Worse Things Than Losing: Underdogs Defining Likelihood of Success

Abstract

This essay is a preliminary argument intended to provoke just war scholars to think more carefully and deeply about the criterion of likelihood of success. This is particularly appropriate at this moment in time as Taiwan is on high alert as it faces China, and as we watch the determination of Ukraine to defend itself from Russian aggression. Since the writing of this essay, the 9 million people of the state of Israel faced the horrific assault by Hamas terrorists on October 7, 2023. If likelihood of success is prioritized over the primary jus ad bellum criteria, then many possible limited successes evaporate from creative strategy. Perhaps a better way of thinking about this is that we must be thoughtful in defining what we mean by “success.” Success need not be only immediate tactical or strategic victory, as tactical losses may result in strategic wins.

Keywords:

• likelihood of success
• just war theory
• ethics of war
• Russia
• Ukraine

In February 2022, the Russian Federation invaded its neighbor, Ukraine. The details of this war are well known to scholars and citizens across the Western world. From a classic just war perspective, the basic principle of national self-defense of the Ukrainian polity justifies the use of force against the Russian invaders.

There is at least one perspective that disagrees. A strong statement of that perspective is that if there is no reasonable likelihood of success, then the destructiveness of going to war, i.e. the loss of human life and property, should not be pursued. According to this view, surrender—being conquered—may be a more moral decision for political authorities rather than throwing away the lives of citizens. One could imagine this argument being made in February 2022 because it seemed obvious that the Russian military would trounce Ukraine. Indeed, the initially slow response by Western governments to provide military aid to Kiev was directly tied to a belief in a low likelihood of success.

There are a number of flaws with this reasoning, the most obvious of which is that it seems to make likelihood of success trump other just war categories rather than be one part of a larger, cohesive whole. It also seems to suggest that it would be better to allow one’s citizens to be enslaved rather than fight back because all living in chains would be better than some killing and dying. This type of reasoning is morally alien to historic just war thinking.

The recent case of Ukraine, as well as others from Thermopylae to the Russo-Finnish “Winter War” of 1940, suggest that likelihood of success is not the essential category by which leaders should think about the use of force, particularly in moments of self-defense of the polity. This essay begins by questioning how we define likelihood of success, finding that it is poorly specified in the classical and contemporary just war literature. We will then turn to appropriate definitions of “success” when it comes to warfare, particularly in cases of defensive warfare. I argue that too limited a definition of likelihood of success results in constrained policy options that are out of tune with strategic just war thinking. This essay begins with an introduction to just war statecraft followed by an overview of the last stand of Sparta’s 300 at Thermopylae, concluding with some specific thoughts on likelihood of success’ relationship to other just war principles and applied to this case.¹

The Classic Just War Framework

The just war tradition is a Western philosophical school of thought with roots in the Greco-Roman world (e.g. Cicero) and early Christianity (e.g. Romans 13, St. Augustine of Hippo). The classical just war framework provides the foundation for individual behavior, customary international law, and the formal laws of armed conflict, in addition to ethical reflection on issues of war and peace (Patterson 2019). It is the foundation from which numerous Western political principles, such as sovereignty, political legitimacy, and just cause in war, derive, and all of these are firmly rooted today both in international conventions and foreign policy practice (Patterson and Joustra 2022). Just war thinking begins with three deontological criteria (Johnson 1999) for the just decision (jus ad bellum) to use military force: legitimate authority acting on a just cause with right intent. Practical, or better, prudential, secondary jus ad bellum considerations include: likelihood of success, proportionality of ends, and last resort. Just war thinking also has criteria regarding how war is rightly conducted (jus in bello): artful military action focused on battlefield victory (military necessity) using means and tactics proportionate (proportionality) to battlefield objectives, which limit harm to civilians, other non-combatants, and property (discrimination).

More specifically, political actors should carefully examine the following principles when considering the implementation of military force:

Jus Ad Bellum (The Morality of Going to War)

• legitimate authority: supreme political authorities are morally responsible for the security of their constituents and, therefore, are obligated to make decisions about war and peace.

• just cause: Self-defense of citizens’ lives, livelihoods, and way of life are typically just causes; more generally speaking, the cause is likely just if it rights a past wrong, punishes wrong-doers, or prevents further wrong.

• right intent: Political motivations are subject to ethical scrutiny; violence intended for the purpose of order, justice, and ultimate conciliation is just, whereas violence for the sake of hatred, revenge, and destruction is not just.

• likelihood of success: Political leaders should consider whether or not their action will make a difference in real-world outcomes. This principle is subject to context and judgment because it may be appropriate to act despite a low likelihood of success (e.g. against local genocide). Conversely, it may be inappropriate to act due to low efficacy despite the compelling nature of the case.

• proportionality of ends: Does the preferred outcome justify, in terms of the cost in lives and material resources, this course of action?

• last resort: Have traditional diplomatic and other efforts been reasonably employed in order to avoid outright bloodshed?

Jus in Bello (The Morality of Fighting War)

• military necessity: Is every reasonable effort made to gain battlefield advantage in pursuit of larger strategic objectives in the cause of justice while restrained by law and other jus in bello criteria?

• proportionality: Are the battlefield tools and tactics employed proportionate to battlefield objectives?

• discrimination: Has care been taken to reasonably protect the lives and property of legitimate non-combatants?

Jus Post Bellum (The Morality of How War Ends)

• order: beginning with existential security, a sovereign government extends its roots through the maturation of government capacity in the military (traditional security), governance (domestic politics), and international security dimensions.

• justice: getting one’s “just deserts,” including consideration of individual punishment for those who violated the law of armed conflict and restitution policies for victims when appropriate.

• conciliation: coming to terms with the past so that parties can imagine and move forward toward a shared future.

The principles of the just war tradition have moved from customary international law and practice into formalized treaties between governments, such as the Hague, Geneva, Torture, and Genocide Conventions, more specific treaties narrowing or reducing specific inhumane or inordinately destructive weapons (e.g. 1868 Petersburg Declaration, Chemical Weapons Convention, etc.), international covenants (e.g. United Nations Charter), and other legally binding documents (Biggar 2013; Charles and Demy 2010).

Likelihood of Success at Thermopylae

As recorded by Herodotus in The Histories, in the translation by G. C. Macaulay with adaptations (1922, 7.201–239), the battle of Thermopylae in 480 BC represents one battle that some might say violates the principle of likelihood of success. What justifies a small band of warriors, faced by hundreds of thousands of Persians, fighting to the death? Is this not a waste of human life?

Xerxes I’s second invasion of Greece was part of the long-running Greco-Persian wars, with the Persian Empire as the primary aggressor as it attempted to dominate the Mediterranean. The famous land battle of Thermopylae occurred simultaneously with a naval battle at Artemisium. The Greek strategy was to hold the Persians at both—at the crucial land invasion point (Thermopylae) and at the Straits of Artemisium. Although the Greek navy had to withdraw from Artemisium, the Greek navy soundly defeated the Persians at the consequential Battle of Salamis later that year. Salamis was so decisive that it resulted in much of the Persian military pulling back from the region, and the Persians were firmly defeated a year later at the Battle of Platea (479 BC). Platea effectively brought the second Greco-Persian war to an end.

Thermopylae was intimately connected with Platea, and thus, it is illustrative for us to seek a more comprehensive way of thinking about the concept of “likelihood of success.” To be more explicit, a destructive battle like Thermopylae, which seems to be a clear defeat, may be part of a larger campaign or war to which that defeat nonetheless contributes to victory. In other words, it is too narrow to think of likely tactical defeat at one place and time as eroding the entirety of the strategic likelihood of success.

What would success have looked like at Thermopylae? To refresh our memory, much of Greece is protected by rocky headlands, coral reefs, and treacherous seas. Thus, finding a landing point with wide beach access and then a pass into the heartland is a strategic necessity. Thermopylae is one such entry point. History reports that the pass was held for three days, with tremendous loss of Persian life, by 300 Spartans and 700 Thespians, led by Sparta’s King Leonidas.

In poetic and cinematic portrayals of Thermopylae, the motivating spirit of the defenders seems to be to prove their own valor. Honor motivates them to fight to the death, to return home “with your shield or on your shield” as, for example, a victor or slain in battle. Over focusing on honor, however, misses the strategic implications of fighting at Thermopylae. Achieving honor was not the sole or most important measure of success. For instance, one element of success at Thermopylae was to make the Persian army pay such a high price that both the senior leaders and the foot soldiers would think twice about invading Hellas. It is impossible to know just how many Persians were killed by “The 300,” yet with thousands upon thousands slain, both sides knew that it was just a handful of Greek warriors holding the pass. This certainly affected Persian planning and morale.

A second, and perhaps even more important, form of “success” was to slow the Persian army down in this engagement to allow time for planning, for additional Greek armies to rally, and for civilians to prepare for the invasion. The three days that the Persians were held at Thermopylae, in addition to the initial landing of Persian troops and Xerxes’ likely oratorical grandstanding, resulted in crucial time for civilians to flee to the interior and for the next phases of defense to be coordinated. In other words, it is entirely possible that the slaughter of Thermopylae’s defenders, fighting to the last man, saved many civilian lives.

A third element in considering “success” at Thermopylae is the strategic communications element. There is something noble about the sacrifice of these warriors who gave everything in order to blunt the power of the Persian aggressor. To some Greeks, this was a morale-lifting call to action. In other instances, the example of Leonidas and his band of brothers provided inspiration to the youth and children as a testament of sacrifice for the common good. That inspiration may be a crucial motivator for the next generation to serve and defend their country. Indeed, it may provide a model for throwing off oppression in the future.

What I am arguing in this brief reflection on Thermopylae is that we must carefully consider what we mean by success when thinking of likelihood of success. In the case of Thermopylae, one could say that the valiant stand of the Spartans and their allies failed because the Persians ultimately did land their army and, due to the betrayal of the Greek Ephialtes, ultimately took the pass and invaded Greece.

However, a richer understanding of “success” is that a number of strategic elements were achieved, even if this specific battle was not won. The Spartans made the Persians pay so high a price that they had to think twice about going farther, slowed the Persians down so that Greece could rally, inspired a patriotic spirit throughout Greece, and, even if it was a loss now and part of a series of losses, nonetheless, there was tremendous potential for their deeds to inspire their children to win the next war. Indeed, Greece had soundly beaten Persia at Salamis and Platea within a year.

Likelihood of Success in the Just War Tradition

Likelihood of Success and the Jus Ad Bellum Criteria

As James Turner Johnson has argued, the principal jus ad bellum criteria are a deontological package describing the moral obligation of political authorities: legitimate authorities have a responsibility for the security of those under their care and, thus, may employ force at times in pursuit of a just cause and with right intentions (1999). Just causes, as suggested by Augustine, are attempts to achieve justice, political order, and security: writing past wrongs, preventing further wrongs, and punishing wrongdoers (Aquinas 1920). Of course, right intention informs the ethos of these decisions for the decision to use force should be for the good (love of neighbor, love of country, love of justice) and not, according to Augustine and his many intellectual progenies, for greed, lust, hatred, or revenge. The people we want to be making these decisions (legitimate authorities) should be experienced experts rather than poorly informed academics or spotlight-seeking media elites.

Over time, political leaders and strategists developed some secondary prudential criteria that are descriptive of how intelligent leaders have acted throughout history: they count the cost of employing force and do so, in large part, by weighing whether the grievance or threat is proportionate to employing force (proportionality of ends), if there is a reasonable likelihood that force will result in a success of their policy aims (likelihood of success), and whether reasonable efforts of the other tools of statecraft (last resort) have been implemented. Of course, if one delays too long to act due to hand-wringing and navel-gazing over whether or not one has achieved true last resort status, it is probable that the security situation has disintegrated beyond likelihood of success.

It is important to note, as Johnson and Elshtain do, that the three primary deontological principles drive the just war tradition. The secondary criteria are practical tools, reminding us that even if leaders decide that it is moral to go to war, they still have to think about their limited manpower, reserves, inventories of materials, alliances and expectations, and so forth. Thus, the prudential criteria are essential, but it is a recent novelty by some to elevate the latter criteria to the same moral plane as the former. Indeed, it may be the case that the first significant statement claiming a moral elevation of the secondary criteria to an equal threshold with legitimate authority, just cause, and right intention is in the 1983 pastoral letter by the US Council of Catholic Bishops, The Challenge of Peace.

One final introductory note on jus ad bellum: The overall objective of a just war is to achieve a better state of peace, so it is important to get likelihood of success right. Leaders ought to consider this particular criterion when they express their war aims prior to the use of force and, as we will see, likelihood of success should be considered not just at the strategic level; it also informs the jus in bello principles of military necessity, proportionality, and discrimination.

Likelihood of Success and the Jus in Bello Criteria

The jus in bello criteria—military necessity, proportionality, and discrimination—informs and restrains the way that warfighters are to fight war. Military necessity is the concept that battlefield commanders should fight to win using every legal tool and tactic at their disposal, as restrained by law and the other two jus in bello principles. Proportionality limits intended damage by focusing attention on how battlefield commanders plan and implement the tactics and tools of warfare in a specific time and place in coordination with larger theatre and campaign objectives. Similarly, discrimination, often called distinction or non-combatant immunity, instructs commanders to take caution in appropriately targeting military personnel, bases, weapons, infrastructure, and other means of war and reasonably protecting civilians, private property, and the like.

Battlefield commanders make tactical and operational decisions that support government war aims (jus ad bellum) as well as the more specific objectives that link one battlefield to many others in a campaign or theatre of war. Thus, commanders are making decisions in a feedback look that brings the idea of success here and now, in this skirmish, into relationship with the overall strategic concept of victory.

One can see, whether in today’s Ukraine or at ancient Thermopylae, how the concept likelihood of success at the strategic level (that is, the success of winning the overall war) may require a high level of sacrifice in a skirmish or battle. The Spartans at Thermopylae may have lost their lives and eventually lost control of the strategic point they were protecting. However, their heroic stand, a form of military necessity that was proportionate and discriminating in its context, had strategic implications for the ultimate success of the Greeks in the subsequent year.

Likelihood of Success and Jus Post Bellum

If the measure of success was simply that armies were not fighting a hot war, then one could imagine many a horrific and unjust political order imposed by immoral and illegal agents. If the Greeks, Romans, Finns in 1940, Iraqis under ISIS, or Ukrainians today had simply bowed meekly to their invaders, it is likely that rapine, plunder, mass murder, and enslavement would have ensued for some or all of the population. We have seen such terrors at the hands of the Nazis, Communists, ISIS, Boko Haram, and other groups; the ancient world well knew that a loss to a Near Eastern power, like Persia, could result in the entire loss of one’s polity as one’s citizens were sold into slavery, killed, or exiled across the empire.

Thus, elevating likelihood of success beyond its secondary rank can result in absurd conclusions, and it does not give us a window for thinking through how the deeper notions of jus ad bellum and how fighting occurs (jus in bello) should have an eye on that “better state of peace,” or, at least the status quo ante bellum.

Elsewhere, I have argued (Patterson 2012) that a rich conception of late and post-conflict begins with order (basic domestic security, order and governance, and safety at one’s borders) and that, at times, governments may seek post-conflict justice (punishment, restitution) and conciliation. Government and military leaders need to have a vision of what success looks like: a just and enduring peace. Determining success ought not to be solely in terms of whether we can have an immediate victory or significant loss of life. As in these challenging cases, however, it may be the case that what we think in terms of the survival of the body politic and the evacuation of civilians.

Conclusion

This essay is a preliminary argument intended to provoke just war scholars to think more carefully and deeply about the criterion of likelihood of success. This is particularly appropriate at this moment in time as Taiwan is on high alert as it faces China, and as we watch the determination of Ukraine to defend itself from Russian aggression. Since the writing of this essay, the 9 million people of the state of Israel faced the horrific assault by Hamas terrorists on October 7, 2023. As that conflict unfolds, defining likelihood of success will take on new urgency, as it always does in major counter-insurgency or counter-terrorism operations in Malaya, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and, now, Gaza.

If likelihood of success is prioritized over the primary jus ad bellum criteria, then many possible limited successes evaporate from creative strategy. Perhaps a better way of thinking about this is that we must be thoughtful in defining what we mean by “success” (Hom 2018; Patterson 2019). Success need not be immediate tactical or strategic victory, as tactical losses may result in strategic wins.

In the case of today’s Ukraine, the valiant defense by President Zelensky and Ukraine’s military forces has not entirely stopped Russia’s devastating attacks across the country. Indeed, the loss of life and the destruction of infrastructure are high. But, the defense of Ukraine resulted in many minor but nonetheless strategic victories. It is a victory that millions of civilians fled the fighting to safety in Western Ukraine, Poland, or elsewhere. It is a victory that the popularly-elected government not only survives in office, but thrives, enhancing the legitimacy of Ukrainian institutions. Counter to President Putin’s claims that Ukrainians are Russians, this war has deepened and broadened Ukrainian nationalism. Moreover, the initial success of halting Russian advances utilizing small arms, Molotov cocktails, and cellular phones, resulted in Western governments coming to believe that Kiev could bloody Moscow’s nose and that military support made sense. In sum, it is incumbent on practitioners and scholars to carefully define “success” in a multi-dimensional fashion and consider a wide range of policy actions that may result in success.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Eric Patterson

Eric Patterson, PhD, is President & CEO of the Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation, Scholar-at-Large and the former dean of the School of Government at Regent University, and a research fellow and former faculty member at Georgetown University Berkley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs. He is the author or editor of twenty-two books, including Just American Wars: Ethical Dilemmas in U.S. Military History.

Notes

1 This essay was prepared for and presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association in Montreal, Canada on March 15, 2023. A later version was presented at the annual meeting of the International Society for Security Studies, held at the US Air Force Academy on October 21, 2023.