This Better Be Good! Complex Systems and the Dread of Influence

Abstract

As much as a bidirectional model of influence has enhanced our understanding of the therapeutic process, this article argues that reliance on two-person models has limited our ability to explore the role that influence plays in therapeutic action. From a psychoanalytic complexity perspective, the manner in which the dyad adapts to influence is a dynamic, emergent property of numerous systems in which the dyad itself is embedded. The conditions that support the dyad's capacity to adapt to and use influence in a manner that builds complexity and supports therapeutic change are explored and contrasted with the qualities of systems that “dread influence” and tend to resist change. From a complexity perspective, therapeutic action involves the dyadic capacity to adapt to one another, as well as to these multiple sources of influence, and to self-organize in a manner that produces and sustains therapeutic change.

Translations of Abstract

Tanto como el modelo bidireccional de influencia ha aumentado nuestra comprensión del proceso terapéutico, este artículo argumenta que la dependencia del modelo bipersonal ha limitado nuestra habilidad para explorar el papel que la influencia juega en la acción terapéutica. Desde la perspectiva de la complejidad psicoanalítica, la manera en que la díada se adapta a la influencia es una propiedad dinámica y emergente de los numerosos sistemas en los que la misma díada se halla incrustada. Se exploran las condiciones que sustentan la capacidad de la díada para adaptarse y utilizar la influencia de manera que construya la complejidad y apoye el cambio terapéutico; ello se contrasta con los sistemas que “temen la influencia” y tienden a resistir el cambio. Desde la perspectiva de la complejidad, la acción terapéutica incluye la capacidad de la díada de adaptarse el uno al otro así como a las fuentes de influencia, y auto-organizarse de una manera que produzca y sostenga el cambio terapéutico.

Cet article affirme qu'autant un modèle d'influence bidirectionnelle a amélioré notre compréhension du processus thérapeutique, autant l'utilisation des modèles à deux personnes a limité notre capacité d'exploration du rôle que l'influence joue dans l'action thérapeutique. Vue dans une perspective de complexité psychanalytique, la manière avec laquelle la dyade s'adapte à l'influence est une propriété émergente, dynamique des nombreux systèmes dans lesquels la dyade est elle-même enchâssée. On y explore les conditions soutenant la capacité de la dyade à s'adapter à, et à utiliser l'influence, d'une manière qui construit la complexité et soutient le changement thérapeutique; ces conditions sont mises en contraste avec les qualités des systèmes qui “appréhendent l'influence” et qui tendent à résister au changement. D'une perspective de complexité, l'action thérapeutique implique la capacité dyadique à s'adapter l'un à l'autre, de même qu'aux multiples sources d'influence, et à s'auto-organiser de telle manière que cela produit et soutient le changement thérapeutique.

Questo articolo sostiene che il modello bi-direzionale di influenza ha arricchito la nostra comprensione del processo terapeutico tanto quanto l'affidarsi ai modelli bi-personali abbia limitato la nostra capacità di esplorare il ruolo sostenuto dall'influenza nell'azione terapeutica. A partire da una prospettiva psicoanalitica della complessità, la modalità di adattamento della diade all'influenza è intesa come una proprietà dinamica e emergente di numerosi sistemi in cui la diade stessa è radicata. L'articolo esplora prima le condizioni che sostengono la capacità della diade di adattarsi e di utilizzare l'influenza per accrescere la complessità e supportare il cambiamento terapeutico, per poi confrontarle con le qualità dei sistemi che “temono l'influenza” e tendono a resistere al cambiamento. Da una prospettiva della complessità, l'azione terapeutica implica la capacità della diade di adattarsi sia a livello reciproco sia a sorgenti multiple di influenza, e di auto-organizzarsi in un modo tale da produrre e sostenere il cambiamento terapeutico.

So sehr ein zweidimensionales Modell gegenseitiger Beeinflussung unser Verständnis des therapeutischen Prozesses auch vergrößert hat, soll diese Arbeit aber zeigen, dass das Vertrauen auf „Zwei-Personen Modelle“ unsere Fähigkeit begrenzt hat, die Rolle, die dem „Einfluss“ in der therapeutischen Aktion zukommt, zu untersuchen. Aus der Perspektive der psychoanalytischen Komplexitätstheorie ist die Art, in der eine Dyade sich auf das Einflussnehmen einstellt, eine dynamische, auftauchende Eigenheit mehrerer Systeme, in die die Dyade ihrerseits eingebettet ist. Die Bedingungen, die die Fähigkeit der Dyade unterstützen, sich auf den Einfluss einzustellen und ihn auch zu gebrauchen, so dass Komplexität aufgebaut und therapeutische Veränderung erreicht werden kann, werden untersucht und den Eigenschaften von Systemen gegenübergestellt, die Einfluss „fürchten“ und therapeutische Veränderung nicht zulassen. Aus der Perspektive der Komplexitätstheorie, schließt therapeutisches Handeln die dyadische Fähigkeit mit ein, sich einander, ebenso wie an die vielfältigen anderen Einflüsse anzupassen, und sich selbst auf eine Weise zu organisieren, die therapeutische Veränderung erzeugt und erhalten kann.

Keywords:

• adaptation
• complexity
• dread of influence
• mutual, reciprocal influence
• nonlinear dynamic systems theory
• systems
• therapeutic action

Notes

¹There is not a single, consistent definition of what constitutes complexity. The difficulty of precisely defining complexity, let alone measuring it, is frequently noted by complexity theorists and reflects the nature of the theory. See M. Mitchell (2009) for an overview of the difficulties of defining complexity.

²This classical view of influence is beautifully illustrated by Bloom's (1973) discussion of poetic history and influence. The oedipal conflict is central to Bloom's argument that “anxiety of influence” reflects every strong, creative poet's unconscious worry that he is not the originator of his own works—that he owes his creativity to his admired predecessor. Bloom suggested that to deal with his anxiety of his predecessor's influence, a strong poet “misreads” his predecessor's words to clear his own “imaginative space.” Applying Bloom's ideas to psychoanalytic theorizing, Kainer and Kainer (1984) suggested that creative psychoanalytic theorists must also wrestle concepts away from their predecessors (not the least of whom is Freud) to build their own theories. The anxiety of influence as articulated by Bloom and Kainer and Kainer reflects a one-directional intrapsychic conflict model of influence.

³There were several noteworthy exceptions to this view in the countertransference literature (see Heimann, 1950; Little, 1951; Racker, 1957).

⁴I am grateful to William Coburn for initially suggesting this metaphor for a bidirectional model.

⁵Stolorow, Atwood, and Orange (2002) suggested the term experiential world to capture an individual's embeddedness in numerous and overlapping relational contexts. In their words, “… the experiential world seems to be both inhabited by and inhabiting of the human being. People live in worlds, and worlds in people” (p. 34).

⁶The interactions of complex systems are said to be “rich,” meaning that any element in a system influences and is influenced by many others. From the perspective of complexity theory, the behavior of the system as a whole, however, is not determined by the exact number of interactions between any particular elements (i.e., dyads) within the system. Some of the elements of the system may perform redundant functions as that of any one richly connected element (Cilliers, 1998).

⁷Cultural embeddedness is an obvious but largely under-examined example of a larger systemic context.

⁸See Coburn (2009) for an excellent discussion of the attitudes that emanate from a psychoanalytic complexity sensibility.

⁹Complex adaptive systems are described as having important characteristics—one of which is that the agents are capable of learning from their interactions with the environment. See Cilliers (1998, pp. 3–4) for a description of other characteristics associated with complex systems.

¹⁰This emphasis on destabilization and perturbation is mostly harmonious with Beebe and Lachmann's (2002) principle of disruption and repair that, they argued, contributes to the individual's relational expectancies. Initially, Beebe and Lachmann (1994, 2002) viewed this process as altering the patient's self-regulatory process. More recently, Beebe and Lachmann (2003) noted that these interactions also affect the analyst, as well as the ways that the dyad coordinates the repair process. Complexity theory is compatible with their revised view—the system itself is destabilized and not merely the individual agents. Furthermore, in the wake of perturbation, the system does not return to its former relational patterns (i.e., the emphasis is not on “repair” per se), but the perturbation enables the system to self-organize into a new pattern of relatedness that may include new possibilities for repair (Sperry, 2008). This emphasis on relational patterning is broader than Beebe and Lachmann's focus on regulation.

¹¹Brandchaft's (2007) elaboration of systems that require pathological accommodation at the expense of the expression and development of psychological distinctiveness provides an excellent illustration of one such context.

¹² Hoffman (2009) argued that, although contemporary theories recognize and welcome the role of the analyst's influence as an aspect of “corrective experience,” we mostly continue to rely on the use of interpretation rather than on the expression of “passionate” responsiveness. Hoffman argued that this focus reflects the ongoing influence of classic theory and taboos, as well as the analyst's ambivalent retreat from responsibility and more “robust” engagement. In the case of my work with John, I certainly used interpretation defensively at times; however, it also reflects the nature of our interactions.

¹³In fact, sometimes aspects of the analyst's subjectivity are conveyed as a function of that restraint (W. Coburn, personal communication, June 7, 2009).