Covenantal Pluralism: Resonances and Dissonances in Cambodia

Abstract

This article explores to what extent the ideals of covenantal pluralism resonate with or deviate from socio-cultural processes in Cambodia. It examines efforts made by various Khmer Buddhist protagonists to recover moral order following the Khmer Rouge era. Conversely, it describes how power continues to be monopolized by certain actors in a way that undermines trust in institutions and in other people generally. Thus it explores the tension between a religious system that might offer protection for all and a predatory political reality marked by unrestrained greed that benefits the powerful at the expense of the vulnerable.

Keywords:

• Cambodia
• engaged Buddhism
• trust
• moral order
• authoritarianism

The concept of covenantal pluralism developed and promoted by the Templeton Religion Trust (Stewart, Seiple, and Hoover 2020) promises that a brighter future is possible, even as ever greater numbers of peoples encounter others who subscribe to radically divergent worldviews. It provides a socio-cultural template for ways of engaging with others based upon profound mutual respect and desire to protect one another. In other words, perhaps, it requires that all subscribe to a set of universal values that transcend differences and unite us in a sense of common humanity and equal value.

In a world riven with clashes in values and competition over resources, ideas about how to create harmony are urgently needed. It is therefore pertinent to explore the potential resonance and dissonance of such visionary ideals with in-depth empirical data from different cultural settings.

This article aims to do this by drawing upon anthropological research I have conducted over the past 20 years in Cambodia on topics ranging over religion, politics, gender, and justice.¹

On the one hand, the article examines features of Cambodian culture that appear to align with elements of covenantal pluralism, contributing to generalized trust and a sense of moral community. It focuses particularly on Khmer Buddhist attempts to revive moral order in the wake of Cambodia’s brutal history—civil war in the early 1970s, the Khmer Rouge regime’s catastrophic experiment with communism from 1975-1979, and continued conflict through the 1980s and 1990s.

On the other hand, the article describes some of the significant obstacles to the prospects for covenantal pluralism to take root in Cambodia. Here, the focus will be upon the way power has and continues to be monopolized by certain actors in ways that undermine trust in institutions as well as in other people generally. Ultimately, the tension explored here is between a religious system that might offer protection for all and, by contrast, a predatory political reality marked by unrestrained greed that benefits the powerful at the expense of both the poor and the natural environment.

The efforts described here by Buddhist protagonists to re-create a just order should be read against the backdrop of rampant consumerism and violent authoritarianism in Cambodia that is now also backed by larger powers, in particular China.

Theoretical Outline

In Stewart, Seiple, and Hoover’s (2020) introduction to the philosophy of covenantal pluralism, the authors cite the story of clergyman Roger Williams (c. 1603-1683). Having been expelled from Puritan Massachusetts, Williams founded Rhode Island according to the normative principles of profound cross-cultural respect. Stewart, Seiple, and Hoover note Williams’ metaphor of the ship to describe a society of religious pluralism: Williams proposed it was the duty of the ship’s commander to ensure justice and peace for all as well as liberty of conscience for everyone, regardless of religious persuasion. The authors note that although Rhode Island was not a perfect manifestation of Williams’ principles, it nonetheless provides an illustration of “a civic order self-consciously seeking to be a place where people of radically divergent religious/worldview perspectives could live together constructively and cooperatively—as both a function of their respective faith traditions (the right thing to do), and their common need for stability (the self-interested thing to do)” (Stewart, Seiple, and Hoover 2020, 2).

In many respects, this notion of covenantal pluralism corresponds with Sztompka’s (1999) theory of trust. Both appeal to our common humanity and possibility to live according to ideals that transcend cultural difference.

Sztompka describes how social fabric is sustained both through social ties based on fiscally mediated and institutionally regulated relationships and through “soft,” moral bonds. The “moral community” he describes requires a specific way of relating to others, which corresponds with elements of a society bonded through covenantal pluralism.

Sztompka describes the moral community as marked by three conditions. Firstly, trust prevails, i.e. we expect others to behave virtuously towards us. Secondly, there is loyalty among its members, i.e. an obligation to refrain from breaching the trust others have bestowed upon us and to fulfill the duties implied by accepting someone else’s trust. Thirdly, there is solidarity, that is caring for other people’s interests and a readiness to take action on behalf of others, even if that may conflict with our own interest. “Moral community is … the indication of the ‘us’ to which ‘I’ feel that I belong” (Sztompka 1999, 5).

While Sztompka is concerned with how this may be achieved through liberal democracy, the Cambodian case suggests democracy may not be the only, or indeed always the most culturally appropriate, means of accomplishing it. Efforts made in 1993 to implement multi-party democracy in Cambodia have clearly failed to provide either the necessary or sufficient conditions for nurturing trust or moral community.

By 2011, when faced with the overthrow of other dictators during the Arab Spring, Cambodia’s prime minister Hun Sen stated his intention: “I not only weaken the opposition, I’m going to make them dead … and if anyone is strong enough to try to hold a demonstration, I will beat all those dogs and put them in a cage.”²

In 2015, Senate President Chea Sim’s death saw the end of constraints on Hun Sen’s power from within his ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP). With now virtually unchecked power lying in the prime minister’s hands, in 2017, the main political opposition party was outlawed, and civil society and independent media were harshly suppressed, with endorsement from China.³ These factors helped propel Cambodia from what authors such as Levitsky and Way (2002, 53) and Morgenbesser (2019, 159) describe as “competitive authoritarianism” to “full-blown hegemonic authoritarian rule”, and others, a “patrimonial dictatorship” (Croissant 2018) or “personal autocracy” (Sutton 2018, 175).

Article 43 of the Cambodian Constitution ostensibly guarantees freedom of religious belief and worship to all citizens (Kingdom of Cambodia 1993).⁴ Although various minority groups, such as the Cham Muslims, appear to have been singled out for particularly harsh treatment during the DK regime (see Kiernan 2002, 486), in general, difference in faith is not the ground for intolerance in Cambodia. No matter what their faith, it is when a group is deemed to threaten Hun Sen’s supremacy that it may be targeted for threats and harsh treatment.⁵

Although trust, and by extension the possibility of establishing the principles of covenantal pluralism, remains one of the most significant cultural casualties of Cambodia’s tragic history of the 1970s, the political realm has since offered little hope of creating moral order. A long tradition of authoritarian rule, endemic corruption,⁶ a culture of impunity with no history of the rule of law, regular human rights abuses, and, today, intensifying competition over resources as consumer culture takes root, all mitigate against the establishment of generalized trust.⁷

Given these conditions, what, then, do Cambodians look to as a source of moral order?

Some 95% of Cambodians claim to be Theravada Buddhists.⁸ Its abolition by the Khmer Rouge regime (1975-1979) left Cambodia in a state of moral chaos. However, as discussed below, elements of its regeneration after the fall of the regime offered many Cambodians hope of recovery of a collective spirit that transcends difference, in a manner comparable to that envisioned by covenantal pluralism. The principles underlying this revival clothe ancient teachings in a new way that suggest how trust and a caring community might be nourished.

Although Cambodia is home to various minority groups including Muslim, Christian, and so-called animist indigenous peoples, I focus here on a number of Buddhist movements that use universal principles and make no requirement of others to convert to Buddhism. Buddhism never supplanted earlier religious practices in Cambodia but subsumed or co-existed with them. For example, today, some groups of Buddhist monks are trying to protect indigenous highland peoples, whose cosmologies are inextricably linked to the forest, from eviction by agro-industrial companies.⁹

Many Cambodians still understand Buddhism as the institution that traditionally checked the power of the ruling monarch, and they therefore look to it to restrain unscrupulous behavior among today’s ruling elites. However, they also see that the revived monkhood (sangha) has become both politicized and intimidated and the monarchy, effectively silenced. Instead of deferring to the sangha as former kings were supposed to in order to sustain the legitimacy to rule, the powerful in Cambodia today often coopt and coerce the weakened sangha in the service of their own interests.

Popular aspirations for moral order in Cambodia therefore stand at odds with current political arrangements. Regrettably, this means the chances of moral community emerging in Cambodia in the foreseeable future, with high levels of generalized trust and a pledge to the principles of covenantal pluralism, seem slim.

History of Buddhism in Cambodia

Roger Williams established his version of covenantal pluralism in the context of a newly founded society on Rhode Island. By contrast, Cambodia is home to an ancient militarized civilization dating back to the Hinduized Angkorean era (classically said to fall between 802 and 1431 A.D.), during which the king was considered the embodiment of Hindu power. Absolute power was vested in the universal monarch “who was the divine source of all authority” (SarDesai 1989, 29).

Theravada Buddhism¹⁰ began taking root in the Khmer kingdom during the 13th century, and is presumed to have been introduced by mendicant monks to rural communities and the royal court. This had a constraining effect upon royal power. As village youths with strong local loyalties ordained, the local temples became rich sources of merit (bon) for their communities, and by the 14^th century, a decentralized monastic system had become established throughout the lowland kingdom. Formerly centralized monarchical power now became subject to moral moderation by these alternate religious authorities among commoners.

The Cambodian monarch’s legitimacy was now qualified—he must perform as protector and patron of the Buddhist faith (dhammaraja). His legitimacy depended upon his demonstration of the ten Buddhist kingly virtues—charity, morality, self-sacrifice, rectitude, gentleness, self-restriction, non-anger, non-violence, forbearance, and non-obstruction (see Stengs 2009, 36). Alongside these changes, Angkorean civilization declined in the 15^th century and the kings and their entourages began shifting southwards from Angkor to the area of today’s Phnom Penh.¹¹

Despite the evolution of this gentler, quietist Buddhist moral order, the Khmer lowland notion of “order” has remained intrinsically hierarchical. This is reflected in every aspect of life. For example, personal pronouns in the Khmer language reflect status differentials between two individuals, and hierarchically arranged patron-client relations continue to form the basis of protective networks (see e.g. Scopis 2011). This results in a tension between Buddhism’s non-violent ethics and the harsher reality of everyday life. As the renowned historian of Cambodia David Chandler has elaborated,

There was a moral order for everyone … based on prescription, memorization, and teaching, largely Buddhist in orientation, on the one hand, and perceptions rooted in the real world, on the other. The first was a celebration of hierarchical arrangements, operating, ideally, in the common good. The second was an attempt to survive inside the framework of what was going on. (Chandler 2008, 44)

According to traditional Buddhist teachings, one’s place in this great chain of beings was the result of merit accumulated in past lives.

Given that covenantal pluralism assumes “all people want to feel that their equal standing and inherent human dignity are universally respected” (Stewart, Seiple, and Hoover 2020, 5, italics added), this makes a straightforward transposition of its principles to the Cambodian cultural context problematic. Perhaps, therefore, Cambodians’ pursuit of moral order might instead help nuance the preconceptions underlying covenantal pluralism.

The Death of Buddhism and Moral Community

Although Cambodia’s history has seen repeated political strife over the past two hundred years, the Khmer Rouge communist era (1975-1979) was the only one that sought to accomplish a total cultural break with the past. The leaders aimed to wipe Cambodia clean of its history and culture and establish an order that in many senses inverted previous hierarchy; children could be given authority over elders, women over men, the uneducated over the educated. Numerous survivor accounts have been published detailing how the cadres broke down spiritual traditions and social bonds, such as kinship, to enlist the loyalty of, particularly, children to the imposed order, “Angkar” (lit. the organization) (e.g. Loung Ung 2006). In this endeavor to invert moral order, Buddhism represented perhaps the greatest obstacle (Gyallay-Pap 2002).

Monks were forced to disrobe, marry, or join the military. Others suffered the fate of so many and were executed or died of overwork, illness, and starvation. By 1978, Mme. Yun Yat, the Minister of Culture, Information, and Propaganda of the Khmer Rouge’s Democratic Kampuchea (DK) regime, declared Buddhism dead and the grounds clear for the building of a new, revolutionary culture (Keyes 1990). The destruction of the temples and the sangha left villagers disaggregated and bereft of their prime focus of communal life, and both refugees and non-exiled Cambodians were left in “cultural bereavement” (Eisenbruch 1991). Some Khmer identify this era as having extinguished the world as they knew it (Ebihara, Mortland, and Ledgerwood 1994, 3).

The Popular Vote

The Khmer Rouge utopian experiment ended in 1979 when the Vietnamese invaded and began rebuilding the country according to their own brand of communism. Thousands fled to the Thai-Cambodian border refugee camps. Others returned to their ravaged villages. The new People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) regime restarted schools, markets, and, to validate its mandate, a state-controlled form of Buddhism.

In 1985, they appointed Hun Sen, who had defected from the Khmer Rouge to Vietnam in 1978, as prime minister. However, conflict persisted between the new government forces and the Khmer Rouge throughout the 1980s. In a cruelly ironic twist of fate, the UN continued to recognize the Khmer Rouge as holders of Cambodia’s UN seat. The PRK relied therefore upon Soviet support but as this dwindled in the late 1980s, they were forced to withdraw.

Following Vietnamese withdrawal, the Paris Peace Accords were signed in 1991 by all warring factions. The UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) then took over administration of the country and introduced the country to liberal democracy, overseeing its first democratic elections in 1993. An illustration of Cambodians’ hope in the peace offered by multi-party democracy was indicated by the fact that 90% of the Cambodian electorate voted.

However, notions of legitimate opposition and the peaceful ceding of power were entirely new to Cambodia, and the peoples’ hopes were thwarted by threats of violence among those still vying for power. Despite being signatories to the peace accords, the Khmer Rouge boycotted the elections and continued to launch attacks from their jungle hideouts for several more years until their leaders had either defected to the government in exchange for amnesty or died.¹² Given the Khmer Buddhist ideal of political configuration that has for centuries been based upon the trinity of Jati (nation), Sasana (religion) and Mohaksatra (king),¹³ it is perhaps unsurprising that the Cambodian electorate set their hopes to the royalist FUNCINPEC party under the leadership of Prince Ranariddh, second son of former King Norodom Sihanouk. FUNCINPEC won the election.

However, having enjoyed power since 1985, Ranariddh’s opponent Hun Sen refused to relinquish it and instead threatened renewed violence.

Ostensibly favoring stability and peace over the election results, the reinstated King Sihanouk therefore brokered a power-sharing arrangement between FUNCINPEC and Hun Sen’s newly named Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), with Ranariddh and Hun Sen as co-prime ministers. This uneasy alliance lasted only four years. In 1997, fighting broke out on the streets of Phnom Penh between those loyal to Hun Sen and those loyal to Ranariddh, with Hun Sen emerging triumphant. This was subsequently regarded by onlookers as a coup d’état by Hun Sen,¹⁴ who has held power ever since, using a mixture of clientism, handouts, menace, and increasingly raw, repressive authoritarianism (see Strangio 2014; Morgenbesser 2019).¹⁵ As Sutton (2018) observes, Hun Sen has now fully consolidated his personal control of the regime, and he is now one of the world’s longest serving leaders.

The ECCC: Ending Impunity?

As the Khmer Rouge nightmare drew to a close, competition for power persisted and mitigated against the establishment of a peaceful era in which differences could be bridged. Given Cambodia’s history of autocratic rule and, despite the temperance by Buddhism, the repeated use of violence to repress opposition, a shift from personal loyalties towards such ideals as those of any form of covenantal pluralism would not be easy.

In the mid-1990s, both Hun Sen and Ranariddh had been trying to woo remaining Khmer Rouge leaders to defect and join their side in exchange for resources, positions of power, and amnesty for past crimes. Having enjoyed power for more than a decade by now, Hun Sen already had networks of patronage throughout the military and police all over the country. Leading Khmer Rouge figures such as Ieng Sary, Khieu Samphan, and Nuon Chea therefore accepted his offer, and lived in the comfortable belief that they would never be held accountable for Cambodia’s fate under the Khmer Rouge.

However, transitional justice (TJ) was now gaining ground throughout the world as a means to ensure stability in war-torn countries. International pressure on Cambodia to try the DK leaders was mounting (see e.g. Jarvis and Fawthrop 2005). After tortuous negotiations between the UN and the Cambodian government an agreement was drawn up to establish a major TJ initiative known as the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) in 2006. The leaders and those most accountable for the atrocities of the DK era were finally to be brought to justice. The former Director of the infamous S-21 Khmer Rouge detention facility (Case 001), and Ieng Sary, Nuon Chea, and Khieu Samphan (Case 002) were all brought to trial and ultimately sentenced to life imprisonment for crimes against humanity. Only Khieu Samphan remains alive and serving his sentence at the time of writing.

Scholars such as Un (2013) note that the two further ECCC cases, Cases 003 and 004, have been stymied by political interference, and the trials are now effectively drawing to a close, a decade and a half after the ECCC was established. The ECCC has operated in tandem with Cambodia’s transition towards ever more deeply entrenched authoritarianism. Instead of enhancing generalized trust in institutions such as the judiciary, the law has now become a political weapon wielded by Hun Sen and his following. The judiciary remains one of the least trusted institutions in the country, with judges and lawyers yielding to both intimidation and bribes¹⁶ (Nissen 2008; Un 2013, 2019).¹⁷

CPP influence over the ECCC Cambodian staff was perhaps most evident when, in the lead-up to the 2018 elections, the ECCC was continuing to operate on the outskirts of Phnom Penh while the Supreme Court in the city center was outlawing the major opposition party, and the Phnom Penh Municipal Court sentenced the opposition party leader to imprisonment for treason and espionage. Notably, some of the legal staff involved in this trial were simultaneously working at the ECCC.

Cambodia’s foreign-supported experiment with electoral democracy and the strengthening of the rule of law thus both came to an abrupt end in 2017. Assassinations of individuals who dared to speak out against the government or its interests,¹⁸ and the clamping down on the freedoms of NGOs and the press,¹⁹ have prompted many to conclude that democracy in Cambodia is now dead.²⁰

Buddhism’s Rebirth

While the Western-promoted liberal democratic recipes for societal transformation from “barbarism” towards “civilization” (see Hinton 2018) may have failed, Cambodia still had its own cultural resources to draw upon after the decades of conflict. Khmer Buddhism in particular initially offered hope to many Cambodians of a revived moral community in the wake of the DK era.

Furthermore, Buddhism and the animistic traditions with which it is interwoven in Southeast Asia are concerned not only with the relationships between people, but also with the relationship between people and the environment. “Buddhism traces all problems within human society to the basic ignorance of man as to where he stands in the scheme of nature” (Bloom 1972, 126).

Prior to the Khmer Rouge era, there were an estimated 88,000 Buddhist monks in the country and around three and a half thousand monasteries for a population of just over seven million. In general, some three-quarters of men over the age of 17 would have spent a period of one or two years as novices or monks (Keyes 1994, 46).

It is believed that more than 60% of monks were executed, died of starvation, fled the country, or disrobed under DK with only a few surviving the era (Harris 1999, 66). Many temples were razed or desecrated, and a tradition of knowledge and practice that had survived for centuries was thus virtually exterminated.

After the defeat of the Khmer Rouge by the Vietnamese in January 1979, recovery began, though the new government tried to maintain control of religious developments. In 1979, seven former Khmer monks were selected by the new People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) government and re-ordained. Their ordination was overseen by Theravadin monks from Vietnam. The youngest, the Venerable Tep Vong (born in 1930) was then given various political duties, and later appointed sanghareach (Supreme Patriarch) of the dominant Buddhist order in Cambodia, the Mahanikay. He remains in this position today and, with his politicized background, is largely considered to be a puppet of the government.²¹

While using the reestablishment of Buddhism to boost its legitimacy, the PRK regime (1979–1991) was wary of the monks’ grass-roots authority, and it was anxious to limit the freedoms of sangha throughout the 1980s, in part by forbidding monks to practice mendicancy and also by prohibiting men under the age of 50 from ordaining. However, Hawk (1981, 6) noted that in the provinces, “scores of young novitiates can be observed.” In the early 1990s, Martin (1994) noted how, despite their poverty, rural communities were trying to support the reconstruction of their monasteries. This gives an indication of the hope that rural Cambodians invested in Buddhism for regeneration of moral order.

After the Vietnamese withdrawal in 1989, the new government relaxed restrictions on Buddhism and the number of monks grew rapidly, reaching some 50,000 by the late 1990s (as well as some 4,000 renunciant women known as don chee) (Emerson 1997, 48). In the 1990s, laymen began utilizing villagers’ temple donations to found elementary Pali schools in Phnom Penh. These soon began attracting novices, particularly from among the elderly, or young orphans. However, the almost total destruction of the clergy and their literature by the Khmer Rouge and the politicization of the monastic leadership made it difficult to establish quality, non-partisan monastic education. Boys from poverty-stricken families were now ordaining not only to earn merit, but to offload the burden on their families’ economy and gain food security and free education. Many were susceptible to cooptation by wealthy politicians who saw monks as a channel to the hearts and minds of the rural electorate. Despite these factors, people continued to set their hopes to the recovery of a strong, independent sangha.

Buddhism and the Recovery of Moral Community after the Khmer Rouge?

Alongside the continuing political disquiet during the 1990s, not only were villagers rebuilding their monasteries, but several notable individuals were now employing the universal tenets of Buddhism to unify people across former divisions: between political factions, between leaders and followers, between Buddhists and non-Buddhists. Herein, I suggest, lay hope of Cambodia’s home-grown version of a kind of covenantal pluralism and the restoration of moral community.

The three examples I shall describe here are the Venerable Preah Maha Ghosananda, the Venerable Sam Bunthoeun, and former monk Heng Monychenda.

The Venerable Maha Ghosananda

The Ven. Maha Ghosananda was born in Cambodia in 1913 and had been a monk since the age of 14 but had been away from his homeland for some 15 years, studying in India. He began working with Cambodian refugees in the Thai border camps in 1978. There, he established Buddhist temples and worked to teach the refugees the tenets of Buddhist loving kindness and forgiveness (Poethig 2002; World Faith Development Dialogue 2010, 37, 136). His ideas were inspired by the growing interest in the modern “socially engaged” Buddhism.²²

Modern activist Buddhists uphold a vision comparable to that of covenantal pluralism, of a radically neutral, compassionate, interfaith society in which goods and virtues are distributed equitably. Social action is based on the concept of interdependence or “interbeing” (Thich Nhat Hanh 1987), and a concern with an individual’s accountability for their impact on the world around them. The standard teachings of Buddhism are also stressed—the control of desire and the noble eightfold path,²³ and the four sublime states of loving kindness, compassion, sympathetic joy, and equanimity.

Following the signing of the Paris Peace Accords in 1991 and the opening of Cambodia’s borders, engaged Buddhism was introduced to Cambodia in the form of a series of annual peace marches led by Ghosananda. Participants included monks, renunciant laywomen²⁴ (don chee) and lay people walking through the Cambodian countryside, even entering Khmer Rouge strongholds, and engaging in dialogue with those of opposing factions. The following swelled as locals joined it en route.

The transnational flavor of Ghosananda’s recipe for moral recovery in Cambodia was further borne out in its social anchorage. The Dhammayietra Center for Peace and Reconciliation (CPR) that organized the peace walks was originally founded on the Thai-Cambodian border. Its founders included an ex-Jesuit, Bob Maat, a Canadian peace activist Liz Bernstein and a Paris-based Cambodian monk, the Ven. Yos Hut. The early peace walks were also led by chanting Japanese monks and funding was received from “Christian and ecumenical foreign NGOs, International Organizations, and King Sihanouk”.

Although the Dhammayietra movement stressed its interfaith character and tried to attract participants from Cambodia’s other ethnic and religious groups, it only succeeded in involving Buddhists and Christians. Each of the peace marches focused on a key issue. These included not only social problems, such as land mines, but also environmental ones, such as deforestation. Since its quasi-political agenda touched upon the burgeoning economic interests of Cambodia’s new avaricious, government-endorsed elites, the Dhammayietra created some discomfort for those closely connected to the government.

Having lost his whole family to the Khmer Rouge, Ghosananda’s message of non-violence acquired universal relevance for humankind:

I do not question that loving one’s oppressor—Cambodians loving the Khmer Rouge—may be the most difficult attitude to achieve … but it is a law of the universe that retaliation, hatred, and revenge only continue the cycle and never stop it … Reconciliation does not mean that we surrender rights and conditions … but rather that we use love. Our wisdom and our compassion must walk together. Having one without the other is like walking on one foot; you will fall. Balancing the two, you will walk very well step by step. (Moser-Puangsuwan 1998, 48)

The desire to create a single moral community that included the rich and the poor was explicit. When a journalist asked Dhammayietra organizer Kim Leng what sustained her through the hard work, she responded, “Everywhere I have been I have met so many orphans, so many widows, so many crippled by mines … now I ask the rulers of Cambodia to see the sorrow of the people and to stop their war”. (Moser-Puangsuwan 1998, 57)

However, as Poethig (2002) notes, the Dhammayietra’s transnational, mobile character was somewhat at odds with village Buddhism. Also, those jockeying for political power were keen to acquire merit by patronizing local temples, but less keen to allow popular figures emerging within Buddhism any real influence.

In 1994, Ghosananda was appointed Sihanouk’s special representative for the protection of the environment, a newly created position. Given increasing efforts by the CPP to control Buddhism through the Supreme Patriarch Tep Vong and by intimidating or coopting monks, Harris (2005, 212) suggests this may have been the king’s attempt to construct an alternative, non-CPP-controlled Buddhist hierarchy.

Ultimately, Ghosananda’s inspiration did not translate into the establishment of enduring institutions or widespread social practices and the movement remained dependent on overseas funding (Appleby 2008, 135). The movement gradually lost its thrust and little of Ghosananda’s legacy remained in everyday Khmer Buddhist practice following his death in 2007.

The Venerable Sam Bunthoeun

The revival of Buddhism has instead become shaped by local needs. It has become increasingly drawn into local intrapolitical conflicts over traditional versus modern Buddhist practice (O’Lemmon 2010; O’Lemmon 2014; Satoru 2008). Also, after monks became included in the electorate in the new Cambodian constitution of 1993, they became of increasing interest to vote-seeking politicians. In particular, monks with leadership qualities, who might influence their local communities, became targets for generous donations. Alternatively, those suspected of sympathies with the opposition risked expulsion from the sangha.²⁵ Monks were not immune from politically-motivated violence. Following public protests in the aftermath of the 1998 elections, monks joined with the people and some were beaten or even murdered by the police. The fact that the police were prepared to violate the venerated clergy horrified the population.²⁶

Village temples also became targets for elite figures and politicians seeking to enhance their legitimacy and spiritual power (parami) (Guthrie 2002; Kent 2007, 2009; Ledgerwood 2008). This meant that instead of acting as a moral brake on the excesses of secular power holders, today’s weakened sangha was becoming pliable in the hands of the CPP.

Despite these developments, some have continued to use Buddhist teachings as a source of moral rectitude to influence society. In 1996, the Venerable Sam Bunthoeun was appointed abbot of a temple in Oudong, not far from Phnom Penh, where the ashes of members of the royal family are kept. There, he established a Vipassana meditation center that attracted significant donations and drew followers from all around the country and from overseas Khmer.

The Vipassana teachings universalized Buddhism by opening an avenue for lay people as well as monks and don chee to become moral authorities without the requirements of ordaining into the Buddhist order. This spawned a new, swelling group of lay people as well as clergy that could, in turn, disseminate the fundamental teachings to others, regardless of status, throughout the country.

However, no matter how universal the teachings, it is difficult to transcend political interests in Cambodia. While teachers like this may not claim to be interested in politics, politicians are interested in what they get up to, particularly if it may be seen as a threat to the ruler’s supremacy.

Sam Bunthoeun was known to be a critic of the rampant corruption in Cambodia and advocated that voting was not against Buddhist principles. This conflicted with proclamations made by CPP-loyal Supreme Patriach Ven. Tep Vong. Presumably anxious about the growing numbers and influence of monks and their political leanings, in the run up to the July 2003 elections, Tep Vong was insisting that monks must not vote since it would conflict with their religious vows.²⁷

On 6 February 2003, Sam Bunthoeun was shot twice in the chest by two unknown assailants at the capital’s Wat Langka temple. He died two days later, but no arrests have ever been made.²⁸

Intimidation has not stopped all Cambodian monks from trying to play a socially engaged role in Cambodia, trying to awaken the conscience of those who mistreat others. However, these activist monks face increasingly brutal oppression.

Further examples include the Venerable Luon Sovath, who received international recognition for his work in documenting land rights abuses in Cambodia and was nominated for the Martin Annals Awards in Geneva in 2012. He also featured in the documentary film “A Cambodian Spring,” which focused on the evictions of large numbers of poor people from land coveted by elites. But in 2020, he was expelled from the sangha by the Monks’ Council for allegedly breaking Buddhist rules by having conversations with women about “deep love.”²⁹ Similarly, the Venerable Buth Buntenh, founder of the online Independent Monk Network for Social Justice, was outspoken about government abuses of power and the rampant destruction of the environment. Recalling the ideal relationship between nation, king, and religion of which Heng Monychenda writes (below), it was reported that Ven. Buth Buntenh “would like a meeting in the tradition of the Sangkum Reasniyum regime,³⁰ when the common man could put his case before his sovereign. If only party members can deliberate with the head of state then he only hears one voice, and not the vox populi.”³¹ However, Ven. Buth Buntenh has been living in indefinite exile in the US after being charged in January 2018 with fraud alongside two other prominent civil society leaders. The three were accused of misappropriating funds gathered for the funeral of political analyst Kem Ley, who was assassinated in July 2016. These accusations came amid widespread government crackdowns on independent media outlets and NGOs.³²

Dhammocracy – Heng Monychenda

Other socially engaged, modern Khmer Buddhist activities that developed in parallel with the Dhammayietra movement have been more politically cautious. A Cambodian NGO called Buddhism for Development (BFD) was founded in 1990 in a refugee camp along the Thai border, offering training for monks in rural development. One of its senior activists, Heng Monychenda, had fled to the Thai border and ordained as a monk in 1980, disrobing in 1997. He has published works providing templates for moral leadership among secular leaders³³ (Heng 2008) and tried to raise popular awareness of the teachings of virtuous administration of power. Foreign sponsors were largely suspicious of traditional Khmer Buddhist practice, viewing it as inward looking, ritualistic, and layered in superstition. By contrast, this kind of modern, engaged Buddhism offered hope of a development-oriented approach that also offered moral guidance for leaders. The Protestant Christian ethos of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAF) fit well with this form of Buddhism and it offered sponsorship for BFD.

Heng Monychenda coins the term “dhammocracy” to envision a just society that consists of both a just ruler and a just populace. His concept captures a resonance between key ideals of Khmer Buddhism and those of covenantal pluralism. The concept appeals both to ancient Khmer Buddhist models of peaceable community but also echoes Sztompka’s visions in which trust may be placed in individuals as well as the institutions that they comprise.

Heng Monychenda first sets out the elements of Khmer Buddhist teachings about the configuration of power. These are based upon the trinity of Nation, Religion, and King mentioned above. According to Buddhist teachings, these three must be in harmony and balance in order for there to be peace and prosperity. He goes on to describe how this trinity also fits with another model of order that is familiar to Cambodians versed in Buddhism today. This describes the king as a charioteer whose duty it is to steer the two wheels of power—Buddhachak (the “wheel” of the Buddhist way of life) and anachak (secular state governance)—evenly so that the chariot will not tip. In Khmer popular imagination, Heng Monychenda explains, the ideal, just ruler is the Dhammik king, known as Preah Batr Dhammik. “In general, Khmer people believe that peace and development can only come about when the government knows how to unite modern state governance, anachak, with traditional state governance, Buddhachak, both conceptually and in practice” (Heng 2008, 311).

This recalls Williams’ metaphor for covenantal pluralism, where “the commander of the ship ought to command the ship’s course, yea, and also to command that justice, peace, and sobriety be kept and practiced, both among the seamen and the passengers” (Stewart, Seiple, and Hoover 2020, 3). Analogously, Heng Monychenda notes the principles that anyone—ruler or commoner, monk or layperson—would acquire from the temple were traditionally dana (generosity), sila (the Buddhist precepts) and bhavana (development). Bhavana from Pali refers to development not in the material or economic sense (Khmer, aphiwat) but to enhanced self-awareness, cultivation of the mind through thought and meditation.

Heng Monychenda laments the changes that have taken place in Cambodia to both the palace and the monkhood. He observes that it was traditionally the Buddhist king’s moral duty to ensure his kingdom’s wellbeing by showing deference to the teachings of Buddhism. Today, however, the power of the palace is weakened and the charisma of the monks has been damaged by war, destruction by the Khmer Rouge, modern education, and state government. He believes villagers must be educated by their monks in the qualities required of their rulers to ensure that moral order is upheld—through fair distribution of wealth, sound public policy, protection of the natural environment, and maintenance of the rule of law. Conversely, he claims, the people should only trust monks insofar as they demonstrate an ability to influence power holders with “‘therapeutic’ dhamma” (Heng 2008, 315).

While Heng Monychenda’s philosophy implies a critique of extant power holders, BFD has adopted a heedful stance, focusing largely on local development initiatives and dissemination of moral teachings and claiming that “by harmonizing its priorities, capacities, and resources with that of the government and other development agencies [it will] be more productive and cost-effective” (World Faiths Development Dialogue 2010, 84). As a layman who plays a non-confrontational role in relation to the elite, Heng Monychenda and BFD have to my knowledge remained free of intimidation, but have also been largely unable to exert significant political influence.

The Reshaping of Kingship

Kingship in Cambodia has, as Heng Monychenda alludes to, changed significantly in Cambodia. King Sihanouk abdicated the throne in 2004, and nominated his son Prince Sihamoni to become his successor. Unlike his father, who had six wives and countless mistresses, Sihamoni is a lifelong bachelor and unlikely to leave an heir. Sin Chhay, a young civil servant, puts words on a widely held view of Sihamoni as “a good, gentle man, a symbol of Cambodia. But he has one problem: no power. He only stays inside the palace. On television the leaders bow down before him but behind his back there is no respect … You could say that Hun Sen is the real king of Cambodia.”³⁴

Sihamoni is surrounded by government watchdogs, overseen by Minister of Royal Affairs Kong Som Ol, an official close to Hun Sen. On his few trips outside the palace, he is closely chaperoned, with the media kept away. Although the constitution endows him with considerable powers, these have never been granted. Son Chhay, an opposition member of Parliament in 2011 said “I think we can use the words ‘puppet king’ … The king must please the prime minister as much as possible in order to survive. It is sad to see.”³⁵

With the only real threats to Hun Sen’s power—the Buddhist sangha and also the monarchy—now so diminished in status and real influence, Hun Sen has instead adopted the trappings of kingly status himself. Noren-Nilsson (2013) has written of Hun Sen’s efforts to liken himself in the popular imagination to the little-known 16^th century legendary peasant king known as Sdech Kan, a minor usurper to the throne.

Hun Sen funded research into the location of this king’s ancient capital, and backed a number of tourism developments around it. In 2006, he financed and wrote the foreword for a book on Sdech Kan by Professor Ros Chantrabot, deputy president of the Royal Academy of Cambodia. He has often likened himself to Sdech Kan in his speeches, noting that both were born in the year of the dragon and share a connection to the province of Kampong Cham.

Attentive CPP oligarchs have taken note and exploited this. Tycoons seeking to curry favor with the prime minister and his seemingly limitless powers to control the economy and the judiciary, have commissioned the erection of numerous statues of Sdech Kan around the country.³⁶

This discursive alignment between the secular prime minister and royal authority, alongside the muzzling of both the sangha and the living monarch block the possibilities for setting moral limits to the power of the ruler and his cronies. The situation in Cambodia today fits poorly with Williams’ analogy of the ship’s commander and their duty to ensure that seamen and passengers alike to show solidarity and care for one another. It would seem instead that those whose interests conflict with those of Cambodia’s captain are jettisoned.

Furthermore, the leader of this small, weak nation is in turn a passenger aboard a greater, geopolitical ship, that China has increasing power to steer.³⁷

The Spirit of China in Cambodia

The silencing of the sangha by Cambodian elite and government figures may be set against the background of shifting geopolitical power in the region and indeed, globally. Post-socialist Cambodia’s entry into the global marketplace in the early 1990s provided new temptations and opportunities for speculators. When the government began awarding land concessions, in a country with poor land tenure security, to members of their networks and overseas investors, many farmers and so-called indigenous forest peoples found themselves landless and deprived of their livelihood and the spirits of the forests they had inhabited for generations (see e.g. Work 2018).³⁸ In 2015, it was observed that Cambodia had one of the fastest rates of forest loss in the world.³⁹ Chinese interest in Cambodian resources has grown exponentially and Chinese companies have been awarded some half of Cambodia’s 4.6 million hectares of economic land concessions.⁴⁰ The development of hydroelectric plants and industrial agriculture, now increasingly financed by Chinese companies that are not bound to the onerous international standards for projects with potentially large social and environmental impacts, are responsible for deforestation, environmental degradation, and the disenfranchisement of numerous communities.⁴¹ China’s insatiable appetite for hardwood has also made the illegal logging of Cambodia’s primary forest areas all the more lucrative for desperate locals, with police being controlled or paid off by land concessionairs.⁴²

As I have described elsewhere,⁴³ widespread land conflicts resulting from the government’s granting of land concessions saw a rise of popularity of the major opposition party in 2013 and 2017 commune elections. This new threat to Hun Sen’s absolute power was quickly quashed. The opposition party was outlawed prior to the national elections of 2018 in a manner that appears to mirror China’s model of governance. It was reportedly⁴⁴ endorsed by Beijing as a means to ensure continued stability and material “development” in Cambodia, much of which has been financed by Chinese investment.

Whither Cambodia?

This article has outlined the historical background to Khmer Buddhism with a view to illustrating its potential to build a better future after the horrors of the 1970s. Citing several examples of Buddhist activism, I hope to have shown that despite Cambodia’s violent history and religious differences, there exists a profound awareness of principles that harmonize well with those of covenantal pluralism, the fostering of trust and moral community.

I have described how Buddhism’s arrival in Cambodia during the 13th century introduced a set of norms about the moral control of leaders’ excesses while incorporating rather than replacing existing religious worldviews. The wellbeing of the world, both human and non-human, now became reliant on the virtuous behavior of the Buddhist king, or dhammaraja.

Following the total destruction of the religion by the Khmer Rouge between 1975 and 1979, new, modern forms of socially engaged Buddhist activism arose that suggested promise of a new era of trust and revival of culturally familiar means for shaping just leadership, moral cultivation, and a sense of shared destiny.

I have selected several examples of socially engaged Buddhist activism, highlighting the ways in which they each tried to appeal to a new consciousness, both in Cambodia and beyond. Each tried to shape their recovering society according to ideals similar to those outlined in covenantal pluralism. Each tried to promote an “holistic conception of the structures and norms that are conducive to fairness and flourishing for all” (Stewart, Seiple, and Hoover 2020, 13). Indeed, Morris (2004, 195) argues that, “For the Khmer-Buddhist majority, Buddhism is the only institution that cuts across political and social divisions … . Monks have exceptional power to sway people at the grass roots. Their very presence in public activities has a legitimizing effect.”

However, the DK era’s destruction of the Buddhist sangha and the conditions under which its revival has taken place have left it significantly weakened. Not only monks, but human rights defenders, and environmental and land activists, regardless of religion or political persuasion, live dangerously in Cambodia today as they clash with the economic interests of newly empowered elites.

The advent of liberal democracy in the early 1990s, the unrestrained greed that accompanied the free market economy, and the weakening of the monarchy have altered the traditional relationship between secular and religious power. No longer does the ruler of Cambodia seek power through deference to Buddhist moral authorities. Nor do the monarch or the sangha have the power necessary to limit the current ruler’s excesses and demand that he care for the weak and poor.

With China’s growing influence and support, prime minister Hun Sen is free to suppress all other forms of opposition and wield his political and economic power unchallenged. Khmer Buddhist teachings and legends have long warned of the dangers inherent for moral order of disarticulating secular power from moral restraint in this way. Both people and their environment are now at imminent risk from the predation of greedy, unscrupulous power holders. Sadly, the chances of a Cambodian version of covenantal pluralism evolving under these conditions seem remote.

Acknowledgments

This article is part of this journal’s Covenantal Pluralism Series, a project generously supported via a grant to the Institute for Global Engagement from the Templeton Religion Trust.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Alexandra Kent

Alexandra Kent is an Associate Professor in Social Anthropology at the Gothenburg Research Institute. She has worked in India, Malaysia, and Cambodia exploring the interplay between religion and politics, gender, trauma and healing, as well as security. Her current research explores how exposure to the Khmer Rouge Tribunal affects Cambodians’ understandings of justice and moral order following conflict, in a context of entrenched clientism, continuing human rights abuses, impunity, and rapid economic change that benefits elites at the expense of the poor.

Notes

1 The author wishes to extend warm thanks to the Swedish Research Council and the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation for the generous funding that enabled this research to be carried out.

2 See https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/01/12/30-years-hun-sen/violence-repression-and-corruption-cambodia (accessed 18 November 2021).

3 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cambodia-politics-china-idUSKBN1DL01L (accessed 22 November 2021).

4 https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Cambodia_2008.pdf?lang=en (accessed 4 October 2021).

5 Today, such groups include activists and their families, or any political opponents. See https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/10/28/cambodia-hun-sen-threatens-families-activists (accessed 18 November 2021).

6 Cambodia ranks worst among the ASEAN nations for corruption levels. See https://www.ucanews.com/news/losing-the-battle-against-endemic-corruption-in-cambodia/69827# (accessed 22 November 2021).

7 Cambodia was, for instance, ranked 138 of 139 countries on the World Justice’s Rule of Law Index 2021. See https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/Cambodia_2021%20WJP%20Rule%20of%20Law%20Index%20Country%20Press%20Release_1.pdf.

8 Cambodia is also home to a significant Muslim minority, most of whom are Cham. Estimates vary between 2.1 and 5 percent of the population. Some 2% of the population is reportedly Christian and the remainder comprise highland indigenous people, Baha’is, Jews, and Cao Dai adherents. See https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-report-on-international-religious-freedom/cambodia/.

9 For example, monks have recently been performing Buddhist ceremonies in forest areas threatened by deforestation “to praying for the forest’s existence in the future, so that indigenous identity can be preserved.” See https://www.rfa.org/english/news/cambodia/prey-lang-buddha-02212019171525.html (accessed 5 October 2021). See also https://www.culturalsurvival.org/news/cambodia-monks-protest-against-destruction-prey-lang-forest (accessed 18 November 2021); c.f. https://sojo.net/articles/protect-environment-buddhist-monks-are-ordaining-trees (accessed 22 November 2021).

10 The two major forms of Buddhism are Mahayana (found in China, Tibet, Japan, Mongolia, Vietnam, Korea) and Theravada. Mahayana teaches the pursuit of enlightenment through compassion while remaining in the cycle of rebirth, samsara. Theravada (found in Burma, Laos, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Thailand) teaches the pursuit of liberation and detachment leading ultimately to extinction from samsara.

11 The demise of Angkor was conventionally dated for 1431 C.E., when Thai chronicles state the city was attacked by the neighboring kingdom of Ayyutthaya and elites fled to settle near the modern capital of Phnom Penh. Recent archaeological research shows that suggests a more gradual decline rather than abrupt collapse (see e.g. https://www.pnas.org/content/116/25/12226). Various explanations have been suggested. See e.g. https://www.sydney.edu.au/news-opinion/news/2020/04/14/climate-change-and-angkor-wat-collapse.html.

12 Pol Pot died in a remote area of Cambodia in 1998. Other high-ranking Khmer Rouge, such as Ieng Sary, Khieu Samphan and Nuon Chea defected and enjoyed amnesty until the establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) in 2006.

13 This is Cambodia’s credo, as seen on the flag and popular documents. See also Heng (2008).

14 See https://www.hrw.org/news/2007/07/27/cambodia-july-1997-shock-and-aftermath for a discussion of the divisions within the CPP. Not all CPP members supported Hun Sen’s move.

15 See https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/authoritarian-rule-shedding-its-populist-skin-in-rural-cambodia/ (accessed 30 September 2021).

16 See https://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/corruption-in-cambodian-courts-endemic-says-new-report/119302 (accessed 4 October 2021).

17 See also https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/05/19/cambodias-unruly-rule-of-law/.

18 See https://www.refworld.org/docid/579ef5364.html (accessed 28 September 2021).

19 See https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2017/09/03/548296895/cambodia-daily-newspaper-to-close-after-24-years?t=1633085698881 (accessed 27 September 2021).

20 See https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/16/death-of-democracy-cambodia-court-dissolves-opposition-hun-sen (accessed 30 September 2021).

21 See https://english.cambodiadaily.com/news/tep-vong-accused-of-favoritism-going-against-buddha-72302/ (accessed 30 September 2021).

22 For more information about socially engaged Buddhism, see, for instance, writings on the Thai activist and founder of the International Network of Engaged Buddhists, Sulak Sivaraksa: http://buddhism.lib.ntu.edu.tw/FULLTEXT/JR-ADM/rothberg.htm (accessed 28 November 2021).

23 Right view, right resolve, right speech, right conduct, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, and right samadhi (“meditative absorption”).

24 Women may not become fully ordained nuns in the Theravada tradition, but many women follow eight Buddhist precepts are live celibate lives at the temple. In Cambodia they are known as don chee.

25 See also https://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/kampong-speu-monks-get-expelled-over-party-affiliation (accessed 27 September 2021).

26 See https://apnews.com/article/93a6414d0df9b69f7eeec6658f929b68 (accessed 5 October 2021).

27 At the time, it was feared that most monks would vote for the opposition party and that their constituencies would be likely to follow their moral leadership and vote similarly.

28 See https://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/slain-monk-set-be-cremated-13-years (accessed 24 September 2021).

29 See https://www.voacambodia.com/a/monk-council-expels-activist-monk-luon-sovath-for-alleged-intimate-relationship/5448949.html (accessed 5 October 2021).

30 The Sangkum Reasniyum (People’s Socialist Community) was the name Sihanouk gave to the regime he headed through Cambodia’s often fondly remembered era of relative peace and prosperity from 1955-1970.

31 See https://www.khmertimeskh.com/56575/buddhist-monk-wants-to-meet-pm/ (accessed 5 October 2021).

32 See https://www.voacambodia.com/a/from-abroad-firebrand-monk-continues-to-oppose-government/4241560.html (6 October 2021).

33 See http://www.elibraryofcambodia.org/ebooks/2015/04/preahbat-dhammik/#p=2 (accessed 7 October 2021, in Khmer).

34 See https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna43209362 (accessed 28 September 2021).

35 See https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/cambodias-king-seen-as-a-prisoner-in-his-palace/ (accessed 2 October 2021).

36 See https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/06/world/asia/hun-sen-cambodia-sdech-kan.html (accessed 17 November 2021).

37 See https://thediplomat.com/2019/12/cambodias-disastrous-dependence-on-china-a-history-lesson/ (accessed 17 November 2021).

38 See https://www.voanews.com/a/cambodia-indigenous-minorities-fighting-tide-of-development/4004979.html (accessed 18 November 2021), and https://theasiadialogue.com/2017/08/10/the-price-of-progress-in-cambodia/ (accessed 17 November 2021).

39 See https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/images/89413/cambodias-forests-are-disappearing (accessed 18 November 2021).

40 See https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2020/12/26/no-simple-solution-to-chinas-dominance-in-cambodia/ (accessed 18 November 2021).

41 See https://wwfasia.awsassets.panda.org/downloads/china_study_executive_summary.pdf (accessed 18 November 2021).

42 See https://www.npr.org/2013/01/29/170580214/as-china-builds-cambodias-forests-fall (accessed 18 November 2021).

43 See https://www.newmandala.org/the-spirit-of-china-in-cambodia/?fbclid=IwAR1KKvLL0XTKrWa5QMb5Fh3K0MWxDq8CPKtG8IpujeFRKKfdCjJLe62yTTg (accessed 5 October 2021).

44 See https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cambodia-politics-china-idUSKBN1DL01L (accessed 18 November 2021).