Acknowledgements
I am grateful to Mr Ralph Erskine for comments on an earlier draft and to Mr Simon Blundell, librarian of the Reform Club, for tracking down some otherwise elusive articles.
Notes
1 Robin Denniston, “Diplomatic Eavesdropping, 1922–1944: A New Source Discovered,” Intelligence and National Security 10, no. 3 (1995): 423–48; Thirty Secret Years: A.G. Denniston’s Work in Signals Intelligence, 1914–1944 (Clifton-upon-Teme: Polperro Heritage Press, 2007).
2 P.W. Filby, “Bletchley Park and Berkeley Street,” Intelligence and National Security 3, no. 2 (1988): 272–84; “Floradora and a Unique Break into One-Time Pad Ciphers,” Intelligence and National Security 10, no. 3 (1995): 408–22.
3 Herbert Romerstein, “Aspects of World War II History Revealed Through ‘ISCOT’ Radio Intercepts,” Journal of Intelligence History 5, no. 1 (2005): 15–28.
4 John Croft, “Reminiscences of GCHQ and GCB 1942–1945,” Intelligence and National Security 13, no. 4 (1998): 133–43.
5 Denniston, “Diplomatic Eavesdropping.”
6 Ibid., 440.
7 Denniston, Thirty Secret Years, 122.
8 Filby, “Floradora and a Unique Break into One-Time Pad Ciphers,” 420.
9 Denniston, Thirty Secret Years, 82. It appears that the problem of machine generated one-time pads was eventually solved by US cryptanalysts assisted by a section at Bletchley Park in 1945. This enabled traffic between Berlin and Tokyo to be read.
10 “Diplomatic intercepts, in Foreign Office jargon, are BJs – short for ‘Black Jumbos’.” Denniston, “Diplomatic Eavesdropping,” 424. Wartime BJs supplied to the Foreign Office increased from 2288 in 1939 to a peak of 14050 in 1943. The National Archives, HW3/162.
11 Romerstein, “Aspects of World War II History,” 28.
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John Croft
John Croft CBE is a graduate of Oxford and London universities. In 1983 he retired as Chief Research Officer and Head of the Research and Planning Unit, Home Office, and as Chairman of the Criminological Scientific Council, Council of Europe.