Abstract
Evaluations of German military intelligence during the Second World War lack a certain contemporary dimension. The recent digitalisation of secret records of conversations between German prisoners of war, made by British intelligence, enables computer-based research on that topic. This article will analyse various statements from around 400 German soldiers concerning their intelligence system, its organisation and usefulness. They each perceived the organisation and personnel of the German system in different ways depending on personal experience. Collection methods were widely discussed and in the case of the use of force during interrogation situations criticised. The analysis of raw material and the link between intelligence and its use in battle can be found to a lesser extent. Although German prisoners mentioned successful applications of intelligence within combat situations enthusiastic comments increasingly diminished during the course of the war. In addition, a growing awareness of a functioning British intelligence system can be detected. The appreciation of the significance of intelligence and its use in combat remained very limited. Summing up, the secret protocols offer a unique access to contemporary views on intelligence and to a German perception in particular.
Introduction
‘Die deutsche Spionage ist auf Zack’ – ‘German espionage is very much up to the mark.’Footnote 1 This is the very positive statement of a stoker second class of the German Navy, made on 20 May 1943. He made it two weeks after being captured while he was detained in a prisoner-of-war camp in Great Britain. The former stoker of U-439 went on to say: ‘We knew about practically every convoy, we knew when it put out from NEW YORK or wherever it was and of exactly what it consisted.’Footnote 2 He evaluated German intelligence activities as efficient and explained that the crew of U-439 was supported by knowledge about Allied convoys and their composition in advance of their departure. Regarding the U-boat missions to attack such ships,Footnote 3 Germany's performance in delivering sensitive data to its fighting forces receives an excellent rating from this soldier and intelligence user.
In general, information about the enemy stood within the reference frame of every soldier, from private to general.Footnote 4 They acted as intelligence officers, as users, or at least dealt with people who were engaged in intelligence. As such, remarks made by members of the German armed forces are a potential source for a historical look at the contemporary perception of intelligence. It helps to clarify our image of the German intelligence system during the Second World War.Footnote 5 Furthermore it is part of any evaluation of intelligence: measuring failure or success has to include what users think about it.Footnote 6
Any historical research about the perception of German intelligence from 1939 to 1945 faces the problem of retrieving unfiltered comments on its various aspects such as structure, acquisition and use. Take, for example, the relevant material of the Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv in Freiburg im Breisgau.Footnote 7 A huge amount of it was generated within the German intelligence system itself. This origin can be problematic insofar as it provides only a limited internal view, when nearly all armed forces users stood outside that system. In addition, their remarks about intelligence cannot be found in personal statements such as letters from the front to their families at home. Official and self-censorship limit the value of this source concerning any secret activities.Footnote 8 Likewise, statements of German officers made several years after the war are ex post and often biased. Therefore, a contemporary evaluation of German military intelligence from the ‘conventional source material’ is difficult to obtain.Footnote 9
However, the release of conversation transcripts between German prisoners of war (POWs) provides an opportunity for another approach.Footnote 10 These were made secretly by the Combined Services Interrogation Centre, United Kingdom (CSDIC (UK)) from 1939 to 1945. It produced nearly 17,000 listening reports of conversations between German soldiers.Footnote 11 Unaware of being monitored,Footnote 12 members of the Air Force, Navy and Army spoke freely about war, family, politics and the kind of information they gained and used for fighting a war: intelligence. Due to the fact that the British were interested in information about German intelligence (inter alia), they recorded particular conversations and they are now available to the historian.
Because of the huge number of available transcripts, it is uneconomical to go through all of them. However, the project Referenzrahmen des Krieges. Wahrnehmungen und Deutungen von Soldaten der Achsenmächte, 1939–1945 (2007–2012), headed by Sönke Neitzel and Harald Welzer, produced a digital version from almost all available protocols.Footnote 13 It enables computer-based research about the views of German soldiers on their intelligence system, its performance, and their comparisons with the British system.Footnote 14
The principle and procedure of this inquiry are based on Foucault's theory of discourse analysis and Mayring's qualitative analysis.Footnote 15 Firstly, the statements of German prisoners of war are treated as representations of their knowledge and perceived reality (regarding intelligence), which are the results of social construction processes.Footnote 16 Secondly, Mayring's model offers a guide to implement ‘aspects of intelligence’ as categories to which the statements can be related. The qualitative analysis is supported by quantitative data to sustain the results.Footnote 17 The enormous number of transcripts can be seen as one of the advantages of the research material.
The initial step consists of a lexicographic search of intelligence subjects in order to identify relevant comments and to arrange them into a code system. It can be both deduced from intelligence literature and retrieved inductively from the protocols.Footnote 18 The final categories represent the following aspects: organisation, persons, activities (collection and analysis), content, use and the overall performance of German intelligence. The collection and content of distinctive pieces of intelligence are both subdivided into different intelligence forms. Finally, statements in every category are classified as positive or negative if they contain judgemental remarks.Footnote 19
In the following, you will get an impression about the perception of German soldiers regarding these aspects of intelligence. Some figures are included as appendices. The results can be seen as an overview and a selection of some remarkable findings. Therefore, there is only a rough differentiation of the German POWs regarding rank, service and date of record. However, the structure of this kind of research permits various enhancements such as combat area or unit, which goes beyond this study. Besides the perception of their own intelligence services, this article will describe the German prisoners' views about British intelligence including the reliability of ENIGMA – the major cypher machine used by all German services – and the possibility of themselves being a source of information for their captors.Footnote 20 Finally, it will be important to determine to what extent the German prisoners of war linked their intelligence services with the course of the war.
Results
First of all, it is important to determine how many times German intelligence is in fact discussed in the conversations. Referring to a total of 10,195 German soldiers handled by the CSDIC (UK) and to 15,582 digitalised protocols, there are 401 different people in 544 protocols speaking about intelligence.Footnote 21 In other words, fewer than 4% of all protocols and bugged POWs deal with intelligence. There is an overall peak in 1944, with 146 protocols involving 122 people. Luftwaffe staff spoke most frequently in 1940, presumably because of their commitment in the Battle of Britain. Of course, prisoners talk much more about ‘important matters’ such as food and accommodation. However, about 1100 times one or more specific intelligence aspects can be identified, on average 2.7 coded passages per speaker.Footnote 22 Let us take a look at the different aspects.
The discussion of organisational aspects of German intelligence can be found a total of 174 times. It is a common subject, especially for soldiers with a high rank (over one fifth of their comments on intelligence are related to its organisation). In general, there are only a few judgemental remarks (45); remarkably, there are twice as many negative ones. They are related to efficiency, cooperation and clarity.
The agent network abroad and cooperation between the services are the main points of dissatisfaction. First, there are complaints about competing agencies (especially between the Abwehr and the SD), which work against each other or at least constrain each other. The situation deteriorates after the replacement of Wilhelm Canaris (1887–1945), head of the Abwehr, in February 1944. Navy Commander Müller reports: ‘The whole of the Intelligence Service – since the time when I left it – has gone to pieces. It is part of HIMMLER's business now, since CANARIS left.'Footnote 23 Secondly, sharing of information and coordination of intelligence work between the three services is rated badly. With the exception of the invasion of Poland, the sharing of air reconnaissance resources for imagery intelligence between the Wehrmacht and the Luftwaffe does not seem to have worked. For instance, in 1941 a bomber pilot criticised thus:
‘Our “Staffel” used to be a long range army reconnaissance “Staffel” (“Heeresfernaufklärungsstaffel”). We used to be quite independent. Then our “Staffel” came to the Air arm and all was over. Now it is a mix-up.’?Footnote 24
Statements about individuals working inside the intelligence system are balanced; there seem to be as many competent officers as there are incompetent ones. The German soldiers speak about many different types of intelligence staff depending on their position and experiences. Admiral Canaris is the most prominent one in the transcripts. Over one fifth (34 out of 147) of the passages linked to intelligence personnel refer to him. Surprisingly, comments from the Army are much more frequent than from the other services, especially from the Navy. There is a tendency to identify him as the whole Abwehr. General Ludwig Crüwell (1892–1958) makes an interesting remark: Speaking about his transport to Great Britain after his capture – he was shot down during a reconnaissance flight – he is displeased about the missing effort to rescue him. He expresses his dissatisfaction clearly and asks a lieutenant of the Kriegsmarine: ‘Why doesn't your CANARIS keep his eyes and ears open?’Footnote 26
Activities, especially the collection of different intelligence forms – human intelligence (HUMINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) – are a recurrent topic.Footnote 27 Twenty-seven per cent of coded passages (297) deal with information gathering – HUMINT, IMINT, SIGINT to the same degree. Referring to each of them, there are many comments and sometimes vivid discussions about efficiency. Speaking about SIGINT activities, only 10% of the statements are clearly negative. Positive and negative remarks about the collection from IMINT and HUMINT sources are more balanced; collectively, good results are slightly in the majority.
At this point the statements about human intelligence are singled out to provide more details on collection matters, because there are similar experiences across all three services.Footnote 28 Two major sources of HUMINT can be distinguished: interrogation of prisoners (including eavesdropping and the use of stool pigeons) and espionage. Concerning interrogation, there is a widespread consensus. Throughout the transcripts the soldiers reject brutal methods to elicit pieces of information from prisoners and rate them as inefficient; deficient provisions of food, extreme heat, etc., are seen as unsuitable for getting information from Allied POWs in German captivity.Footnote 29 In addition, they are regarded as better trained to cope with interrogations. However, Lieutenant Wessels, who had to interrogate British POWs in Africa, appreciates the German system. Furthermore, he emphasises elaborate psychological methods and the use of personal files (‘I tell you, it's just the sort of thing the Jews would do’).Footnote 30 He and other intelligence officers grade the efficiency of the German interrogation centre Dulag Luft in Oberusel as high.
Espionage is the other important HUMINT source. The secret conversations indicate that Luftwaffe and Navy staff noticed agent activities abroad mostly because they had to transport them to their destination. They speak about the high frequency and the quantity of missions, but cannot evaluate the efficiency. In March 1944, Lieutenant General Friedrich Freiherr von Broich (1896–1974) comments on the agent network in Great Britain:
M 179: Of course I was staggered. I said: ‘How is that possible? It must certainly be organised!’…
A 1432: When did you hear, sir, that there is no one in ENGLAND. Just recently?
M 179: In November 1942, a year and a half ago… received no news.Footnote 31
Nonetheless, despite several deficiencies many German soldiers see the high number of agents transported as an indication of good intelligence collection from human sources. In general, the efficiency of German spies is better valued than their performance in the last war and is not seen as inferior to the British one.
In contrast to collection, the analysis of secret information is not a common topic of conversation (39). Of course, there are not many intelligence specialists with experience in analysing intelligence. Nonetheless, an awareness of intermediate steps between collection and use cannot be found. Where analysis is mentioned, mostly ‘simple products’ such as image interpretation and maps are discussed.Footnote 32
The most significant aspects are those relating to the content and use of intelligence, especially text passages which are coded with both of them – which in other words deal with the perceived accuracy of an intelligence report combined with its usefulness in battle. On the one hand, one quarter of intelligence statements are about content (269). Seventy to ninety per cent of HUMINT, IMINT or SIGINT is seen as accurate in contrast to multi-source intelligence which is below 50%. On the other hand, only 13% of the statements are about its use in battle. The success rate is always over 50%, with its peak in 1941 corresponding to the course of the war.
In particular, day-to-day operations are combined with mostly accurate intelligence. Navymen speak about the support of HUMINT from Spain and evidence submitted by codebreakers of the B-Dienst to hunt down enemy ships.Footnote 33 The Luftwaffe appreciates feedback from IMINT about their bombing attacks and rates the analysis of the intelligence officer from Air Fleet West about British night fighter techniques as helpful.Footnote 34 The German ground forces speak about signals intelligence, which was ‘important’ in El Alamein, or about a successful attack. See, for example, a conversation between three German soldiers captured in Africa:
Our tanks were always able to listen in to the Americans' R/T communications. On one occasion the American tanks stated their exact position and this was heard by ours. Immediately some of the ‘Tigers’ drove off and destroyed six of the American tanks.Footnote 35
Inaccurate information and bad results are also discussed; intelligence about convoy movements was not useful or the tactical information at the beginning of the Battle of Crete turned out to be incorrect.Footnote 36
Protocols of senior German officers – the most notable files regarding the strategic use of intelligence – contain mainly intelligence failures; in particular, General Crüwell and General Wilhelm Ritter von Thoma (1891–1948)Footnote 37 speak several times on the subject. They concentrate on their experiences in Africa and Russia. Firstly, the German reaction to Operation Crusader in the end of 1941 was unsuccessful; accurate information about the intentions and strength of the British came too late and the available forces were too weak and not deployed successfully. Secondly, speaking about Russia prior to Operation Barbarossa, the reports of the German military attaché about the Russian arms build-up were not believed. Calculations about the actual strength were wrong or contradictoryFootnote 38 – only a report from Canaris’ agency about the T-34 tank turned out to be correct.Footnote 39 Furthermore, von Thoma delivers insight into the presentation of intelligence results during a briefing with Adolf Hitler:
I had to report to HITLER on Russian production. I was able to report to him then that the position was that the Russians had a monthly output of 800 tanks and armoured vehicles. I was easily able to produce evidence for my statements from the reports of secret agents (?) and that sort of thing. Then he kept on chewing his moustache and biting his finger nails – he always does that – (and said): ‘Nonsense, that's out of question!' I said: ‘My FÜHRER, whether it is out of the question or not, at my rate that's the position as reported.’ Our output at the time was 300.Footnote 40
Besides speaking about the quality of information about the Soviet Union, both Generals agree that the Russian campaign was ‘absolute madness.’Footnote 41
German soldiers in the CSDIC (UK) speak not only about their own intelligence system but also compare it with the British one, as in their discussion of the security of the cipher system and their reflections on their own role as POWs. On the one hand, there is continuous confidence in the security of ENIGMA. For example, a radio operator from U-464 states: ‘I'm sure they'll never find out how to do it.’Footnote 42 The worst case would be that both sides have some secret material. However, the British are seen as incapable of breaking into German communications, whereas their own ability to read British wireless traffic is regarded as very high. The exact numerical security of ENIGMA seems to be unclear, which is surprising because many transcripts contain technical details.Footnote 43 There are comments on what happens if the British are able to capture some material from a German U-boat, but there is no doubt that their own security measures are sufficient. This was not so in the case of U-110.Footnote 44 However, the crew of U-110 do not speak about it, which the British would have surely recorded.
On the other hand, the British interrogators seem to know nearly everything. Their own contribution as source of intelligence is suspected by each German soldier and they discuss it. They realise the British are in possession of various pieces of sensitive information.Footnote 45 In addition, the British have recruited many foreigners and are therefore ‘well informed,’ as noted by a German senior officer in 1943.Footnote 46 Furthermore, there are vague assumptions that the British use their intelligence successfully. A bomber observer comments in 1941:
I'll tell you one thing which worked perfectly with them: ‘SCHARNHORST’ and ‘GNEISENAU’… in the afternoon in the harbor and the ‘DEUTSCHLAND’ is in BORDEAUX. They were in there in the afternoon and the English arrived in the evening. They hit a hangar and smashed up one FOCKE-WULF and damaged the other.Footnote 47
The German POWs clearly admit in various discussions that they are impressed by the knowledge the British have. However, there are no further considerations about any consequences, such as that good intelligence might help the British to win the war.
Summary
Transcripts of secret conversations between German prisoners of war are an unusual source concerning the perception of intelligence. Computer-based approaches allow a flexible handling of tens of thousands of pages.Footnote 48 In particular, several hundred protocols contain many contemporary comments about various aspects of intelligence work, referring especially to German intelligence services.
Summing up the statements about the various intelligence aspects, there is a differentiated image about the organisation and personnel of the German intelligence system. The perception of information gathering depends on the experience of each soldier; in the case of POW interrogation there is a critical attitude towards brutal methods. The important step of analysis of raw material before its dissemination to potential users is rarely discussed. The combined perception of the correctness and the rate of success in battles can be found in the protocols to a lesser extent. Evidently, many combat situations are not related to available intelligence. In general, tactical successes are related to good (mostly single-source) intelligence. This view diminishes on the strategic level of war, where multi-source intelligence is prevalent.
Besides these detailed comments, there are also some statements concerning the overall performance of the German intelligence agencies. SIGINT successes especially lead to very positive remarks, such as, ‘Yes, we know every damn thing the English transmit.’Footnote 49 Due to cumulating defeats on all fronts, there are no further enthusiastic comments from 1944 onwards.
In contrast, via contacts to interrogation officers, a lot of German prisoners – finally – realize, British intelligence is very good. However, they never draw conclusions from it. They do not consider that good intelligence supports a successful outcome of a battle. They see no correlation between German losses and superior British intelligence efforts. The astonishment about the high state of knowledge which the British demonstrate during interrogations does not lead to a re-evaluation of British intelligence capabilities in general. Likewise, their own defeats are not linked to possible British intelligence successes. The limited appreciation of these interdependencies becomes apparent with regard to German wireless traffic. Neither the increasing losses of U-boats from 1943 nor their experiences with very well-informed interrogation officers reduce confidence in ENIGMA. Its security is never questioned by German POWs.
Speaking about insufficient intelligence, there is no tendency among German soldiers to see disadvantages for their own conduct of war. Correspondingly, good British intelligence is not regarded as a powerful ‘force-multiplier.’Footnote 50 Although intelligence is discussed in many situations, a definite perception of the role and significance of intelligence in a war is missing. This can possibly be considered as a particular feature of German soldiers during the Second World War.
The protocols of the CSDIC (UK) offer unique access to contemporary views on intelligence. This article has tried to offer some clues as to how to deal with this material and which historical questions might be applied to it. The results presented here point to another one; does a typical German mentality influence the specific perception of intelligence, which can be found in the secret recordings? This thought should be pursued in future studies.
Acknowledgements
This article is based on a paper presented at the 17th Annual Conference of the International Intelligence History Association, ‘German Intelligence History from Bismarck to the Present’, in Marburg from 17 to 19 June 2011.
Notes
1. Prisoner N 1617; see SRN 1831, 20 May 1943, War Office (WO) 208/4145, The National Archives, Kew (TNA). In the following, the codes in brackets refer to the ID number which the British assigned to every German prisoner of war; the files in TNA usually consist of the German original record and a contemporary English translation; the latter is used in the text and the former in the footnotes.
2. ‘Wir haben fast jeden Geleitzug gekannt, wie er überhaupt in NEW YORK oder irgendwo ausgelaufen war, wie er überhaupt vollkommen zusammengestellt war wussten wir ihn schon’ (N 1617); see SRN 1831, 20 May 1943, WO 208/4145, TNA.
3. Details on its patrols can be found on List of all U-boats – U-439 (online): http://www.uboat.net/boats/u439.html (accessed 6 July 2011).
4. A reference frame is defined as ‘eine Matrix von ordnenden und organisierenden Deutungsvorgaben’; see Sönke Neitzel and Harald Welzer, Soldaten: Protokolle vom Kämpfen, Töten und Sterben, 3rd ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2011), 17.
5. The German intelligence system refers to the intelligence services, their organisation and modus operandi.
6. Amos Kovacs, ‘The Nonuse of Intelligence,’ International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 10, no. 4 (1997): 383–417; Robert M. Clark, Intelligence Analysis: A Target-centric Approach, 3rd ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2010), 1–7.
7. The German Federal Archives (Department Military Archives); see the recently published edition Norbert Müller et al. eds., Das Amt Ausland/Abwehr im Oberkommando der Wehrmacht. Eine Dokumentation, Materialien aus dem Bundesarchiv 16 (Koblenz: Wirtschaftsverlag NW, 2007).
8. Gerald Lamprecht, Feldpost und Kriegserlebnis: Briefe als historisch-biographische Quelle. Grazer zeitgeschichtliche Studien 1 (Innsbruck: Studien-Verlag, 2001), 45–56.
9. Gerhard Weinberg takes an interesting approach. He bases an article on the Joseph Goebbels diaries to describe the use of intelligence at the policy-maker level; see Gerhard Weinberg, ‘Aspects of World War II German Intelligence,’ Journal of Intelligence History 4, no. 1(2004): 1–6.
10. In 1996 these files were made accessible in The National Archives, Kew; see S. Neitzel, Abgehört: Deutsche Generäle in britischer Kriegsgefangenschaft 1942–1945, 3rd ed., List-Taschenbuch 60760 (Berlin: List, 2007), 9.
11. The History of C.S.D.I.C.(U.K), undated, WO 208/4970, TNA.
12. This is very likely because there is no systematic concealment inside the protocols; see Neitzel, Abgehört, 21f; Neitzel, Soldaten, 428f.
13. Only 1378 so-called ‘extracts’ are not digitalized; however, they seem to be much less significant because they contain mainly specific (technical) details and had ‘restricted circulation due to limited interest’; see The History of C.S.D.I.C.(U.K), undated, WO 208/4970, TNA.
14. One possible programme to perform such a computer-based research is MAXQDA10; for further information see MAXQDA10 , The Art of Text Analysis (online), http://www.maxqda.com (accessed 5 July 2011).
15. Regarding the scope of this article, there is only a brief sketch on it; for further reading see Achim Landwehr, Historische Diskursanalyse, Historische Einführungen 4 (Frankfurt am Main: Campus-Verlag, 2008) and Philipp Mayring, Qualitative Inhaltsanalyse: Grundlagen und Techniken, 11th ed. (Weinheim: Beltz, 2010).
16. Landwehr, Historische Diskursanalyse, 18f.
17. Compare Mayring, Qualitative Inhaltsanalyse, 51.
18. There are numerous articles and books on various aspects of intelligence; exemplarily, see Loch K. Johnson, ed., Handbook of Intelligence Studies (London: Routledge, 2009); Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); regarding ‘induktive und deduktive Kategoriendefintion’ see Mayring, Qualitative Inhaltsanalyse, 83–5.
19. Details of the code system can be found in Appendix A.
20. The extensive code tree used for the German intelligence system can be applied to the British one, too. A short introduction about ENIGMA is offered in Jürgen Rowher, ‘Die ENIGMA-Schlüsselmaschine,’ in Geheimdienste in der Weltgeschichte. Von der Antike bis heute, ed. Wolfgang Krieger, rep. ed. (Köln: Anaconda, 2007), 217–39.
21. The following results are based on the 15,582 transcripts excluding the technical extracts; records of conversations between members of the German Air Force/Army/Navy are labelled as SRA/SRM/SRN; SRX relates to ‘mixed protocols’, SRGG and GRGG contain comments of German senior officers. All of them can be found in the series WO 208, TNA.
22. See Appendix B and C.
23. ‘Die ganze Abwehr ist ja doch überhaupt, nachdem ich raus war, in die Brüche gegangen. Ist ja eine HIMMLER-Unternehmung jetzt. Seit CANARIS weg ist’ (Fregattenkapitän DZ/129897(N)); see SRN 4061, 20 August 1944, WO 208/4154, TNA.
24. ‘Unsere Staffel war früher eine Heeresfernaufklärungsstaffel. Da waren wir früher ganz selbstständig. Dann kam unsere Staffel zur Luft und dann war es aus. Jetzt ist es ein Gewurschtel’ (Leutnant A 683); see SRA 1083, 01 January 1941, WO 208/4122, TNA.
25. ‘Unheimlich viel wert. Es ist prima organisiert’ (Oberleutnant A 777); see SRX 333, 10 June 1941, WO 208/4159, TNA.
26. ‘Warum passt er nicht auf, euer CANARIS?’ (General der Panzertruppe M 154); see SRX 1205, 31 October 1942, WO 208/4161, TNA; details on Crüwell in Neitzel, Abgehört, 437f.
27. The focus of this study is secret intelligence; open source intelligence (OSINT), which declines in quantity during a war and which is rarely of interest to soldiers during combat, is left out.
28. This is not the case for IMINT or SIGINT; for example, Navy staff do not speak much about IMINT (only 3 of 93 passages).
29. The extent of using extreme heat to elicit information from POWs in DULAG Luft (Oberursel) is dealt in Stefan Geck, Dulag Luft, Auswertestelle West: Vernehmungslager der Luftwaffe für westalliierte Kriegsgefangene im Zweiten Weltkrieg, Europäische Hochschulschriften: Reihe 3, Geschichte und ihre Hilfswissenschaften 1057 (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2008), 477–513; Geck concludes that there was no systematic use.
30. ‘Das ist ein rein jüdisches Unternehmen, sage ich Ihnen’ (Lieutenant M 270); see SRM 254, 19 October 1943, WO 208/4137, TNA. The methods in Dulag Luft are extensively described in Stefan Geck, Dulag Luft, 291–424.
31. ‘M 179: Natürlich war ich erschüttert. Ich sagte: “Wie ist denn das nun möglich? Das muss doch organisiert sein!”… A 1432: Wann hatten das Herr General gehört, dass in ENGLAND niemand ist. Jetzt zum Schluss? M 179: Im November ‘42, vor anderthalb Jahren… keine Nachrichten kriegten’; see SRGG 881, 23 March 1944, WO 208/4168, TNA; more details about von Broich in Neitzel, Abgehört, 432f.
32. See for example SRA 2637, 13 June 1943, WO 208/4126, TNA; in the author's opinion the dissemination of intelligence reports as an independent step is not within the reference frame of German POWs, it is rather assigned to the use of intelligence (availability); regarding dissemination in intelligence studies see for example Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War, 44–7.
33. SRX 459, 31 August 1941, WO 208/4159, TNA; SRN 2055, 4 August 1943, WO 208/4146, TNA.
34. SRA 2659, 18 June 1942, WO 208/4126, TNA; SRA 5255, 10 May 1944, WO 208/4133, TNA.
35. ‘Unsere Panzer haben immer den Funkverkehr der Amerikaner abgehört. Amerikanische Panzer gaben einmal ihren genauen Standort ab und das hörten unsere. Sofort fuhren einige “Tiger” los und haben sechs amerikanische Panzer kaputt gemacht’ (speaker unclear, possibly Leutnant A(Am)43); see SRX 1694, 22 March 1943, WO 208/4162, TNA.
36. SRX 315, 26 May 1941, WO 208/4159, TNA; SRX 1514, 20 January 1943, WO 208/4162, TNA.
37. Neiztel, Abgehört, 475f.
38. According to Hans Cramer (1896–1968, General der Panzertruppe M 166), there were different calculations about the Russian reserves made by Eberhard Kinzel (1897–1945), chief of Fremde Heere Ost, and Franz Halder (1884–1972), chief of the Generalstab des Heeres; see SRGG 31, 18 May 1943, WO 208/4165, TNA.
39. Against this, David Kahn and Kenneth Strong argue that there was no previous knowledge of the T-34, see David Kahn, Hitler's Spies: German Military Intelligence in World War II, rep. ed. (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2000), 458 and Kenneth Strong, Die Geheimnisträger: Männer im Nachrichtendienst (Wien: Paul Tzolnay Verlag, 1970), 146f.
40. ‘Ich musste dem HITLER einen Vortrag halten über die russische Fertigung. Ich konnte ihm damals melden, dass die Situation so ist, dass damals bereits die Russen einen Ausstoss von monatlich 800 Panzern und gepanzerten Fahrzeugen hätten. Das habe ich in aller Ruhe nachweisen können, auf Grund dieser Agenten-Nachrichten(?) und dem ganzen Zeug. Da ist er dann dort gewesen und hat immer so seinem Bart gekaut und Fingernägel gekaut – das tut er ja immer – ‘A-c-h was – A-c-h- das ist – das kommt ja gar nicht in Frage! Da sagte ich: “Ja, mein FÜHRER, ob es in Frage kommt oder nicht, auf jeden Fall, das sind die Nachrichten.” Wir haben damals einen Ausstoss gehabt von 300’ (General der Panzertruppe M 159); see SRGG 69, 29 May 1943, WO 208/4165, TNA. This statement supports Kahn's result that Hitler was reluctant to accept bad intelligence (Kahn, Hitler's Spies, xi).
41. ‘Größten Unsinn’ (General der Panzertruppe M 159); see SRM 79, 20 November 1942, WO 208/4136, TNA.
42. ‘Ich bin überzeugt davon, den kriegen sie nicht ‘raus’ (Funkgefreiter N 1300); see SRX 1158, 11 October 1942, WO 208/4161, TNA. Even members of Lehr-Regiment Brandenburg believed that ENIGMA was absolutely secure (see SRX 1135, 30 September 1942, WO 208/4161, TNA).
43. For example, the number of possible settings ranges from 1.5 million to billions; see SRX 1202, 29 October 1942, WO 208/4161, TNA and SRN 3479, 27 April 1944, WO 208/4151, TNA.
44. See Hugh Sebag-Montefiore, Enigma: The Battle for the Code (London: Cassell, 2004), 149–65.
45. This is a recurrent topic among the prisoners; see for example SRX 239, 01 April 1941, WO 208/4158, TNA. The frequency of similar statements can be seen as an indicator of successfully conducted interrogations; compare Geck, Dulag Luft, 325–7.
46. ‘Na, bei diesen vielen Ausländern, die sie im Dienst haben, die sind doch so orientiert’ (the speaker could not be identified – possibly von Broich, Cramer, Generalmajor Fritz Krause (1895–1975, M 170) or Kapitän zur See Dr Paul Meixner (1891–1950, N 1680)); see SRGG 220, 12 July 1943, WO 208/4165, TNA.
47. ‘Ich will Ihnen was sagen, was ganz genau funktioniert hat bei denen: “SCHARNHORST” und “GNEISENAU” sind nachmittags im Hafen… und die “DEUTSCHLAND” liegt in BORDEAUX. Nachmittags sind die da hineingeschafft worden, abends sind die Engländer da. Die haben eine Halle getroffen und eine FOCKE-WULF zerstört und die andere beschädigt’ (Leutnant A 804); see SRA 1504, 14 April 1941, WO 208/4123, TNA.
48. Neitzel, Soldaten, 425.
49. ‘Ja, ja, wir wissen jeden Scheiß, den der Tommy funkt’ (Bootsmannsmaat N 1698); see SRN 2009, 25 July 1943, WO 208/4146, TNA.
50. Compare Michael I. Handel, ‘Intelligence and Military Operations’, Intelligence and National Security 5, no. 2 (1990): 2; Anthony Clayton, Forearmed: A History of the Intelligence Corps (London: Brassey's, 1993), xv.
Appendix
(A) Extract: Code Tree of Intelligence Comments
(B) Intelligence as topic
(C) Intelligence aspects
