Religious Freedom in Pakistan: Glimmers of Light on a Darkening Horizon

The growing pattern of religious intolerance and persecution of religious minorities in Pakistan is threatening the very fabric of Pakistani society and undermining democracy, not to mention putting the lives of millions of members of religious minorities in danger. The proliferation of Sunni Islamist militant groups in the country over the last 25 years, along with exclusionary laws and a flawed education curriculum that emphasizes Muslim identity rather than respect for religious diversity, have all contributed to the problem. In this environment, extremist ideologies have flourished and become entrenched in society, leaving religious minorities, such as Shia Muslims, Ahmadis, Christians, Sikhs, and Hindus, facing numerous injustices and the persistent threat of violence.

Muslims make up around 95 percent of the country’s total population of 190 million, with around 20–25 percent being Shia Muslim. Christians and Ahmadis each, respectively, account for around 2 percent of the total population, while Sikhs, Hindus, Parsis, Buddhists, and others make up the remaining 1–2 percent.

The issues of religious freedom and communal violence in South Asia are complex and deeply rooted in history. As the British ended colonial rule in the Indian Subcontinent in 1947, the purpose of partition was to create a separate state for Muslims. However, the largest migration in human history soon turned into a massive communal bloodbath as hundreds of thousands were killed in riots that broke out between Muslims on one side and Hindus and Sikhs on the other. The scars of partition still feed Indo-Pakistani rivalry and inform their divergent concepts of nation-hood: Pakistan as a homeland for Muslims and India as a multi-religious secular democracy.

Rolling back the tide of extremism in Pakistan will be an enormous task and could take a generation. But there are some recent hopeful signs that the Pakistani government under Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif is committed to making changes that will help uproot support for extremism and enhance protection for religious minorities. Moving forward, Pakistan must amend discriminatory legislation, strengthen the civilian court’s hand in dealing with cases of religious intolerance, and reform school curricula to focus on the values of religious tolerance and pluralism. The US must make protection of Pakistan’s religious minorities a higher priority in its dialogue with Pakistan, and press Islamabad to improve ties with New Delhi, since militant groups that thrive on regional tension are also responsible for spreading extremist ideologies throughout Pakistani society. Until Islamabad takes a comprehensive approach to shutting down all Islamist militant groups that operate from Pakistani territory, religious minorities will remain under threat.

Straying from the Founder’s Vision

Pakistan’s founding father, Muhammed Ali Jinnah, had tried to set a course for the country that would avoid divisions over religion. Even though Pakistan was established as a homeland for Muslims, Jinnah supported the idea of Islam serving as a unifying force and believed Pakistanis had a responsibility to uphold the principles of religious freedom and to protect the rights of religious minorities. Jinnah declared in a speech on August 11, 1947, that “You may belong to any religion or caste or creed – that has nothing to do with the business of the state … We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one state (Ispahani 2015).”

After four military dictatorships and several periods of ineffective civilian rule over its 69-year history, Pakistan has failed to uphold Jinnah’s vision of a country where people are free to worship as they choose. Indeed, support for Islamist extremist ideologies has been rising in recent years along with attacks on religious minorities. An editorial published in one of Pakistan’s major newspapers, The Express Tribune, in August 2014, described the plight of Pakistan’s religious minorities this way:

Many choose flight as the alternative to being butchered in their own homes. There is a silent but steady stream of minority citizens seeking asylum from persecution in Pakistan … The manner in which successive governments of Pakistan have treated minority communities is a national disgrace and exposes the intolerance at the heart of the establishment. (The Express Tribune 2014)

The evolution from Jinnah’s vision of a religiously tolerant society to one in which religious minorities are fleeing out of desperation and fear for their lives can be attributed to several factors. Soon after the creation of Pakistan, debate about the role of religion in the country’s constitutional and legal systems was increasingly influenced by the idea that Islamic principles should inform the conduct of the state. Moreover, the strategic environment in South Asia over the last 30 years and the Pakistani response to regional challenges has also influenced Islamist trends in society and heightened religious-inspired violence. Ineffective civilian institutions and the failure of both civilian and military leaders to uphold the rule of law against religious extremists also are to blame.

But it was the rule of military dictator General Zia ul-Haq in the 1980s that did the most damage to the state of religious freedom in Pakistan. As part of his campaign to further Islamize Pakistani society and governing institutions, Zia strengthened blasphemy legislation by making it a capital offense, incorporated anti-Ahmadi provisions into the Pakistani penal code, expanded the madrassa (Islamic school) network to support the Afghanistan jihad against the Soviets, and incorporated militant interpretations of Islam into the Pakistani public school curriculum.

The first major obstacle to establishing a state based on principles of religious freedom was the introduction of the Objectives Resolution in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan just six months following Jinnah’s death on September 11, 1948. The Objectives Resolution was a list of guiding principles for creating a constitution for the new Pakistani state that essentially opened the door for the development of legislation based on Islamic injunctions (Ispahani 2015).

The Objectives Resolution stated that “sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to Allah Almighty alone and the authority which he has delegated to the State of Pakistan.” It went on to support the “principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance, and social justice as enunciated by Islam.” The resolution gave a small nod to protecting religious minorities by stating that “provision shall be made for the minorities to profess and practice their religions and develop their cultures (The Constitution of Pakistan 1973).” However, over time, the clauses emphasizing a role for Islam in governing state affairs were used to develop legislation discriminatory toward religious minorities. Furthermore, in 1985, under Zia ul-Haq, the Objectives Resolution was incorporated into the body of the Pakistani Constitution, giving it more legal weight and making it easier for laws that contradict the principles of religious freedom to be promulgated in the name of Islam (Hasan 2010).

The Ahmadis, who consider themselves Muslim but do not recognize the finality of the Muslim prophet Muhammed, have suffered significant discrimination throughout Pakistan’s history. Six years after Pakistan’s independence, Islamists started a mass movement to declare Ahmadis as non-Muslim and called for the removal of Pakistani Foreign Minister Chaudhry Zafrullah Khan, an Ahmadi. Twenty years later, in 1974, President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto passed a resolution declaring Ahmadis as non-Muslims. Pakistani laws prohibit Ahmadis from calling themselves Muslim or their places of worship mosques, from performing the Muslim call to prayer, or using the traditional Islamic greeting in public. The sale of Ahmadi religious literature also is banned.

Zia ul-Haq further eroded protection of Pakistan’s religious minorities through the introduction of a parallel legal system that created Sharia benches in all high courts to declare any law disrespectful of Islam as unconstitutional (Curtis and Mullick 2009). The parallel legal system also includes a Federal Shariat Court and Sharia bench inside the Supreme Court often competing against secular courts in civil and criminal cases.

Misuse of Blasphemy Laws

One of the most prominent examples of the growing culture of intolerance and extremism is the misuse of the blasphemy law and the inability of the Pakistani political leadership to amend these harsh laws due to threats from extremist forces.

The blasphemy legislation was originally introduced during British colonial rule but at that time was applicable to all religions and rarely used. In the 1980s, Zia ul-Haq tightened the legislation as one more way to Islamize the country. Under Pakistani law, blasphemous acts included making derogatory remarks against the Muslim prophet Muhammed and defiling the Qur’an.

Today blasphemy allegations are often fabricated and are commonly used to intimidate religious minorities or settle personal vendettas, including against other Muslims. Blasphemy charges do not require proof of intent or evidence, and there are no penalties for false allegations. Since the laws do not provide details on what constitutes a violation, accusers have broad leeway to define what they deem an offense. Religious minorities have been disproportionately accused of committing blasphemy relative to their small population numbers (U.S. State Department International Religious Freedom Report 2014). There are currently around 38 people serving time in Pakistani jails for charges of blasphemy (U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom 2015).

Pakistanis who have sought changes to the blasphemy laws or who have defended those wrongly accused have often been killed, demonstrating the rise in religious intolerance and support for extremist ideologies. In early 2011, Pakistan’s Governor of the Punjab Salman Taseer and Minority Affairs Minister Shahbaz Bhatti were assassinated by religious extremists because of their efforts to roll back the controversial blasphemy laws. Human rights lawyer Rashid Rehman was assassinated in June 2014 for defending an English professor, Junaid Hafeez, who was accused of blasphemy.

Because of incidents like those cited above and a failure by the Pakistan government to take meaningful steps to protect religious minorities, the U.S. Commission for International Religious Freedom has called on the State Department to designate Pakistan as a “country of particularly concern” under the International Religious Freedom Act for the last 14 years.

Escalating Violence

The proliferation of Sunni Islamist militant groups that seek to recruit and inspire members by condemning religious minorities has contributed to increased violence against non-Sunni Muslim groups and individuals. The Pakistani authorities have failed on several occasions to uphold the rule of law against those committing violence in the name of religion. Militant intimidation of lawyers, judges, and journalists often prevents the holding of fair trials and limits the number of prosecutions in cases such as mob attacks against religious minorities.

Violence against the Shia community, in particular, in the last few years has reached alarming proportions. In May 2015, gunmen attacked a bus in Karachi, killing 45 Ismaili Shia. In January 2015, at least 61 people were killed after a bombing at a Shia mosque in Shikarpur, while two years prior in January and February 2013, sectarian attacks including bombings in Quetta killed nearly 200 Shia. The predominantly Shia ethnic Hazara community in Balochistan has faced particularly brutal attacks in recent years that have prompted tens of thousands to migrate from the province. In addition to attacks on Shia mosques, there have also been an increased number of targeted attacks against Shia professionals including doctors, lawyers, and college professors.

Sectarian violence between Sunnis and Shia has been prevalent in Pakistan since the 1980s, and has been exacerbated by Saudi–Iranian competition for ideological influence in Pakistan. Zia ul-Haq’s Islamist policies helped fuel the phenomenon, and indeed, it was Zia ul-Haq’s passage in 1980 of wealth and farming tax laws that conflicted with Shia law that led to the birth of the Movement for Enforcement of Shia Law.

In recent years, most of the attacks against Pakistani Shia have been carried out by the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LJ), a Sunni militant organization that succeeded the Sipah-e-Sahaba, and seeks to declare Shia as non-Muslims. Over the last year, the Pakistan government has started cracking down on LJ and targeting its leadership. In July 2015, one week after his arrest, LJ founder and supreme leader Malik Ishaq and over a dozen of his followers were killed in a police encounter (BBC 2015).

Large-scale attacks on other religious minorities have also occurred in recent years, most notably the suicide bombing at a park in Lahore this past Easter. A breakaway faction of the Pakistani Taliban, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, claimed responsibility for the attack, saying the group directly targeted Christians and that the bombing was a message to the Pakistani government that “we will carry out such attacks again until sharia is imposed in the country” (Hussain and Cunningham 2016). While the attack was targeted at Christians, most victims were Muslim, and about half of the 72 killed were children. The Pakistani authorities immediately launched a series of raids throughout the Punjab province, netting hundreds of suspects, and vowed to conduct a paramilitary crackdown similar to that carried out in Karachi over the last two years.

Just one year prior, in March 2015, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar claimed responsibility for bombings of two Christian churches, which killed 15. The terrorist group also took credit for the September 2013 suicide bombing of a church in Peshawar, which killed nearly 100, saying it was in retaliation for US drone strikes in Pakistan’s tribal border areas.

There was also a mob attack in March 2013 against a Christian community in the Punjab in which dozens of homes were burned down following allegations of blasphemy against a Christian man (Dawn.com 2013). A year later, a mob set fire to a Hindu community center in southern Pakistan after allegations that a Hindu had desecrated the Qur’an. This was followed by attacks on four other Hindu temples (U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom 2015).

In December 2014, a member of the Ahmadi community in Gujranwalla was shot and killed five days after an extremist cleric called Ahmadis “the enemy” in a rant on a popular Pakistani television show. In May 2010, militants armed with hand grenades, suicide vests, and assault rifles attacked two Ahmadi mosques, killing nearly 100 worshippers.

Reversing the Trend

There have been some positive developments over the last year, which may signal the government is slowly seeking to reverse extremist trends in society. The most notable event was the government’s follow-through with the execution of Mumtaz Qadri, who had assassinated Punjab Governor Salman Taseer on January 4, 2011, while serving as his bodyguard. Taseer was an outspoken critic of Pakistan’s blasphemy laws and had defended a Christian farm worker, Asia Bibi, who has been jailed under blasphemy charges since 2009.

Many Pakistanis considered Qadri a hero and the international community was shocked when the assassin was showered with rose petals during his first court appearance the day after the assassination. Qadri appealed his conviction but the Supreme Court upheld his death penalty on grounds that objections to the blasphemy law did not constitute blasphemy and that Qadri had no authority to kill the governor. The Supreme Court said if it were to accept the arguments of Qadri’s defense team, “then a door shall become open for religious vigilantism which may deal a mortal blow to the rule of law in this country where divergent religious interpretations abound and tolerance stands depleted to an alarming level (Shah 2016).”

Despite street protests in all of Pakistan’s major cities against the execution of Qadri, the government resisted intervention against the Supreme Court’s decision, and the death sentence was carried out on February 29. Following through with the execution signaled that murder, including that justified on religious grounds, will not be tolerated.

The Supreme Court also agreed in 2015 to review the case of Asia Bibi. Bibi, a mother of five and a farmworker, was arrested in 2009 after her Muslim coworkers alleged that she had committed blasphemy during an argument about sharing a water bowl. In November 2010, she was sentenced to death by a Pakistani trial court—a decision that was upheld by the Lahore High Court in October 2014.

Other positive steps over the last couple of years include the Supreme Court’s June 2014 judgment directing the federal government to establish a task force and special police force to protect religious minorities and to develop a strategy for promoting religious tolerance (U.S. State Department International Religious Freedom Report 2014). In response, the government created a National Commission for Minorities under the Ministry of Religious Affairs, but there are concerns that the commission has little access to Pakistan’s top leadership (Swett and Glendon 2015).

Anti-terror courts in 2015 sentenced to death an individual for the 2010 attacks on an Ahmadi mosque and remanded four individuals for the mob attack that killed a Christian couple in November 2014 over blasphemy allegations (U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom Annual Report 2015). Additionally, the Punjab provincial government has reviewed several hundred blasphemy cases pending in the courts to determine compliance with evidentiary standards and to ensure no case is unfairly prosecuted.

According to Farahnaz Ispahani, former Pakistani parliamentarian and author of Purifying the Land of the Pure: Pakistan’s Religious Minorities, there are other signs of positive change, including the recent willingness of Pakistan’s political leaders to publicly celebrate non-Muslim festivals and the initiation of a process to reform the educational curriculum in the Sindh and Punjab provinces (Notezai 2016). Indeed, the Sharif government agreed in mid-March to make the Hindu festivals of Holi and Diwali and Christian celebration of Easter public holidays for the first time in Pakistan’s history. There are also reports that the Pakistani government and military have quietly sent notices to mosques, requesting them to tone down their sermons (Craig 2016).

The civilian and military leadership’s tougher stance toward the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) over the last two years also is helping close space for extremists to operate and to spread their deadly ideologies. Pakistani military operations against the TTP in North Waziristan have led to a nearly 50 percent reduction in terrorist attacks throughout the country in 2015, compared to 2014 (Pak Institute of Peace Studies 2015). The military operations against the TTP began in June 2014, following a major terrorist attack on Karachi airport, and further intensified after gunmen stormed a military school in Peshawar in December of that year, killing 130, mostly children.

The National Action Plan (NAP) to combat terrorism that was passed by the Pakistani parliament in January 2015 has further contributed to the decrease in terrorist attacks as well as laid initial groundwork for delegitimizing extremist ideologies. The action plan includes steps like lifting the moratorium on the death penalty for terrorists, establishing special military courts to try terrorists, curbing the spread of extremist literature and propaganda on social media, freezing the assets of terrorist organizations, and forming special committees, comprised of army and political leaders, in the provinces to implement the NAP.

There are some extremist leaders, however, that are still treated with kid gloves by the Pakistani authorities. One is Maulana Abdul Aziz, the leader of the Red Mosque, where Islamist vigilantes in 2007 defied the government for several months before the Pakistan military was forced to flush them out in an operation that killed nearly 75. Aziz continues to openly support extremism and defy government directives to moderate his Friday sermons.

Instead of arresting Aziz, the Pakistani authorities resorted to shutting down cellphone service in Islamabad during Friday prayers to block Aziz’s efforts to preach to his followers (Nordland 2015). The tepid treatment of Aziz has led many Pakistanis to question the government’s overall commitment to implementing the NAP and to conclude that some extremist leaders will simply remain above the law (Hussain 2016). Unless Pakistani civilian and military leaders are willing to enforce the NAP comprehensively through legal means, it will have little impact in stemming the spread of extremist ideology and will be seen as merely window dressing by the international community.

Policy Recommendations

Prioritizing protection of religious freedom is not only important as a human rights issue, but also as a strategic and security issue, since it must be part of a broader narrative that seeks to counter the message of Islamist extremism, which is threatening the stability of the Pakistani state.

The Pakistan government needs to implement legal reforms and foster an environment conducive for people to freely express their religious beliefs. The civilian courts also need to be strengthened so that militants are unable to sway court opinions and judgments in favor of religious extremists. Finally, the Pakistan government must prioritize the issue of educating its youth and reforming educational curricula so that it teaches values of religious tolerance and pluralism and civic education. While efforts in this regard appear to be underway, the government must be resolute and swift with this process, given the demographic trends coming down the pike. With 55 percent of the population currently under the age of 25, Pakistan must not waste any more time in educating its youth on the virtues of religious tolerance and pluralism.

For its part, the US must make the protection of Pakistan’s religious minorities a higher priority in its dialogue with the country. Before Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s visit to Washington, DC in October 2015, several US-based Pakistan experts wrote a letter to the US President expressing concern about persistent attacks against religious communities. A similar letter in January 2015 had called on US Secretary of State John Kerry to make religious freedom a plank of the US–Pakistan Strategic Dialogue.

As part of this dialogue, the US should encourage Pakistan to fully implement those steps called for by the Pakistani Supreme Court in 2014, including creating a special police force to protect religious minorities and elevating the work of the National Commission for Minorities. The US should structure its aid programs to support these activities through technical assistance, training, and exchanges.

Washington must also continue to monitor individual cases of violations of religious freedom, and speak up publicly to defend those facing religious persecution. In this vein, Washington must sustain its public advocacy for the release of Asia Bibi. While the Pakistani Supreme Court has taken a step in the right direction with its decision to review Bibi’s appeal, the US must sustain pressure for her immediate release from jail.

Washington must also explore opportunities for enhancing civil society engagement between Americans and Pakistanis. This would help elevate the voices of moderation and democracy in Pakistan and facilitate freer discourse on issues of religious freedom and pluralism. There are many Pakistani citizens who are working diligently, and indeed, risking their lives, to reverse extremist trends and ensure the rights and freedoms of all Pakistanis. US–Pakistan government-to-government interactions alone will not suffice in turning the tide of extremism in Pakistan. There is a need for more frequent and deeper civil society engagement between the two countries that can help mobilize grassroots support for preserving religious freedom.

What may be the most important step to tamping down religious intolerance in Pakistan is the pursuit of friendlier ties with India. Extremist ideologies have gained traction in Pakistan in part because the government has failed to uphold the rule of law against certain terrorist groups and leaders that target India (and which have links to the Pakistani security establishment). These extremist forces, which were created to train their fire on Pakistan’s neighbors, are now threatening the stability of Pakistan itself.

A willingness to rethink Pakistani-Indian relations to break the cycle of suspicion and enmity would go a long way to restoring balance in Pakistani society. Sustained Pakistani-Indian dialogue would help diminish support for groups that thrive on promoting regional tension and conflict and which also are responsible for the spread of extremist ideology throughout society. Until Islamabad takes a comprehensive approach to shutting down all Islamist militant groups that operate from its territory, religious minorities will remain under threat and Pakistan’s future as a cohesive and stable nation will hang in the balance.

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Lisa Curtis

Lisa Curtis is a Senior Research Fellow on South Asia at the Asian Studies Center of the Heritage Foundation, focusing on U.S. national security interests and geopolitics in the region. Curtis has appeared on major broadcast networks to comment on developments in South Asia and testifies regularly before Congress. Before joining Heritage, Curtis spent 16 years working for the U.S. government on South Asian issues, including as a staffer for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, senior advisor in the State Department, senior analyst at the CIA, and as a diplomat at the U.S. embassies in Islamabad and New Delhi.