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Abstract
Sri Lanka’s post-independence ethnoreligious tussles show how drastically the island has moved away from pluralism. Indeed, the country represents an illiberal democracy that operates like an ethnocracy. Not only is Sinhalese Buddhist majoritarianism now embedded, its proponents are determined to consolidate further majority domination while ensuring minority subordination, leading to a “schadenfreude nationalism” wherein many among the majority community take pleasure seeing minorities hagridden and marginalized. This, however, has not prevented various groups engaging with ethnoreligious minorities, learning of their challenges, and involving them in societal relations as distinct yet equal Sri Lankan citizens. This covenantal pluralism can thrive, provided the island’s major stakeholders champion it. The failure to do so will prevent Sri Lankans from achieving their full potential as citizens and leave the island further diminished.
Acknowledgements
This article is part of this journal's Covenantal Pluralism Series, a project generously supported via a grant to the Institute for Global Engagement from the Templeton Religion Trust.
Notes
1 It is worthwhile noting that the rule of law and soft authoritarianism in Singapore also maintains an “ethnic hierarchy with the Chinese at the top and all others … positioned at various levels of assigned inferiority” (Krishna Citation1996, 312).
2 The quote in Sinhala (mage rata, mage jatiya, mage agama, mage bhasava yana me maha anargha ratna satarak mata tibe. Me ratana satara araksa karaganima mage yutukamaki) is taken from Schalk Citation2007, 136. I, however, have used my own translation.
3 This was partly evident when the chief monk of a temple recently said, “Mahinda is a form of politics. Mahinda is a philosophy. Mahinda is a complete cultural ethic which this country needs. Therefore, this is a philosophy resembling a different religion. Learn it” (Lankanewsweb.net Citation2020).
4 Doing so was one of the recommendations that the Mahinda Rajapaksa-appointed Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission made in its November 2011 report.
5 Muslim women have played a leading role calling for MMDA reforms, partly due to how it forces underage girls into marriage, disallows Sri Lankan Muslim women serving in quazi courts (comprising Muslim judges), and discriminates against women when dealing with divorce and wife and child maintenance.
6 The flag with no stripes first reappeared in recent times when Gotabaya Rajapaksa made a statement before the Bribery Commission in April 2015. This was right after Mahinda Rajapaksa lost power thanks to Tamils and Muslims voting against him en masse. Flaunting the flag reiterated the Rajapaksas’ links to Buddhists and vice versa. It resurfaced widely in 2016 as part of an anti-Muslim hate speech campaign called “Sinha Le” (meaning Sinhalese Blood, although the term “Sinhale” had been used in the early colonial period to refer to areas not occupied by foreign forces).
7 The version posted on the presidential office webpage adopts more neutral phrasing to say, “In accordance with our Constitution, I pledge that during my term of office, I will always defend the unitary status of our country, and protect and nurture the Buddha Sasana whilst safeguarding the right of all citizens to practice a religion of their choice.” See https://www.president.gov.lk/the-policy-statement-made-by-his-excellency-gotabaya-rajapaksa-president-of-the-democratic-socialist-republic-of-sri-lanka-at-the-inauguration-of-the-fourth-session-of-the-8th-parliament-of-sri-lanka/
8 The NPC’s Charter for a Pluralistic Sri Lankan Society (National Peace Council Sri Lanka Citation2019) comprises Recommendations for Building a Pluralistic Sri Lanka and these recommendations indicate how state authorities and disregard for the rule of law undermine a pluralistic ethos from taking root.
9 This synthesis report stems from four individual reports on the Northern, Eastern, North Central, and Southern provinces variously co-authored by Mark Salter, Sajeed Ahamed, Nilshan Fonseka, Farah Milhar, Udha Deshapriya, Anushani Alagarajah, and Vidya Mutulingam.
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Neil DeVotta
Neil DeVotta is a Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Wake Forest University. His research interests include Asian security and politics, ethnoreligious nationalism, ethnic conflict resolution, and democratic transition and consolidation. His publications include Blowback: Linguistic Nationalism, Institutional Decay, and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004).