A new methodology for strategic assessment of transnational threats

ABSTRACT

Transnational threats including organised crime and terrorism pose serious physical and national security concerns, and have significant economic and social costs. Despite these widely recognised harms, there is limited literature on using strategic intelligence resources to understand and assess transnational threats to enable action to reduce them. Whilst there is growing consensus that national security and national law enforcement intelligence challenges are moving closer together – especially in relation to transnational threats – there is very little theory or practitioner guidance. This article presents an applied national law enforcement case study; the provision of strategic intelligence assessments to senior decision-makers of the Australian Federal Police intended to improve decision-making. During this case study, practitioners drew on national security intelligence approaches and analytical techniques to produce strategic assessments of transnational threats. The case study addressed challenges raised in the literature as obstacles to effective strategic intelligence, including ambiguity relating to the role of intelligence in the criminal environment, a broad range of divergent threat types and the need to demonstrate value of strategic intelligence for decision-makers. This has broader applicability in different jurisdictions and on different topics due to the focus on consultation, engagement and collaboration alongside traditional intelligence processes. Given the lack of literature in the field, it makes a contribution to understanding and developing best practice in strategic intelligence as applicable to national policing and security.

KEYWORDS:

• National security
• strategic intelligence
• policing
• transnational threats
• criminology

Acknowledgments

Thank you to Chad Whelan at Deakin University for helping us to shape a practitioner piece for an academic audience. Thanks to the anonymous reviewers for their feedback and improvements.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors. This paper has been approved for publication by the Australian Federal Police.

Notes

1. In 2017, after this case study, the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission released the Australian Criminal Intelligence Management Strategy 2017–20 which set out five stages of the intelligence cycle for the Australian context; 1) Plan, Prioritise and Direct, 2) Collect and Collate, 3) Analyse and Produce, 4) Report and Disseminate, 5) Evaluate and Review (Commonwealth of Australia, 2017). The relevant reference at the time was the 2010 AFP Intelligence Doctrine which listed the intelligence cycle as planning & direction, collection, collation, analysis and dissemination.

2. This is certainly not a reflection of our colleagues, or a criticism. The complexity of work and calibre of analysts and intelligence products in policing and law enforcement varies considerably.

3. The AFP mission is to protect Australians and Australia’s interests with the vision; policing for a safer Australia (Police, 2018). This is a very broad role and includes responsibility for prevention, disruption, enforcement of a wide range of offences as well as response, community policing and offshore roles.

4. This is an intelligence planning document intended to seek decision-maker approval and direction to ensure a suitable product is delivered. This particular IPS was approved by then Assistant Commissioner Intelligence.

5. Ensuring use by decision-makers is an important part of the intelligence producer-consumer relationship and has been discussed extensively in the literature (Hulnick, 2011; Kent, 1966; Laqueur, 1993; Lowenthal, 2012; McDowell, 2008; Omand, 2010).

6. The legislative responsibilities include but are certainly not limited to Criminal Code offences and responsibilities set out in AFP Act. The Ministerial direction is published at https://www.afp.gov.au/about-us/governance-and-accountability/governance-framework/ministerial-direction and community expectation was based on a range of organisational performance metrics.

7. Initial intelligence collection included existing AFP and partner agency intelligence holdings, written products, verbal briefings, emailed information and assessment (especially from interstate and offshore members), meetings and forums.

8. Intelligence analysis in the criminal environment often lends itself to various interpretations. In this case, the authors’ approach most clearly aligns with Heuer, Johnson and Lowenthal.

9. This included a few large group sessions, but largely ad hoc with authors, the initial drafter and SMEs.

10. Offshore is in Australian term used to refer to foreign jurisdictions (i.e. other countries/locations).

11. A Key Assumptions Check is a four-step process that requires analysts to consider how their analysis depends on the validity of certain premises, which they do not routinely question or believe to be in doubt (US Government, 2009; Heuer & Pherson, 2015).

12. A Quality of Information Check evaluates completeness and soundness of available information sources (Government, U, 2009; Heuer & Pherson, 2015).

13. Including a number of Australian Government and organisationally specific threat assessment models.

14. Indicators or Signposts of Change involves creating and reviewing lists of observable events or trends to track events, monitor targets, spot emerging trends, and warn of unanticipated change (Government, U, 2009; Heuer & Pherson, 2015).

15. ‘What If?’ analysis identifies a conventional analytic line and then considers what alternative outcomes are too important to dismiss, even if unlikely (Government, U, 2009; Heuer & Pherson, 2015).

16. Alternative futures analysis is most useful when a situation is viewed as too complex or the outcomes as too uncertain to trust a single outcome assessment. It enables communication of multiple possible outcomes or scenarios (Government, U, 2009; Heuer & Pherson, 2015).

17. Devil’s Advocacy involves challenging a single, strongly held view or consensus by building the best possible case for an alternative explanation (Government, U, 2009; Heuer & Pherson, 2015).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Miah Hammond-Errey

Miah Hammond-Errey is a strategic analyst, who speaks and writes on national security and intelligence in Australia and internationally. Miah has over a decade of experience leading analysis and communications activities for the Australian Government and is currently researching the impact of ‘big data’ for intelligence production and decision-making in the Australian National Intelligence Community. Miah is a Doctoral Candidate at Deakin University, having won a National Security Big Data Scholarship from Data 2 Decisions CRC (2017–2020) and Deakin University Postgraduate Research Scholarship (2017–2020). Miah has a Master of National Security Policy (Advanced) with Honours from the Australian National University, a Master of Criminology from Sydney University Law School and a Bachelor of Arts from Sydney University.

Kate Ray

Kate Ray is a criminal intelligence analyst who has worked in the field of intelligence for 15 years.