The Second Lebanon War: Democratic Lessons Imperfectly Applied

Abstract

There is next to consensus that the second 2006 Israeli war in Lebanon was a hasty military adventure that ended in failure. This article takes a different view. Relying on recently published testimonies and accounts, it is argued that the decision to go to war was calculated and grounded in widely shared assumptions that Israel's deteriorating deterrence posture required an offensive booster. After mapping Israeli failures, this article argues that Israeli military performance should be attributed to the influence of domestic democratic politics on the formation of military strategy, more so than to battlefield incompetence. The article concludes by suggesting that, in fact, the Israeli war demonstrated a positive if imperfect adjustment of strategy to domestic constraints. The indications of democratic learning suggest that future asymmetric conflicts may end differently than expected for the enemies of democracies who poorly understand democratic power and politics.

Keywords:

• Asymmetric Conflict
• Democratic Impact
• Deterrence
• Battlefield Efficiency
• Air Power
• Ground Campaign
• Casualty

INTRODUCTION

At first blush, the 2006 Summer War between Israel and Hezbollah seems to further support a troubling pattern of democratic failure in asymmetric conflicts. Yet again, a powerful Western democracy emerges out of violent asymmetric conflict with a militarily inferior foe bruised and frustrated; all, in spite of familiarity with its enemy and battlefield, preparation for the specific conflict, and favorable international conditions.

Why did Israel fail? How significant are its failures? What would be the consequences for similar future wars? Theories of war failure and asymmetric conflict, as well as first accounts of the Second Lebanon war, offer a number of possible answers. Organizational theories would point to inherent problems in the structure and command of the Israeli Defence Force (IDF). Theories of asymmetric conflict would focus on the improper strategy and doctrine. Theories of decision-making would attribute failure to the personality and conduct of leading individuals. Civil-military relations and institutional theories would focus on the peculiar structure of civil-military relations in Israel, and in particular the central and seemingly unchallenged position of the IDF in the national security decision-making process in Israel. ¹

While all theories are likely to explain important pieces of the puzzle and offer valuable lessons, none is capable of dealing with the most fundamental reason for the failure of Israel. Using a domestic departure point, this article argues that the main reason for Israel's disappointing performance is its democratic structure, though the story does not end there. The IDF conduct in Lebanon was not simply another expression of inefficient democratic war-fighting, but paradoxically rather more so an expression of strategic learning and adjustment to domestic constraints. In brief, the Israeli strategy and performance in war, even though deficient, should not be attributed to generals “fighting the last war,” but rather to the improper application of essentially correct lessons.

The argument has important consequences. Israel, and with it other democracies, are not out of the asymmetric strategic game, but rather in the midst of a learning process. Hence, future democratic wars may end differently for foes that seem to be infatuated by the present outcomes of asymmetric conflicts. Specifically, while Hezbollah and its patrons boast confident about their resilience, they maybe in for a surprise, if they take their own rhetoric too seriously. By way of extrapolation, the next democratic war, or that after, is likely to involve sobering experiences for the weak challengers of powerful democracies. Democracies, Israel included, are in the process of closing the inefficiency gap.

This article proceeds in the following order. The first section deals with the war objectives of Israel, and in particular deterrence, as it's the supreme motivation. The second section assesses the scope of the Israeli failure. The third section briefly discusses proximate and structural causes of democratic failures in asymmetric conflicts and the lessons democracies gained from the latter. The fourth section focuses on the “democratic impact” on Israel's war strategy in Lebanon. Much of this section is devoted to demonstrating how democratic considerations constrained and shaped the IDF strategic choices and battle conduct. In the conclusion the article briefly recasts the argument and findings and explains their implications.

Before getting to substance, however, a key methodological issue must be addressed. Readers may object to the very idea of an analysis of a recent and hence presumably empirically opaque event. Fortunately, this is not exactly the case. What used to be a major obstacle for research of “contemporary” events—sparse evidence—has been considerably reduced in some cases. Democratic life influences not just war, but also the capacity to study it early. Indeed, good journalistic accounts of the Second Lebanon War are already available and so are initial analyses by security experts and academics. ² On top of all these studies, an Israeli Inquiry Committee, headed by a former President of the Tel Aviv District Court (and at one time acting Supreme Court Justice)—henceforward the Vinograd Committee—has produced an interim report and testimonies that form a unique un-adulterated insight into the Israeli decision making process during the war. ³ Public opinion polls and media coverage have added a further empirical layer. In sum, available data already makes the Second Lebanon War, research-enabled.

Israeli War Objectives and Deterrence Motivation

Perhaps surprisingly, and against prevailing arguments, the 2006 Israeli war objectives were rather clearly defined. On the fifth day of war, Prime Minister Olmert told the Israeli Parliament, the Knesset, that Israel set out to:

1. return the kidnapped soldiers through a process that will not encourage further kidnapping;

2. eject Hezbollah from the northern border of Israel and enforce UN resolution 1559;

3. deploy the Lebanese army on the border;

4. arrive at a complete cease fire; and

5. rid Israel of the Hezbollah missiles and rockets threat. ⁴

Obviously, these objectives, which were articulated for public consumption, reflected a blend of both political and strategic considerations. As such, they did not include a sense of hierarchy, they were couched in the immediate state of affairs, and hence they ignored the deepest Israeli motivation for action, which in fact surfaced long before the war.

The correct point of departure for discussing Israel's objective, thus, should be that fundamentally the war and the way it started did not catch Israel by surprise. ⁵ The Israeli leadership knew well that Hezbollah deployment on the border contained the seeds of conflagration, as much as they knew that Hezbollah's militant position against Israel was largely an instrument of its domestic and international politics. For years the Hezbollah built its claim for legitimacy as an arm-bearing militia on the argument that it alone could defend Lebanon against Israel. Hezbollah's status among the Shiites, in Lebanon in general, on the “Arab street,” and in Damascus and Teheran largely depended on its defiant anti-Israeli image. In a sense, Israel became its punching bag and a hostage of its domestic calculations, and according to the Israeli defence establishment, also of those of its Iranian patron and Syrian ally. ⁶

As if to make a war all the more likely, Israel was in no position to endlessly accept Hezbollah's periodic provocations. When in 2000 the IDF unilaterally and abruptly retreated from Lebanon, the government promised its citizens, as well as its enemies, that any violation of Israeli sovereignty would be swiftly dealt with. Yet, Hezbollah's occasional attacks after the retreat were not met with the promised resolve or overwhelming force. Successive Israeli governments endorsed an essentially defensive posture of containment because the country's attention and energy were devoted to the escalating conflict in the Palestinian territories and because rebuilding normal life in the Northern region required stability. ⁷

In the longer run, however, the periodic Hezbollah provocations made containment untenable. At the heart of the problem was the fact that Hezbollah had no state, nor international-responsibility, whereas Israel had both. As a result, the Hezbollah assessed that it could defy Israel at will. Israel, on the other hand, was torn between the strategic logic of retaliation and credibility (both at home and abroad), and its interests in avoiding a second front. Its leadership hence searched for maintenance leverages. Until early 2005, Syrian forces in Lebanon and Lebanese infrastructure seemed to meet the Israeli qualifications. ⁸ However, in April 2005, following the Lebanese and international outcry over the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, Syria was forced out of Lebanon, and Israel was instantly deprived of its main leverage—a punishable state authority in Lebanon.

Indeed, once the Syrians left Lebanon, confrontation with the Hezbollah largely became a matter of time. Israeli intelligence did not miss the point and promptly warned the IDF command and the government of a future Hezbollah provocation. ⁹ In fact, Nasrallah also left little room for ambiguity as he indicated clearly that his organization would continue to aspire to kidnap Israeli soldiers. ¹⁰ The IDF, in turn, seriously considered this threat. The General Staff and the Northern Command discussed how to minimize the risk of kidnapping, prepared a protocol for a kidnap event, and planned a retaliatory response in case the preventive measures failed. At the same time, the Israeli defence establishment and political elite assessed that a major confrontation was merely a matter of time and that it was likely to start following a successful kidnapping attempt. ¹¹

Against this background, the Israeli leadership established its key war objective. As the IDF Chief of the General Staff (CGS), Halutz, and Prime Minister Olmert found Israel's hostage position on the Lebanese border unacceptable (much as did one of his predecessors), they considered a Hezbollah provocation as an opportunity to radically alter “the rules of the game” rather than simply a matter calling for retaliation. ¹² It is this state of mind which was prevalent in Israel that sheds light on the primary Israeli objective of the Second Lebanon war: Israel was after restoring its deterrence. ¹³

The primacy of deterrence should not come as a surprise. The democratic preference for less confrontational strategies, primarily containment and deterrence, was explained in a series of seminal works by Azar Gat. ¹⁴ In a sense, students of Israeli security merely confirm the relevance of Gat's broad insight in one extreme case. ¹⁵ Israel has made deterrence a central pillar of its national security strategy and its first line of defence not in spite of, but rather due to its challenging threat environment. Moreover, it did so, at all levels—against lesser “current security” threats, against fundamental conventional security threats, and all the way up against existential unconventional threats.

The nature of the combustible situation in the north and Israel's main war objective become ever clearer in the light of its emphasis on deterrence. The point is that the Hezbollah threat involved a number of levels of Israeli deterrence. First, at a current security level, Israeli leaders wished to deter Hezbollah from transgressing the border and more specifically avoid kidnapping soldiers. This was a main reason why six years earlier (October 7, 2000), CGS Mofaz recommended a particularly fierce retaliation as response to Hezbollah's kidnapping of three IDF soldiers. ¹⁶ Second, the Israeli leaders feared that a failure to deter Hezbollah would embolden the Palestinian militants in the Territories. Last, they feared that a Hezbollah success would erode Israeli general deterrence vis-à-vis Arab states, and in particular, Syria. The fact that Hezbollah was considered in the Arab world as responsible for the expulsion of the IDF from Lebanon in 2000, and Nasrallah's “spider web” thesis (on Israel's presumed social frailty) only made these deterrence considerations more prominent.

On top of these concerns, Israeli decision makers were influenced by their conceptualization of the idea of cumulative deterrence, ¹⁷ which essentially suggested that without periodic proofs of resolve through tough actions, or boosters, deterrence was destined to erode dangerously. According to the IDF former head of intelligence, General Amos Malka, “after deterrence is made, it needs to be maintained [particularly] in the Middle East” and hence “in [Israel's] efforts to recast deterrence, [it] will have to go through deeds … statements alone will not create deterrence. Deeds, that is, events in which deterrence will be tested and the resolve to uphold it will be tested.” ¹⁸

When Hezbollah attacked on July 12, 2006, the notions of interdependence between deterrence levels, cumulative deterrence, deterrence erosion, and boosters, all converged. For the Israeli leadership, the daring successful Hezbollah operation (coming after a number of failed attempts) suggested that deterrence was at low ebb. Worse, the operation followed a similarly daring and successful operation by Palestinian militants near Gaza, only seventeen days earlier. The perceived need for an immediate deterrence booster became almost self-evident. Halutz apparently told the Defence Minister, Peretz, that “[this was] a flagrant injury of Israeli sovereignty [and hence] we must restore our deterrence that was damaged by the [Gaza] kidnapping, and was now set back further.” ¹⁹ Minister Ramon thought that “if we do not (act immediately with disproportional force to the Hezbollah challenge), it would be detrimental for Israeli deterrence, and … [it] would be eventually translated also to an existential threat. It would be translated in Iran, it would be translated everywhere … ” ²⁰ And, Minister Avi Dichter, former head of the General Security Service (GSS), testified in the Vinograd Committee, that:

It is with good reasons that I started my account [on the July 12 Government meeting] with the story of the [Gaza] kidnapping. Because, with this load we all arrived, I can at least testify about myself, [about] a state of realization that we have lost a very significant component of deterrence … it made it a whole lot easier to vote for [the strong response] … ²¹

Deterrence calculations, hence, were the prime motivation behind the Israeli disproportional response to the Hezbollah challenge. Gone was Israel's defensive posture, gone was the local containment policy, and gone was the “let the (Hezbollah) rockets corrode” philosophy of the previous CGS, Yaalon. ²² Most decision makers, with Halutz and Olmert in the lead, were in favor of the restoration of deterrence through “disproportional” response. On day one of the war, in a discussion in the Seniors’ Forum (of Security Officials), Halutz submitted that his definition of the campaign objective was “closer to the utility definition of the Head of Operations, [that is] restoring Israeli deterrence.” ²³ He was only “closer,” probably because deterrence, once restored, was for him more than an objective in and of itself. Or, as he explained a bit later that same day, in a meeting with Peretz, “[Israel] will have to take a few very aggressive actions in order to establish a new pattern of rules of the game.” ²⁴ For a third time that day, Halutz presented the deterrence cause, this time with reference to the booster logic, in the government meeting. “Israeli deterrence” he submitted, “will not be upheld just because they (the enemies) think that we possess such or other things. Even if it is true that we have [these] it does not play out on the ground … the fact is that things [enemy aggressions] happen.” ²⁵ To drive the point further, Olmert concluded this meeting by stating that “Israel's resolve” was being tested and that “such a price tag must be defined, that no one would wish to mess up with [Israel].” ²⁶ He then added a warning that Hezbollah was expected to act in return against the Israeli civil rear. ²⁷

Olmert may not have had to add his warning. No one in the meeting, or within the IDF command, had any illusions. The cost of changing the rules of the game through disproportional Israeli response was clear to all: a barrage of Hezbollah rockets. In fact, a number of ministers and officers thought that absorbing rocket attacks on the Israeli civil rear actually served the purpose of restoring Israeli deterrence. Minister Herzog suggested to the Vinograd Committee, that the war was in large measure a contest that demonstrated Israel's resolve and readiness to fight in spite of threats and pain. ²⁸ Whereas retired General Malka (who favored a rather limited “punitive” strike that did not involve radical change of the rules of the game), nevertheless supported a “breaking of the thesis that the state of Israel [was] not ready to take actions that could [result] in damage to its citizens, and is not ready to sacrifice citizens for strategic objective, which is, incidentally, the [Nasrallah] spider web thesis.” ²⁹ Months after the war, Defence Minister Peretz defined the challenge and needed action in even sharper terms:

What Israel had to prove to Hezbollah, was that the fact that they could launch rockets to Israel did not paralyse us … this was the strategic problem. Hezbollah knew that it held Israel by the throat. It knew that Israel would not dare. It assessed that no Israeli leadership would dare starting a confrontation that brings the launching of Katyoosha rockets on the rear. We had to break this equation. ³⁰

In summary, translated to the logic of motivation theory and the critics of deterrence theory, ³¹ Israel was acting aggressively out of a sense of vulnerability. More specifically, though Israel was acting for a variety of reasons, the one most prominent and of the deepest roots, was the acute sense among Israeli decision makers that deterrence has been dangerously eroding for quite some time. In their mind, Israel's first line of defence, which was designed to deal with various levels of the fundamental asymmetry of its relations with the Arab world, needed a quick and resolute fix; i.e. an immediate booster.

The Degree of Israeli Failure in Lebanon

Although ostensibly obvious, it is not trivial to define precisely in what and to what extent did Israel fail in the Lebanon war. Compounding the problem of the slippery nature of failure (and success) are the gaps between the military and political realms, between outcomes and consequences, and between the observed and the perceived. The military and political outcomes of war can diverge, their consequences can contradict their outcomes, and they are often a matter of perception as much as a concrete matter for the protagonists and onlookers. One way to overcome this complexity and simplify the assessment of failure in the 2006 war would be to start the discussion by asking whether and to what degree were the Israeli objectives achieved?

As noted, the Israeli war objectives had both military and political dimensions. The most important strategic objectives were to restore Israeli deterrence and “change the rules of the game” in the north. The immediate military and political objectives, as defined for public consumption, were articulated in Olmert's first address to the Knesset. Finally, the operational objectives of the military can be teased out of Halutz's July 17 analysis in the Knesset's Foreign Relations and Security Committee. According to Halutz, the parameters of military success were indicated by “the scope of rocket launching … Second: on who and on what [in Israel the Hezbollah] shoots—i.e., at what distance they are from the [international border] line … [third] killing Hezbollah members, hitting these terrorists … Fourth … critical damage to their strategic system … the long range rockets” ³²

At least as far as the operational dimension is concerned, the IDF campaign can be assessed fairly easily against the Halutz criteria. First, during a period of 33 days, some 4,000 rockets hit Israel, 44 civilians died, and an assessed population of some 200,000 civilians was dislocated from the northern villages and towns of Israel, including from the largest regional city of Haifa. ³³ No Israeli military measure ever reduced the Hezbollah capacity to attack its civil rear, nor limit the territory subject to the rocket attacks. ³⁴ In fact, never was the Israeli population exposed to such a long and uninterrupted attack from across its borders, lost so much property, or dislocated on such a scale from such a widespread territory since 1948. ³⁵ The first and second Halutz criteria were not met. The IDF failed to reduce the scope of rocket attacks, reduce their range and limit the target area, or prevent civil and material losses.

As far as Hezbollah losses are concerned, the IDF had probably taken a heavy toll on the organization fighting force. The IDF intelligence claimed that it had the name of over two hundred dead enemy casualties, and that overall, Hezbollah may have lost as many as 400, or possibly even 600–800, warriors. ³⁶ It is reasonable to assume, considering the death toll of past encounters between superior Western armies and insurgency forces, as well as anecdotal accounts of close range encounters in the Second Lebanon War, that the IDF was not far off the mark. Israel lost in the war 119 soldiers and hence the kill ratio was probably 3:1 or 4:1 in its favor. Yet, all that may be of limited consequence. At the end of the day, the Hezbollah jealously guarded its casualty numbers and the IDF did not produce any significant number of enemy bodies or captives, or indications of successful decapitation. In brief, even if the IDF had a favorable kill ratio that indicated “success” by Halutz third criteria, it failed in the world that counts in this respect, the one of images and perceptions.

Thus, of Halutz's four operational criteria, only the last—the elimination of the “strategic” threat of the more powerful longer range rockets—was met. On day one of the war, based on a long and meticulous intelligence collection effort, the IAF launched operation Specific Gravity against the dispersed long range rockets of Hezbollah, destroying most almost faultlessly. ³⁷ Still, the tally remains one objective achieved out of four. Halutz himself admitted that “with the means available to us, we could have achieved much more, had we been more … resolved, more initiating, more responsible.” ³⁸ Words that are all the more credible in the light of the vastly favorable balance of material power Israel enjoyed and its massive use of firepower.

Indeed, Israeli officers and politicians pretty much accepted the scope of the operational failures. When a Colonel from the IAF Planning Department was asked whether the war was won or whether it was lost, he answered: “it is a question with no clear-cut answer, but certainly it would be wrong to ignore the elements of loss … at the end of the day even if it is a victory, it does not smell like the victories we are used to … ”. ³⁹ Minister Itzhak Herzog was less lenient. He told the Vinograd Committee, that the IDF simply “did not deliver the goods,” at least as far as ground operation was concerned. ⁴⁰

Perhaps because the IDF performance, particularly on land, was clearly lacking, one additional dimension of operational failure remained unnoticed: the inability of the IDF to meet its own timetable, a matter that had political consequences. Explained in other terms, the IDF not only did not quite deliver the goods, but also achieved whatever it did in a belated manner. In retrospect, of all the operational failures of the IDF, this was probably the second most significant after the IDF's inability to protect the Israeli civil rear from Hezbollah's rockets.

There is some dispute in Israel concerning the intended length of the war. ⁴¹ But, there is no dispute that it was dragged beyond anyone's expectation. According to General Eisenkot, the Head of the IDF Division of Operations, the war was planned to last 4–6 days, but got out of hand. ⁴² Olmert and Halutz, however, seem to have entertained a longer time frame. A day into the war (July 13) Halutz assessed that Israel “was far away from the end” in part, because “Israel has no interest that it would end soon.” ⁴³ Two days later (July 15), the General Staff planning team, led by Halutz, converged on an estimate that the objectives would be achieved within about two weeks. ⁴⁴ Defence Minister Peretz thought that at most, the campaign would last “10 days to two weeks … [because] the international community would not provide [Israel] with an extended window of time.” ⁴⁵ In short, no one in Israel contemplated a full month campaign. Indeed, Halutz honestly admitted that “till the last day I did not know … that it will drag for 33 days,” ⁴⁶ and that “33 days [of rocket attacks on civilians] is a longer period than it should have been; unequivocally. I accept that, and I say that at the end of the day, it is the key non-achievement, or the key failure.” ⁴⁷

Operational military failures aside, the most important issue remains whether the main strategic objectives of the war were achieved—i.e., whether Israeli deterrence was restored and whether the rules of the game have changed. On these points, the answer is far less clear than on the operational dimension, and indeed opinions diverge. ⁴⁸ Among other things, it is harder to answer, because much is to be assessed in the perceptual domain which is currently still opaque, and as the time lapsing since the end of the war is rather short. Nevertheless, a preliminary assessment can be offered.

On the one hand, the war was not deprived of achievements in the context of deterrence and the “rules of the game.” Key issues to consider would be post-war perceptions of resolve, credibility, cost and risk, and capabilities. ⁴⁹ In this respect, Israeli threats proved more credible and the leadership more resolved than before the war. A significant cost was imposed on the Hezbollah, which was not limited to the heavy loss of warriors and other assets. ⁵⁰ The organization was relentlessly bombed in its prime sanctuary, the Dahya quarter of Beirut. Its status among some Shiites and much more so other minorities in Lebanon was damaged. Its image as a defender of Lebanon gave way to one of a radical player who irresponsibly breeds misery rather than pride. Lebanese minorities and Sunni Arab states pretty much stood idly by almost encouraging Israel, as its forces hit Hezbollah hard. The organization lost its border deployment, which had permitted it to hold Israel by the throat. Unwanted international forces were deployed on the border and deeper inside the south of Lebanon. Hezbollah went semi-underground in the south and its leaders in Beirut still stay away from the limelight as if they are haunted by fear of Israeli decapitation. In some senses, the rules of the game were changed. As an early indication of the change, in the days immediately following the war, IDF forces killed a few Hezbollah warriors, yet the organization avoided any retaliation. Most significantly, Nasrallah himself admitted in a late August 2006 interview to the Lebanese network New TV that had he anticipated the scope of the Israeli reaction, he would have not ordered the kidnapping operation.

On the other hand, the war may have also eroded other components of Israeli deterrence. Clearly, the capacity of Hezbollah to withstand the IDF offensive, bleed it, drag the war beyond any expectation, and launch rockets against the Israeli rear until the very last day of war, have tarnished the reputation of the IDF. Hence, while the “political resolve” and “punishment” components of Israeli deterrence may have been boosted, the capabilities part of “credibility” was somewhat eroded. For one, Shimon Peres suggested that the war ended with a feeling “that Israel is not what it always used to be, not brilliant, not surprising, not creative … [it] lost deterrence power vis-à-vis the Arabs, [a matter] which is evident in signs of delegitimation of Israeli's [right to] exist” ⁵¹ Minister Ramon was more critical. “The central problem [created by the war outcomes],” he explained, “is not an objective problem, but rather how we are perceived. Israeli deterrence power in the eyes of those surrounding us, and the rest of the world was damaged … ” ⁵²

Last, the humbling war experience did not skip the Israeli public. It lost some confidence—like it did in the post 1973 war, though on a far smaller scale. All in all, the Israelis merely arrived at similar conclusions as their leaders. A relative majority thought that the war ended in a draw, and equally smaller portions of Israelis believed that either side won. ⁵³ Approval rating for the Defence and Prime Minister plummeted and two weeks after the war (August 25) the negative approval rating of the CGS, Halutz, was almost twice his positive one. ⁵⁴ Even the IDF, though still ending on positive grounds, suffered a sharp decline in its approval rating. ⁵⁵ Yet, this picture is partial and as such, misleading. As far as support for the war was concerned, Israeli public opinion demonstrated resilience and tenacity. Public opinion polls show robust public support for a tough reaction, as measured by the justification of the Israeli strong response. Initially support for the strong response ran at over 90%; it remained roughly around 90% all along the war; and it declined somewhat towards the end of the war, yet never below 80%. The robust public support was complemented by the reserve's unwavering readiness to mobilize and fight. Be Nasrallah's rhetoric what it may, Israeli society did not show signs of a “spider web” but rather displayed a significant capacity to withstand attacks, an aggressive spirit, and sustained support for the government's offensive decisions in spite of their cost. If anything, Israeli public attitudes seem to have strengthened deterrence.

Proximate and Structural Causes of Democratic Failure in Asymmetric Conflicts and their Consequences

Even elementary postwar analyses suggest that the Israeli strategic behavior, and in particular the conduct of ground forces, were deficient on several levels. A review of the work of the Vinograd Committee, strategic experts, former IDF officers, and journalists, suggests that the immediate reasons for the questionable performance of the IDF in 2006 are the following: ⁵⁶

• Hezbollah's strategic plans, deployment and disciplined performance

• Israeli inadequate strategic plan and military doctrine

• Hesitant and confused decision making of the IDF top command

• Mediocre performance at the IDF brigade to division command levels

• Poor readiness of IDF ground units

These reasons seem to support Arreguin-Toft's “strategic interaction thesis.” ⁵⁷ According to Arreguin-Toft, Western failures in asymmetric conflicts are due to bad strategic choices, inadequate force structure, and its improper use. Without denying the explanatory power of the strategic interaction thesis in the case of the Second Lebanon War, it is still too simple to understand the war outcomes and Israeli failures simply in terms of immediate or proximate causes, or only in terms of an insulated military interaction between the two protagonists—i.e. the IDF and the Hezbollah.

Scholars have long demonstrated that the formation of military strategy is a complex process that involves, beyond military considerations, also cultural, institutional, and political factors. ⁵⁸ They have also pointed out the special relations between democracy and war. ⁵⁹ Thus, while the Israeli military performance in 2006 conforms to the arguments of the strategic interaction thesis, the deeper and more substantial reasons for the Israeli strategic failures should be looked for elsewhere. Specifically, a close inquiry into the origins of the Israeli strategy and performance, as well as their shortcomings, reveals just how decisive was the impact of domestic considerations and of political lessons from past experiences.

As I have made a general argument about democratic structure and strategic performance in asymmetric conflicts, in a book about how democracies lose small wars, ⁶⁰ I will confine myself here only to a brief reminder. In a nutshell, militarily superior democracies which fight asymmetric conflicts are manoeuvring between two major constraints: their societies’ tolerance to own losses (mostly casualties), and their society's tolerance to brutality against others. For democracies, the second constraint is further tightened by sisterly vigilance—i.e., public opinion and government scrutiny of their behavior in other democracies. To make matters more difficult, losses and brutality are inversely related. On the one hand, limiting to a minimum the numbers of one's casualties, almost by definition requires the escalation of brutality. On the other hand, tightly controlling brutality—by way of careful discrimination between the innocent civilians and culpable warriors—almost by definition involves mounting losses. Understood in the strategic context of conflict, democracies face built-in obstacles to battlefield efficiency, particularly in the non-existential context of asymmetric conflicts. Even when democratic armies perform well, governments still struggle hard to gain political traction out of the quality performance of these armies. Hence, what maybe perceived as failing strategy could in effect reflect failure to adjust to domestic conditions rather than to battlefield needs. A string of cases in which democracies lost guerrilla wars in spite of military superiority, and at times battlefield success, have taught democracies a few formative lessons.

These lessons were already applied and observed in several recent cases of intervention. Abstractly, the challenge for democracies is to run a relatively “sterile” war: visibly costless and bloodless. Concretely, democracies try to achieve just that by reconsidering four issues: the objectives of action; force structure; combat means and methods; and, consequently, strategy. ⁶¹ Specifically, democracies are increasingly more selective about intervention. They try to stay away from long territorial conquest and occupation. They prefer professional forces to conscripts and in particular reservists (as the former, their conduct, and losses, are least likely to turn society against the war). They enthusiastically endorse the precision Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and in particular air power as a substitute for ground forces. And finally, they tend to escalate war quickly in the hope that massive application of force will condense the time of military exposure and consequently keep to minimum political opportunities available to potential domestic opponents of the war. In fact, these lessons have already percolated beyond the political level into the central nerve system of defence establishments. The expression of the process of learning and the lessons can hardly be missed as one considers the Israeli strategy in 2006.

The Democratic Roots of Israeli Strategy

Judging from the IDF ground performance in the Second Lebanon War, one can be misled into believing that Israel was guided by no strategy. This impression may further strengthen, considering that the IDF had two cohesive strategic plans, Ice Breaker (Shoveret Kerach) and Sky Water (Mei Marom), yet it fully executed neither. Whereas Ice Breaker was based largely on standoff fire and limited cross-border raids, Sky Water involved a massive army sweep that sought to isolate the southern part of Lebanon from northern sources of supply, and then eradicate the Hezbollah in the sealed off area. Sky Water gained additional attention and was further refined after the Syrians left Lebanon in April 2005. ⁶² Yet, the IDF never executed any of its plans. Rather, its ground performance seemed improvised. The operational objectives were rapidly changed, battle plans were redrawn almost daily, and a little sense of direction was shared by all levels: individual military units, the Northern Command, and eventually the general public. Nevertheless, Israel did have a strategy whose contours can become clear once the democratic context of the war is understood.

First, Israeli leaders assumed that they had a limited window of opportunity, because “the international community would limit the Israeli operation, would do everything to limit it … ” ⁶³ Second, the leadership essentially acted with mistrust of its society as a result of the First Lebanon War and the events which led to the IDF retreat from this country (1982–2000). As retired General Ben-Israel described, the war decisions were taken against the backdrop of the “traumatic psychological deposit” of the “Lebanese mud,” ⁶⁴ or as others defined, the “Lebanese trauma.” ⁶⁵ Retired General Malka explained the genesis of the “trauma” to the Vinograd Committee in the following manner:

The decision on the fate of the conflict in Lebanon [1982–2000], came … before the election campaign that brought Barak to power … [it] came as a result of pressure, and domestic protest movements, and the Four Mothers [movement], and a magnitude of 20 to 25 dead soldiers a year, in the last years in southern Lebanon … it came about in trickles, in road side bombs, convoys, in attacks on [IDF] fortifications, and through the emerging of the public debate … ” ⁶⁶

The fresh memories of the Lebanese trauma and the implicit assumption that society could not be trusted in similar circumstances had a profound impact on the strategic calculations of the leadership. In particular, they resulted in strong aversion to a land campaign. ⁶⁷ This aversion was not new, nor exclusively limited to the leadership in 2006. According to General Ben-Israel, “the inability to prevent short range rocket launch by any other means then taking control over southern Lebanon, was well known to previous Prime Ministers, and was one of the main reasons that brought about the policy of restraint (havlaga).” ⁶⁸ However, in 2006, the aversion for ground war was out in the open. Ministers such as Ramon and Yishai specifically reasoned their opposition to a major ground invasion by reference to the Lebanese trauma, the expected number of IDF casualties, and the presumed relative advantage of Hezbollah as indigenous guerrilla force. ⁶⁹ Their view was in fact shared by the Prime Minister. In response to the Vinograd Committee question about his state of mind on July 12, when he heard the news of the kidnapping, Olmert explained: “in my imagination [I] saw the new Lebanese swamp closing on us like the old one. I wanted us to avoid being trapped in our own moves … ” ⁷⁰ Of even greater significance, he shared with Ramon a deeper conviction about the futility of ground campaign. ⁷¹ Months before the war, as he entertained a possible response to an expected Hezbollah kidnapping effort, he concluded that the best “was not to be fixed by past perceptions, that the essence is seizing territory, and striking … ” ⁷² He further explained what he claimed he had “told all along”:

We are captive of some conception that typified all the Israeli wars, an Israeli war and victory—[means that we] enter with full force and seize territory. We already did it in Lebanon and we know what level of complexity it involved … I immediately see this element that I know that we go in with full forces with thousands of soldiers, with logistical lines, with whatever comes with this, with friction with the civil population, but I still do not know how one gets out of it … Now the question is whether this is the only option or the best option? I think that not. I think that not … ⁷³

Judging from the IDF's patchy use of ground forces in Lebanon, and considering that the command used the forces in such a way even though it had a ready-made drawer plan (Sky Water) and sufficient forces to execute it, one is forced to conclude that the General Staff (as embodied in Halutz's opinion), much like the politicians, did not have much stomach for a major land campaign. ⁷⁴

The IDF aversion to a land campaign was influenced in part from its vision of an effective high precision standoff fire war. However, it also reflected another layer of the democratic impact. The IDF command rejected a major land manoeuvre, at least partially, because the latter required a significant component of reservists. Both the military and political elite made different claims. They suggested that initially the mobilization of reservists was declined because such action would have been interpreted in Israel as a “war situation,” and because in any case they did not want to launch a major ground invasion. ⁷⁵ However, the undesired “war awareness” argument rings somewhat hollow, and the no-intention no-need argument seem to hide the true causal chain. Indeed, the evidence seems to lead elsewhere.

If Israel did not intend to go to war, then why would Halutz tell his officers, on the morning of the second day of war (July 13), that “there is now a war in Lebanon and so it must be perceived. We are at war, this is my definition, and by these rules we operate … ” ⁷⁶ Moreover, why would he then emphasize to the officers the need for a change in their state of mind” ⁷⁷ and conclude a discussion in the Forum of [Security] Seniors by noting that Israel “was far away from the end … [and had] no interest that it would end soon”? ⁷⁸

The “no-intention no-need” argument sounds plausible, because obviously, if the IDF did not plan a major ground offensive, reservists were not needed. At the same time, however, the argument that aversion to mobilization and to the use of reserve forces would have precluded a ground campaign sounds just as plausible. But which argument captures the causal order? Considering the near consensus on the formative impact of the “Lebanese trauma,” and the fact that the latter started with a political backlash from the reservists, the causal chain seems to start from the latter. Halutz himself lamented about the domestic constraints on mobilization and force use. To the Vinograd Committee he submitted that: “the military system is deeply influenced by long term processes,” by “interrelated socio-cultural, budgetary, and doctrinaire processes.” ⁷⁹ One such process, he further noted, concerned the dealing with the reserve. “How did we come to the point that calling up reservists became less and less self-evident?” he asked rhetorically. ⁸⁰

As is often the case, deeds may be even more indicative than words. It is thus worthwhile to observe that aversion to mobilize reservists was so strong, that even when the war became sluggish and the Defence Minister and senior officers advocated mobilization, they met the resolute opposition of Olmert and Halutz, and these two were not alone. On July 19, a week into the war, Peretz raised the issue of reserve mobilization. His request was first declined by Olmert, then by the “War Cabinet” (the “Group of Seven”), and finally, by the full government. ⁸¹ Eventually, the reservists were mobilized. However, even then the leadership delayed their use in battle as much as possible.

The above discussion leads to the consideration of the fourth democratic constraint on the IDF strategy formation, which is in a way antecedent to the ground campaign and reservists aversions: the fear for IDF casualties, which was an integral part of the Lebanese trauma. ⁸² Retired General Einan—a member of the Vinograd Committee and a graduate of the first Lebanon War, suggested that “casualties is a highly influencing factor in Israeli society and culture … but [in Lebanon] it became obvious that the harming of soldiers versus the issue of harming civilians lost direction.” ⁸³ Minister Herzog similarly noted that “[he] remember[d] a journalist who told [him] during the war: it is an army that now protects the army. It is complex. The army is not to blame. It is the totality … it is an ethos, it is anxiety … ⁸⁴

Einan and Herzog were not alone. Casualty-considerations clearly shaped the strategic outlook of ministers and their operational recommendations. Yishai and Ramon are again good examples. To the Vinograd Committee Ramon explained that “I would not have supported war. I would not have supported the introduction of 4–5 divisions into Lebanon, with hundreds of [IDF] casualties … and then I would be asked what we should do? I would have said … it is better to do nothing than ground invasion in this way … ” ⁸⁵ Ramon and Yishai also drew the “logical” strategic conclusions; they were among the most ardent advocates of massive and not particularly selective bombing in Lebanon. Equally revealing, casualty-consideration also affected campaign planning at a proximate level. On July 16, at the IDF Design Forum, the CGS opposed a proposed rather limited ground campaign, partially because such initiative could end with “dead IDF soldiers within Lebanese territory” … which “was not in our interest in the context of the Israeli public … ” and besides, because “the people in Israel do not like getting into Lebanon … ” ⁸⁶

Within this web of democratic memories, constraints, lessons, and influences—low domestic tolerance to casualties, and even if higher, still low tolerance to brutality (which was strengthened by international sisterly vigilance) ⁸⁷ —the Israeli strategic choice, methods, instruments, and goals, became almost predictable.

First, the aversion for a massive ground campaign with multiple engagements meant a bias toward standoff fire, particularly one delivered from the air. Hence, against the best judgement of some former and serving army officers, ⁸⁸ air power became the decisive instrument of war rather than a complementary half of a ground campaign. ⁸⁹ Halutz—former chief of the IAF and the lead architect of the war—clearly preferred air power, but so did the former Defence Minister and CGS, Shaul Mofaz, who rose to rank in the ground forces. ⁹⁰ Moreover, Halutz's choice received enthusiastic endorsement from the politicians. Minister Pines-Paz indicated the dominant political attitude when he told the Vinograd Committee that he “focused mainly on verifying that … as a rule, whole of our operations in Lebanon would be aerial and not on land, because we have bad experience which was gained from ground operation in Lebanon.” ⁹¹

Above all, the strategic choice of a “landless” campaign based on standoff fire and air power was revealed in numbers. In thirty-three days, the IAF flew a total number of sorties roughly similar to that it had in the 1973 two-front war against two major Arab armies. ⁹² IDF artillery shot in the 2006 war more than twice the number of shell it had in 1973. ⁹³ Conversely, although the IDF eventually mobilized and used in Lebanon several divisions, and had at the peak 100,000 ground troops ready for battle, it only ever used at any one time no more than 9,000 soldiers. ⁹⁴

A second important strategic consequence of the democratic setup was that force was applied early on in a resolute and quick escalatory mode. Halutz, who was guided by the objective of restoring deterrence and by a wish for maximal impact, was among those pushing hardest for the quick escalation. Indeed, within two days, the IAF was bombing to rubble Hezbollah's Dahya quarter in Beirut, ⁹⁵ and soon after, it ran out of targets, at least military ones. ⁹⁶ A Lieutenant Colonel in the IAF Department of Campaign Planning observed after the war: “One day, at the outbreak of war, we were instructed to decipher what would be the next [escalatory] step from the Hezbollah [perspective] … we found ourselves in an interesting dilemma and reached an even more interesting conclusion: in this war, there was not, at least from our perspective, an element of gradual escalation. There were no steps to climb.” ⁹⁷

A corollary third strategic consequence of the democratic impact emerges from the perception of limited time, the objective of deterrence, and the wish to minimize IDF casualties: the campaign was to involve much destruction (a matter that in a dialectic way further suggested that time was limited). The reasons behind the tendency to brutalize the campaign included an obvious mix of “efficiency” and “effectiveness” considerations. Israel wanted to have an impact at low casualty rate and consequently without seizing territory or mopping up the warriors of Hezbollah. But, the tendency towards greater application of standoff fire was also grounded in the objective of deterrence and the realization that the sum total of all considerations meant that the Israeli strategy could not directly bring the desired effect, and hence, that Israel took on some alternative leverage.

Minister Ramon revealed to the Vinograd Committee that he thought: “that if after 4–5 days, Lebanon would be without water, electricity, and fuel … the public sense would have been that … a state that attacks us or let (others) attack us, pays unbearable price. This is the message to all Arab nations and leaders.” ⁹⁸ And, the CGS, Halutz, told Peretz “that he had ready-made answers … he could set darkness on Lebanon for a year … he could damage Lebanon in the billions. He offered to attack the Beirut Airport … ” ⁹⁹ Yet, although seemingly similar, the leverage vision offered by Halutz differed from that of Yishai and Ramon, who were far less restrained. Ramon readily admitted that he was “a disciple of standoff fire, and still is … ” ¹⁰⁰ adding that he thought that the strategy was vindicated in Belgrade (where, as he argued, NATO forces suffered no casualties at the cost of about 10,000 civil lives). “I thought” he further explained, “that the clearer it would be to the Lebanese people that it pays an intolerable price for the Hezbollah, it will not let Hezbollah take centerstage.” ¹⁰¹ Aware, however, that the Lebanese state might be too weak to force its will on the Hezbollah, Ramon concluded: “if the state is ineffective, its citizens—I say it with great misgiving—citizens, the citizens of the state should pay for their choice.” ¹⁰²

In an interview few months after the war, Defence Minister Peretz summed up nicely the dynamics that precluded the ground campaign and drove the Israeli strategy to rely on a punishing air delivered standoff fire:

The army regarded the air campaign the main tool of decision. No doubt. The CGS lead this line … no one was eager to bring in, to confrontation zones, land forces. Especially, not as the Lebanese trauma is hovering over everybody's head. The truth needs to be said. The trauma of exiting Lebanon was hovering over the heads of the Cabinet ministers and some of the leaders of the Army. It delayed the decision on land intervention … Most [ministers] reiterated once and again their adamant opposition to a large scale land intervention. Instead, there were calls to erase villages rather then get [land] forces in; to turn villages into soccer fields and sand. ¹⁰³

The fact is that the Israeli government never went as far as Ramon advocated, nor did it even follow Halutz's more moderate recommendations. ¹⁰⁴ A blend of political, strategic, and identity calculations precluded savagery. Olmert and Peretz were concerned about the response of allies and the conveniently divided Arab world, and saw quite differently the intra-Lebanese impact of indiscriminate attack on Lebanese “infrastructure.” Whereas the visionaries of destruction assumed that a Lebanese public outcry would force the Seniora government to confront Hezbollah; Olmert and Peretz saw a paralyzing global protest, the Lebanese united against Israel rather than divided against Hezbollah, and a weak and inefficient Lebanese government with which post-war tacit cooperation would be impossible.

Yet, excessive brutality was also rejected for ethical and identity reasons. First, the government was clearly divided as a few ministers, including Itzhak Herzog, found compelling moral and legal considerations against indiscriminate brutality. ¹⁰⁵ Second, the war leadership feared that a high number of Lebanese civil casualties would form an Archimedean point that would prevent the translation of battle outcomes into political achievements. ¹⁰⁶ If anything, Israeli leaders assessed that Hezbollah would try to lure the IDF into killing civilians in order to destroy Israel's image and end prematurely the IDF offensive. Olmert and Peretz did not need much imagination. This was a clear lesson from operation Grape of Wrath (April 1996), in which Israeli shells ended the campaign when they hit a UN installation near Qana, killing over 100-civilian refugees. ¹⁰⁷ The actions of the IDF indeed suggest that brutality-constraining calculations had great influence. Acting on fears of civil casualties, Israel reduced its chances of decapitating the Hezbollah. Instead of attacking by surprise, the IAF covered target areas in south Lebanon and the Dahya quarter in Beirut with leaflets, calling on civilians to abandon battle zones before heavy bombing started. ¹⁰⁸ Still, on July 30, the IDF stepped right into the trap of inadvertently killing a significant group of civilians. IAF bombs landed on a building, yet again precisely in Qana, killing a score of civilians who took refuge in the basement. These inadvertent civil casualties became, as expected “a serious breaking point,” ¹⁰⁹ forcing the command to recoil from massive bombing for two days and assess the international damage before it could try to regain the lost momentum.

At the end of the day, democratic constraints and pressures merged with strategic calculations to produce a strategic “compromise.” The IDF isolated Lebanon from the world through a sea and an air blockade, the Beirut Airport runway was precisely and reversibly knocked out, probably as a signal, and most major infrastructure installations were spared; the brunt of the bombing was targeted at buildings in the Hezbollah quarter of Dahya and at infrastructure and suspected military targets in the southern combat zone. Moreover, with the understanding that the IDF could not on its own bring the desired outcome and that a Lebanese domestic leverage was inoperable, Israel's strategic vision was oriented necessarily towards third parties.

Many within the Israeli political and military elite grasped this complexity and its consequences rather early. Having perceived the limits on the power democracies can apply in asymmetric context, the Israeli leaders turned to the logical conclusion: diplomacy will have to kick in at some point. ¹¹⁰ As minister Herzog put it: “[the] political level … supported more a political rather than military solution. From day one it displayed more restraints considering certain matters. In the matter of infrastructure, in the matter of ground invasion it thought … that it would be possible to achieve a political solution without further massive use of force or a long war of months … ” ¹¹¹ Olmert himself presumably subscribed to the idea that “the best option is that you apply the military power and you always know how to leverage the diplomatic power.” ¹¹² Even Halutz, to his credit, proved Clausewitzian at heart. On day one of the war he told the government not to expect “a victory by knock out,” advising its members that “international entities must be brought in, and intervene at the correct juncture, so as to influence whoever needs to be influenced.” ¹¹³ Five days later (17 July), when most leaders were rather euphoric about the IDF campaign, he told the Knesset Foreign Relations and Security Committee that “the Army is not everything. The army is supposed to provide the most convenient platform to whoever is supposed to pick it up and then transform it to a diplomatic achievement.” ¹¹⁴

Indeed, the only and most critical dispute among the leaders, was not over the need to move from the military to the diplomatic domain, but rather when to do so. On the one hand, some, Foreign Minister Livni apparently in the lead, but also a few high ranking officers, searched for an early exit. ¹¹⁵ On the other hand, others, namely Halutz and his rather placating civil superiors, Olmert and Peretz—possibly under the spell of the first successful days of the campaign—wanted to bring to bear as much force as possible for as long as possible, even though there was not much to do after a few ferocious days of bombing. Of course, there was the option of conquering and mopping up the south of Lebanon with ground forces. However, this was the one thing almost everyone dearly wished to avoid.

CONCLUSION

The Second Lebanon War is assessed in Israel and possibly elsewhere as a failed and hasty adventure. An inexperienced political leadership presumably took a gamble of strategic proportions without sufficient deliberation. Then, the Israeli military machine was exposed as deficient. For thirty-three days, the mighty IDF could not finish off a band of disciplined guerrillas. Two key objectives, one defensive the other offensive, were not achieved. The IDF failed to protect the civil rear, or more precisely, could not reduce significantly the rocket attacks on northern Israel. And, it failed to demonstrate clear superiority, be it in terms of the Hezbollah casualties and captured warriors, decapitation of its leadership, or forcing the organization to retreat from south Lebanon and accept Israel's terms. In the Middle East, where reality and perceptions often seem inseparable, the deterrent image of Israel was presumably damaged. Foes and friends alike may view Israel in a dimmer light.

Although containing kernels of truth, this view is nevertheless simplistic, possibly misleading, and most probably short-sighted. The immediate strong Israeli response to the Hezbollah July 12 provocation was not taken in haste. Rather, it was entertained and discussed several times over, long before the war broke out. It was generally accepted in Israel that the situation in the north was essentially intolerable as Israeli deterrence was seriously eroding. The Israeli political and military elite were thus ready for battle. The prime Israeli objective was to hit Hezbollah hard in order to restore deterrence. Israeli leaders wished to change the rules of the game and push Hezbollah away from the international border. So much so, that a “proper” Hezbollah provocation was considered in Israel as an opportunity. The widespread political and public support for the government's quick and powerful reaction and its actions thereafter, suggest that the analysis and actions of the Israeli leaders were deeply rooted and widely shared in Israel.

It was thus left for the Israeli government mainly to decide on the precise strategic reaction to a provocation. This decision was dominated by domestic considerations, the very same considerations that had often not been taken seriously enough by democracies that had fought asymmetric conflicts, Israel included. Specifically, the Israeli decision makers formed their response in light of three factors: the “Lebanese trauma,” realization that conquest led to entanglement, and fear of a political backlash that could follow if a large number of IDF casualties occurred. In a sense, the Israeli strategic choice was formulated in terms of negation: anything but a ground campaign. This is also why the textbook solution for the sort of challenge Hezbollah presented, was avoided. The forces of Hezbollah in southern Lebanon were not isolated, nor methodically eradicated thereafter, as both actions required a comprehensive ground campaign. Democratic pressures and the lessons learned previously in Lebanon and in the Palestinian Territories guided the Israeli leaders to rely on a strategy largely based on standoff fire.

The Israeli strategic choice suggests that one should not be too quick to judge too harshly the IDF's admittedly lacking performance. The IDF “did not deliver the goods,” but its ground forces were never seriously called on to deliver these. Aversion to ground campaign precluded a large scale army engagement and only more so as such choice required a massive use of reservists. In a way, the leadership acted as it did, because it did not trust society. The result of the approach of the government and the command was twofold: the IAF was chosen as the main instrument of war, and the leadership searched for an alternative leverage to territorial achievement.

In quite a surprising turn of events, Israel preferred diplomatic action and international intervention, as the methods to achieve the desired political outcomes, once military achievements paved the way for both. The outcomes came late and only after a hesitant and confused ground performance. Hence, some aspects of Israel's deterrence were probably damaged. Yet, other aspects of Israel's deterrence image were equally, if not more forcefully boosted. Israel proved resolute and taxing. It did not hesitate to attack with great force key Hezbollah targets in spite of rocket attacks on its civil rear. The Hezbollah, although elusive, paid dearly both in terms of its hard assets and in terms of its softer assets in Lebanon and the region. It was forced away from the international border and was compelled to operate in a far less convenient context that involves international forces. The world and Sunni states stood by as Israel ferociously attacked and destroyed its positions in south Lebanon and in Beirut. Hezbollah proved to be more of a destructive than a defending agent of Lebanon.

Apart from the strategic analysis, Israel's war yields insight into the impact of democratic factors on war conduct and a few counterintuitive understandings. Even though correctly considered to be a political system dominated by security considerations and the defence establishment, Israel proved very considerate of its civil society, perhaps even too considerate. The Israeli strategy was tailored to satisfy assumed societal constraints, as much as, if not more than battlefield needs. The democratic impact was most probably excessive as a result of the political pain inflicted by past experiences. Yet, Israeli society gave its leaders greater decisional freedom than they dared taking. The Hezbollah provocative violation of Israeli sovereignty was perceived by Israeli society in an existential context, and hence the latter was ready to tolerate more casualties and apply more force than assumed. Future Israeli governments are not likely to miss this fact. They will adjust after the Second Lebanon War, as much as they did in the wake of the first one. The lessons of both wars will probably blend and counterbalance each other. If the first war defined for the government the limits of power, the second one suggested what can be done within these limits. With surprising patience of the international community and robust support of the Israeli society, a major ground manoeuvre will not be automatically precluded next time. Likewise, the level of IDF ferocity is unlikely to decline. Contrary to expectations, Israel did not necessarily loose confidence. Rather, future Israeli governments will probably assess more accurately their room of manoeuvre. As Israel's neighbors are no fools, they are probably considering each aspect of the Second Lebanon War with greater attention than conventional wisdom suggests. Against popular predictions Israel's neighbors did not rush into confrontation in 2007, nor did they seem to develop a particular appetite for another round soon. But then again, they did not rush for confrontation in 2006 either, and war still occurred. Indeed, the next round of war may very well start without warning, but if so, it is more likely than not that the Israeli military record will be rectified.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The author wishes to express his gratitude to Dr. Diarmuid Maguire and Mr. Gideon Schaller for their wise comments and editorial help.

Notes

1. On the dominance of security considerations and the IDF in Israeli decision making see Michael I. Handel, “The Evolution of Israeli Strategy: The Psychology of Insecurity and the Quest for Absolute Security” in Williamson Murray, Macgregor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein (eds), The Making of Strategy (NY: Cambridge UP, 1994), pp. 553–63, 570; and Gil Merom, “The Architecture and Soft Spots of Israeli Grand Strategy” in Bradford A. Lee and Karl F. Walling (eds.), Strategic Logic and Political Rationality (London: Frank Cass, 2003), pp. 223–225. Surprisingly, perhaps, the excessive influence of the IDF in Israeli decision making was criticized by many key witnesses of the Vinograd Committee (see note 3), including senior IDF officers. See for example, Herzog testimony, p. 16; and Mofaz testimony, p. 10. Retired General Malka submitted that “we have [long] given strategy to the army, and forgot to take it out when the reasons for depositing it within the army ended.” Malka testimony, p. 27. Though perhaps sharper than all critics was Halutz, who argued that “one of the anomalies developed in Israel … . . . [is that] the army's status is too powerful … [the army] decides what is the strategic utility, which is in certain respect a political utility, which blends the military and the political. [The army] brings it for approval and usually that is what is accepted … ” Halutz testimony, pp. 55–56. For another well-reasoned critic of the Israeli strategic decision-making, by retired General Eiland, who was Head of the Planning Division of the IDF and then Head of the Israeli National Security Council (INSC) see “The Decision Making Process in Israel” in Meir Elran and Shlomo Brom (eds.), The Second Lebanon War (Tel Aviv: Yediot Aharonot Books and Chemed books, 2007) [in Hebrew], pp. 25–32.

2. Ofer Shelah and Yoav Limor, Captives of Lebanon (Tel Aviv: Yediot Aharonot Books and Chemed books, 2007) [in Hebrew]; Ronen Bergman, Point of No Return: Israeli Intelligence against Iran and Hezbollah (Kinneret, 2007) [in Hebrew], pp. 503–52; Meir Elran and Shlomo Brom (eds.), The Second Lebanon War (Tel Aviv: Yediot Aharonot Books and Chemed books, 2007) [in Hebrew]; Yehuda Ben Meir and Dafna Shaked, “The People Speak: Israeli Public Opinion on National Security, 2005–2007” Memorandum No. 90, May 2007, The Institute for National Security Studies; Isaac Ben-Israel, “The Missile War (Summer 2006): Israel-Hezbollah,” unpublished manuscript [in Hebrew].

3. The Committee for the Inquiry of the Events of the Lebanon Campaign 2006, Interim Report, April 2007. Hence forth Vinograd Interim Report. See http://www.vaadatwino.co.il/

4. Vinograd Interim Report, p. 101.

5. See Zvi Lanir, Fundamental Surprise: The National Intelligence Crisis (Tel Aviv: HaKibbutz HaMeuchad, 1983) [in Hebrew].

6. The Israeli intelligence claimed, and the Israeli leadership seem to have accepted, that Hezbollah was “built by a state … as if it was another division that was merely placed in Lebanon rather than Iran..” Dichter testimony to the Vinograd Committee, p. 13. See also Shelah and Limor, Captives of Lebanon, pp. 146–47; and Eitan testimony to the Vinograd Committee, p.6.

7. Vinograd Interim Report, p. 39, articles 2–3.

8. Ibid., p. 39. Mofaz testified that after the October 2000 kidnapping, the IDF recommended to attack Syrian military targets in Lebanon “on the basis of the Prime Minister's position that they [the Syrians] are the landlords [in Lebanon].” Mofaz testimony to the Vinograd Committee, p. 12. In April 16, 2001, Israel indeed attacked a Syrian radar station in Lebanon, following Hezbollah rocket attack that killed an IDF soldier.

9. Retired IDF Intelligence Head, General Aharon Zeevi Farkash in Elran and Brom, The Second Lebanon War, pp. 76–78; The Vinograd Interim Report, p 58.

10. Mofaz testimony, p. 23–24.

11. Vinograd Interim Report, p. 38 (and pp. 60, 63). See also Shelah and Limor, Captives of Lebanon, p. 149. When Olmert reasoned his July 12 decision to respond immediately with great force, he explained: “we have analyzed the matter, discussed it, considered it, checked it from all its aspects long before [apparently on March 5, May 10, and June 25, 2006—after the kidnapping of an IDF soldier in Gaza] … we considered the options … and concluded that any delay (in the reaction) meant prevention of the possibility of the (powerful) action” Olmert testimony to the Vinograd Committee, pp. 61–62.

12. See Shelah and Limor, Captives of Lebanon, p. 150; and Halutz testimony, pp. 9–11. 36. Netanyahu, equally concerned about the northern situation as Prime Minister (May 1996—May 1999), testified that upon hearing the July 12 news, he thought that the kidnapping “presented a great opportunity”. Netanyahu testimony to the Vinograd Committee, p. 25.

13. Netanyahu testified that seven years before the war, as Prime Minister, he thought that “[Israel] had to draw a line in the sand. … that [Israel] had to change the established norm that [the Hezbollah] can shoot on [Israel]. [That] the price should be much more painful, much sharper, that is restoring deterrence.” Netanyahu testimony, p. 4. Netanyahu hence asked the Minister of Defence to prepare an “escalatory menu of very powerful responses so as to corroborate the deterrence against the Katyusha rockets. … [so as] to break the rules that [Hezbollah] can shoot on [Israeli] settlements … [since] overtime, the risk of not responding … leads to significant erosion in Israel's image … and in what it projects not only vis-à-vis Hezbollah … it is a price [Israel] cannot pay.” Ibid., p. 7. Hence also, Netanyahu was at the time for “immediate response … within minutes, if [Israel] wishes to change the rules [of engagement].” Ibid., p. 8.

14. Azar Gat, War and Human Civilization (NY: Oxford UP, 2006), particularly pp. 609–18, and “Isolationism, Appeasement, Containment, and Limited War: Western Strategic Policy from the Modern to the ‘Postmodern’ Era,” in Zeev Maoz and Azar Gat (eds.), War in a Changing World (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2001), pp. 77–91.

15. See Israel Tal, National Security (Tel-Aviv: Dvir, 1996) [in Hebrew], pp. 61–67; Jonathan Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence: Border Warfare from 1953 to 1970 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1988); Handel, “The Evolution of Israeli Strategy” pp. 534–578; Avner Yaniv, Deterrence Without the Bomb: The Politics of Israeli Strategy, (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1987); Gil Merom, “The Architecture and Soft Spots of Israeli Grand Strategy” in Bradford A. Lee & Karl F. Walling, Strategic Logic and Political rationality (London: Frank Cass, 2003), p. 221; Efraim Inbar and Shmuel Sandler, “Israel's Deterrence Strategy Revisited” Security Studies 3 (1994), pp. 330–58; Barak Mendelsohn, “Israel Self Defeating Deterrence in the 1991 Gulf War” The Journal of Strategic Studies 26:4 (2003), pp. 83–107; Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (NY: Columbia UP, 1999); Shai Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence: A Strategy for the 1980s (NY: Columbia UP, 1982), and “Israeli Deterrence and the Gulf War” in Joseph Alpher (ed.), War in the Gulf (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), pp. 184–208.

16. Mofaz testimony, p. 13, 15.

17. See Isaac Ben-Israel, “The Crisis in the Oslo Process through the Prism of Israeli Deterrence” Strategic Assessment 5:2 (August 2002) The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University; and Doron Almog, “Cumulative Deterrence and the War on Terrorism” Parameters 34 (Winter 2004/05), pp. 5–9.

18. Malka testimony to the Vinograd Committee, p. 5.

19. Quoted in Shelah and Limor, Captives of Lebanon, p. 45.

20. Ramon testimony to the Vinograd Committee, p. 32.

21. Dichter testimony, p. 5 (see also p. 3).

22. Ben-Israel, “The Missile War,” p. 5, note 18.

23. Quoted in Vinograd Interim Report, p. 70.

24. Quoted in Vinograd Interim Report, p. 69. See also the Defence Minister presentation of the objective of the Israeli military campaign in Peretz testimony to the Vinograd Committee, p. 36, 37.

25. Quoted in Shelah and Limor, Captives of Lebanon, p. 57. See also Dichter testimony, pp. 6–7.

26. Quoted in Vinograd Interim Report, p. 81.

27. Ibid.

28. Herzog testimony to the Vinograd Committee, p. 4.

29. Malka testimony, p. 23.

30. Interview with Ari Shavit, Ha'aretz, May 3, 2007. See also Peretz testimony, pp. 16–17, 22.

31. For a compelling critique of deterrence theory and vulnerability as motivation see Richard Ned Lebow, “Deterrence Failure Revisited” International Security, 12:1 (1987), pp. 197–213; Lebow, “Deterrence: A Political and Psychological Critique” in Paul C. Stern, Robert Axelrod, Robert Jervis, and Rov Radner (eds.), Perspectives on Deterrence (New York: Oxford UP, 1989), pp. 25–51; Lebow and Janice Stein, “Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter.” World Politics 41 (1989), pp. 208–24; and Lebow and Gross Stein, “Deterrence: The Elusive Dependent Variable” World Politics 42 (1990), pp. 336–69.

32. Quoted in Vinograd Interim Report, p. 100.

33. Ibid. p. 11. See also Shelah and Limor, Captives of Lebanon, pp. 221–22.

34. For an analysis of the geographical reach of Hezbollah's rockets, see Ben-Israel, “The Missile War,” p. 11.

35. In fact, if anything Hezbollah rocket attacks increased. Whereas before the brief July 31-August 1, bombing pause (following the Qana bombing) Hezbollah shot an average of about 105 rockets a day, after the pause it increased the average to about 170 a day. Data from Vinograd Interim Report, Apendix A “Timetable of Events” pp. 154–62. See also Giora Rom “The Test of the Strategies of the Rivals—As if Two Ships Pass Each Other in the Night” in Elran and Brom, The Second Lebanon War, p. 54, table 3.

36. Ben-Israel, “The Missile War,” p. 1, note 3.

37. Ibid., p. 36; and Shelah and Limor, Captives of Lebanon, pp. 77–81. For the IDF, the two main criteria were the elimination success rate and the level of collateral damage. The IAF did extremely well on both with far fewer Lebanese casualties then feared.

38. Halutz testimony, p. 46.

39. Quoted in Noam Gutman, “Setting the Rules of the Game,” Israeli Air Force Magazine 172 (December 2006), p. 31.

40. Herzog testimony, 17.

41. After the war, a few Israeli ministers suggested that they expected a short retaliatory strike and a violent exchange of about 24 to 48 hours. Foreign Minister Livni testified that: “from [her] point of view the operation starting on the 12^th was supposed to end that night—[or] at most, noon the day after,” Livni testimony to the Vinograd Committee, p. 5 (see also p. 20, 45). However, the war leadership never though in such time frame, and, considering the magnitude of the main objective, it was anyhow inconceivable.

42. Haaretz, April 26, 2007.

43. Quoted in Vinograd Interim Report, p. 88.

44. Ibid., p. 93.

45. Peretz testimony, p. 35, 46.

46. Halutz testimony, p. 61.

47. Ibid., p. 19.

48. While most writers and politicians perceive a degree of damage to Israel's deterrence image, a few suggest that on balance this image was not significantly harmed, or was possibly even boosted. See for example Yair Evron “Deterrence and its Limits” in Elran and Brom, The Second Lebanon War, pp. 36–43.

49. For discussions of deterrence see Robert Jervis, Richard N. Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1989), pp. 1–33; Paul Gordon Lauren, “Theories of Bargaining with Threats of Force: Deterrence and Coercive Diplomacy” in Paul Gordon Lauren (ed.) Diplomacy (NY: The Free Press, 1979), pp. 183–203; Axelrod, Jervis, Radner and Stern, Perspectives on Deterrence (New York: Oxford, 1989); Patrick Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977); and Frank C. Zagare and Marc D. Kilgour, Perfect Deterrence (New York: Cambridge UP, 2000).

50. Ben-Israel, “The Missile War,” pp. 18–19

51. Peres testimony to the Vinograd Committee, pp. 8–9.

52. Ramon testimony, p. 37 (italics added). When asked why he supported, against his fundamental approach, the last war decision to use a significant number of ground forces offensively, Ramon reasoned “I thought that even at the troubling and difficult price … which I assessed at 200 to 250 [IDF] fatalities … there was no choice … Israel's deterrence capacity, which is Israel's capacity to survive, was in my view important, and I though that this heavy price [we had] to unavoidably sacrifice … ” Ramon testimony, p. 43.

53. See Ben Meir, “Israeli Public Opinion and the Second Lebanon War” in Elran and Brom, The Second Lebanon War, p. 93, table 5.

54. See ibid., p. 94, Table 6; and Meir Elran, “The Civil Front in the Second Lebanon War,” in Elran and Brom, The Second Lebanon War, p. 106

55. Elran “The Civil Front,” p.106. Public assessment of the campaign management and progress dropped sharply as of early August. See Haaretz, April 30, 2007. Further analysis suggests that the war turned sour following the August 7 decision to appoint the deputy CGS, Kaplinsky, as the “representative of the CGS” (in fact, a babysitter) to the Northern Command. For Israelis, this decision all but confirmed that after 26 days of war, things were not going as planned. Shelah and Limor, Captives of Lebanon, p. 272, 300.

56. See Vinograd Interim Report, p. 14, articles 23–25, and 27. See also ibid., p. 20 article 61, and Bergman, Point of No Return, p. 549.

57. Arreguin-Toft, “How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict” International Security 26:1 (2001), pp. 93–128.

58. Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Germany and Britain between the Wars (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1984); Murray, Knox and Bernstein (eds.), The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994); Michael Howard, “The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy,” Foreign Affairs 57:5 (1979), pp. 975–86; Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (NY: Columbia UP, 1996); Jack L. Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1984); Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between the Wars (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1997); Stephen Van Evera, “The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War,” International Security 9:1 (1984) pp. 58–108 and “Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War,” International Security 22:4 (1998), pp. 5–43.

59. See Gat, War and Human Civilization, pp. 570–661; Bruce Russett, Controlling the Sword (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1990), Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1993); Russett and John Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations (NY, W. W. Norton & Co, 2001); Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam, Democracies at War (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2002); and Randal Schweller, “Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are Democracies More Pacific?” World Politics 44:2 (1992), pp. 235–69.

60. Gil Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars (NY: Cambridge UP, 2003).

61. See the analysis in ibid., pp. 246–49.

62. Vinograd Interim Report, pp. 55–56.

63. Peretz testimony, p. 24.

64. Ben-Israel, “The Missile War,” p. 13. Defence Minister Pertez suggested that “the trauma of the [First] Lebanon War and the Lebanese mud were in the air in all the Cabinet discussions.” Quoted in Peretz testimony, p. 56 [italics added].

65. Herzog testimony, p. 20.

66. Malka testimony, pp. 7–8.

67. The Vinograd Committee euphemistically described this aversion as “preference for not conducting massive ground activity in Lebanon.” See Vinograd Interim Report, p. 14, article 22.

68. Ben-Israel, “The Missile War,” p. 12 (italics added).

69. Ramon argued that “I thought that conceptually it was wrong to repeat the mistake of getting into Lebanon, [the mistake] of the first [1982] conception of 40 kilometers. … it was clear to me that it would involve hundreds of [IDF] casualties … ” Ramon testimony, pp. 27–28, and 31. See also Yishai testimony, p. 4, 7, 9.

70. Olmert testimony to Vinograd Committee, p. 4.

71. For Ramon's aversion for seizing and occupying territory, see Ramon testimony, pp. 31–32.

72. Olmert testimony, pp. 3, 69–70.

73. Ibid., p. 30. Olmert general analysis was not off the mark. See the discussion of the “territorialization of (Israeli) strategic thinking” in Merom, “The Architecture and Soft Spots of Israeli Grand Strategy” pp. 226–229.

74. See also Vinograd Interim Report, p. 14, article 22.

75. See Mofaz testimony, p. 34, 38, 43; Halutz testimony, p. 28; Peretz testimony, p. 31; and Shelah and Limor, Captives of Lebanon, p. 44, 45.

76. Quoted in Vinograd Interim Report, p. 85. Halutz made the same points a few hours later in a meeting in the Defence Ministry (ibid., p. 86).

77. Ibid., p. 85.

78. Ibid., p. 88.

79. Halutz testimony, p. 2.

80. Ibid., pp. 2–3.

81. According to Peretz, the Group of Seven declined reserve mobilization, at least in part because “it would be a procedure that might cause tremors in Israel.” Peretz testimony, p. 56.

82. See the discussion on the impact of casualties in the First Lebanon War, in Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars, pp. 177–84.

83. Menachem Einnan statement in Herzog testimony, p. 28.

84. Herzog testimony, p. 29.

85. Ramon testimony, p. 31. See also Yishai Testemony, p. 9, 10.

86. Quoted in Vinograd Interim Report, p. 98.

87. Herzog describes these two constraints as: a) the public/parents pressure, and b) international law that “paralyses the enlightened democracies.” Herzog testimony, p. 19.

88. Retired General Gilad, well-respected by his peers, predicted very early that “at the end, [Israel] will have to be ready [to initiate] a land manoeuvre, even though it was not popular.” Vinograd Interim Report, p. 71.

89. For analyses of the limits and advantages of air power in guerrilla wars see Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1996), and “The True Worth of Air Power,” in Foreign Affairs, March/April 2004 (see also the exchange with retired Air Force General Merrill A. McPeak, in Foreign Affairs, September/October 2004); See also Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of North Vietnam (New York: The Free Press, 1989).

90. Halutz told the Vinograd Committee: “I thought and still think that the firepower dimension has greater weight in the modern era … the air force has a major contribution in the firepower dimension, an accurate contribution … and it [thus] has a capacity and capability to be a very dominant player in the modern battlefield.” Halutz testimony, p. 16. Mofaz told the Committee that “if you think that you know how to achieve (your objectives) from the air, it is preferable. I do not think that any of us would have liked to operate ground forces, when you can achieve (your objectives) otherwise.” Mofaz testimony, p. 17.

91. Quoted in Vinograd Interim Report, p. 80, article 53.

92. The IAF flew 11,897 sorties (about 12% of which were unmanned) or 350 average daily sorties in the 2006 war, versus 11,223 or 590 average daily in the 1973 war. See Ben-Israel, “The Missile War,” p. 32, table 7.

93. The Israeli artillery shot over 170,000 shells in the 2006 war, versus only 75,000 in the 1973 war. See Shelah and Limor, Captives of Lebanon, pp. 159.

94. Ben-Israel, “The Missile War,” p. 9.

95. The Dahya bombing apparently resulted in the destruction of some 140–150 residential blocks. See Ibid., p. 40.

96. See Shelah and Limor, Captives of Lebanon, p. 104.

97. Quoted in Gutman, “Setting the Rules of the Game,” p. 28.

98. Ramon testimony, p. 37.

99. Interview with Ari Shavit, Haaretz, May 3, 2007.

100. Ramon testimony, p. 18.

101. Ibid., p. 20. See also Yishai testimony, p. 12.

102. Ramon testimony, p. 21.

103. Interview with Ari Shavit, Haaretz, May 3, 2007 (italics added). It is worthwhile to note how Ramon and Yishai reasoned their positions. Ramon explained that a brutal action was needed “so that the Arab World around us would know that whoever … attacks us in such a manner would pay a dreadful and terrible price … that is the message.” Ramon testimony, p. 16. Yishai argued that “if they are crazy … they should think that we are mad.” Yishai testimony, p. 6. See also ibid., p. 12, 14, 15.

104. Herzog testimony, p. 9.

105. For example, Herzog testified that in the government's meeting of July 27, he opposed, with Olmert's backing, suggestions to “erase villages”. Herzog testimony, p. 12.

106. Halutz testimony, p. 52.

107. Ibid., p. 67.

108. Shelah and Limor, Captives of Lebanon, p. 206.

109. Olmert testimony, p. 34.

110. For example, see Dichter testimony, p. 15.

111. Herzog testimony, p. 49.

112. Olmert testimony, p. 30.

113. Quoted in Shelah and Limor, Captives of Lebanon, p. 57. See also Halutz testimony, pp. 29–30, 74.

114. Quoted in Vinograd Interim Report, p. 100.

115. Livni testimony, p. 7.