Managing a Corrupted Sporting System: The Governance of Professional Baseball in Taiwan and the Gambling Scandal of 1997

Abstract

This paper employs approaches drawn from governance theory and strategic relations analysis in an empirical evaluation of the behaviour of stakeholders in the governance of the professional baseball system in Taiwan. The paper highlights the significance of political clientelism as a key characteristic of the strategic environment which affords criminal interests space to pursue illicit activities, and evaluates the responses of stakeholders in the governance system. Four principal conclusions are as follows: first that this case illustrates the heuristic weaknesses of traditional, hierarchical models of governance; second, it demonstrates how political clientelism, as a strategic context, constrains and/or facilitates the choices available to stakeholders; third, it points to evidence that political clientelism may be waning in some respects as Taiwan's political system adopts greater pluralism; finally the case illustrates how the outcome of one set of struggles (the gambling crisis) shapes the context for subsequent governance decisions.