The Battle Against Unfair Trade in the EU Trade Policy: A Discourse Analysis of Trade Protection

Abstract

The European Union considers Trade Defence Instruments (i.e., anti-dumping, countervailing duties and safeguards) as a cornerstone of the EU trade policy in the battle against ‘unfair competition from across the globe’. At the same time, the rationale behind these instruments, or the fight against ‘unfair trade practices’, remains somehow woolly. In this article, we argue that it is crucial to unpack the different meanings bestowed on the concept of unfair trade. An interpretative perspective is therefore adopted in order to highlight the complexity behind this notion. The analysis is based on a systematic analysis of the debates revolving around the issue of Trade Defence Instruments held within the European Parliament during the current legislative session. First, we show that a specific storyline on unfair trade can be considered dominant. Second, we expose the ‘kaleidoscopic’ reality behind unfair trade, showing that this notion is a floating signifier. Against this backcloth, the article puts forward the argument that the institutionalisation of Trade Defence Instruments precisely relies on this character of unfair trade as a floating signifier.

Keywords:

• European Union
• discourse
• trade policy
• European Parliament
• unfair trade

Notes

For a discussion of the methodological issues related to measuring the use of trade remedies, see Vandenbussche and Viegelahn (2011); see also Zanardi (2004).

In this research, we mainly focus on linguistic practices but we acknowledge the importance of non-linguistic practices.

On the difference between Saussure's structuralist understanding of discourse and Laclau and Mouffe's post-structuralist approach, see Philips and Jorgensen (2002).

The ‘debates’ analysed in this article consist of both parliamentary debates and explanations of vote, i.e., oral or written statements in plenary sessions. It is therefore possible that the content of these statements can be in part regarded as ‘political posturing’, i.e., the expression of a political position that is deemed politically rewarding. These political statements may include the willingness to express sympathy for workers of the MEP's nationality affected by international competition, disagreement with the official stance of the MEP's home government, or any electoral consideration. In this article, however, we do not consider the motivation behind the construction of the discourse on trade defence instruments, but exclusively the construction of this discourse itself. We consider that, whatever the political motivations of actors, it is crucial, even from a policy view point, to understand how trade remedies are discursively constructed.

Within the European Parliament, speaking time is allocated during plenary sessions according to the size of political groups (European Parliament, Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament – 7th parliamentary term – January 2013, Rule n° 149 [Allocation of speaking time and list of speakers]. Available at www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getLastRules.do?language=EN&reference=TOC). Groups then in turn decide which members will receive speaking time. But the speakers are also selected according to a ‘catch-the-eyes’ principle; in this case, the President selects MEPs having indicating their willingness to speak during the debates. Furthermore, MEPs who would not have had the opportunity to speak have the possibility to include a statement of up to 200 words for inclusion in the verbatim. From the point of view of ‘representativeness’, the procedural rules imply that all political groups present in the European Parliament should have had the opportunity to express themselves. It is possible, however, that the MEPs willing to speak through the speaking time allocated to political group or through the ‘catch-the-eyes’ principle and written statements are the most concerned by ‘unfair trade’ and trade defence instruments. Given the fact that we are not interested in the motivations of MEPs but rather in the dominant discourse, or regime of truth, present in the parliament, the issue is nonetheless not problematic.

The debates include issues such as: general discussions on anti-dumping cases; questions with the President of the Commission; climate change; human rights and social and environmental standards in international trade agreements; exceptional trade measures for countries and territories participating in or linked to the European Union's Stabilisation and Association process; the Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual use items; EU–Canada trade relations; a raw materials strategy for Europe; the state of play of the negotiations on the Doha Development Agenda; the Community regime for the control of exports of dual-use items and technology; the agreement between the EU and Morocco concerning reciprocal liberalisation measures on agricultural products and fishery products; a proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending certain regulations relating to the common commercial policy as regards the procedures for the adoption of certain measures; restrictions on imports of certain steel products from Russia; protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community; the report: EU and China – unbalanced trade?; the EU–China summits; measures to protect the EU market from unusually low priced imports of Chinese.