To Intervene or Not to Intervene? The EU and the Military Option in the Lebanon War of 2006

Abstract

During the Lebanon war in the summer of 2006, the EU made an effort to raise its profile in the Middle East, playing a political role more commensurate with European values and interests at stake in its immediate neighbourhood. The EU, already the main provider of humanitarian aid to the region, was expected to provide the bulk of forces to any successor to the UN's ill fated peacekeeping force UNIFIL I. It was not only UN Secretary General Annan asking Europeans to assume a leading role for the force, but so did Israel, looking for a way out of a war that was not going as expected. For a couple of weeks in July, the EU internally debated the possibility of assuming command and control for the force. France, the prime contender for the role as ‘framework nation’ for the operation, in the end declined to assume the command and control of an EU-led force, instead deciding to put its forces under UN lead and fold its forces into what became UNIFIL II. While it may have been premature for the EU, who initiated its military operations only in 2003, to take on the responsibility for an operation fraught with risks, and possibly also of long duration in the Middle East, the fact that it discussed the possibility at all is indicative of the EU's ambition in the field of military crisis management and its wish to play a role in case there would in the future be a settlement between Israel and Palestine that would require the presence of international stabilisation forces.

Key Words:

• EU's role in the Lebanon war of 2006
• EU or UN led military forces
• EU ambitions and limitations
• immature military command and control
• international institutions as shock absorbers
• a military role for the EU in a future Middle East settlement

Notes

¹ The author is Deputy Director General in the Swedish Ministry of Defence and was Minister for Defence Affairs at the Swedish Permanent Representation to the European Union and the Swedish Nato Delegation between 2004–07. The author is fully responsible for the contents of this article, concluded during a stay as an Associate with Harvard's Weatherhead Center, its Programme on Transatlantic Relations, and does not represent the views of the Swedish Ministry of Defence.

² This article forms part of a dissertation with the title ‘To intervene or not to intervene? Driving and inhibiting factors behind EU's military operations’ that will be presented to the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University and the Swedish Defence College, FHS.

³ According to Israeli intelligence, Iran had since 2000 delivered, mainly through Syria, the Zelzal-2 missile with the range of 200 km, Faj-3 (43 km) and Fajr-5 (75 km) to Hezbollah, in IISS. 2007. The Military Balance. London: Routledge.

⁴ Comprising eight major industrialised economies; France, Italy, Japan, Canada, Russia, the UK, Germany and the US.

⁵ Notes by the author, Brussels, summer 2006.

⁶ Erkki Toumioja in interview with the author in Helsinki, October, 2008

⁷ Press statement of Javier Solana EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy in Beirut. Beirut. 16 July. S203/06

⁸ In interview with the author.

⁹ Quartet on the Middle East, established in 2002, comprising the UN, the US, the EU and Russia.

¹⁰ Notes by the author, Brussels, summer 2006, and interview with Erkki Tuomioja.

¹¹ In an interview with the author.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Notes by the author, Brussels, summer 2006.

¹⁴ Notes by the author, Brussels, summer 2006.

¹⁵ Gen Perruche in interview with the author in Paris, February 2009.

¹⁶ Notes by the author, Brussels, summer 2006.

¹⁷ Comprising the UN, the World Bank, the presidency (Finland), the high representative and the commission, the US, Canada, Cyprus, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Lebanon, Jordan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Turkey and the UK.

¹⁸ In an interview with the author.

¹⁹ International Conference for Lebanon. Rome. July 26. Co-Chairmen Statement.

²⁰ In an interview with the author.

²¹ Erkki Tuomioja, Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner, EU Special Representative for the Middle East, Marc Otte.

²² In an interview with the author.

²³ Germany had held the Presidency during the first part of 2007 and was thus part of the so called Troika, comprising the three EU presidencies in suite, according to a rolling scheme.

²⁴ Notes by the author, Brussels, summer 2006.

²⁵ The Secretary-General Statement to the Security Council. New York. 30 July, 2006.

²⁶ 2006. Le Figaro. 29–30 July.

²⁷ In an interview with the author in Stockholm, October, 2008.

²⁸ 2006. Le Figaro. 31 July.

²⁹ Erkki Tuomioja in an interview with the author.

³⁰ in interview with the author.

³¹ In an interview with the author.

³² Five EU member states were part of the UNSC: the UK, France, Denmark, Greece and Slovakia.

³³ In an interview with the author.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Press statement from the Council of the European Union. Council Conclusions. Extraordinary General Affairs and External Relations Council meeting – Brussels. 1 August 2006.

³⁶ In an interview with the author.

³⁷ Draft UNSC resolution/Projet de résolution du Conseil de Sécurité. New York. 6 August, 2006.

³⁸ Notes by the author, Brussels, summer 2006.

³⁹ IISS. 2007. The Military Balance. London: Routledge.

⁴⁰ In an interview with the author.