Beliefs in free will and determinism: associations with social cognition and gambling behavior

Abstract

Beliefs about free will and determinism have been shown to associate with and influence behavior. The present study examined the relationship between these beliefs, key social cognitive constructs, and gambling behavior. A cross-sectional design was used with assessments taken of participants’ (N = 316) past gambling behavior; beliefs in free will and determinism; and attitude, perceived behavioral control, and intention toward gambling. Four weeks after survey completion, participants (N = 218) reported their gambling behavior. A MANOVA examined differences between gambling frequency and constructs. Bivariate correlations and regressions were undertaken to understand the relationships between constructs and gambling behavior. Results showed frequent gamblers had significantly greater positive attitudes and intentions toward gambling compared to infrequent gamblers. Infrequent gamblers also had significantly stronger perceived behavioral control and beliefs in free will than frequent gamblers. Free will significantly predicted attitude and perceived behavioral control, and explained additional variance in intention above attitude and perceived behavioral control. There was no effect for determinism. Finally, gambling behavior was explained by intention and perceived behavioral control, but not beliefs in free will and determinism. The study provides evidence for the association between free will beliefs, key social cognitive constructs, and gambling behavior. Future research should confirm the causal role of these relations.

Keywords:

• Free will
• determinism
• gambling
• social cognition

Introduction

The existence of free will has been debated philosophically for centuries (Baer et al. 2008). On the one hand, some believe behavior to be a consequence of wilful action whereby individuals are able to choose among alternative behaviors in any given situation. This position is typically adopted by the layperson (Nahmias et al. 2005). Conversely, determinism suggests behavior is mechanically driven by prior events and the laws of nature (Caruso 2012; Hannikainen et al. 2019). In this instance, free will is nothing but an illusion (Wegner 2002). Moving beyond the philosophical issue of the existence of free will (or the lack thereof), recent work in psychology has examined the consequences of believing in free will and determinism. That is, rather than debating the existence of free will, research has examined the impact that such beliefs have on other cognitions and behavior. Studies have found greater belief in free will to be associated with better job performance (Stillman et al. 2010) and greater academic achievement (Feldman et al. 2016). Those who believe more strongly in free will have been shown to set more meaningful goals (Crescioni et al. 2016) and exert greater autonomy (Alquist et al. 2013). Studies have also demonstrated that reducing belief in free will increases both cheating (Vohs and Schooler 2008) and aggression (Baumeister et al. 2009). Moreover, Vonasch et al. (2017) found that people with lower beliefs in free will were more likely to have a history of addiction. It appears, therefore, that the extent to which an individual believes in free will and determinism has an influence on behavior.

For the present work, we focus on gambling behavior. Although a form of entertainment, gambling can result in financial (Castrén et al. 2013; Swanton and Gainsbury 2020), psychological (Lorains et al. 2011; Dowling et al. 2015), and relationship (Paterson et al. 2020; Raisamo et al. 2013) harms. For example, Lorains et al. (2011) found that problem gamblers experienced mood and anxiety disorders. Gambling has also demonstrated behavioral comorbidities with substance abuse (Grant and Chamberlain 2020) and alcohol consumption (Svensson and Sundqvist 2019). As a consequence, gambling has been identified as a significant public health concern (Gainsbury et al. 2014).

Social cognition and free will

To understand social behavior, theories of social cognition can be applied. A prominent model of social cognition is the Theory of Planned Behavior (Ajzen 1991). The theory asserts that the proximal determinants of behavior are behavioral intention and perceived behavioral control. Intention represents an individual’s decision to exert effort to perform the behavior and perceived behavioral control refers to the amount of control a person perceives to have over behavior. Intentions are influenced by attitude, which relates to the evaluation of behavior, subjective norm, which concerns the normative influences of other people, and perceived behavioral control. Accumulated evidence has found these theory constructs to explain significant variance in intention and behavior (e.g. Armitage and Conner 2001; McEachan et al. 2011). However, as far as we are aware, no study has investigated the relationship between constructs in the Theory of Planned Behavior and beliefs in free will and determinism. It could be that, with respect to gambling, these beliefs are associated with specific social cognitive constructs outlined in the theory, namely attitude, perceived behavioral control, and intention. We will now outline these potential relations.

Beliefs in free will and determinism could be associated with the attitude construct in different ways. Specifically, those possessing a greater belief in free will could have negative attitudes toward gambling whereas those believing that behavior is determined could have more positive attitudes toward gambling. With regards to perceived behavioral control, although this construct and belief in free will both relate to agency, we argue that these represent two distinct constructs. Perceived behavioral control can be thought of as a person’s perception that they can and do exert control over their own actions. Free will belief relates to the belief that behavioral control is possible, regardless of whether one believes themselves to be capable of exercising such control. Thus, having high perceived behavioral control should presuppose the belief in free will, but believing in free will does not guarantee the perception of personal behavioral control. In the context of gambling, for example, a person might believe that humans are capable of free choice while still believing that they themselves are not able to exert such control, perhaps due to addiction, substance abuse, unfortunate circumstances, or any number of other external factors. Evidence for free will belief as a construct distinct from other agency-related constructs can be found in Crescioni et al.'s (2016) study on the correlates of free will belief. The authors found that belief in free will was positively correlated with satisfaction with life, gratitude, self-efficacy, and perceived meaning in life. These relationships held when adding locus of control and implicit person theory (two additional constructs related to agency); in each case belief in free will emerged as the strongest of the three predictors. Moreover, Rigoni et al. (2012, 2013) found that undermining free will reduced self-control. This could also relate to gambling behavior; if people believe in their own free will, they could believe they possess the ability to control their gambling behavior. Conversely, if people do not believe their decisions are made freely and that gambling is a consequence of determinism, we might predict that they would be less likely to believe in their ability to control their gambling behavior.

Finally, beliefs in free will and determinism could relate to intention toward gambling. Previous work has shown that those believing in free will ascribe their own (Rigoni et al. 2011) and others’ (Genschow et al. 2019) behavior to intentionality. However, Genschow et al. (2017) found that reduced free will led to increased external attributions. With regards to gambling, belief in free will could be related to weaker intentions to gamble, whereas belief in determinism could be related to a stronger intention to gamble. In addition to the social cognitive constructs, free will and determinism could also relate to gambling behavior itself. As was previously outlined, those with a history of addiction have been found to possess lower beliefs in free will (Vonasch et al. 2017). Therefore, it could be that those with higher past gambling behavior have lower beliefs in free will and higher beliefs in determinism compared to those with lower past gambling behavior. Moreover, it could also be that deterministic beliefs positively predict future gambling behavior and free will beliefs negatively predict future gambling behavior. In sum, there could exist many relationships between gambling behavior and beliefs in free will and determinism. Adopting a prominent social cognition model to understand the specific mechanisms through which these beliefs operate could be valuable for work in this area.

Study purpose and hypotheses

The purpose of the study was to examine the relationship between social cognitive constructs, gambling behavior, and beliefs in free will and determinism. A number of hypotheses were generated. In relation to past gambling behavior, it was hypothesized that: 1) frequent gamblers would have greater attitudes, intentions, and beliefs in determinism than infrequent gamblers, and 2) infrequent gamblers would have greater beliefs in free will and stronger perceived behavioral control than frequent gamblers. In accordance with the Theory of Planned Behavior, it was expected that: 3) attitude would positively correlate with and predict intention, 4) perceived behavioral control would negatively correlate with and predict intention and behavior, and 5) intention would positively correlate with and predict behavior. With regards to free will, it was hypothesized that beliefs in free will would: 6) negatively correlate with and predict attitude, intention, and behavior, 7) and positively correlate with and predict perceived behavioral control. Finally, it was expected that determinism would: 8) positively correlate with and predict attitude, intention, and behavior, and 9) negatively correlate with and predict perceived behavioral control.

Materials and method

Design and procedure

A cross-sectional design was used with a four-week follow-up. Participants were recruited through university announcements. Interested participants were instructed to access and complete an online survey at T1. Participants were reminded at the end of the survey that they would be required to complete a second questionnaire four weeks later (T2) assessing their gambling behavior over the previous month. Participants were emailed a link to the survey, and pseudo codes were generated to match data across both time points. Once the second questionnaire was completed at T2, participants were provided with debrief information and thanked for their participation in the study. The study received full ethical approval from the school ethics board.

Participants

Participants were eligible if they; 1) were a student attending a university in the UK and 2) had access to an email address. This led to 316 participants enrolling in the study. Full participant demographics can be seen in Table 1.

Table 1. Demographics of study participants.

	N
Age
18–21 years	170
22–24 years	73
25–29 years	32
30–35 ears	23
>35 years	18
Gender
Male	163
Female	148
Other	3
Prefer not to say	2
Ethnicity
White	242
Black	11
Asian	43
Mixed	11
Other	5
Prefer not to say	4
University level
Foundation	4
Undergraduate	224
Postgraduate	88
Religious affiliation
Christianity	82
Islam	9
Hinduism	5
Sikhism	2
Judaism	3
Atheist	158
Other	37
Prefer not to say	20
Political affiliation
Alliance Party	2
Conservative Party	24
Co-operative Party	3
Democratic Unionist Party	0
Green Party	24
Labor Party	87
Liberal Democrats	11
Plaid Cymru	3
Scottish National Party	12
Sinn Féin	2
Social Democratic and Labor Party	6
Other	13
None	113
Prefer not to say	16

Measures

Measures were taken at T1 and T2. At T1, assessments of past gambling behavior, free will, determinism, and social cognitive constructs were taken. Four weeks later at T2 measures of gambling behavior were taken. Participants were provided with the following definition of gambling behavior and were asked to adhere to it at both time points: “Please remember that gambling refers to playing a game of chance for a prize and/or making or accepting a bet on (a) the outcome of a race, competition or other event or process, (b) the likelihood of anything occurring or not occurring, or (c) whether anything is or is not true. We are specifically interested in mobile gambling which can occur using a mobile application, accessing a website, sending a text message, or making a call over the phone. We are referring to the extent to which you gamble at least once per week.”

T1: The Attitude Toward Gambling Scale (Orford et al. 2009) was used to measure attitude (e.g. There are too many opportunities for gambling nowadays, Strongly agree-Strongly disagree, Cronbach’s α = .82). Perceived behavioral control was assessed using the Perceived Control over Gambling Refusal Scale (Wu and Tang 2012) (e.g. I can control myself not to gamble if I try hard enough, Strongly disagree-Strongly agree, Cronbach’s α = .86). Three items were developed using guidelines suggested by Ajzen (2006) to measure intention (e.g. I intend to participate in gambling, Strongly disagree-Strongly agree, Cronbach’s α = .87). Subscales of the FAD-Plus (Paulhus and Carey 2011) questionnaire were used to measure free will and determinism. Specifically, free will was assessed using seven items (e.g. People have complete control over the decisions they make, Totally disagree-Totally agree, Cronbach’s α = .79) and determinism was assessed using seven items representing scientific determinism (e.g. People’s biological makeup determines their talents and personality, Totally disagree-Totally agree, Cronbach’s α = .72). Past gambling behavior was assessed using one item within the Gambling Quantity and Perceived Norms Scale (Neighbors et al. 2002). The item measures how often a person gambles (i.e. never, once a year, 2–3 times per year, every other month, once a month, 2–3 times per month, weekly, more than once per week, every other day, and every day). Measures of age, gender, ethnicity, university level, religious and political affiliation, religiosity, and political ideology were also taken at T1.

T2: Three items were used to assess gambling behavior at T2. Two items used 7-point Likert scales (e.g. During the past month, how often did you participate in mobile gambling, Never-Almost always) and one item required participants to identify the number of weeks the behavior was performed (scored 0 weeks, 1 week, 2 weeks, 3 weeks, and 4 weeks, Cronbach’s α = .95).

Analysis

All statistical analyses were undertaken with IBM SPSS (version 27.0). Negatively worded items were reversed when required, meaning lower responses represented negative perceptions toward gambling and higher scores reflected positive perceptions. Lower responses also represented weaker perceived behavioral control and beliefs in free will and determinism. The mean of each item representing the same construct was averaged to give an overall score for each construct. The three items assessing gambling behavior at T2 were first converted to z-scores, before being averaged.

To investigate relationships with past behavior, past gambling behavior was dummy coded with participants that had either never gambled or gambled once within the previous year (N = 179) categorized as ‘Infrequent gamblers’ and those that had gambled more than once within the previous 12 months (n = 137) categorized as ‘Frequent gamblers’. A MANOVA was then undertaken with frequency of past gambling behavior (frequent and infrequent) as the independent variable and attitude, intention, perceived behavioral control, free will, and determinism as the dependent variables.

A descriptive analysis of means, standard deviations (SD) and bivariate correlations between constructs was then conducted. Following this, separate multiple linear regressions were undertaken to examine the relationships between free will and determinism in relation to attitude and perceived behavioral control, respectively. Two hierarchical multiple regressions were then conducted to examine associations between intention and behavior. Given that political ideology and religiosity have been shown to be associated with free will (Carey and Paulhus 2013; Vonasch et al. 2017; Genschow and Vehlow 2021), we controlled for these in the models. Specifically, model 1 examined the relationship between intention and attitude, perceived behavioral control, free will, and determinism, controlling for political ideology and religiosity. To do this, political ideology and religiosity were entered at step 1, attitude and perceived behavioral control at step 2, and determinism and free will at step 3. Model 2 tested the relationship between free will, determinism, intention, and perceived behavioral control in relation to behavior, controlling for political ideology and religiosity. Political ideology and religiosity were entered at step 1, intention and perceived behavioral control at step 2, and determinism and free will at step 3.

Results

Attrition analysis

T1 questionnaires were completed by 316 participants and T2 questionnaires by 218 participants (69% retention). One participant was removed at T2 because despite completing measures, consent was not provided. To examine attrition bias between participants completing both questionnaires and those completing T1 only, a MANOVA was conducted with attitude, perceived behavioral control, intention, free will, and determinism as the dependent variables and status of participation (completers and non-completers) as the independent variables. There were no significant differences, F(5, 310) = .81; Wilks' Λ= .98, p = .54; ηp2 = .01. Additionally, a series of chi-square tests revealed no significant differences between participation status and past behavior (χ²(9, N = 316) = 12.83, p = .17), age (χ²(4, N = 316) = 4.92, p = .29), gender (χ²(3, N = 316) = 7.23, p = .06), ethnicity (χ²(5, N = 316) = 3.77, p = .58), religion (χ²(7, N = 316) = 2.24, p = .94), and political affiliation (χ²(12, N = 316) = 12.93, p = .37).

Main results

Past gambling behavior

There was a significant main effect for past behavior on attitude (F (1, 314) = 131.42, p ≤ .001, η2 = .29), perceived behavioral control (F (1, 314) = 26.80, p ≤ .001, η2 = .07), intention (F (1, 314) = 358.03, p ≤ .001, η2 = .53), and free will (F (1, 314) = 60.49, p ≤ .001, η2 = .16). Compared to infrequent gamblers, frequent gamblers had significantly stronger attitudes (Frequent = 3.34, Infrequent = 2.68) and intentions (Frequent = 4.29, Infrequent = 1.70). Infrequent gamblers, however, demonstrated significantly greater perceived behavioral control (Infrequent = 3.63, Frequent = 3.35) and free will beliefs (Infrequent = 3.26, Frequent = 2.64) than frequent gamblers. There were no significant differences related to beliefs in determinism (F (1, 314) = 1.09, p = .29, η2 = .00).

Social cognition constructs, free will and determinism

In accordance with the Theory of Planned Behavior, attitude and perceived behavioral control significantly correlated with intention, and intention and perceived behavioral control significantly correlated with behavior (see Table 2). Free will beliefs were negatively associated with attitude, intention, and behavior, and positively correlated with perceived behavioral control. Beliefs in determinism did not correlate with constructs and behavior.

Table 2. Descriptive statistics and correlation between study variables.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	M	SD
1. Attitude	–	−.19**	−.31**	.02	.45**	.38**	2.96	.60
2. Perceived behavioral control	−.19**	–	.28**	−.05	−.31**	−.26**	3.51	.49
3. Free will	−.31**	.28**	–	.12	−.42**	−.31**	2.99	.76
4. Determinism	.02	−.05	.12	–	.07	.04	2.72	.64
5. Intention	.45**	−.31**	−.42**	.07	–	.71**	2.82	1.76
6. Behavior	.38**	−.26**	−.31**	.04	.71**	–	.86	1.32

Note. **p < .01

Behavior is represented using the item assessing the number of weeks gambling had taken place within the previous month.

The multiple linear regressions found free will significantly predicted attitude and perceived behavioral control, but determinism did not significantly predict these constructs (see Table 3). The hierarchical multiple linear regression showed that when controlling for religiosity and political ideology, attitude and perceived behavioral control significantly predicted intention and explained 25% of the variance (see Table 4). When free will and determinism were added to the model, the variance significantly increased to 32%, although determinism was not a significant contributor. Free will therefore explained additional variance in intention beyond attitude and perceived behavioral control. In relation to behavior, the hierarchical multiple linear regression showed religiosity and political ideology accounted for 1%. At step 2, intention and perceived behavioral control explained an additional 49% of the variance in behavior (see Table 5). The variance did not increase with the inclusion of free will and determinism at step 3.

Table 3. Multiple linear regressions of free will and determinism on attitude and perceived behavioral control.

Variable	B	β	R^2	Adjusted R^2	B	β	R^2	Adjusted R^2
	Attitude				Perceived behavioral control
Free will	−.25	−.31***	.10***	.10***	.19***	.29***	.08***	.08***
Determinism	.06	.06			−.06	−.08

Note. ***p < .001.

Table 4. A hierarchical multiple regression analyses of religiosity and political ideology (step 1), attitude and perceived behavioral control (step 2), and free will and determinism (step 3) on intention.

	Variable	B	β	R^2	Adjusted R^2	Δ R^2
Step 1:	Religiosity	.01	.02	.01	.00	.01
	Political ideology	−.04	−.10
Step 2:	Religiosity	−.01	−.01	.26***	.26***	.25***
	Political ideology	−.04	−.09
	Attitude	1.17	.40***
	Perceived behavioral control	−.86	−.24***
Step 3:	Religiosity	−.01	−.02	.33***	.32***	.06***
	Political ideology	−.01	−.03
	Attitude	.96	.33***
	Perceived behavioral control	−.60	−.17**
	Free will	−.64	−.28***
	Determinism	.24	.09

Note. **p < .01, ***p < .001.

Table 5. A hierarchical multiple regression analyses of religiosity and political ideology (step 1), intention and perceived behavioral control (step 2), and free will and determinism (step 3) on behavior.

	Variable	B	β	R^2	Adjusted R^2	Δ R^2
Step 1:	Religiosity	.02	.05	.01	.00	.01
	Political ideology	−.02	−.09
Step 2:	Religiosity	−.01	−.03	.51	.50	.49***
	Political ideology	−.00	−.03
	Intention	.39	.69***
	Perceived behavioral control	−.13	−.06
Step 3:	Religiosity	−.01	−.02	.51	.50	.00
	Political ideology	−.00	−.03
	Intention	.38	.68***
	Perceived behavioral control	−.13	−.06
	Free will	−.00	−.00
	Determinism	.05	.03

Note. ***p < .001.

Discussion

Previous research has demonstrated behavior to be influenced by beliefs in free will and determinism (e.g. Vohs and Schooler 2008; Stillman et al. 2010; Feldman et al. 2016). The purpose of the study was to examine the relationship between these beliefs, social cognitive constructs, and gambling behavior. In line with the Theory of Planned Behavior, attitude and perceived behavioral control significantly correlated with and predicted intention (H3 & H4). The positive association between attitude and intention suggests that stronger attitudes lead to the development of gambling intentions. The negative association between perceived behavioral control and intention suggests gambling intentions are more likely to develop when perceptions of control are weak. The influence of both attitude and perceived behavioral control on intentions to gamble supports previous studies (e.g. Martin et al. 2010; Wu and Tang 2012; St-Pierre et al. 2015). Furthermore, intention and perceived behavioral control were associated with future gambling behavior (H4–H5). This supports previous work in suggesting positive intentions and weaker control relate to gambling behavior (e.g. Wu and Tang 2012; St-Pierre et al. 2015).

The study found frequent gamblers had significantly stronger attitudes and intentions, and significantly weaker perceived behavioral control and beliefs in free will compared to infrequent gamblers (H1–H2). However, there were no significant differences between beliefs in determinism and past gambling behavior (H1). This suggests a relationship exists between past gambling behavior, social cognitive constructs, and free will beliefs, but no relationship exists with determinism. Support was found for the association between free will beliefs and attitude, perceived behavioral control, and intention (H6–H7). Free will beliefs also explained additional variance in intention above Theory of Planned Behavior constructs. The negative association with attitude and intention suggests that those with greater belief in free will possess weaker attitudes and intentions toward gambling. Conversely, people with lower free will beliefs demonstrate stronger attitudes and intentions to gamble. The positive association between free will beliefs and perceived behavioral control suggests that those believing in free will demonstrate stronger control over gambling. However, those with less free will beliefs exert weaker levels of control over their gambling behavior. There are a number of explanations for these findings. Believing in free will has been suggested to protect against impulsive action (Stillman et al. 2010). In contrast, disbelieving in free will may reduce people’s willingness to exert control over impulses (Baumeister 2008) and provide a justification for not exerting effortful control (Vohs and Schooler 2008). Greater belief in free will has also been associated with less conformity (Alquist et al. 2013). To the extent that social norms to gamble are present, greater belief in free will could insulate potential gamblers from the pressure to conform to those norms.

Similar to past behavior, the study found no relationship between determinism, social cognitive constructs, and gambling behavior (H8–H9). This suggests that it is reduced free will beliefs rather than beliefs in determinism that exerts influence on key social cognitive constructs. With regards to behavior, neither free will beliefs nor determinism contributed directly to gambling behavior. This suggests that rather than influencing gambling behavior directly, such beliefs impact social cognitive constructs, which then influence behavior. Nevertheless, the independent contribution of free will beliefs on intention suggests these beliefs are robust predictors, especially as attitude and perceived behavioral control are key constructs in the Theory of Planned Behavior.

It may come as a surprise that free will beliefs predicted outcomes, but determinism did not. However, these differences suggest that people can hold compatible beliefs between free will and determinism; disbelieving in free will does not mean endorsing determinism and rejecting determinism does not mean endorsing free will. In fact, some have observed a positive correlation between the two sets of beliefs (e.g. Nahmias et al. 2006; Wisniewski et al. 2019). The lack of association identified in the present study has also been found in previous studies (e.g. Paulhus and Carey 2011; Alquist et al. 2013). For example, Alquist et al. (2013) found free will predicted conformity, but scientific determinism did not. This appears to be the case for gambling behavior.

Although the importance of free will has predominantly been debated philosophically, study findings suggest free will beliefs are associated with social cognitive determinants underlying gambling behavior. The results can therefore have important implications for research attempting to modify participation in gambling. Specifically, results suggest that increasing free will beliefs may lead to a reduction in positive attitudes toward gambling and increase perceptions of control over gambling. Successfully promoting belief in free will could therefore modify key psychological determinants. In accordance with the Theory of Planned Behavior, manipulating these determinants could then limit the development of gambling intentions, which may then lead to future gambling abstinence. Interventions developed to reduce gambling should therefore consider promoting free will beliefs. However, if beliefs in free will are attenuated, this could lead to increased attitudes toward gambling, weaker control over gambling, and greater intentions to gamble. This may subsequently lead to gambling behavior itself. As a consequence, it is important that intervention designers do not limit belief in free will when targeting gambling reduction. If interventions promote free will beliefs, gambling behavior could be reduced by modifying key social cognitive determinants.

Strengths and limitations

The strengths of the study relate to the examination of beliefs in free will and determinism and how these beliefs relate to social cognitive constructs. As far as we are aware, no study has previously examined these relationships. The study also demonstrates the impact of free will beliefs on social cognitive constructs important to gambling behavior. Past work has found that weakening belief in free will can increase antisocial behavior (Vohs and Baumeister 2009) and that emphasizing the role of the brain in addiction reduces participants' belief in their own free will (Racine et al. 2017). Our results lend further support to the idea that deemphasizing the role of personal volition in addictive behaviors may counterproductively encourage rather than discourage behaviors. There are some limitations attached to the study. The findings are correlational and therefore causal links cannot be made. Study findings, therefore, need to be tested experimentally or longitudinally to establish that, for example, increasing belief in free will reduces gambling attitudes and intentions. However, it should be noted that a recent meta-analysis undertaken by Genschow et al. (2021) showed manipulations of belief in free will and determinism had a limited impact on attitude, behavior, and cognition. Researchers should therefore consider the strength of manipulations, participants’ current belief strength in free will and determinism, and the distance from free will to behavior through social cognitive constructs (Genschow et al., 2021). Second, the study recruited from a student population. Findings should be replicated in other populations. Finally, the use of self-report may have led to some bias in measurements of gambling behavior (Auer and Griffiths 2017; van der Maas et al. 2021).

Conclusion

The study examined the relationship between free will and determinism beliefs, social cognitive constructs, and gambling behavior. In addition to supporting propositions from the Theory of Planned Behavior, the study identified a role for free will beliefs. Specifically, free will beliefs were negatively associated with attitude and intention toward gambling in that those who believed less strongly in free will demonstrated stronger gambling attitudes and intentions. Moreover, free will beliefs were positively associated with perceived behavioral control in that weaker belief in free will was associated with weaker perceptions of control. Determinism was not found to be associated with constructs and gambling behavior. The study provides further support for the role of free will in social behavior. Future work is needed to test and confirm the causal role of these relations.

Disclosure statement

There are no competing interests to declare.