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Abstract
The end of the Cold War ushered in a new era in which Western intelligence establishments needed to reform and adapt to the new security environment of the twenty-first century. The Israeli foreign intelligence service (Mossad) offers a unique case study of operational and organisational adaptation. During the Cold War the organisation enjoyed many successes, but also some setbacks. However the post-Cold War security environment, which was characterised by reconciliation processes and an expanding variety of asymmetric and non-conventional threats, was a catalyst for reform inside Mossad. The article has two goals: first it will investigate the utility of Amy Zegart’s conceptual framework of intelligence adaptability and internally driven adaptation. Second, it will review Mossad’s efforts to adapt. The article will demonstrate that despite reforms that have taken place over the past two decades, not much progress has been achieved.
ORCID
Tamir Libel 
http://orcid.org/0000-0002-5141-7418
Notes
1 Abram Shulsky and Gary Schmitt, “Intelligence Reform: Beyond the Ames Case,” in U.S. Intelligence at the Crossroads, eds. R. Godson, E. R. May, and G. Schmitt (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1995), 46–7.
2 Walter Jajko, “The Future of Defense Intelligence,” in U.S. Intelligence at the Crossroads, eds. R. Godson, E. R. May, and G. Schmitt (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1995), 215.
3 Calvert Jones, “Intelligence Reform: The Logic of Information Sharing,” Intelligence and National Security 22, no. 3 (2007), “Intelligence Reform,” 397.
4 Geoffrey R. Weller, “The Internal Modernization of Western Intelligence Agencies,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 14, no. 3 (2001): 299.
5 Ibid., 307.
6 Ibid, “The Internal Modernisation,” 299–300.
7 Amy Zegart, Spying Blind - the CIA, the FBI and the Origins of 9/11 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), 4–5.
8 Ibid., II.
9 Ibid., 7.
10 Ibid., 10.
11 Ibid., 16.
12 Ibid., 17.
13 Ibid., 50.
14 Len Scott and R. Gerald Hughes, “Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century: Change and Continuity or Crisis and Transformation?” Intelligence and National Security 24, no. 1 (2009): 7.
15 On the Church Committee and the establishment of standing intelligence oversight committees in Congress, see Loch K. Johnson, “The Church Committee Investigation of 1975 and the Evolution of Modern Intelligence Accountability,” Intelligence and National Security 23, no. 2 (2008): 198–225.
16 Marvin C. Ott, “Partisanship and the Decline of Intelligence Oversight,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 16, no. 1 (2003): 72. For a review of Congress’ activities in the first wave of reforms, see Ernst R. May, “Intelligence: Backing into the Future,” in U.S. Intelligence at the Crossroads eds. R. Godson, E. R. May, and G. Schmitt (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1995), 36–45.
17 Joshua Rovner and Austin Long, “The Perils of Shallow Theory: Intelligence Reform and the 9/11 Commission,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 18, no. 4 (2005): 609–37; William J. Lahneman, “Knowledge-Sharing in the Intelligence Community After 9/11,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 17, no. 4 (2004): 626.
18 The Israeli intelligence community Military Intelligence Directorate (MID), Mossad, Shabak and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Centre for Political Research. However, usually only the first three agencies are involved in the main collection and analysis efforts with the latter being marginalised and often completely ignored.
19 Meirav Arlosoroff, “The Government Has to Decide-security or Welfare,” TheMarker, 9 December 2011 (in Hebrew).
20 The sole exception may be higher appointments in the Mossad, e.g. heads of divisions and major units. See Efraim Halevy, Man in the Shadows (Tel-Aviv: Matar, 2006), 155–156 (in Hebrew); Danny Yatom, The Confident: From Sayeret Matkal to the Mossad (Tel-Aviv: Miskal, 2009), 70–1 (in Hebrew).
21 Thirty years for the archival release of most government documents, 50 years for IDF documents and 70 years for sensitive intelligence-related documents.
22 Ephraim Lapid and Yochi Erlich, “Comet Star Is also a Comet,” Mabat Malam 46, (2006): 8 (in Hebrew); Amir Rappaport, “Shavit: World War Three,” Israel Defense, 9 March 2012 (in Hebrew).
23 Rappoprt, “Shavit.”
24 Lapid and Erlich, “Comet,” 8; Rappaport, “Shavit.”
25 Rapport, “Shavit.”
26 Ronen Bergman, Point of No Return: Israeli Intelligence against Iran and Hizballah (Israel: Kineret-Zmora-Bitan-Dvir, 2007), 215 (in Hebrew).
27 Ibid., 213–14.
28 The unit responsible for consolidating the intelligence items related to terrorism, their integration, assessment and analysis and directing the Mossad’s collection units towards the central terrorism-related targets.
29 Bergman, Point of No Return, 222.
30 Ibid., 234.
31 Ibid., 238.
32 Lapid and Erlich, “Comet,” 9.
33 Rappaport, “Shavit.”
34 Yatom, The Confident, 68.
35 See note 34 above.
36 Ibid., 69.
37 See note 36 above.
38 Ibid., 70.
39 Ibid., 72.
40 Halevy, Man in the Shadows, 151.
41 Ibid., 66.
42 Ibid., 168.
43 Amir Oren, “Billions of words,” Haaretz, 4 September 1998 (in Hebrew).
44 Halevy, Man in the Shadows 151.
45 Ibid., 158.
46 Oren, “Billions.”
47 Amir Rappaport, “Prisoner X Affair: The Imperfect Agent,” Israel Defense, 14 February 2013 (in Hebrew).
48 Halevy, Man in the Shadows, 144.
49 Yossi Melman, “Tamir Prado Appointment to Head of Mossad- Big Shoes, Worthy Feet,” Haaretz, 30 November 2010 (in Hebrew); Yossi Melman, “Front Organizations or the Mossad- This is How We Screwed Iran,” Haaretz, 20 November 2008 (in Hebrew).
50 Melman, “Front organizations.”
51 Ofer Shelah, “The Exodus Generation,” NRG, 16 October 2010 (in Hebrew).
52 Ronen Bergman, “Zero Zero Fracture,” Yediot Acharonot, Weekly Supplement, 26 March 2010 (in Hebrew). See also Gordon Rayner and Martin Evans, “Arrest head of Mossad, Dubai Police chief says,” The Telegraph, 18 February 2010.
53 Anonymous, “Editorial: Turnovers at the Mossad,” Haaretz, 1 December 2010 (in Hebrew).
54 Yossi Melman, “Y leaves, N Joins: Meir Dagan Doubts his Successors Resilience,” Haaretz, 9 June 2011 (in Hebrew).
55 Melman, “Tamir.”
56 Melman, “Y Leaves.”
57 Melman, “Tamir”; Yossi Melman, “Former Deputy Head of Mossad, David Kimchi, Was Buried,” Haaretz, 11 March 2010 (in Hebrew).
58 Rappaport, “Prisoner X”; Amir Rappaport, “IDF Won’t Establish New Formations,” Israel Defense, 16 August 2012 (in Hebrew).
59 Rappaport, “Prisoner X.”
60 Anonymous, “Editorial: Exposure is Crucial for the Mossad,” Haaretz, 31 March 2011 (in Hebrew).
61 Yossi Melman, “Mossad Got Off with the State Comptroller Audit,” Haaretz, 30 March 2011 (in Hebrew).
62 The respective legal advisor’s appointment itself came as a result of growing openness of the Mossad for legal oversight. She was the first legal advisor of the Mossad who did not grow in the agency. She arrived to the Mossad in 2002 (close to Dagan’s appointment) after working as a junior advisor at the central district of the Attorney General. She dealt mainly with labour issues and worked on several cases of labour conflicts within the Mossad and financial sues of employees. This loose familiarity resulted in her final appointment. She got the rank of Head of Unit and took part from time to time in the Forum of Head of Divisions and Units – the agency’s highest organisation. In her position she represented the agency in most of the negotiations related to legal issues with external bodies. She was in regular contact with the Ministry of Justice and the Attorney General and appeared in court in cases of misbehaving employees or requests of media outlets to leave bans on publications decrees. See Yossi Melman, “What is the Meaning of the Fierce Recent Dispute Between Meir Dagan and Mossad’s Legal Advisor?” Haaretz, 21 October 2010 (in Hebrew).
63 Ibid.
64 Rappaport, “IDF.”
65 Amir Rappaport, “Cyber is an integral dimension of warfare,” Israel Defense, 21 March 2013 (in Hebrew).
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Tamir Libel
Dr Tamir Libel is a visiting scholar in the Department of Political Science at the University of Trier and a non-resident fellow at the Centre for War Studies, University College Dublin. His book European Military Culture and Security Governance: Soldiers, Scholars and National Defence Universities will be published by Routledge in 2016.