The Dialectic of Empathy and Freedom

Abstract

This article applies dialectical logic, as it has been emerging in contemporary relational theory, to the self-psychological concept of empathy. It proposes a reframing of analytic empathy as a core ideal that exists in dialectical tension with analytic freedom. The principle of analytic freedom, first made explicit in the theories of Bion and Winnicott, is broader and more robust than that of expressive authenticity (central in contemporary relational theory) because it refers not only to the analyst's expressiveness but to a quality of the analyst's “inner” experience and processing capacities in the presence of the patient. This article argues further that the capacity for analytic empathy rests on the various capacities involved in the exercise of analytic freedom. The importance of the dialectic of empathy and freedom comes fully into focus when one appreciates that self-transformation emerges from the total intersubjective relationship between patient and analyst, not only the analyst's empathic understanding.

En este artículo aplico la lógica dialéctica, tal como ha emergido en la teoría relacional contemporánea, al concepto de empatía de la psicología del self. Propongo una reformulación de la empatía analítica como el ideal central en tensión dialéctica con la libertad analítica. El principio de libertad analítica, que fue primeramente explicitado en las teorías de Bion y Winnicott, es más amplia y más potente que el principio de autenticidad expresiva (central en la teoría relacional contemporánea) porque se refiere no sólo a la expresividad del analista sino a la cualidad de la experiencia ‘interna’ del analista y a su capacidad de procesar en presencia del paciente. Además argumento que la capacidad para la empatía analítica depende de las distintas capacidades implicadas en la libertad analítica. La importancia de la dialéctica entre empatía y libertad se pone en evidencia cuando se observa que la transformación del self emerge de la relación intersubjetiva global entre paciente y analista, no solamente de la comprensión empática por parte del analista.

Dans cet article, j'applique une logique dialectique telle qu'elle a émergée dans la théorie relationnelle contemporaine, au concept d'empathie en psychologie du soi. Je propose un recadrage de l'empathie analytique en tant qu'idéal fondamental existant dans une tension dialectique avec la liberté analytique. Le principe de liberté analytique a d'abord été explicité dans les théories de Bion et de Winnicott. Ce principe est plus large et plus robuste que celui de l'authenticité expressive (centrale à la théorie relationnelle contemporaine) parce qu'il réfère non seulement à l'expressivité de l'analyste mais aussi à la qualité de l'expérience «interne» de l'analyste et à ces capacités de traitement de cette expérience en présence du patient. De plus, je soutiens que la capacité d'empathie analytique repose sur les diverses capacités impliquées dans l'exercice de la liberté analytique. L'importance de la dialectique entre l'empathie et la liberté se clarifie pleinement lorsqu'on se rend compte que la transformation de soi émerge à partir de toute la relation intersubjective entre le patient et l'analyste et non pas seulement à partir de la compréhension empathique de l'analyste.

In dieser Arbeit wende ich die dialektische Logik, so wie sie sich aus der gegenwärtigen relationalen Theorie entwickelt hat, auf das selbstpsychologische Konzept der Empathie an. Ich schlage eine Neuformulierung des zentralen Ideals: analytische Empathie - vor, das in einer dialektischen Spannung mit analytischer Freiheit steht. Das Prinzip der analytischen Freiheit, zuerst formuliert in der Theorie von Bion und Winnicott, umfasst einen weiteren Bereich und ist robuster als das der expressiven Authentizität (ein zentraler Begriff der gegenwärtigen relationalen Theorie), weil es sich nicht nur auf die Expressivität des Analytikers, sondern auch auf die Qualität seines inneren Erlebens und seine, in Gegenwart des Patienten aufsteigenden Fähigkeiten bezieht. Daraufhin lege ich dar, dass die Fähigkeit zur analytischen Empathie geradezu begründet ist in den verschiedenen Fähigkeiten, die in der Einübung in die analytische Freiheit eingeschlossen sind. Die Wichtigkeit der Dialektik von Empathie und Freiheit wird klar erkennbar, wenn wir wirklich zur Kenntnis nehmen, dass Selbst-Veränderung aus der zur Gänze intersubjektiven Beziehung zwischen Patient und Analytiker entsteht und nicht nur aus dem empathischen Verstehen des Analytikers.

Keywords:

• dialectic
• intention
• empathy
• freedom
• intersubjective
• aliveness
• self-transformation
• fittedness

Notes

¹It is beyond the scope of this article to fully develop the following, but I propose a distinction between at least three kinds of dialectic that have emerged in the relational literature: existential, developmental, and technical. An existential dialectic is one that is inherent in the human condition (or in a particular domain of human experience), and over which one has little or no control. Ogden (1994) regards the relationship between the Freudian conscious and unconscious as the first such dialectic to have been discovered and named within psychoanalysis—that is, according to Ogden (1994), the revolutionary insight in Freud's topographical model is that human subjectivity is constituted dialectically in the complex interplay of conscious and unconscious experience. Teicholz (1999) has argued that the relationship between self and selfobject in Kohut's theory is another such dialectic: The experiences of self and selfobject connectedness are understood to be mutually constitutive aspects of human subjectivity. An example of a developmental dialectic is Benjamin's (1988, 1990) dialectic between self-assertion and recognition of the other's subjectivity. The capacity to shift back and forth between one and the other, and to fully appreciate their essential interdependence, is a developmental achievement rather than a human given. Finally, the various dialectical tensions identified by Hoffman (1998) as guides for the analyst's therapeutic presence or intentionality are examples of technical dialectics. The dialectics between, for example, expressive spontaneity and analytic discipline, or relational mutuality and asymmetry, refer to more or less conscious aspects of the analyst's intentionality or technique that, if recognized and embraced, are thought to contribute to therapeutic action. There may be, in addition, hybrid or more complex forms of dialectic. For example, the relationship between self and interactive regulation in Beebe and Lachmann's (2002) work strikes me as a complex dialectic with elements of all three types (although they, themselves, do not label it a dialectic). Although I believe all three forms have potential contributions to make within self psychology, it is the last type that I focus on in this article.

²Teicholz (personal communication, September 8, 2007) has alerted me to an important, although unpublished, article of hers in which she does fully embrace a dialectical relationship between empathy and authenticity (Teicholz, 2002). Thus, my statement here refers only to her published positions on the topic.

³See Waddell (2002) for a beautiful rendering of Bion's (1970) developmental theory, replete with vivid examples of both mother–infant and therapist–patient interactions illustrating reverie and containment functions.

⁴We see these ideas carried forward in the work of Eigen (1997) and Ogden (1996), as well as in the contemporary relational understanding of enactment as a mutual or shared dissociation (Bromberg, 1998; Stern, 2003).

⁵Here, Bion (1970) anticipated one of the major conclusions and clinical recommendations of contemporary non-linear dynamic systems theorists: the principle of remaining open to that which is not yet known and perhaps even unknowable.

⁶Although beyond the scope of this article, it occurs to me that the analyst's exercise of relative freedom is a primary basis for the patient's development of an idealizing selfobject transference. Idealization is a complex topic: I believe there are many forms of it. Some forms are “given”; some are “earned.” It is the earned idealization that, I believe, is ultimately most therapeutic. One of the principal ways the analyst earns the patient's necessary idealization is through the competent exercise of analytic freedom.

⁷ Benjamin (2004), following Ghent (1990), has described this as surrender, on the analyst's part, to the “intersubjective third.” It also seems to have qualities of the shift toward mentalization described by Fonagy et al. (2002).

⁸No matter how well our theories seem to capture the analytic experience, there will always be a mysterious element beyond conscious and symbolic comprehension (Bion, 1970; Bollas, 1999; Coburn, 2007). That ever-present mystery is best approached with a maximum degree of analytic freedom.

⁹The dialectic of subjectivity and intersubjectivity falls in the category of existential dialectics, which I defined in Footnote 1.