Abstract
This study builds upon the argument of alignment effect and posits that the close alignment of the interests between Chinese central state-owned enterprises (CSOEs) and those of the Chinese central government creates state-level incentives (e.g. GDP volatility mitigation) for CSOEs to manage earnings. Consistent with our proposition we find that Chinese CSOEs engage in earnings management to reduce GDP volatility. Furthermore, we find that Chinese CSOEs only use the real earnings management approaches that also reduce enterprise earnings volatility to mitigate GDP volatility.
Notes
13. Fan (Citation2011) provides a marketization index for China’s provinces for 1997–2009. For the 2010–2013 period, we use the same value for 2009 to proxy the 2010–2013 values. We recognize the limitations of these data.
17. http://www.datanggroup.cn/templates/T_Second/index.aspx?nodeid=309 (in Chinese).