Elite opinion and foreign policy in post-communist Russia

Abstract

Russian elite opinion on matters of foreign policy may be classified as ‘Liberal Westerniser’, ‘Pragmatic Nationalist’ and ‘Fundamentalist Nationalist’, terms that reflect long-standing debates about the country's relationship with the outside world. An analysis of press statements and election manifestoes together with a programme of elite interviews between 2004 and 2006 suggests a clustering of opinion on a series of strategic issues. Liberal Westernisers seek the closest possible relationship with Europe, and favour eventual membership of the EU and NATO. Pragmatic Nationalists are more inclined to favour practical co-operation, and do not assume an identity of values or interests with the Western countries. Fundamentalist Nationalists place more emphasis on the other former Soviet republics, and on Asia as much as Europe, and see the West as a threat to Russian values as well as to its state interests. Each of these positions, in turn, draws on an identifiable set of domestic constituencies: Liberal Westernisers on the pro-market political parties, Pragmatic Nationalists on the presidential administration and defence and security ministries, and Fundamentalist Nationalists on the Orthodox Church and Communists.

Key words:

• Russia
• elite
• foreign policy
• Liberal Westernisers
• Pragmatic Nationalists
• Fundamentalist Nationalists

Acknowledgements

This paper is based on research conducted for the project ‘Inclusion without Membership? Bringing Russia, Ukraine and Belarus closer to “Europe”’, which is funded by the UK Economic and Social Research Council under grant RES-00-23-0146 to Stephen White, Roy Allison and Margot Light. Fuller details are provided on the project website http://www.lbss.gla.ac.uk/politics/inclusionwithoutmembership/. We are grateful for the research assistance of Yulia Korosteleva, and in Moscow of Nikolai Kaveshnikov and Olga Kryshtanovskaya. An earlier version was presented at a conference on ‘Strategic Elites and European Enlargement’ that took place in Kyiv in October 2006.

Notes

¹ This is not the place for a full discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of elite interviewing, but we should note the existence of some sample bias (figures from the military and security world were understandably less willing to be interviewed, and those who made themselves available were almost certainly more pro-Western than the foreign policy community as a whole). Some interviews, at the request of the interviewee, took place in informal locations – such as cafes or restaurants – which made it more difficult to generate a satisfactory recording. Our interviews took about 45 – 60 minutes, occasionally longer; interviewees were assured that their views would not be individually attributed, in line with Chatham House rules and ESRC ethics requirements, and a very small number (at their request) were entirely anonymous. The first interviews in Russia were conducted in spring 2004, the last in September 2006; we were also able to draw on the interviews conducted in a previous project. For a full account, see Allison et al. (2006).