Law enforcement intelligence: implications for self-radicalized terrorism

Abstract

A series of tragic events over the last three years has further strengthened the emerging preventative and proactive philosophies adopted by US law enforcement post-September 11, 2001. Law enforcement and the American public now have a heightened awareness of homegrown terrorism. While these terrorist actors operate independent of traditional terrorist networks and groups, they are often influenced by such groups through a process where they enter as a non-violent individual and exit as a violent ‘true believer’. Efforts by law enforcement to mitigate or prevent such threats rely on the implementation of intelligence-led policing practices. Central to these practices is the input of raw information into the intelligence cycle. This paper will discuss the importance and application of suspicious activity reporting as it impacts law enforcement intelligence practices to prevent threats from self-radicalized terrorism.

Keywords:

• self-radicalized terrorism
• suspicious activity reporting
• law enforcement intelligence
• intelligence-led policing
• law enforcement partnerships

Notes

1. The 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon demonstrated the detailed and comprehensive planning of modern terrorist groups as well as their patience and willingness to invest in methods of attacks that have not been utilized in the past.

2. Terrorist methods have evolved consistently with counter-measures. Historically speaking, terrorist groups would often utilize a variety of bombing methods to instill damage and fear. While this approach is still prevalent – especially at the international level – groups and bombings have given way in the USA to individual actors who utilize any available means to cause violence and terror.

3. Shahzad’s attempt to detonate the bomb in Times Square was prevented due to a tip from a community member to a local NYPD police officer.

4. A detailed discussion of ILP can be found in Carter, 2009.

5. The financial SAR deals specifically with financial transactions where financial institutions must report large cash transactions as suspicious activity. For more information about the financial SAR see http://www.fincen.gov/reg_sar.html

6. For more information on law enforcement fusion centers, refer to Chapter 8 of the Carter, 2009.

7. As a matter of nomenclature, an ‘intelligence gap’ is information law enforcement does not possess about the existence, nature, and/or viability of a threat. An ‘intelligence requirement’ is information that is identified and proactively collected to ‘fill the gaps’.

8. The FBI defines a criminal enterprise as a group of individuals with an identified hierarchy, or comparable structure, engaged in significant criminal activity that often engage in multiple criminal activities and have extensive supporting networks (Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI], 2010).

9. Hasan’s relationship with al-Awlaki serves as an example of the ‘mentorship’ role within the process of self-radicalization.

10. Al-Awlaki has also been tied to Faisal Shahzad, the man who attempted to detonate a bomb in New York City’s Times Square on 1 May 2010 (Huffington Post, 2010; Shane & Mekhennet, 2010).