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ABSTRACT
This essay aims at establishing whether the failure of the intelligence reports that led to the Iraqi War is to blame on flaws in the analysis or on the alleged politicisation. It will do so by examining three possible classes of explanations for the failure. Firstly, it will analyse structural features of the UK and US Intelligence Communities, explaining how the organisation can affect the accuracy of the assessments. Secondly, it will focus on the analytical breakdowns occurred in the 2002 process of assessment. Thirdly, it will address the issue of politicisation, in both its forms of political pressure and political representation of the perceived truth. Finally, it will argue that, although the analysis was undoubtedly flawed, the politicisation played a major role in the failure of the 2002 assessments.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1 Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace, 268–273.
2 Ibidem, 269.
3 Ibidem.
4 Davies, Intelligence & Government in Britain and the United States, 85.
5 Jones, Report on leaving the Ministry of Defence, 156.
6 Davies, Intelligence & Government in Britain and the United States, 86.
7 Turner, Why Secret Intelligence Fails, 46.
8 Bradford “American Exceptionalism ad American Intelligence”.
9 Davies, “Intelligence Culture and Intelligence Failure,” 498.
10 Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War, 279.
11 Davies, Intelligence & Government in Britain and the United States, 91.
12 Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War, 275–277.
13 Jervis, “Reports, Politics, and Intelligence Failures,” 20–21.
14 Davies, “Intelligence Culture and Intelligence Failure,” 499.
15 Turner, Why Secret Intelligence Fails, 46.
16 Davies, “Intelligence Culture and Intelligence Failure in Britain and the United States”, 500.
17 Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War, 279.
18 Janis, Grouthinking, 174–175.
19 Davis, “After The Butler Report: time to take on the group think in Washington and London”, British American Security Information Council, http://www.basicint.org/sites/default/files/PUB010704.pdf, Accessed March 8.
20 Butler, Review Of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction, 16.
21 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Report On The US Intelligence Community’s Prewar, 18.
22 Aldrich, “Whitehall and the Iraq War,” 77.
23 SSCI, 18.
24 Jervis, “Reports, Politics, and Intelligence Failures,” 21.
25 Ibidem, 22.
26 SSCI, 21.
27 Ibidem, 23.
28 “Analytic Culture In The U.S. Intelligence Community – Chapter Two”, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/analytic-culture-in-the-u-s-intelligence-community/chapter_2_research.htm, Accessed March 9.
29 SSCI, 21.
30 Ibidem, 14–15.
31 Butler, Lord, 112.
32 Ibidem.
33 Jervis, “Reports, Politics, and Intelligence Failures,”, 29.
34 SSCI, 14.
35 Ibidem, 22.
36 Ibidem, 16.
37 Butler, Lord, 114.
38 Foreign Affairs Committee, The Decision to go to War in Iraq, 32.
39 SSCI, 24.
40 Jervis, “Reports, Politics, and Intelligence,” 29.
41 Butler, Lord, 108.
42 Russell, “A Weak Pillar for American National Security,” 469.
43 U.S. Congress, Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), 84.
44 Ibidem, 88.
45 Jervis, “Reports, Politics, and Intelligence,” 29.
46 WMD, 128.
47 SSCI, 26.
48 Ibidem, 265–266.
49 WMD, 122.
50 Ibidem, 125.
51 Ibidem, 194.
52 Ibidem, 4.
53 Butler, Lord, 111–113.
54 Betts, “Two Faces of Intelligence Failure,” 598.
55 Jervis, “Reports, Politics, and Intelligence,” 14–48.
56 Russell, “A Weak Pillar for American National Security”, 475.
57 ”Intelligence & Analysis in Iraq: issues for the Intelligence Community,” CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001245667.pdf, Accessed March 11.
58 Ibidem.
59 Gates, “Guarding Against Politicization,” CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/volume-36-number-1/pdf/v36i1a01p.pdf, Accessed March 12, 6.
60 Council of Foreign Relations, Making Intelligence Smarter, 5.
61 Davis, “Improving CIA Analytic Performance.”
62 Lowenthal, Intelligence: from Secrets to Policy, 189.
63 Gates, “Guarding Against Politicization,” 6–13.
64 Betts, “Politicization of Intelligence,” 59.
65 Hastedt, “The Politics of Intelligence and the Politicization of Intelligence,” 10.
66 Treverton, Intelligence for an Age of Terror, cited in Jason, “The Recent Past and Future of Intelligence Politicization,” World Politics Review, 2 February 2009, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.
aspx?id¼3237, Accessed February 14.
67 Goodman, “The CIA and the perils of politicization,” Center for International Policy, https://www.ciponline.org/images/uploads/publications/CIAPerils.pdf, Accessed March 13.
68 Hastedt, “The Politics of Intelligence and the Politicization of Intelligence,” 5.
69 Rovner, Fixing the Facts 18–35. [Other pathologies include ‘excessive harmony’ and ‘neglect’].
70 Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails, 133.
71 Rovner, Fixing the Facts, 18–35.
72 Lucas, “Recognising Politicization,” 222–227.
73 Turner, Why Secret Intelligence Fails, 41–55.
74 Bar-Jospeh, “The Politicization of Intelligence,” 361.
75 Ibidem, 364.
76 Butler, Lord, 110.
77 SSCI, 273.
78 WMD, 188–194.
79 Kettel, “Who’s Afraid of Saddam Hussein?” 407–410.
80 Glees, and Davies, “Intelligence, Iraq and the limits of legislative accountability during political crisis,” 866.
81 Ibidem, 866–867.
82 Pillar, “Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq,” Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iraq/2006–03-01/intelligence-policyand-war-iraq, Accessed February 14.
83 Ibidem.
84 Ibidem.
85 Ibidem.
86 Bar-Jospeh, “The Politicization of Intelligence,” 361.
87 Bar-Jospeh, “The Politicization of Intelligence,” 362.
88 Hastedt, “Public Intelligence,” 420–428.
89 Gailmard, & Patty, “Stovepiping.” https://www.ocf.berkeley.edu/~gailmard/stovepiping12.pdf, Accessed March 16.
90 Fitzgerald, & Lebow, “Iraq: the Mother of All Intelligence Failures,” 895.
91 Ibidem, 895–896.
92 Hastedt, “Public Intelligence,” 434.
93 Butler, Lord, 125.
94 Fitzgerald, & Lebow, “Iraq: the Mother of All Intelligence Failures,” 900.
95 Butler, Lord, 110.
96 Aldrich, “Whitehall and the Iraq War,” 82.
97 Hastedt, “Public Intelligence,” 432.
98 Fitzgerald, & Lebow, “Iraq: the Mother of All Intelligence Failures,” 885.
99 Ibidem, 889.
100 Pillar, “Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq.”
101 Ibidem.
102 Buter, Lord. 113.
103 Chilcot, Sir John, The Iraq Inquiry (London: House of Commons, 2016), 605.
104 Ibidem, 605–611.
105 Ibidem, 6.
106 “Anger over “secret Iraq inquiry””, BBC, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/8102203.stm, accessed September 30.
107 Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War, 279.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Giovanni Coletta
Giovanni Coletta moved to London from Florence. He studied International Relations at the University of Florence, where he completed his Bachelor’s Degree, and achieved a Master’s Degree in Intelligence & Security Studies at Brunel University London. Other than working as geopolitical and risk analyst, he is passionate about intelligence, books, cinema, music, Cuba and northern landscapes. He speaks Italian, English, Spanish and Russian.