Keep the Faith: How American Diplomacy Got Religion, and How to Keep It

Any discussion of post-Obama U.S. international religious freedom (IRF) policy needs to acknowledge two basic structural realities. First, the State Department’s IRF Office is arguably the strongest and healthiest it has ever been. Second, the State Department as a whole is more institutionally attentive to religion than at any time in living memory. The next administration will have the duty and opportunity to consider afresh where IRF fits—conceptually, practically, and bureaucratically—within the State Department’s greatly expanded architecture for religion and diplomacy.

I will try to justify these two rather bold claims regarding the IRF Office and the State Department, and then offer a series of recommendations for how the next administration might best leverage existing momentum to further enhance U.S. IRF promotion.

IRF in the Bush Administration

First, the IRF Office is the strongest it has been since its creation in 1998. Despite the torrent of criticism that Obama and his administration have received for supposedly giving short shrift to international religious freedom, Obama’s record on the issue, especially during his second term, has actually been fairly good. And it looks all the better in comparison to the Bush Administration. I served in the IRF Office under Bush and Obama, so my reflections here are based largely on my own first-hand experience—as well as on the research I conducted for my doctoral dissertation, A New Beginning: Barack Obama and Reshaping of American Religious Diplomacy (Birdsall 2014).

During the Bush Administration, the IRF Office grew rapidly—from a handful of staff to over 20—but it struggled to capitalize on its size and its status as the Department’s only “religion office.” The office’s potential was limited by significant conceptual, practical, and bureaucratic impediments. Let’s briefly examine each of these three impediments.

Conceptually, the IRF Act of 1998, the legislation that created the office, framed U.S. promotion of religious freedom as a humanitarian objective largely disconnected from broader strategic goals. The opening line of the act states its purpose: “To express United States foreign policy with respect to, and to strengthen United States advocacy on behalf of, individuals persecuted in foreign countries on account of their religion.” A noble cause, for sure. But why is it in American interests to pursue this objective? The act grounds U.S. IRF promotion in America’s historical experience, international human rights documents, and the gruesome realities of persecution in the modern world. But it does not detail why assisting persecuted individuals might advance other U.S. goals such as democracy, civil society, economic development, or counter-radicalization.

To be fair, at the time of the act’s drafting, scholarly and policy attention to religion in international affairs was still in its infancy. But then as scholarship raced forward in the ensuring years—propelled, in no small measure, by scholars mining the data in the Department’s annual IRF Report—the IRF Office remained saddled with a congressional act that fossilized a 1990’s vision of religious freedom. As Thomas Farr, IRF Office director from 1999 to 2003, argued, the State Department’s promotion of religious freedom was one of “reacting to the outrages of persecuting governments,” and thus “The religious freedom office has nearly no input into our broader democracy strategy” (Farr 2006).

Practically, the office’s potential was limited by a lack of religious diversity among its staff and the perception of pro-Christian bias. Many of us “IRFlings,” as we called ourselves, did actively engage and advocate on behalf all religious communities, but most of the high-profile cases that consumed the office’s time, attention, and political capital involved persecuted Christians. It did not help that the administration’s “War on Terror” was widely perceived by Muslims as an anti-Islamic campaign.

Bureaucratically, the IRF Office’s marginalization within the State Department structure militated against its success. The IRF Act established the IRF Office, but did not specify where the Department should place the office within its vast bureaucracy. The Clinton Administration, which had vigorously denounced the IRF Act for creating a so-called hierarchy of human rights, placed the new office within the existing human right bureau. This arrangement set up an inherently awkward dynamic. As Farr noted,

The position of ambassador at large, created by the act as “principal advisor to the president and secretary,” is viewed at the State Department as a mere deputy in the human rights bureau, itself perceived within the building as outside the diplomatic mainstream. (Farr 2006)

As for the ambassador’s office, Farr lamented that it is “still viewed within State as custodian of a special interest issue imposed by Congress.”

IRF in the Obama Administration

During the Obama Administration, the IRF Office has continued to face these challenges, but significant progress has been made on each front.

Conceptually, the IRF Office has in recent years articulated, for internal and external audiences, a much broader understanding of religious freedom and its relation to strategic foreign policy goals. The Introduction to the 2009 IRF Report, the first issued during the Obama era, framed the issue this way:

Despite the varied conditions religious communities encounter around the globe, the principled and practical reasons for safeguarding their freedom remain the same: religious freedom is a fundamental right, a social good, a source of stability, and a key to international security. (US State Department 2009)

Many other statements by Obama, Clinton, Kerry, and a host of other senior administration officials have expounded the strategic relevance of religious freedom.

Practically, the IRF Office has diversified its staff and greatly expanded its engagement with religious communities around the world. The current IRF ambassador, David Saperstein, is a Jewish rabbi who brings an extensive network of new contacts to the job. Having spent 40 years as the director of the Religious Action Center, Reform Judaism’s political and legislative arm, Saperstein is supremely well connected and respected around Washington and indeed around the world.

Bureaucratically, the IRF Office remains in DRL, as is appropriate, but it enjoys much more congenial relationships with colleagues inside and outside its bureau. Life within a bureaucracy is complex, but a reputation for competence, fairness, and collegiality goes a long way. Also, the office now has added firepower as the institutional home of the first-ever Special Advisor for Religious Minorities in the Near East and South/Central Asia. In September 2015, the Obama Administration tapped veteran religious freedom advocate Knox Thames for the new role.

Even with all this conceptual, practical, and bureaucratic progress, promoting religious freedom is of course still an uphill battle. Authoritarian governments and extremists movements fiercely oppose efforts to advance international respect for religious pluralism and toleration. Closer to home, Obama’s first term was a reputational nightmare for the IRF office. The position of IRF ambassador remained vacant for two years and then was filled for two years by someone spectacularly unqualified and ineffective. With Saperstein’s arrival the office has thoroughly rebounded. But it now has the blessing and curse of needing to navigate a much more complex religion bureaucracy at the State Department.

The State Department Got Religion

That leads us to my second claim, that the State Department as a whole is more institutionally attentive to religion than at any time in living memory. This claim is even easier to substantiate than the first.

For years, seasoned practitioners and knowledgeable observers of American diplomacy criticized the State Department’s religion deficient. In his seminal 1994 edited volume, Religion, The Missing Dimension of Statecraft, Douglas Johnston argued, “Foreign policy practitioners in the United States … are often inadequately equipped to deal with situations involving other nation-states where the imperatives of religious doctrine blend intimately with those of politics and economics” (Johnston and Samson 1994, 3).

Former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright concurred with Johnston’s assessment and even commended many of his policy recommendations in her 2006 book The Mighty and the Almighty: Reflections on God, America, and World Affairs. Albright frankly admits that she was trained to avoid religion in polite company and applied that mind-set to her diplomacy. Not wanting future diplomats to make the same costly mistake, she urges them to “learn as much as possible about religion, and then incorporate that knowledge into their strategies” (Albright 2006, 73).

In the decade since the publication of Albright’s book, American diplomats have been on a steep learning curve with respect to religion. At a conceptual, practical, and bureaucratic level, Albright’s message has been taken to heart.

Conceptually, American diplomats increasingly understand that religion is a factor whose relevance extends far beyond obvious issues like religious freedom, radicalization, and faith-based charity. It touches on nearly every major issue. Religious groups have unique capability, credibility, and constituencies to bring to bear on issues of concern to the United States government. Thus, John Kerry signaled in 2013 that religious engagement would be a signature priority of his time as Secretary of State:

So I say to my fellow State Department employees, all of them, wherever you are, I want to reinforce a simple message: I want you to go out and engage religious leaders and faith-based communities in our day-to-day work. Build strong relationships with them and listen to their insights and understand the important contributions that they can make individually and that we can make together. (Kerry and US State Department 2013)

Practically, the State Department, along with other foreign affairs departments, has developed a range of new tools for understanding and engaging religion overseas. In 2010, President Obama commissioned the Religious Engagement Report to assess how every U.S. overseas post was engaging faith communities. In 2011, the Foreign Service Institute launched an excellent new course on Religion and Foreign Policy that it continues to offer periodically. The Working Group on Religion and Foreign Policy, a community of eminent outside experts, has advised the State Department on a range of religion-related issues for the past several years.

Bureaucratically, there has been a dramatic proliferation of religion-related institutions within the State Department. When Johnston wrote in 1994 the State Department had no religion-focused office. When Albright wrote, there was only the IRF Office.¹ But in the last decade we have seen the creation of the Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism, the Special Envoy to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the Special Representative to Muslim Communities, the Special Representative for Religion and Global Affairs, and the aforementioned Special Advisor for Religious Minorities in the Near East and South/Central Asia. All these “specials,” save for that last one, now reside within the Office of Religion and Global Affairs, itself situated within the Office of Secretary on the State Department’s rarefied 7th floor.

Between the RGA Office and the IRF Office, the State Department now has over 50 employees working full-time on issues at the nexus of religion and foreign policy. Hundreds of other State Department officials in Washington and at overseas posts work on portfolios that regularly intersect with religious actors and factors.

Religion is no longer the missing dimension of statecraft—or at least it is more findable than it once was.

Recommendations

So, how should the next administration leverage the Department’s enhanced religion-attentiveness in the service of advancing religious freedom around the world? In keeping with the schema of the conceptual, practical, and bureaucratic, let me offer a series of recommendations under each of those headings.

Conceptual Recommendations

The next administration will need to give serious attention to both religious freedom and religious engagement. It must articulate and then demonstrate a compelling account of how the two intersect. George W. Bush came to office with a keen personal interest in religious freedom but not until 9/11 did he give much thought to broader religious engagement—and his administration struggled mightily to conceptualize a coherent approach to Muslim outreach. Obama was just the opposite. He came to office having pledged to restore America’s relationship with the Muslim world, but he initially gave little attention to religious freedom and some of his White House aides were quite skeptical of the IRF Office. Given the urgency of persecution and other religion-related global crises, the next administration must attend to religious freedom and engagement from the get-go.

But how are the two related? As I see it, religious freedom and religious engagement are distinct yet overlapping, and they can be mutually reinforcing. They need each other and build off of each other. Some modicum of religious freedom is necessary for any meaningful religious engagement. There is no possibility of genuine engagement with faith groups in North Korea, for instance. If done well, engagement with diverse religious communities on any given issue can help to foster the understanding, trust, and relationships required for pluralism and freedom to take root. And more freedom brings more opportunities for engagement. And on it goes.

That does not mean the two activities are easily synchronized in practice. It can be awkward to pursue proactive engagement and condemn abuses in the same meeting in a religiously restrictive country. For that reason, the two functions should be coordinated but not combined. There is currently a good deal of communication between IRF and RGA staff, and the next administration should ensure that this communication continues. When selecting appointees for RGA and IRF leadership positions, the next administration should look for individuals who share a strong commitment to collaboration and who see their particular role as part of the larger whole of religion and foreign policy.

Practical Recommendations

There are any number of practical steps the next administration can take to advance religious freedom, but the first order of business is this: appoint an IRF ambassador immediately. Even before the inauguration in January, the incoming administration should identify a person for the post, and then announce that nomination within weeks of announcing the next Secretary of State and other senior diplomatic positions. The Bush and Obama administrations both took an inexcusably long time—14 months and 17 months, respectively—to nominate an IRF ambassador. That need not and should not happen again.

What is the rush? Three primary reasons. First, religious persecution is an urgent and escalating problem. Second, an expeditious appointment signals America’s commitment to advancing religious freedom. Everyone knows low priorities get slow appointments. Third, of all the “specials” with religion portfolios, the IRF ambassador is the only one who requires Senate confirmation—a process that can take several months. As length of service is an important element within the State Department’s formal and informal hierarchy, an IRF ambassador who is sworn in long after his or her colleagues in RGA will be at a distinct disadvantage.

I should add that if a Democrat wins the 2016 presidential election, they should consider keeping Amb. Saperstein in his post until the Senate confirms his replacement, so as to avoid an ambassador-less interregnum.

That leads me to one further practical recommendation: keep Knox Thames as the Senior Advisor for Religious Minorities in the Near East and South/Central Asia. Thames is a globally respected expert and is well liked by Republicans and Democrats. And he is new in the position and still carving out his diplomatic niche. Thames is not a political appointee, so he does not need to tender his resignation in January 2017. The next administration would do well to keep him on.

Bureaucratic Recommendations

The next administration should undertake a serious review of the vast bureaucratic apparatus that has evolved around religion and foreign policy. There are many questions to ask. Does the State Department now have too many or still too few specialized religion envoys? Does it make sense to have all religion-related offices, other than IRF, consolidated within RGA? Is it best to keep RGA within the Office of the Secretary? Above all, how can institutional religion-related resources best be arranged to facilitate collaboration on advancing American foreign policy objectives in a pervasively religious world?

The model for such a review process could be Obama’s Advisory Council on Faith-based and Neighborhood Partnerships. The council, which convened in early 2009, included a taskforce focused on reform of the faith-based initiative that had developed throughout the George W. Bush Administration. After a year of research and discussion, the taskforce issued a 34-page report detailing 12 policy recommendations for reform, as part of the Council’s overall report to the president. In 2017, the State Department could initiate a similar review process regarding the bureaucratic architecture for religion and diplomacy. Such a review should build on the work of the Religion and Foreign Policy Working Group, especially its consequential 2012 white paper.

Conclusion

We are not in the 1990s anymore. Back then the State Department deserved its reputation for avoiding religion. There is still plenty of room for improvement, but we must appreciate the fact that an institutionally cautious and highly secular agency has in a relatively short time span created an impressive array of resources for engaging religion in international affairs. And the IRF Office, after a rough patch in Obama’s first term, has rebounded and reached new heights of influence and impact. The next administration will have the important opportunity to review, consolidate, and extend the gains made on religion and diplomacy during the past decade.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Judd Birdsall

Judd Birdsall is the Managing Director of the Cambridge Institute on Religion & International Studies (CIRIS) at Clare College, Cambridge. He is also the executive director of the Transatlantic Policy Network on Religion and Diplomacy. He holds a BA and MA from Wheaton College and a PhD from the University of Cambridge. He serves as an editorial fellow with The Review of Faith & International Affairs.

Notes

1. The Office to Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism was created by the Global Anti-Semitism Review Act of 2004, but the State Department did not announce its appointment for anti-semitism special envoy until May 22, 2006—a few weeks after the publication of The Mighty and the Almighty.