Introduction: Ethnic Nationalism and Politicized Religion in the Pakistan-Afghanistan Borderland

Abstract

There is a presumed tension between nationalism and religious ideology in the context of ethno-linguistic communities in the contemporary politics of Central and South Asia. This essay introduces a series of articles that explore these issues along the Pakistan and Afghanistan borderland. Together we explore how religion, nationalism, and ethnic identity interact with one another to shape political phenomena in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and its turbulent border region. We examine the extent to which ethno-linguistic and religious identities interact with, reinforce each other, and at times may come into conflict with one another.

Keywords:

• nationalism
• Islamism
• religious political parties
• Afghanistan
• Pakistan

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Correction

Violent extremism has been a driving factor for the instability gripping Pakistan and Afghanistan. Support for the Taliban and related militant groups can be seen in many locations throughout the two nations, but these have consistently found support and willing hosts among the communities along the contested Afghanistan-Pakistan border. The border follows the Durand Line, which was purportedly demarcated according to a 100-year agreement between Emir Abdur Rahman Khan (r. 1880–1901) and British India. Indeed, many of the fault lines that continue to beset these two states and their national identities are traceable to this time (Siddique 2014). Abdur Rahman pursued a heavy-handed policy of repression and the forcible relocation of hundreds of thousands of people. Large swaths of land were nationalized and reallocated, causing major social upheaval and economic hardship. Abdur Rahman’s Afghaniyat (Afghan identity) as historian Jonathan Lee keenly observed stimulated notions of cultural and ethnic supremacy, which over time has exacerbated historic differences of tribe and sect and. fueled the emergence of ethnocentric nationalism in the region (Lee 2018). The interplay of ethnicity, nationalism, and religion continues to shape the political, economic, and social trajectory of these two nations.

As defined by constructivist scholars, nationalism is a desire to fit a homogenously imagined cultural community inside a single political unit, or to emphasize the homogeneity of people already within such a political unit. Most argue that it is a modern phenomenon whose cause is variously located in processes intricately linked with modernity, including industrialization, the rise of print capitalism, instruments, like the census, of modern statecraft, as well as cynical politicians seeking to mobilize political support in newly democratized multi-ethnic societies. Most modernist constructivists like Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson have argued that nationalism generally supplants traditional religion and its civilizational or conversely local loyalties and aspirations (Anderson 1998; Gelner 2009). Similarly, observers of Political Islam have generally argued that the rise of Islamism carried with it a rejection of nation-state boundaries drawn by colonial powers, the emphasis on a civilizational idea, the ummah, and criticism of the separation of political and religious spheres of life in modern post-colonial states (Roy 2003). To what extent, however, are nationalism and politicized religion necessarily in tension with one another? After all, most successful Islamist projects have occurred within the confines of individual nation-states. The Islamic Revolution in Iran or the rise of Islamist political parties through Turkey’s democratic process have progressed within states that have a strong sense of cultural and linguistic affinity (Zia-Ebrahimi 2018). Transnational Islamist movements, on the other hand, have not seen sustained long-term political success. According to Juergensmeyer (1993), the phenomenon of religious nationalism entails the infusion of nation-states, and secular nationalism, with religious significance, seeking to give it a moral basis rooted in a given country’s cultural traditions (Juergensmeyer 2008).

In this issue, the authors seek to interrogate the presumed tension between nationalism and religious ideology in the context of ethno-linguistic communities in the contemporary politics of Central and South Asia. How do religion, nationalism, and ethnic identity interact with one another to shape political phenomena in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and its turbulent border region? For instance: to what extent can and does the tribal and ethnic Pashtun ethos of the Taliban co-exist with its unique brand of political Islam? When do Afghan refugees find it easier to assimilate into a new Pakistani identity, and how do their personal religious beliefs affect this assimilation? To what extent do regional ethnic parties in Pakistan use religion as a mobilizing tool? And what are the regional and ethnic peculiarities of self-identified religious parties? These are some of the questions we seek to pursue as we examine the extent to which ethno-linguistic and religious identities interact with, reinforce each other, and at times may come into conflict with one another.

The idea for the edition initially germinated in a conversation between Charles Ramsey, Qasim Wafayezada, and Ryan Brasher regarding the relative influence of ethnic nationalism and religion in the new Taliban government, as well as other political organizations and movements in the broader region. Ramsey then forged the idea of a symposium that would bring scholars from Afghanistan and Pakistan together to present their research and delve into this question. Hosted by the Centre for Public Policy and Governance at Forman Christian College in Lahore, Pakistan, and supported by the Afghanistan Program for Peace and Development (University of Notre Dame) and the Keston Center for Religion, Politics and Society (Baylor University), the symposium achieved a remarkable outcome: Pakistani scholars with both Pashtun and non-Pashtun backgrounds, Afghan academics associated with the previous government and currently serving under the Taliban, as well as international area specialists presented and discussed their papers focusing on different aspects related to the central question of religion and ethnic nationalism. The results of the symposium are published in this journal edition, along with additional contributions by scholars unable to participate synchronously.

While acknowledging the importance of cross-border linkages, the paper contributions themselves follow the division created by the Durand line and entrenched by partition in 1947: they focus either on the politics of Afghanistan or Pakistan. Understandably, given the momentous events of 2021, all papers related to Afghanistan seek to understand and analyze the Taliban, both in its previous iterations as ruling group and insurgency, and its current position of power. Many—although not all—of these papers question the long-term political legitimacy and viability of the Taliban government. Those focused on Pakistan examine the electoral politics of ethnic and religious political parties, Pashtun nationalist mobilization, and national identity among Afghan refugees in Peshawar, the biggest city in the predominantly Pashtun province of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. The contributions indicate the extent to which ethnic and regional identities may converge and coincide with, or repel Islamic ideological impulses, depending on the empirical context as well as the interpretive framework of the author.

Wafayezada and Ibrahimi separately tackle the central question of this volume straight on: should the Taliban be considered an ethno-nationalist or religious movement? They come to a strikingly similar conclusion: both argue that the current Taliban government needs to be understood as a hybrid phenomenon, combining elements both of political Islam, with its transnational tendencies, and exclusionary Pashtun ethnic nationalism. Both also suggest that this combination may be inherently unstable and may not allow the Taliban to generate long-term political legitimacy among the Afghan people. Important differences between the two authors also emerge. According to Wafayezada, there is an inherent tension between the Taliban’s Pashtun ethno-nationalism and its Islamist ideology. Educated Pashtun elites are drawn to them by their almost exclusively Pashtun leadership and the elevation of the Pashto language but repulsed by their traditionalist village mores. The potential to draw on non-Pashtuns via their Islamist credentials, on the other hand, is limited by their inherent, although not explicitly articulated, Pashtun ethno-nationalism. Until the Taliban can solve this contradiction, Wafayezada believes the Taliban will remain an unpredictable and combustible movement unable to break the long cycle of violence in the country. Ibrahimi, on the other hand, does not see an inherent contradiction between ethno-nationalism and Islamism. According to him, the Taliban is seeking to transform what it means to be Pashtun, all the while continuing the long-standing strategy of the Afghan state, dating back to Abdur Rahman in the late 19^th century, of excluding and suppressing non-Pashtun identity groups. Pashtun groups on the periphery, such as the Kuchi nomads in Bamyan or Ghilzai settlers in the northern part of the country, may not ascribe to Taliban ideology, but instrumentally make use of Taliban rule to pursue their interests vis-à-vis non-Pashtun regional majorities.

Zaland gives the reader an inside glimpse of the authoritarian state-building project of the Taliban in Afghanistan. This is enriched by his current personal experience as well as an analysis of one of the few published blueprints of the new government written by its Chief Justice, Abdul Hakim Haqqani. According to Zaland, Taliban ideology with its limited vision of women’s rights and strict enforcement of social behavior has not markedly changed over time. But he does take a cautiously optimistic tone in his analysis of the Taliban, who he sees both deeply rooted in a rural Pashtun social framework as well as in transnational Deobandi religious networks. Any national and international actors seeking to influence the Afghan government’s actions need to work through these twin realities or risk rebuff and rejection, notwithstanding other internationally recognized Islamic credentials. Zaland and Ramsey further dissect the current Taliban government into four segments. While the first-generation leadership remains in power and maintains the loyalty of the mass of Taliban foot soldiers, it will continue to clamp down on women’s rights and push for an antagonistic relationship with the international community. However, Zaland and Ramsey argue that the second-generation leadership, along with a cadre of younger tech-savvy bureaucrats waiting in the wings, have greater awareness of the international system, and may be keen to smooth relations with external powers to maximize their economic interests.

William Maley’s assessment of the Taliban is rather more pessimistic. He argues that it is a proto-fascist movement with totalitarian tendencies that represents a significant rupture with traditional Afghan social and political life. Drawing parallels to the homosocial training of clerics in the Catholic Church, Maley believes the dysfunctional socialization of the Taliban rank-and-file in Deobandi madaris in adjoining Pakistan, where young men have little to no interaction with women or traditional Afghan family life, creates disproportional opportunities for deviant and authoritarian personalities to rise to leadership positions. Ultimately, according to Maley, the Taliban are deeply unpopular and lack legitimacy to stay in power in the long-term. Jamal Malik looks deeper at local responses to reforms initiated within the traditional madrassa curriculum. There is a global trend for governments to integrate madrasas into the formal education sector, ostensibly for national development and ideological and societal purposes, while also seeking to limit their socio-religious influence. In Afghanistan, this has inadvertently led to the Salafising of the Hanafiyya tradition by imposing trans-cultural values that can lead to de-cultured form of Islam. Malik argues that the traditional Hanafi religious establishment has resisted these reforms and is seeking to protect its normative validity and cultural and political autonomy from Salafi-influenced homogenization. The Taliban is seeking to embrace the concept of the umma (the global Muslim community) but in a manner that combines global and indigenous influences.

Similar to Maley, Shafiq and Wafayezada also argue that the Taliban has largely played a destructive role in Afghan politics by subverting the economy. They conduct an economic post-mortem of the old Afghan republic that documents its potential and its ultimate collapse. While endemic corruption in the previous regime played an important role in its rapid disintegration, their econometric model indicates that it was primarily an uptick in violence associated with the Taliban insurgency, and the American decision to legitimize it by engaging in negotiations, that permanently damaged the Afghan economy and led to the downfall of the fledgling democratic experiment.

The articles by Chacko and by Khoso and Rovidad examine the interaction of regional identity and religion in Pakistan’s electoral politics. Through in-depth analysis of electoral data that he has collected from multiple sources, Chacko seeks to challenge the prevalent notion that religious parties in Pakistan have had little electoral success. If national results are disaggregated and combined with provincial votes, a far more differentiated picture emerges. Particularly in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly Northwest Frontier Province), explicitly religious parties, as well as coalitions of different sectarian movements, have had considerable success, gaining access to power at multiple points in time. Even in Sindh and Punjab provinces, where sectarian parties have had little direct representation, religious figures associated with Sufi orders have found electoral success through association with mainstream parties. Khoso and Rovidad, in turn, scrutinize the extent to which regional ethnic parties use religious discourse to gain victory at the polls. They find that religious symbolism, or at least not anti-religious rhetoric, tends to lead to greater electoral success for ethnic parties, while religious skepticism generally hurts their chances. However, by and large, Pakistan’s major ethnic parties have followed a path of secular ethno-nationalism, which has led to repression from the federal government due to its perceived threat to national unity, as well as suspicion from religious segments of the population.

Husnul Amin, as well as Burki and Brasher, specifically focus on political identity in predominantly Pashtun regions of Pakistan. Amin conducted ethnographic research and in-depth research among young Pashtun social activists, who represent what he calls Pashtun “neo-nationalism,” challenging the old elite nationalist families preoccupied with intra-party power struggles and dynastic politics. Although the state has sought to paint them as anti-regime elements that need to be monitored, if not repressed, Amin argues that they are the true heirs of the non-violent legacy of social reformer Abdul Gafar Khan, who have challenged the dominant narrative of Pashtuns as brave religious warriors—or conversely, potentially dangerous terrorists. Unlike the previous generation of Pashtun nationalists who had a strong sense of “Afghaniyat,” or Afghan identity, however, Amin finds that the new generation, represented above all by the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM), is more oriented toward Pakistan’s urban centers rather than historically important cities within Afghanistan. They have developed a hybrid Pashtun-Pakistani identity and are primarily interested in pushing for their constitutional rights as Pakistani citizens, rather than challenging the legitimacy of the Pakistani state, and its territorial boundaries. Burki and Brasher also focus on “Afghaniyat” and “Pakistaniyat,” but among Afghan refugees living in Peshawar. Based on survey research and in-depth interviews, they ask what happens to national attachment when people cross boundaries but remain in a culturally similar environment to their homeland. Initial results indicate that second generation immigrants are more likely to feel Pakistani, and less likely to feel Afghan compared to their parents. This relationship, however, is also mediated by religion. Those educated in a madrasa are more likely to identity with Pakistan, as are those who self-report greater regularity in religious activity like daily prayers and Qur’anic recitation.

The articles in this special edition are the fruit of a collaborative effort among Brasher, Wafayezada, and Ramsey. The idea for the project crystalized over time as we discussed and contemplated the broader issues of the context and the predicament faced by many scholars who were affected by the fall of the regime and the traumatic evacuation. Also at the heart of the conversation was the difference between local Afghan and Pakistani scholars whose perspectives at times have been overshadowed by more senior and accomplished academics and political pundits in the West. At the heart of our deliberations, however, was the shared view that there will not be peace in the region until there is greater understanding and collaboration across the infamous Durand Line. We hope that this will be the first of many more collaborative endeavors in this regard.

A project like this cannot be accomplished without the gracious and willing support of many. We are exceedingly thankful to the authors who prepared papers for the symposium and this journal on a very tight schedule. We are grateful for the diligent guidance of Dr. Dennis R. Hoover, Editor of The Review of Faith & International Affairs, and the generosity of the Institute for Global Engagement. We are grateful for the support of Dr. Eric Patterson and Jeremy Barker at Religious Freedom Institute for their consistent support in research and advocacy in this region. We are also thankful to Prof. Saeed Shafqat at Center for Public Policy and Governance (CPPG) at Forman Christian College in Lahore, Pakistan, and the University Rector, Ambassador Dr. Jonathan Addleton. Though the work of many was required to bring out this edition, articles included reflect the opinions of the respective authors alone. It is our sincere hope that the articles, and the extensive engagement required to bring these together, will in some humble way advance the cause of peace.

Correction Statement

This article was originally published with errors, which have now been corrected in the online version. Please see Correction (http://doi.org/10.1080/15570274.2023.2259175)

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Ryan Brasher

Ryan Brasher holds a PhD in Political Science from Indiana University (Bloomington) and works at Simpson University (Redding, CA). He previously served as faculty member at Forman Christian College in Pakistan from 2014–2021. His research has focused on state-building, national identity, political religion, federalism, and foreign policy in Central and South Asia.

Charles Ramsey

Charles Ramsey (PhD, Birmingham) teaches history of South Asia at Baylor University. He is also a Teaching Fellow in the Keston Center for Religion, Society, and Politics and Senior Fellow at the Religious Freedom Institute.