Critical (Realist) Reflection on Policy and Management Research in Sport, Tourism and Sports Tourism

Abstract

The paper revisits the ontological and epistemological grounding of economic, social science and management research in sport, tourism and sports tourism that has, as its motivation, a desire to inform policy and management. To inform policy and management requires an implicit assumption about the generality of insights and, moreover, access to enduring phenomena upon which policy levers can operate and upon which management decisions can be based. Yet these assumptions are not typically made transparent in applied work emanating from an economic or management perspective and much social science research rejects the concepts. In what sense, therefore, can research inform policy or management advice, or can policy and management failures be understood? This paper argues that critical realism can provide the philosophical framework from within which answers to these questions can be offered. Moreover, critical realism imposes some clear guidelines upon the nature of research design. As well as research design, the paper revisits concepts of cause, including agency and emergence. The arguments are illustrated with reference to applied research into sports tourism.

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the British Philosophy of Sport Association Conference, 12–14 May 2005, Louisa Centre Stanley County Durham. I am grateful for comments on the paper from participants at this conference and for reviewer's comments.

Notes

1. http://www.qaa.ac.uk/academicinfrastructure/benchmark/honours/hospitality.asp (accessed 25 April 2005).

2. These arguments draw heavily on previously published researched that explore these issues in the context of economics and Tourism and Hospitality (Downward, 2003; Downward & Mearman, 2004a). This paper is an attempt to extend these ideas to cover sports and their combination to tourism.

3. The implication of the current discussion for this broader context, as well as reflective practice in the action-based research of sports education and pedagogy is discussed in Downward (2005).

4. Discussion of the broader “studies” literature would involve encapsulating non-realist, constructivist accounts. Elements of this are discussed below. For further discussion see Downward & Mearman (2004a).

5. An important feature of realism is a commitment to causal explanation.

6. This approach arguably began in economics (see Friedman, 1953), with an emphasis upon prediction. There is an echo of positivism in the approach, in which data provides the arbiter in assessing the usefulness of theories. At the very least the approach is inductive, yet this does not imply necessarily a quest for objective truth.

7. Interactionism or constructivism so defined embraces a wide range of specific methods, such as content analysis, discourse analysis, grounded theory, ethnography as well as methodological positions including postmodernism, post-structuralism, hermeneutics and phenomenology. But, in general interactionism recognises hermeneutic concerns that social phenomena are intrinsically meaningful; that meanings must be understood; and that the interpretation of an object or event is affected by its context (Sayer, 1992, 2000).

8. For a discussion of the changing conception of positivism in sociology see Halfpenny (1982). For a discussion in economics see Walters & Young (2001).

9. Lakatos's (1970) concept of scientific research programmes in which sophisticated falsification is required in the absence of crucial experiments is, in this regard, an extension of detail and aspiration than difference in logical position.

10. The deductive–nomological and inductive–statistical models of Carl Hempel (1965) can be viewed likewise as extensions of a simplistic view of positivism.

11. In social science the researcher shares the hermeneutic moment of the objects of study Bhaskar (1978). Indeed, Sayer (2000) argues that the social researcher operates in a double hermeneutic of both the scientific and objects-of-study communities. Logically speaking, a triple hermeneutic applies to policymakers synthesising and acting upon research findings.

12. Generality here refers to essential constituents rather than, say, statistical generalisation.

13. One can view statistical induction as a process of “hypothetical” triangulation. Here validity is sought from hypothetical repeated sampling, with ontological assumptions about the nature of probabilities being required to facilitate this. The usual arguments presented are that probabilities can act as summary indicators of the outcomes of complex covariation not specifically of interest to a particular study or policy outcome, for example as the errors of a regression model, or they can be viewed as a literal feature of reality (independently of their purported objectivity or subjectivity). It is clear that such a limited view of triangulation or validity requires the persistence of the ontological closure required to define probabilities. Whilst this might be useful as a vehicle for generating possible scenarios, for example if one argues that current structures persist, clearly it implies a potentially fragile basis, in isolation, for inferences outside such conditions and, in particular if one rejects the concept of universal relationships because of the likelihood of changes to structures and behaviours in an open system.

14. It is worth noting at this point that there is a literature addressing concern with the conceptual measurement of economic impacts (see Crompton, 1995, 2004; Hudson, 2001). These papers focus on the technicalities of arithmetic and what to include or exclude in a calculation of the multiplier effect stemming from initial direct spending activity, as was the case in the study above. The issue being discussed in this paper concerns the logically prior question of what constitutes the nature of visitation or use of a resource, in other words the structure of demand. It is clear that a similar exercise should apply to the derived demands that form the basis of multiplier effects.