Corruption in Postcommunist Societies in Europe: A Re-examination

Abstract

Anti-corruption drives and a new ‘corruption paradigm’ have figured prominently in the reconstitution of political order in Europe's postcommunist states, under strong pressure from the international financial institutions and the European Union. Now that data on corruption are systematically collected, measured and monitored, it is both possible and essential to step back and assess what these data reveal, conceal or omit. This paper articulates and provides a critique of the assumptions, preconceptions and methodology implicit in the prevailing ‘corruption paradigm’. The critique is organized around the cultural and historical neutrality of the definition of corruption (assumption 1); problems with the measurement of corruption (assumption 2); and the implications for policy-making (assumption 3). The paper argues that the ‘disaggregation’ of the corruption paradigm in the postcommunist states is essential, both for an adequate assessment of the postcommunist experience and for determining the validity of the paradigm.

Key Words:

• Corruption paradigm
• definition
• public/private division
• measurement
• perception of corruption
• policy-making
• disaggregation
• informal practices

Acknowledgements

The article is the outcome of many years of teaching a Governance and Corruption course at the University College London. I am grateful to my students for challenging me on these subjects, to Eugene Nivorozhkin for helping with re-scaling indices in Table 1, to Robert Bideleux and to anonymous referees who have contributed comments on, and criticisms of, this text.

Notes

These agencies have been aided by the emergence of new measuring techniques, which have facilitated an in-depth analysis of corruption. Indeed, the independent Volcker Commission issued a report in 2007 on the anti-corruption investigative unit of the World Bank, also known by its acronym, INT. In its opening pages, the report noted in particular the role of the World Bank Institute (WBI) in the work that has taken place to combat corruption and called for resolute and concrete progress on implementing an ambitious anti-corruption programme around the world. For access to the full Volcker Independent Panel Review: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/NEWS/Resources/Volcker_Report_Sept._12,_for_website_FINAL.pdf (accessed October 2007). See also Zoellick (2007).

One reason for this is the role of corruption in undermining economic development and impeding investment.

The scores range from ten (squeaky clean) to zero (highly corrupt). A score of five is the number Transparency International considers the borderline figure distinguishing countries that do and do not have a serious corruption problem. To access the CPI index go to http://www.transparency.org/cpi/.

World Bank governance indicators, now measured annually, include voice and accountability; political stability and lack of violence; government effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law; control of corruption.

See the volume edited by Janos Kornai, Susan Rose-Ackerman and Bo Rothstein (2004), which includes contributions from the research project ‘Trust and Honesty in Post-Communist Societies', supported by the World Bank and the Bank of Sweden. See also, Geoffrey Hosking's chapter and other chapters in Markova (2004).

Some governments have sold offices to raise money. This was true, for example, of judicial positions in eighteenth century France and of commissions in the army and navy in most European countries in the nineteenth century. As the vested rights of office holders were an obstacle to reorganization and an impediment to efficiency they were bought out or expropriated with compensation.

There is plenty of evidence that anti-corruption campaigns are used manipulatively to prosecute political opposition, to gain advantage over business competitors, to achieve visibility and positive image in the international ratings and to satisfy conditionalities of the funds that can be further embezzled and to pursue other tactic driven goals (Ledeneva, 2003). Such policies do not necessarily enhance the governance pattern but may change position of the countries in the international rankings.

To measure cultures against the criteria of rules versus relationships the authors use a selection of scenarios created by Stouffer and Toby (1951) and survey more than 30 nationalities (see Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 1998)

For more critique of measurements of corruption within the World Bank see Shah & Thompson (2005) and Shah & Iqbal (2006, 2007).

A discussion of the author's complementary approach, with suggestions of disaggregated measurements, will be published in the volume edited by Jan Kubik and Amy Lynch (forthcoming), as part of the SSRC project on Justice, Hegemony and Social Movements.