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Abstract
UEFA’s Financial Fair Play (FFP) policy represents a severe regulatory intervention in European club football competitions. While potential outcomes of the concept have been thoroughly assessed, there is little research on the genesis and background behind its implementation. The present paper fills this gap by analyzing the discourse in the run-up to the passage of FFP. We focus on interpreted practice and context and argue that the rising indebtedness of clubs and their increasing reliance on benefactors were a necessary but not sufficient requirement. Further ingredients imperative for the successful policy development were claims-making activities by influential actors to secure support for their problem perception. Strong discourse coalitions were formed around powerful storylines, such as the interpretation of making debts as ‘cheating’ as well as the notion of traditional sporting values being undermined by financial forces. By detecting such mechanisms of interaction, the study helps to better understand the beliefs and ideologies underpinning the policy. It furthermore identifies discrepancies between public discourse and scholarly debate concerning the problem assessment as well as the proposed solutions and their effectiveness. Additionally, it proposes an improved heuristic for understanding discursive practices which contributes to future investigations of social problems in sport.
Notes
Disclosure statement
The authors report no conflicts of interest. The authors alone are responsible for the content and writing of this article.
Notes on contributors
Dr. Mathias Schubert is a senior researcher at the Department of Sport Economics, Sport Sociology and Sport History, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz.
Dr. Thomas Könecke is a senior researcher at the Department of Sport Economics, Sport Sociology and Sport History, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz.
Hermann Pitthan holds a Master of Education in Political Science and Sports Science from the Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz.
Notes
1 The increasing commodification and its repercussions on the whole European football landscape have been vividly portrayed by Walsh and Giulianotti (Citation2001, Citation2007). The quest for new commercial opportunities also extended the clubs’ focus on global activities, provoking a further concentration of resources in the hands of the elites (Giulianotti & Robertson, Citation2009; Millward, Citation2011).
2 Schubert (Citation2014) underlines that UEFA must nowadays take into account the interests of a variety of stakeholders that all have a bearing on the development of FFP. This is due to significant structural changes in the governance of football in Europe during the last decade, which are outside the scope of this contribution (for excellent accounts, see, for example, García, Citation2009a; Geeraert, Scheerder & Bruyninckx, Citation2013).
3 Müller et al. (Citation2012, 123) argue that since funding can be provided independently from sporting success, competition may ‘shift away from the pitch and on to the quest for the most wealthy club owner, benefactor or creditor’. The authors offer a sound reasoning to what extent excessive external funding as well as the increasing reliance of clubs on benefactors undermine the integrity of the sporting competition.
4 Blumer (Citation1971) had already stated that the social definition and not the objective character of a given condition determine whether a problem exists.
5 Schetsche (Citation2014) points out that the first three stages in Blumer’s model usually overlap and together shape the constitution of a problem.
6 This arrangement shares many similarities with common frame analyses in social problems literature, which mainly differ in terminology only. For example, a widespread distinction made by Snow & Benford (Citation1988) includes the elements diagnostic frame, motivational frame and prognostic frame; Best (Citation2013) uses the terms grounds, warrants and conclusions; Loseke (Citation2003) combines both terminologies. Principally, our approach consists of very similar yet slightly more differentiated elements.
7 Mass media have a double function in public discourses: One the one hand they provide a stage for claims-makers, yet on the other they are a relevant actor with their very own specific interests. Furthermore, it is acknowledged that media are bound to certain (economic and cultural) constraints (Best, Citation2013; Luhmann, Citation2000) and guided by news factors and that this necessarily affects the analysis.
8 However, it seems plausible to argue that that the 50 + 1 rule is already undermined due to the exceptions made for the clubs located in Leverkusen and Wolfsburg, as well the factual control that patron Dietmar Hopp has exerted over Hoffenheim for more than a decade (for a vivid illustration, see Lammert, Citation2008). Interestingly, in December 2014 the German Bundesliga decided to ease the rule to also allow private benefactors to acquire a major share of a club (if they have continually and substantially funded the club for at least 20 years).
9 Besides the regular editions this encompasses online and Sunday editions of all media, between which there is no discrimination in the following analysis. References for the cited sources as well as the complete sample can be provided by the authors upon request.
10 We agree with Piggin, Jackson and Lewis (Citation2009, 91) who point out that in ‘line with Foucauldian theorizing, it is acknowledged that controlling and examining all ‘data’ on a given subject is not possible’ – consequently, an important assumption underlying this study is that the entire discourse about the topic could never be covered. The chosen documents rather represent focal points in the discourse.
11 We are, however, in line with Starks and Brown Trinidad (Citation2007) who state that qualitative analysis is inherently subjective because the research team is the instrument responsible for analysis.
12 The proposal to reduce the CL starting slots for the big leagues and have domestic cup winners enter the competition has never been put into practice. It is believed that UEFA, besides other agreements, had to give up this plan in return for the dissolution of the G-14 group, which had been a constant antagonist since its creation in 2000 (Guardian, 07.11.07). Indeed, this move, followed by giving the newly formed European Club Association (ECA) access to UEFA’s internal governance structures through membership in the Professional Football Strategy Council, can be seen as a masterstroke by UEFA to get support for its initiatives.
13 The report had been initiated by Richard Caborn, the then British Minister for Sport during the UK's presidency of the European Union and chaired by his Portuguese counterpart José Luis Arnaut. It has been sharply criticised for being unsound as well as for the heavy involvement of UEFA and was largely ignored in the Commission’s 2007 White Paper (for a vivid description and critique of the review, see for example, García Citation2009b).
14 Blumer (Citation1971) notes that usually also during this phase plans are modified and reshaped to serve the needs of actors involved. Indeed, in 2012 UEFA presented an updated version of FFP. The analysis of the discourse after the release of the initial version in 2010 may indeed cast further light on underlying dynamics. Given that the purpose of this research is, however, to investigate the discursive practices preceding the enactment of FFP this is therefore considered outside the contribution’s scope.
15 The term ‘financial doping’ to conceptualize money injections by club owners or debt-led expenses for players would have been a strong label to raise attention and facilitate communication (Schubert, Citation2014). Apparently, former UEFA chief executive Lars Christer Olsson was the first to use this expression in 2004, which then became increasingly employed by other actors. While Michel Platini has referred to ‘financial doping’ on several occasions, it is not used by UEFA in any official releases. Hamil (Citation2014, 37) recently noted that ‘the phrase has now entered into the mainstream sport business vocabulary’.
16 The very denoting of the policy as ‘Financial Fair Play’ can be seen in this light. Admittedly, it is plausible to assume that UEFA does not use the term as part of a detached philosophical analysis. Rather, it is more likely that it is used quite deliberately in an ideological sense, drawing on the positive sentiments associated with fair play as one of the central ethical values of sport. Szymanski (Citation2014, 218) denoted UEFA’s decision to name the rules ‘Financial Fair Play’ a ‘masterstroke. Who could argue that fair play should apply in financial matters, as in all aspects of the game?’. This is of course a witty observation. Yet, connotations over fair play at the same time inevitably provide a target for critics.
17 Indeed, Walsh and Giulianotti (Citation2001, Citation2007) provide a sound analysis in how far football’s commodification may have detrimental effects on traditional fandom. Here, however, such notions were mostly less reflective.
18 Different to advocacy coalitions, discourse coalitions are more flexible in the sense that their members do not automatically pursue the same objectives (Fischer, Citation2003), which is of special relevance for our case given the diversity of stakeholders with different agendas involved.
19 It should be taken into account, however, that even though scientists tend to be idealized as objective, impartial authorities, they are themselves actors in the larger social order and may have vested interests (Best, Citation2013). This refers of course to both proponents and opponents of the policy.
20 See, for example, two special issues dedicated to these topics in the Journal of Sport Economics Lago, Simmons & Szymanski, Citation2006a and the Scottish Journal of Political Economy Vrooman, Citation2007a.
21 In a similar fashion, the Arab owners of Manchester City also defended accusations of worsening the financial inequality between clubs with their investment by claiming the opposite, i.e. that only external money on such a scale could ever break the monopoly of Europe’s richest clubs (FAZ, 20.09.09).
22 The y-axis in Figure 3 shows the corresponding stages and refers to the attention and recognition of the problem in the discursive arena. The x-axis lists examples of outstanding events and conditions that trigger, produce or enhance the discourse in their chronological order, which include both statements by actors as well as ‘randomly’ appearing incidents (Dresen, Citation2010), such as for example club take-overs or outstanding player signings. From an ontological perspective it is important to note that it is irrelevant whether or not these events did indeed change or worsen the (objective) situation – crucial is that they were perceived as such and used by actors to bolster their arguments.