Where Does Poland Fit in Europe? How Political Memory Influences Polish MEPs' Perceptions of Poland's place in Europe

Abstract

This research article investigates the degree to which the ‘politics of memory’ influences the behaviour of Polish MEPs. It explores the ways in which Polish MEPs, through ‘educating’ the European Parliament about important Polish/European moments in history, reaffirm their own national identity while simultaneously promoting the need for European identity to be constructed in relation to Poland and other countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

Key Words:

• Politics of memory
• identity
• European Parliament
• Poland

Notes

¹ Also see N. Davies, God's Playground: A History of Poland, Volume 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp.3–82; and J. Tazbir and A. Rodzinska, ‘Antemurale or bridge?’, Dialogue & Universalism, Vol. 9, Issue 5/6, 1999.

² Adding to this, Jan Kieniewicz (1991), a historian from Warsaw University, explains that the Polish questioning of their ‘Easterness’ was often contrary to the facts, exposing a Polish sense of inferiority rather than an affiliation with Western values. But, he believes that Poland might become the space where the civilizations meet; the space of freedom which will be exported further.

³ At the end of the Second World War, Poland's place in Europe was discussed and analysed by the Polish émigré circle predominantly associated with Kultura. Indeed, the ideas of Poland's dissenting opposition, especially those associated with KOR-KSS and Solidarność, concerning Poland's place in Europe, were heavily influenced by the concepts formulated by Kultura (Jasina, et al., 2007, p. 173).

⁴ Mach (2005) notes that the Polish intelligentsia were somewhat disillusioned with this treatment; ‘[A]s heroes who have been protecting Europe for centuries, Poles believe that they need a better (sic) treatment than they actually receive, that they deserve a certain reward for what they did and are doing’.

⁵ Interview with Zbigniew Zaleski – interview conducted in Brussels on 16 October 2008.

⁶ Polish insistence on changing the Constitution's Preamble from reference to a ‘reunited Europe’ to a ‘Europe, reunited after bitter experience’, also reflects a sense of having experienced a particularly traumatic past (Cichocki, 2006, p. 312).

⁷ Anna Wolff-Powęska (2007) suggests that the first years of independence were dominated by political and intellectual elites concentrating on the processes associated with democratic transformation, while the debates on the meaning of history evolved around discovering the ‘white spots’ of Poland's past.

⁸ ‘We draw a thick line on what has happened in the past. We will only answer for what we have done to help Poland to rescue her from this crisis from now on’ (‘Przeszłość odkreślamy grubą linią. Odpowiadać będziemy jedynie za to, co uczyniliśmy, by wydobyć Polskę z obecnego stanu załamania’); (see R. Stemplowski, 2007, pp. 149–166).

⁹ ‘Chcemy żyć w zwyczajnym kraju. Nie na szańcach, nie na bastionie, nie na barbakanie, nie na przedmurzu, ale w zwyczajnym kraju. Nie chcemy ani misji dziejowych, ani przewodnictwa, nie chcemy mocarstwowości ani imperializmu’ (cited in Janion, 2004).

¹⁰ According to Olszewski (2009), Solidarność needs to be framed within a ‘normal country’ perspective, exclusive of sentimental myths: ‘Solidarity is ultimately a great, sentimental myth, as much emotional as harmful, if used as a guide in the new reality’.

¹¹ Interview with Zaleski.

¹² Although 14,700 Poles were murdered in Katyń: the Katyń Massacre stands for –pars pro toto– the suffering of the entire Polish nation during the Second World War. This broader symbolic meaning was reinforced through a tragic accident in April 2010, when a delegation of 96 prominent Polish leaders led by the President Lech Kaczyński perished in a plane crash on their way to commemorate Katyń. For more on Katyń see: Malcher, 1993; Sanford, 2005; Snopkiewicz & Zakrzewski, 1992; and Zawodny, 1962.

¹³ ‘Zbrodnia katyńska zajmuje jednak w zbiorowej pamięci Polaków miejsce szczególne. Jest jak wielka rana, o której musimy ciągle mówić– właśnie po to, aby mogła się zabliźnić’ (Kwaśniewski, 1998).

¹⁴ Interview with Zaleski.

¹⁵ Interview with Bogusław Liberadzki (PES) – interview conducted in Warsaw, 29 September 2008.

¹⁶ Interview with Zaleski.

¹⁷ Interview with Zaleski.

¹⁸ Interview with Grażyna Staniszewska – interview conducted in Brussels on 14 October 2008.

¹⁹ Interview with Staniszewska.

²⁰ Interview with Staniszewska.

²¹ Václav Havel noted that one of the defining characteristics of the Soviet imposed systems in Central Europe was the state's ability to control the truth. Although Havel argued that in order to survive the system, people no longer needed to believe in what he called the regimes' ‘mystifications’, ‘they must behave as if they did … they must live within a lie’ (Havel, 1990, p. 31).

²² ‘Na Zachodzie będziemy tyle znaczyli ile znaczymy na Wschodzie’ (cited in Wandycz, 2007, p. 57)

²³ According to Polish MEP Konrad Szymański (PiS) (2005), politics of memory and relations with Poland's Eastern neighbours were the most important issues dealt with by Polish MEPs in 2004.

²⁴ Milan Kundera (1984, pp. 33–38) argues that Central European identity is inseparable from (Western) European identity.

²⁵ Consider, for example, in 1931, Poland consisted of: 69 per cent Poles, 15 per cent Ukrainians, 8.5 per cent Jews, 4.7 per cent Byelorussians, 2.2 per cent Germans, 0.6 others (Davies, 2005, p.301).

²⁶ See discussion organised by the Stefan Batory Foundation (‘Polska Polityka Wschodnia’, 2001).

²⁷ Interview with Urszula Gacek – interview conducted in Brussels on 14 October 2008.

²⁸ Interview with Staniszewska.

²⁹ Polish MEPs also assumed a prominent role in condemning the conditions of the 2004 Ukrainian presidential elections. MEPs from PiS, in collaboration with those from EPP, initiated a proposal that ultimately led to a joint EP resolution on the situation in Ukraine (see Szymański, 2004; and European Parliament Resolution, 2004).

³⁰ Wolff-Powęska (2007, p. 10) argues that for the new members of the EU, such as Poland, the national pride and a new patriotism constitute the element of balance in a global arena.

³¹ It is not only the nationalist right who promote a particular Polish national interest in Europe. In 2003, the governing Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), the successor of the communist party, and then president of Poland, Aleksander Kwaśniewski, also a former communist, battled for a reference to Christianity in the proposed EU Constitution Preamble in 2003. Poland wanted a reference based on its own national constitution, which refers to ‘both those who believe in God as the source of truth, justice, good and beauty, as well as those not sharing such faith but respecting those universal values from other sources’. See: Chancellery of Prime Minister News ‘Podróż do Watykanu i Rzymu: Prywatna Audiencja u Papieża i Polskie Stanowisko na Konferencji Międzyrzadowej’, 4 October 2003, Warsaw. Avaliable at http://www.kprm.gov.pl/archiwum/2130_10182.htm (accessed 9 December 2009).

³² While the Kaczyńskis are often described as Eurosceptics, this does not tell the whole story. Both Lech and Jaroslaw ‘acknowledge Poland needs an EU ready to countenance further enlargement to the east and sensible policies towards Russia’, but this acknowledgement is premised on the belief that ‘Europe is fated to be perpetually stuck at the end of the Second World War in 1945, facing the problem of how to arrange the affairs of the continent in such a way as to counter a resurgence of German might’ (see Bobiński, 2007).

³³ ‘Zamierzamy także prowadzić aktywną politykę historyczną. Ma ona w nowoczesny sposób przedstawiać wolnościowe zasługi Polski w walce z nazistowskim i komunistycznym totalitaryzmem’, (2005 PiS Party Programme, p. 49).

³⁴ Jaroslaw Kaczyński's infamous remarks regarding voting weights in the EU serve as a perfect case in point (‘Domagamy się tylko tego, by nam oddano to, co nam zabrano. Gdyby Polska nie przeżyła lat 1939–1945, byłaby dzisiaj, je[stilde]li odwoła[ctilde] sieę do kryterium demograficznego, państwem 66-milionowym'). See: ‘Niemiecka Prasa Krytycznie o Wypowiedzi J. Kaczyńskiego nt. Strat Wojennych', Gazeta Wyborcza, 22 June 2007.

³⁵ For example see the list of omissions and misinterpretations of European history presented in the initial proposal of the House of European History compiled by MEPs from PiS: W. Roszkowki, A. Bielan, backed up by MEPs from several countries, presented in a letter to the president of the European Parliament, 4 December 2008, available at: http://www.bielan.pl/biuletyny/46.pdf (accessed 20 February 2009).

³⁶ See European Parliament Press Release ‘EP Bureau decides to set up a “House of European History”‘ 16 December 2008. Available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/expert/infopress_page/008–44856–350–12–51–901–20081216IPR44855–15–12–2008–2008-false/default_en.htm (accessed 6 December 2009).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

M. Killingsworth

The research for this article was undertaken with the financial support of the Institute of European Democrats. The authors are grateful for the suggestions made by the anonymous referee.