prevention work that considers all Muslims potential radicals. This confirms previous findings that critically examine Muslim communities’ involvement in deradicalization and prevention work (Abdel-Fattah 2020; Spalek 2012; Welten and Abbas 2021; Yousuf 2020) and is reflected in the following statement:

What also came to my mind with regard to our project is this securitization of our project work. What we do is actually youth work, but we always need to frame it as prevention, as security measures, and that then of course results in this stigmatization of our target group.

Not responding

Similar to the salience of gender in the context of prevention work, gender has been used as a central point of reference and a source of mobilization in instances of Islamist confrontation.

Two organizations reported to have been targeted directly by Islamist actors. In one case, an organization’s representative was denounced by an Islamist actor on a social media platform for her “immoral” dress and behavior as she shook hands with a political representative in public. Further hostile comments have appeared on social media platforms in which the appropriateness of the organization’s religious position has been questioned or even declared heresy. Through the promotion of an ideal image of a “proper” Muslim woman and the condemnation of all who deviate from it, Islamists draw symbolic boundaries between those who belong to the Muslim community and those who do not.

However, the organization concerned decided either to not respond or delete the defamatory posts. This might be explained by the limited harm these types of Islamist confrontations cause to Muslim women’s organizations. Another reason for the choice of not responding might also be the low prospect of the success of other strategies. Nevertheless, these incidents of verbal abuse might have signal effects that legitimize the interference in the self-determination and representation of Muslim women(’s organizations). Furthermore, these confrontations might sustain and fuel sexist attitudes and encourage other groups and individuals to engage in such derogatory discourse.

While some cases of censure toward Muslim women can clearly be categorized as Islamist, others are only considered conservative. Although there is some overlap between conservative views and Islamist ideologies with regard to gender norms that assign a privileged position to males, interviewees clearly differentiate between both phenomena. This thorough distinction seems to be of particular importance in a climate where unfavorable attitudes of Muslims are easily dismissed as Islamist and are consequently deemed illegitimate.

Confronting and developing counter-narratives

In another instance, Islamist actors made use of online information provided by a Muslim women’s organization regarding an incident of gendered anti-Muslim racism and published it on their own website. In the same vein, Islamists tried to mobilize around Muslim grievances by calling for donations to file an action for Muslim women who are legally forbidden to teach at public schools because they wear headscarves. As these incidents show, Muslim women’s experiences of gendered anti-Muslim racism represent an important source of Islamist mobilization. In this context, the work of Muslim women’s organizations is misused for Islamists’ own purposes. While no action was taken in the former instance, in the latter the organization’s representative raised awareness in her social environment and deconstructed the Islamists’ contradictory argumentation and abbreviated representation of the incident.

As the organization’s representative highlights the development of counter-narratives to confront Islamists’ argumentation, the issue is often complicated by the fact that Islamist claims (in relation to anti-Muslim racism) often hold true. However, the conclusions drawn from it are perceived as contradictory and highly problematic since they do not comply with democratic values and a pluralist model of society.

In another incident, an Islamist group posted a photograph and a quote from the aforementioned chairwoman on its website. When the chairwoman found out, she contacted the people responsible and asked them to remove both her picture and her statement from their website. Although her request was honored, her organization was later contacted by a presumably affiliated individual who tried to inquire the reason for her refusal to be cited by the Islamist group. The following account describes her response:

And then I said, “We have a particular way of working. And this consists of focusing on coalition and communalities, so to speak, and promoting them – but I have the impression that the [other] organization is acting rather divisively and we do not support this way of working, so we do not want to be associated with it.”

As the chairwoman’s response indicates, the organization clearly distances itself from the Islamist group. However, it does not do so by arguing on ideological or theological grounds, but on ethical ones. While Muslim women’s organizations support a pluralist model of society in which different attitudes, identities and lifestyles are recognized, Islamists convey an exclusivist view that draws sharp boundaries around the dimension of “the true” religion. According to their view, anyone who does not comply with their understanding of Islam does not belong to the “true” Muslim community.

Conclusion

In this study I have explored the strategies of Muslim women’s organizations vis-à-vis anti-Muslim racism and Islamism in Germany. The findings reveal that Muslim women’s organizations are not only disproportionately affected by anti-Muslim racism; they also face verbal assaults and exploitation by Islamist actors who mobilize around grievances of Muslim women.

An intersectional perspective to boundary making reveals the centrality of the social categories of gender, religion, race, and ethnicity within processes of boundary making. While experiences of anti-Muslim racism reaffirm (pre-)existing symbolic boundaries along the axes of religion, gender, race, and ethnicity and define belonging within German society, Islamists primarily refer to gender and religion in their practices of boundary making and determine who belongs to the Muslim community. In both cases, Muslim women’s organizations have experienced exclusion and stigmatization based on their gender identity and their right to self-determination has been neglected. In accordance with Lamont et al. (2016), social boundaries and their maintenance have limited the access of Muslim women’s organizations to material as well as symbolic resources (Lamont and Molnár 2002) and have thus limited their scope of action.

To overcome boundaries mediated through anti-Muslim racism and Islamism, Muslim women’s organizations have developed a variety of response strategies that include trust building and networking, the activation of existing contacts and networks, confrontation, showing attitude and authenticity, and acting against stereotypes. With regard to Islamism, the most common strategies are not responding or removal of social media posts, awareness raising (within the organization and respective social environment), prevention work, counter-narratives, and confrontation.

While strategies of confrontation, showing attitude, and not responding have tended to maintain or even strengthen (pre-)existing boundaries, most strategies have shifted or resolved established boundary (re-)constructs and transformed symbolic boundaries to accommodate intersectional identities that are marginalized within broader society. Within these processes, Muslim women’s organizations have (re-)positioned themselves within broader society, but have also sought to include other minority groups, such as migrant and refugee women, as well as other Muslim communities. This has been reflected in both their self-representation and their counternarratives that have emphasized the plurality of views and lifestyles.

By illuminating Muslim women’s strategies against anti-Muslim racism and Islamism and analyzing their related boundary making, this study applies an intersectional approach. Doing so, it contributes to the emerging body of literature on intersectional boundary making. In times of polarization from right-wing populists on the one hand and Islamists on the other, an understanding of boundary-making processes is pivotal to the strengthening of democratic forces that foster social cohesion. In addition, this work provides new insights into the dynamics of Muslim communities in Germany and their active contribution to a vital civil society. As the findings show, Muslim women’s organizations have access to diverse groups and communities due to their intersectional positioning and are thus able to mediate among different actors by blurring or overcoming existing boundaries along various identity markers.

In order to understand the decisions of Muslim women’s organizations to apply certain response strategies, further research inquiring into the determining conditions for their strategic choices is needed. In line with Lamont et al. (2016), this would require an in-depth analysis of the political and social context in which the organizations are embedded and an expansion of the actual sample to include greater regional diversity.

As the study has further shown, most incidents of Islamist agitations have been mediated through digital channels that provide easy access to other actors and allow for a greater degree of anonymity. In light of a relatively young Muslim population in Germany, it is to be expected that digital platforms will become more relevant. Future studies should therefore explore ways that anti-Muslim racism and Islamism are mediated through digital media and the implications for counterstrategies and related processes of boundary making. In addition, a study of informal groups that have been increasingly active on social media platforms would convey a more complete picture of Muslim women’s activism in Germany.

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank Gökçe Yurdakul, Özgür Özvatan, Anna Korteweg, the project team, and the members of the Migration Cluster for their generous comments on the draft version. Together with Bastian Neuhauser I presented. I would particularly like to thank all of the organizations’ representatives who agreed to be interviewed. An earlier version of this article at the CES conference and the ECPR conference in Summer 2022 and received helpful feedback from the panel and Jean Beaman. The article has also benefitted from thoughtful remarks by the anonymous reviewers and by the editors of the Special Issue, Serena D’Agostino and Nadia E. Brown. Any mistakes remain, of course, my own. I would particularly like to thank all of the organizations' representatives who agreed to be interviewed.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Correction Statement

This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung (Project "Deutscher Islam") [01UG2035]. I acknowledge support by the Open Access Publication Fund of Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin.

Notes on contributors

Fatima El Sayed

Fatima El Sayed is a research associate at the Berlin Institute for Integration and Migration Research at Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Germany. She studied political science at the Freie Universität Berlin, Germany and at the Universidad de Granada, Spain. She is currently pursuing her doctoral degree from the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. Her research interests include critical migration and integration studies, gender, intersectionality and postcolonial theories.

Notes

1. The meaning of identity categories within intersectional studies is highly contested. While some scholars criticize the use of identity categories as essentializing and homogenizing (Harris 1990; Lugones 2007), rendering internal group hierarchies and marginalization invisible (Cole 2009; Nash 2008), other scholars contend that unitary categories are at the very heart of intersectionality, but need to be reconceptualized (Carastathis 2016). For analytical purposes and in line with scholars such as Belkhir and McNair Barnett (2001) this study explores those four identity categories that seem discursively most salient with regard to Muslim women in Germany.

Appendix

Table A1. Overview of the Organizations Interviewed.

Organization name	City	Number of Members	Founding year	Main Goals	Main Services	Main target group(s)
Coalition of Muslim Women (Aktionsbündnis muslimischer Frauen, AmF)	Wesseling	500	2009	Improvement of Muslim women’s political and social participation	Representation of Muslim women’s interests	Muslim women
Meeting and Education Center for Women and Families (Begegnungs- und Bildungszentrum für Frauen und Familien, BBF)	Berlin	30	2019	Empowerment and Support of Muslim/Migrant women	Social Services	(Muslim/Migrant) Women and Families
Muslim Women’s Center for Encounter and Further Education (Begegnungs- und Fortbildungszentrum muslimischer Frauen, BFmF)	Cologne	100 (employees)	1996	Social Welfare	Social Services	Minorities and disadvantaged persons
Family Education Center MINA (Familienbildungszentrum MINA)	Duisburg	48	2009	Empowerment of Muslim women and women of Color	Social Services	Muslim and minoritized women and children
Women’s Initiative for Education and Childcare (Fraueninitiative für Bildung und Erziehung, FIBEr)	Bonn	40	2009	Women’s empowerment, integration of immigrant and refugee women	Social Services	Migrant and refugee women
Welfare Services of Muslim Women (Sozialdienst Muslimischer Frauen, SmF)	Cologne	119	2016	Social Welfare	Social Services	Muslim and minoritized women