Violent Religious Extremism and U.S.–Africa Policy

While US policy-makers today generally take religion and religious actors more seriously than they did two decades ago, there remains a need for greater understanding of what makes for an effective response to the problem of violent religious extremism. Religious extremism has become particularly acute in parts of Sub-Saharan Africa over the past several years. Having already spread across national borders in some cases, it threatens to spread across sub-regions, wipe out some recent gains in human development, and politically destabilize the continent in ways that are harmful to US national security. While the US has attempted to address the problem, its efforts, like those of African governments, appear to be focused almost exclusively on “hunting down and killing the bad guys.” Although force has its necessary place in subduing insurgents and curtailing their activities, the US must ensure its policies are informed by the best available evidence. That evidence clearly shows that force is an inadequate solution to the problem of religious extremism (Gompert and Gordon 2008; Campbell 2014; Gompert, Binnendijk, and Lin 2014). It is of paramount importance that the next US presidential administration develop a nuanced strategy to deal with the problem of religious extremism in Sub-Saharan Africa, one that is comprehensive, pro-active, far-sighted, and informed by a more sophisticated understanding of religious freedom.

Based on analysis of previous attempts to address religious extremism within and beyond Sub-Saharan Africa, it is becoming increasingly clear that efforts which merely respond to immediate threats, which rely almost exclusively on force, and which do not engage religious civil society are ineffective and even counter-productive. All too often, the efforts of African governments to subdue murderous groups like Al Shabaab and Boko Haram have been rather murderous themselves. Military and police action have been heavy handed and indiscriminate, often harassing, injuring, or killing people unlucky enough to live in the vicinity of suspected extremist hideouts or who share ethnic and religious identity with extremists. As a result, there is reason to think that such responses have made matters worse and played into the narrative promoted by extremists—namely, the narrative that there is a religious war in Africa, and that they are merely defending Islam against the US and Christian-dominated governments or, as in the case of Nigeria, governments led by those they consider to be unfaithful Muslims. Several Christian religious leaders I have interviewed in Kenya and Nigeria were of the view that overly violent and poorly targeted responses to groups like Al Shabaab and Boko Haram have inadvertently boosted the efforts of extremist groups to recruit.¹ These same religious leaders said they believe that such responses have unnecessarily increased tensions between Christians and Muslims and that, in the long run, such tensions will make it more difficult to promote good inter-religious relations and the communal resiliency necessary for longer term security and economic development.²

In this essay, I argue that the next US president should develop a strategy for dealing with religious extremism in Sub-Saharan Africa that focuses more on preventing extremism, building resiliency, and supporting Christians and Muslims who are engaged in efforts to promote religious tolerance and freedom of religion. Further, the US should work with African governments to promote a more measured and precise use of force to subdue extremists, recognizing that, as necessary as force may be, in the long run it is not the solution to the problem at hand. In the long run, economic development, inter-religious cooperation, and equal freedoms and responsibilities for all religious and secular groups in civil society will create conditions that allow for holistic human development, which in turn will help advance US national security interests.

This essay proceeds as follows. In the next section I review the problem of religious extremism and how African governments have responded, focusing in particular on efforts to defeat Boko Haram and Al Shabaab. I continue by briefly assessing how the US has and has not responded to the problem. In the third and final section of the essay, I put forward important components of a more far-sighted US strategy. I conclude by calling for research that would assist the US in preventing and not merely reacting to religious extremism in the region.

The Problem of Religious Extremism in Sub-Saharan Africa

In western and eastern Africa, religious extremism has become an increasingly serious problem. While there are a number of groups that have arisen in recent years in West Africa, including the Macina Liberation Front, Al-Mourabitoun, and Al Qaeda in the Sahel, for the sake of this essay I focus on the “Congregation of the People of Tradition for Proselytism and Jihad” or Boko Haram (often translated as “western education is forbidden”). In East Africa, I focus on the “Movement of Striving Youth” or Al Shabaab. Despite recent successes by both Nigerian and Kenyan militaries and police agencies, Boko Haram and Al Shabaab continue to wage successful attacks.

While it is difficult to trace the exact origins of Boko Haram and Al Shabaab, both groups began as Islamist revivalist movements intended to establish a Shari’ah-based society in Nigeria and Somalia, respectively (Campbell 2014; Hansen 2015; Smith 2015). Boko Haram most likely began in Maiduguri, the capital city of Nigeria’s Borno State in the far northeastern corner of the country, one of the most economically underdeveloped regions of Nigeria. The charismatic Muslim preacher Mohammed Yusuf gathered young Muslim men around his message of Islamic revival and strict adherence to the Shari’ah. That message included a withering critique of the Nigerian state and Western culture (Comoli 2015). What has come to be called Al Shabaab is an offshoot of the Islamic Courts Union in Somalia. It seems to have originated around the year 2004. Al Shabaab largely began as a movement to fill the vacuum of central political authority in a “failed state” (Hansen 2015). The group gradually became more ambitious, as it sought to recruit from and establish its authority over northeastern Kenya, an impoverished area of Kenya where the population is largely made up of Somali-Kenyans who are mostly Muslims. Al Shabaab became increasingly violent and declared war on Kenya after the Kenyan military invaded Somalia in 2011 as part of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).³

It is important to put both Boko Haram and Al Shabaab in their proper contexts. It is difficult to understand the growth of Boko Haram without considering inter-religious tensions in Nigeria over the past several decades and the perceived political and economic marginalization of the northeastern part of the country, where the group was born and continues to be most powerful. While Christians and Muslims in most parts of Nigeria get along quite well and there is a long history of accommodation if not mutual respect, inter-religious tensions have been of growing significance in Nigeria. Nigeria is roughly half Christian and half Muslim and, since the late 1970s and early 1980s, deadly violence between Christians and Muslims has engulfed some portions of Nigeria’s Middle Belt and northern parts of the country (Kukah 1993; Falola 1998; Paden 2005, 2008). Boko Haram emerged in this context of inter-religious tensions and conflict, and its attacks on Christian churches in and beyond its stronghold in the northeastern part of Nigeria have fueled more inter-religious tensions and suspicions.

As of August 2015, Nigeria’s National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) estimates that there were more than 1.5 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) as the direct result of religious conflict, and the vast majority of the displaced have fled the advances of Boko Haram (Comoli 2015).⁴ There are 24 official camps for displaced.

Persons.⁵ According to NEMA, there are also as many as 200,000 Nigerian refugees, both Christians and Muslims, who have fled the Boko Haram insurgency into neighboring Chad and Cameroon. It is estimated that Boko Haram has been responsible for at least 13,000 deaths since the insurgency began, with about half of these killings, 6,644, having occurred in the year 2014 alone, which is more deaths than the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is thought to be responsible for that the same year (Global Terrorism Index 2015).

While the number of people who have been killed or displaced by Al Shabaab in Kenya is lower than the number killed and displaced by Boko Haram in Nigeria and surrounding countries, the attacks waged by Al Shabaab have been sensational and have instilled a great deal of fear, particularly among Christians, who have often been targeted for death by the group.⁶ As in the case of Boko Haram, it is important to put Al Shabaab in context. It emerged in a failed state, Somalia, and has appeared to be rather successful at recruiting Kenyans of Somali ethnic background in the long-impoverished northeastern and northern coastal areas of Kenya (Hansen 2015). There is evidence to suggest that Al Shabaab would like nothing more than to trigger something like a destabilizing “religious war” between Muslims and Christians in East Africa, particularly in Kenya (see Mutiga 2015). Both Boko Haram and Al Shabaab consider the governments of Nigeria and Kenya to be vehicles of US and Western influence and by triggering more violence in both countries and creating an economic and political crisis in each, they hope to do damage to such interests in the region.

Nigeria’s President, Muhammadu Buhari, has claimed that the Nigerian government has wrested control a significant amount of territory from Boko Haram. However, there is concern that the recent gains are ephemeral. The government’s strategy has relied almost exclusively on force and there have been well-documented reports that the Nigerian military has been guilty of violating the human rights of local Muslim populations in the northeast (see Human Rights Watch 2014; Nossitier 2015; Amnesty International 2016). These violations have played into the narrative promoted by Boko Haram—that it is defending northern Muslims from Christians and unfaithful Muslims who care little about their well-being. It is important to recognize that there have been attempts to adopt a more comprehensive strategy through working with local communities and religious civil society to spread messages that counter those of the insurgents. For example, Nigeria’s Countering Violent Extremism Programme has been a vehicle for the federal, state, and local governments to engage traditional and religious leaders (Akilu 2015). However, such efforts have been relatively weak and under-funded. They have not been important components of President Jonathan’s or President Buhari’s strategy. Several Muslim and Christian leaders have expressed dismay that those in government, the police, and the military do not seem interested in their experience or in their opinion about the best way to respond to the insecurity in the northeast. “The government sends us the signal that they are sorry about the problems we experience, but they do not need our advice on how best to end the Boko Haram insurgency,” said one religious leader from Nigeria’s Borno State.⁷

Like the Nigerian government, the Kenyan government too has claimed recent successes in foiling plots hatched by Al Shabaab and in capturing and killing militants (see Ohikere 2016). The question is, are such successes enough and, in the long run, will they contribute to the end of religious extremism and greater security in the region? Many of Kenya’s Christian leaders, those who should ostensibly care most about subduing Al Shabaab, have their doubts. Based on recent conversations with Christian leaders in the coastal area of Kenya, there are fears that the Kenyan government’s responses have been overly violent, rather indiscriminate, and damaging to Christian–Muslim relations. Several Christian leaders noted that they thought that any longer term solution to the anti-Christian violence along the coast and in the northeast must involve efforts to increase economic opportunities for young people, whether Christians or Muslims, and in greater inter-religious dialogue and cooperation.⁸ According to one of these Christian leaders who work along the north coast of Kenya,

There are people who want this to look more and more like a religious conflict. They encourage despondent youth to attack Christians. Government’s tactics are playing into their hands. A religious war will be bad for us and bad for Kenya; it will make defeating terrorists difficult.⁹

How the US Has and Has Not Responded

The US responses to the problems of religious extremism in Sub-Saharan Africa, and in particular Boko Haram and Al Shabaab, have been largely reactive and improvised. It is understandable that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Syria, and, more recently, the challenges posed by ISIS have been the focus of US policy-makers’ energies. Since Boko Haram has not been considered a direct threat to the US homeland and because of problems of corruption in the Nigerian military, the US has appeared largely content to allow the Nigerian government to deal with the group (Campbell 2014). Al Shabaab has been a greater concern to US officials since there is some evidence that the group has successfully recruited US citizens to its ranks and, therefore, the US has been directly engaged in efforts to subdue Al Shabaab.¹⁰

While the US has provided assistance to help Nigerian and Kenyan authorities locate extremists and has been directly engaged in the attempt to subdue Al Shabaab, and more recently Boko Haram, the US response has been largely military and military-intelligence in nature (Campbell 2014). While the US may play a very helpful role in assisting militaries and intelligence-gathering agencies to be more precise and effective, there is good reason to think that a strategy that relies solely or mostly on force is inadequate. Although building the capacity of Nigerian’s intelligence and defense forces to detect and thwart violent attacks while they are still in the planning stages is crucial to any comprehensive strategy, such capacity building does not get at the root of the problem of religious intolerance and radicalization.

Indeed, even if the use of force was more effective in killing militants and reclaiming territory, this would not be enough to end the problem of extremism in Nigeria. In fact, even after military successes, Boko Haram has been responsible for several deadly bombings in 2015 and 2016 (Guardian 2016). The same goes for Kenya’s response to Al Shabaab. As long as US efforts are mostly focused on assisting Nigeria and Kenya to be more effective in the use of force, they will be inadequate for addressing the longer term problem of religious extremism in West and East Africa. Unless a longer term and more comprehensive strategy to address the problem of religious extremism in Sub-Saharan Africa is developed, the problems of religious extremism and inter-religious violence will persist and likely even grow to become more serious and damaging; reversing recent advances in economic growth and human development, destabilizing fledgling democracies, providing havens for international terrorist networks, and damaging US security interests.

Toward a More Comprehensive and Far-Sighted Strategy

It is important to note that there are limits to what the US can do to address the problems of religious extremism anywhere, including western and eastern Africa. US policy-makers must be careful to observe the first principle to “do no harm” and not to involve the US in Sub-Saharan Africa in a way that actually prompts more extremism. If thoroughly informed by realities on the ground, the US can play a role in preventing and not just reacting to religious extremism. First, the next US presidential administration should continue to work with African governments to provide military training and to enhance intelligence gathering so as to eliminate human rights abuses and increase the accuracy of efforts to subdue extremists. Second, the next administration must find a way of working with African governments to promote economic growth and human development in areas vulnerable to religious extremism. Third, the next US presidential administration should work with Africa governments to engage with religious civil society and support inter-religious efforts to promote religious tolerance and freedom. In short, the US should work with its allies in Sub-Saharan Africa to develop a grander and more far-sighted strategy that (1) promotes respect for human rights and a more discriminate use of force, (2) focuses on economic growth and human development, and (3) supports religious civil society in efforts to promote inter-religious tolerance and greater respect for religious freedom for all.

Promote Respect for Human Rights and a More Discriminate Use of Force

The Obama Administration has not effectively encouraged Nigerian and Kenyan governments and their militaries to respond to attacks waged by religious militants in ways that are largely respectful of human rights. Admittedly, it is difficult to do so. There is credible evidence that Nigerian military officers have committed gross human rights violations as they have sought Boko Haram militants, adopting something like scorched earth tactics in areas where they suspect militants are hiding or where local populations are thought to have valuable information (Human Rights Watch 2015). As noted earlier in the essay, even many of those most threatened by Boko Haram and Al Shabaab have complained that the use of force by Kenyan and Nigerian militaries has been indiscriminate and that in the long run, such use of force is not promoting greater security for them. Among other things, the next US presidential administration should offer to grow the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program to support more precise, measured, and proportionate use of military force. Further, it should use the program to teach search and questioning techniques that respect the human rights of populations in areas where militants are thought to take cover (Campbell 2014).

Because any sizeable and noticeable US military presence in West Africa or East Africa would likely trigger a backlash and put local people in danger, the US should continue to focus on training African governments’ security personnel and sharing certain types of military hardware and intelligence equipment/expertise. However, the sharing of military hardware and intelligence equipment/expertise should be made contingent on the training regimen that focuses on respect for human rights and more discriminate use of force. Further human rights violations should trigger an immediate suspension of further military or intelligence assistance. Without doubt, there will be those who will disagree with such strict conditions on US military and intelligence support, claiming that suspending US support in response to such violations will mean more advances by groups like Boko Haram and Al Shabaab. However, I would argue that US support for military activities that are abusive of human rights would, in the long run, make efforts to contain religious extremism all the more difficult. Further, the US must work with African governments to diversify their strategies and to consider the longer term consequences as well as the short-term objectives in the struggle to subdue extremist groups. All too often, the ways of achieving shorter term objectives, such as capturing or killing individuals responsible for violent attacks or those thought to be planning violent attacks, undermine longer term goals of creating conditions that make extremism less likely. The US should focus on partnering with its allies in Africa, such as Nigeria and Kenya, to find ways of achieving both short-term objectives without undermining the longer term goals.

Focus on Economic Growth and Human Development

An important component of a more diversified and far-sighted approach to tackling the problem of religious extremism is an effort to promote economic growth and human development. While we know that poverty and political marginalization do not necessarily lead to religious extremism, such conditions may contribute to the rise of and attractiveness of extremist movements. It is no accident that Boko Haram and Al Shabaab have emerged or recruited successfully in impoverished regions of Nigeria and Kenya, respectively. It is hard to imagine such groups emerging and/or thriving in contexts where people enjoy greater access to education and public health, where there is a greater degree of opportunity. Religious extremists are able to make compelling arguments to local populations where the state has largely failed to provide basic order and public services. The next US presidential administration should redouble efforts to promote economic growth and human development in those parts of Sub-Saharan Africa that are most vulnerable to religious extremism. In the short term, this means urging the governments, like those in Nigeria and Kenya to invest to a much greater degree in education, health, and basic infrastructure in the northeastern parts of each country. The US should consider funding programs in areas that have been most successful at boosting health indicators and educational outcomes. Such programs would be best run through government and trusted non-governmental organizations. Any comprehensive strategy to root out the problem of religious extremism should involve non-governmental organizations that are religiously based, particularly those that are rooted in local communities and that bring Christians and Muslims together.

Support Religious Civil Society to Promote Tolerance and Religious Freedom

It is clear that African governments have not focused a great deal of energy on engaging religious civil society in their efforts to address religious extremism. An essential component of a more comprehensive and far-sighted strategy intended to inhibit the rise of religious extremism is support for groups that bring Christians and Muslims together in the region. There are Christian and Muslim leaders in East and West Africa who work hard at promoting equal rights and responsibilities for Christians and Muslims. An example of such efforts includes those of the Catholic Archbishop of Jos, Nigeria Ignatius Kaigama, and the late Grand Khadi Kanam, as well as those of Pastor James Wuye and Imam Muhammed Nurayan Ashafa, based in Kaduna. The Interfaith Mediation Centre, founded by Wuye and Ashafa, is an example of an institution that has proven effective at bringing Christians and Muslims together to encourage mutual respect and freedom of religion (Paden 2012, 2005). Recently, the Kukah Centre in Abuja, Nigeria, has brought people together across the religious divide to defuse religious and political conflicts. Named after Catholic Bishop Matthew Hassan Kukah who is widely respected for his work with Muslims and Christians, the Centre has devoted considerable energy to issues of faith and public policy.¹¹ Present at the grassroots level and led by religious leaders who have the respect of Christians and Muslims, the efforts of these groups and organizations serve to build resiliency to withstand the rumors and innuendo that all too often fan the flames of religious conflict. While the Nigerian government has recognized the importance of grassroots community engagement, it has not sufficiently engaged with such groups and supported their efforts.

The same is true of US policy-makers. While many of them note the importance of engaging religious civil society, at the end of the day, efforts that focus on religious civil society have been relegated to the margins of US strategy.¹² Perhaps this is partly due to the fact that the US does not know how to support such groups without harming their reputations among populations that are already suspicious of the US. If people already suspicious of US activities were to learn of US government support for inter-religious activities designed to prevent extremism, such activities may be discredited. The reluctance to support religious civil society may also be due to a lack of patience. Yet, impatience typically leads to mistakes that end up undermining the ultimate objective of societies free of religious extremism and serious threats to US national security interests. Efforts to engage religious civil society may take years to pay off. Nonetheless, there is good reason to think that an effective effort to subdue religious extremist groups and make religious extremism less likely in the future requires such long-term engagement. The next US administration should make such engagement central to its strategy.

Conclusion

Ultimately, it is important to recognize that there remains a great deal that we do not yet understand about the causes of religious extremism, let alone the most effective ways to address the problem. Therefore, the next US presidential administration should devote considerable resources to monitoring and evaluating any strategy that it employs. It should also seek to support rigorous research devoted to more fully understanding why extremism emerges where and when it does, and the most effective means to counter the narratives used by religious extremists to attract followers. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the stakes are high. While there is much we do not know, it is becoming clear that a strategy that relies largely on force is inadequate at best and counter-productive at worst. Any US strategy to address the problem of religious extremism in Sub-Saharan Africa should be predicated on a mindset of long-term prevention. Such a strategy should certainly include a focus on promoting human development and on engaging with religious civil society to promote religious tolerance and respect for religious freedom.

Additional information

Funding

The interviews referenced in this article were conducted as part of the Under Caesar's Sword research project, made possible by a grant from the Templeton Religion Trust (Grant number TRT0066). This research was also supported by grants from the Kellogg Institute for International Studies and the Institute for Scholarship in the Liberal Arts at the University of Notre Dame.

Notes on contributors

Robert A. Dowd

Robert A. Dowd is Assistant Professor of Political Science and Director of the Ford Program in Human Development Studies and Solidarity at the Kellogg Institute for International Studies, Keough School of Global Affairs at the University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN. He is author of Christianity, Islam, and Liberal Democracy: Lessons from Sub-Saharan Africa (Oxford University Press, 2015).

Notes

1. These interviews were conducted in Kenya in July 2015 and in Nigeria in August 2015. For example, one Christian leader from Kenya’s coastal region said, “It’s not easy, but we have had to work hard to prevent violence and seek restraint. Al Shabaab and others are trying to draw a violent response.” Interview conducted by the author, August 12, 2015.

2. One Nigerian Christian leader in Maiduguri said he witnessed human rights abuses committed by Nigerian soldiers. “People were dragged out of their houses, stepped on, and beaten within an inch of their lives. I do not think they had anything to do with Boko Haram.” Interview conducted by the author July 18, 2015.

3. Ugandan and Ethiopian troops also make up the AMISOM force.

4. Boko Haram has also attacked Christians outside of Nigeria’s northeast. In August 2011, Boko Haram claimed responsibility for Christmas day bombings of several churches throughout Nigeria.

5. These statistics are taken from the Nigeria’s National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA). For more on the camps, see Offiong 2015.

6. The deadly attacks that have received the most attention are those on the Westgate Shopping Mall in Nairobi in September 2013 and on Garissa University, in northeastern Kenya, in April 2015.

7. Interview conducted August 13, 2015.

8. Interview conducted by the author on July 16, 2015.

9. Interview conducted by the author on July 29, 2015.

10. See Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounders at http://www.cfr.org/somalia/al-shabab/p18650. Accessed February 23, 2016.

11. I attended a workshop on responses to the Boko Haram insurgency that was sponsored by the Kukah Centre on August 12, 2015. For more on the work of the Kukah Centre, see http://www.thekukahcentre.org/.

12. See the US State Department’s 2014 Report on International Religious Freedom at http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2014/frontmatter/238178.htm.