The Double-Edged Sword of “Buddhist Democracy” in Myanmar

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Notes

1. The latter is the closest to a literal translation. The former two, offered in more recent publications, may reflect the increasing democratic “spin” through which Mahāsammatha is understood and described in modern Buddhism.

2. As noted by Matthew Walton, this pessimistic reading of human nature has been used in Burmese history to legitimate stronger political authority by Burmese kings and military rulers, whereas some of those championing democracy have focused on competing Theravada notions about the propensity of all beings to strive for and even achieve moral perfection and enlightenment (2012, 80–81).

3. The only historical evidence that exists from the actual time of Aśoka, the rock edicts, offers an ambiguous picture about Aśoka's so-called conversion. In fact, the “dharma” to which Aśoka commits himself out of remorse could very well be the classical Hindu-Indian understanding of dharma as duty and moral obligation determined by caste and social position, rather than the Buddhist understanding of dharma (Pāli: dhamma) as the teachings of the Buddha.

4. As John Strong has shown, a stricter reading of Aśoka in the Aśokavadana reveals a much more ambiguous moral figure. He is described as physically unattractive, prone to fits of rage, and, fickle in his allegiance to nonviolence even after his conversion.

5. U Hpo Hlaing refers to the Mahāsammatha story as one of “traditional Myanmar political ideas” (Walton 2012, 85).

6. See also Andrew Huxley's analysis of U Hpo Hlaing's treatise in Buddhism, Power, and Political Order, in which he described U Hpo Hlaing as revitalizing rather than revolutionizing notions of governance (Huxley 2007, 49).

7. In 1993, during a speech in Washington, D.C., His Holiness the Dalai Lama said this: The institution the Buddha established was the sangha or monastic community, which functioned on largely democratic lines. Within this fraternity, individuals were equal whatever their social class or caste origins ' Individual freedom, exemplified by liberation or enlightenment, was the primary focus of the entire community … [W]ithin the community decisions were taken by vote and differences were settled by consensus. Thus, the sangha served as a model for social equality, sharing of resources, and democratic process (1993).

8. A striking example comes from Tibet, where the Dalai Lama has stated that he will not reincarnate, and so propagate the office of the Dalai Lama, unless it is the will of the people, and where he stepped down as Tibet's political leader and initiated an electoral process for selecting the political leader of the Tibetan-government-in-exile. On his website, in an essay concerning his reincarnation, he writes the following: “The Dalai Lamas have functioned as both the political and spiritual leaders of Tibet for 369 years since 1642. I have now voluntarily brought this to an end, proud and satisfied that we can pursue the kind of democratic system of government flourishing elsewhere in the world. In fact, as far back as 1969, I made clear that concerned people should decide whether the Dalai Lama's reincarnations should continue in the future (2011).

9. As some scholars have noted, these political citizenry movements arose in part contemporaneous with the rise of the mass lay-meditation movement launched originally by Ledi Sayadaw. Some have drawn a link between the “democratization” or “laicization” of Buddhist practice, the widening participation of lay Buddhists in practices and study traditionally practiced only by spiritual elite (monastics) and the growing democratic political impulse more generally. See Jordt 2007 and Braun 2013.

10. Walton cites a monk in Yangon who offered a sermon in 2011 in which he said explicitly “Democracy is Buddha's doctrine. It is truly Buddha's doctrine … If you have taya you will have democracy … Democracy means acting in accordance with taya, having laws.” The term “taya” has multiple meanings but implies fairness, justness, and a sort of Buddhist natural law (Walton 2012, 218).

11. Schober tends to describe the Buddhist merit-making rituals of the military regime as disingenuous: “The regimes agenda encompasses control over monastic institutions and mobilizing the general population for Buddhist and nationalist causes” (Schober 2005, 117). By contrast, Jordt in her book Burma's Lass May Meditation Movement argues that the practice, and the intentions of the individual officials offering merit, are more complex, and offers reflections from many Burmese who see these actions as being in keeping with expectations for Buddhist rulers, and bringing some tangible and spiritual benefit to the Buddhist community.

12. This notion also manifested as a result of the policies and attitudes of Burmese military leaders, who saw those outside the religious (and ethnic) majority as potential threats to the integrity and stability of the state.

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Susan Hayward

Susan Hayward is Director of Religion and Inclusive Societies at the US Institute of Peace, where she coordinates the Institute's efforts engaging religious actors and factors to advance sustainable peace. She has published widely on issues such as interfaith engagement in the midst of political violence, political Buddhism in Sri Lanka and Myanmar, and the role of religion in hampering and propelling women's work for peace. She is currently pursuing her doctorate in theology from Georgetown University, focusing on Christian and Buddhist responses to authoritarianism and violence in Myanmar.