![Sample our Politics & International Relations journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5947/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Politics-International-Relations.jpg"})
Abstract
The low functional effectiveness of institutions of regional representation is an urgent issue for the Russian political system. The Russian system of bi-cameralism is in crisis because the Federation Council has, to a large extent, lost its function as a body of authority representing regional interests due to the current practices of delegating senators. There are also problems related to the role of the Federation Council in the law-making process and division of competencies between the two houses of the Russian parliament. The fact that it has become virtually impossible to create regional parties in Russia is yet another obstacle for regional representation. The functions of the State Council and the Council of Lawmakers are very limited, not specified in legislation and reduced to the purely consultative. As a result, the balance in the centre-region relations is distorted, though retaining situational stability because of the absence of meaningful regional impulses able to offset the balance of power.
Acknowledgement
This paper has been translated by Andrey R. Gladkov.
Notes
1 In the protocol to the Federal Treaty signed in 1992 the republics demanded at least half the seats in the regional house, thus insisting on their special status in the federation and an asymmetry of the latter. In the end, the republics were allocated less than a quarter of the seats, in accordance with their number (the most number of seats were allocated to krays and oblasts).
2 A unique principle of equality of the two branches of state power was used (which is observed in no other state in the world), when one member represents a regional legislative assembly and the other one represents the regional executive power. This principle turned out very helpful so that each region has two representatives in the Federation Council.
3 This turned the Federation Council into an intra-elite dialogue forum for central and regional elites, often concealed from general society.
4 The actual importance of St Petersburg is much higher because many Moscow deputies were originally from St Petersburg and moved to the capital only a few years prior to the elections.
5 Moscow is divided into 10 constituencies; Moscow Oblast into 8, St Petersburg, Krasnodar Kray and Rostov Oblast – into 5; Bashkiria, Tatarstan, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast and Chelyabinsk Oblast – into 4.
6 The process of establishing special economic zones, as well as distributing the Investment Fund is overseen by G. Gref.
7 The following indices were used: own per capita income in the consolidated regional budget and per capita federal subsidies.
8 In our study we examined only those cases when together with the federal aid received by a region (own income plus federal aid) its budgetary performance in per capita terms exceeded the national average by more than a quarter (i.e. 1.25 times the national average).
9 Please note that the calculations were done on the basis of the national average for the regions' own budgetary income without taking into account federal aid. In other words, taken after receiving federal subsidies their budgetary performance against the national average will be even lower.
10 Governor G. Khodyrev tried to strip him of his Federation Council seat, accusing him of neglecting regional interests. Now E. Bushmin is a senator for … Rostov Oblast.
11 Despite the fact that Tver Oblast is represented in the Federation Council by former deputy finance minister V. Petrov.
12 Author's estimate, based on the World Values Survey data.
13 The centre's importance in terms of re-distribution could even grow, which is perfectly normal under the conditions of the existing disproportions. Adopting a different scenario and leaving the regions more of their own funds will only aggravate the existing disproportions.