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Abstract
The agenda of the civilian police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina evolved quite dramatically since its creation in 1996 under the framework of Annex 11 of the Dayton Peace Accord (DPA). Under the UN (1996–2002), the CIVPOL mission shifted from an initial programme centred on individuals—the micro level—with projects such as training, code of conduct, recruitment, and vetting, to an internal reorganization of all police forces of the country—the meso level—with activities centred on democratization, depolitization, internal control, and accreditation. After the European Union took over the CIVPOL mission on January 1, 2003, the agenda became no longer ‘democratization’ but macro issues of ‘nation‐building’ and financial sustainability. In the process, the DPA has lost its normative and reference character and has been substituted by the logic of the Realpolitik of influence in the region by the European Union. The paper explains this change of agenda with a set of three factors: (1) mission cycle, (2) changing role of international actors and agency style, and (3) the local configuration of power.
Notes
[1] Having been a regular consultant to the police academies of BiH between 2000 and 2004 and as a member of an assessment team mandated in 2004–2005 by the European Commission to audit the police system in BiH, the author had a privileged access to the police in BiH and conducted numerous formal and informal interviews with local police authorities, the International Police Task Force, and the European Union Police Mission that have informed the substance of the paper.
[2] Article 2, paragraph 4 of Annex 11. During the IPTF period, however, it seems that the Commissioner ‘reported’ to the Special Representative of the Secretary‐General (SRSG) and ‘worked closely’ with the HR.
[3] The PIC is a group of 55 countries and international organizations that ‘sponsor and direct the peace implementation process’ and the High Representative is nominated by the steering board of the PIC.
[4] See the conclusions of the Bonn conference of the PIC (http://www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=5182).
[5] See the OHR description of its mandate (http://www.ohr.int/ohr‐info/gen‐info/#pic).
[6] This section is based mainly on the account by Dziedzic and Bair (Citation1998).
[8] These are unofficial figures from the survey.
[9] This paragraph is partially based on the account of the ICG report ‘The Wages of Sins’ (ICG, Citation2001, p. 9).
[10] By the end of 1997, the provisional certification process was finished for the Bosniak police in the Federation; beginning in 1998 it started with the Croatian side (ICG, Citation2002, p. 6) and in 1999 in the RS.
[11] Another project along this line was the physical separation of the intelligence services from the police as the two agencies used to share the same premises.
[12] See ESI paper ‘Turning Point. The Brussels PIC Declaration and a State‐Building Agenda for Bosnia and Herzegovina,’ June 7, 2000.
[13] In addition, the organizational reform of the police and the Ministry of Interior led by the IPTF failed to put the support services under the police commissioner authority. Instead, they remained under the direct authority of the Ministers of Interior.
[14] ‘Policing the Police in Bosnia’ (ICG, Citation2002, p. 2).
[15] See the programme ‘state‐level criminal justice institutions’ of the 2004 Implementation Plan of the OHR. The War Crime Chamber was expected to hear cases as soon as January 2005 and to be composed by local and international judges (see: ‘War Crime Chamber Project,’ OHR publications, November 2004).
[16] OHR Mission Implementation Plan 2003–2004.
[17] Livno, Gorazde, Orasje, see Final Report (Citation2004, p. 87).
[18] Bosnia and Herzegovina Police Restructuring Commission, Executive Summary, December 15, 2004.