The International Dimension of ETA's Terrorism and the Internationalization of the Conflict in the Basque Country

Abstract

Since the 1960s Spain has suffered a terrorist campaign by ETA, a group that has espoused an ethnonationalist ideology with which it has justified terrorism in pursuit of its aims. ETA's campaign has also been marked by an international dimension. The international environment inspired many activists, and ETA has attempted to develop an international network of political and operational support throughout its campaign. International perceptions of ETA's violence have also decisively influenced its campaign in parallel with the evolution of the most recent wave of international terrorism. Therefore, this article will analyze the international sphere's influence upon ETA's strategy.

Keywords:

• Basque Conflict
• ETA's Terrorism
• Internationalization
• Mediation

Notes

1. For an analysis of all of ETA's victims and its patterns of victimization and target selection throughout its terrorist campaign, see Rogelio Alonso, Florencio Domínguez, and Marcos García Rey, Vidas rotas. Historia de los hombres, mujeres y niños víctimas de ETA (Madrid: Espasa, 2010).

2. On the history of ETA, see Florencio Domínguez, De la negociación a la tregua: El final de ETA? (Madrid: Taurus, 1998); Florencio Domínguez, ETA: Estrategia Organizativa y Actuaciones 1978–1992 (Bilbao: Universidad del País Vasco, 1998); Antonio Elorza et al., La historia de ETA (Madrid: Temas de Hoy; Garmendia, 2006); José María Garmendia, Historia de ETA. Volume I (San Sebastián: Aramburu, 1979); José María Garmendia, Historia de ETA. Volume II (San Sebastián: Aramburu, 1980); Patxo Unzueta, Los nietos de la ira. Nacionalismo y violencia en el País Vasco (Madrid: El País-Aguilar, 1998).

3. Goldie Shabad and Francisco José Llera Ramo, “Political Violence in a Democratic State: Basque Terrorism,” in Terrorism in Context, ed. Martha Crenshaw (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 410–469, 419–423.

4. See, on this issue, the motivations provided by some IRA and ETA activists in Rogelio Alonso, The IRA and Armed Struggle (London and New York: Routledge, 2007); and Fernando Reinares, Patriotas de la muerte. Quienes han militado en ETA y por qué (Madrid: Taurus, 2001).

5. José María Garmendia, “ETA: Nacimiento, desarrollo y crisis (1959–1978),” in Antonio Elorza et al., La historia de ETA, 77–102, 99–100.

6. Shabad and Llera Ramo, “Political Violence in a Democratic State,” 419–423.

7. Statement by ETA's leadership published in Egin on October 12, 1990.

8. Some of the activities of this department are analyzed in Florencio Domínguez, Josu Ternera. Una vida en ETA (Madrid: La Esfera de los Libros, 2006), 89–129. For an excellent and very thorough analysis of the activities carried by this department in Latin America, see Florencio Domínguez, Las conexiones de ETA en América (Madrid: RBA, 2010).

9. Zutik 63, published in Documentos Y, vol. 12, 351.

10. Documentos Y, vol. 12, 396.

11. Hautsi, no. 2, September–October 1973, in Documentos Y, vol. 16, 447–448.

12. This has been the case in spite of the opinion of ETA leaders like José Luis Álvarez Emparantza. This founding member of ETA saw the IRA as “the armed wing of the Irish nationalist right,” as opposed to the INLA (Irish National Liberation Army), a splinter group from the main IRA formed in the 1970s, which was regarded by Álvarez as more similar to the Basque terrorist group. Domínguez, ETA: Estrategia Organizativa y Actuaciones, 115.

13. Interviews with IRA members conducted by the author, Belfast and Derry, January 2000 and March 2002.

14. Brian Walker, “Web of Terror: The Blame in Spain,” Belfast Telegraph, May 22, 2002.

15. Gerry Adams, president of Sinn Féin and a key IRA leader since the 1970s, has paid several visits to the Basque Country. Other Sinn Féin politicians have also endorsed some of Batasuna's initiatives, such as Alex Maskey's presence in the Basque Country at the launch of an official document in January 2002.

16. Maria McGuire, To Take Arms (New York: The Viking Press, 1973), 74.

17. Author interview with Sean O'Callaghan, London, February 1997.

18. Mary Fitzgerald, “ETA Admits Ties with Provos. Terror Groups Help Each Other, Says Basque Ex-Leader,” Belfast Telegraph, May 20, 2002.

19. Fernando Iturribarría, “La justicia francesa prueba la conexión entre el terrorista ‘Carlos’ y ETA pm,” El Correo, April 8, 2007.

20. Domínguez, De la negociación a la tregua, 76.

21. Andrés Casinello, “ETA y el problema vasco” (paper, 1984 Seminar on International Terrorism, organized in Madrid by the Instituto de Cuestiones Internacionales).

22. For a more detailed description of the contacts with some of these countries, see Domínguez, De la negociación a la tregua, 124–127; and Domínguez, Las conexiones de ETA en América.

23. Juan de Dios Colmenero, “ETA se financia en Iberoamérica,” La Clave, July 2–8, 2004, 14–17.

24. Juzgado Central de Instrucción número 6, Audiencia Nacional, Sumario 75/09 (DP 263/08), Auto de procesamiento, February 24, 2010.

25. For a thorough analysis of the complex system of organizations linked to ETA, their actions, and the nature of such a relationship, see José Manuel Mata, El nacionalismo vasco radical. Discurso, organizaciones y expresiones (Bilbao: Universidad del País Vasco, 1993).

26. The banning of Batasuna by the Spanish judicial system was backed up by the European Human Rights Tribunal in June 2009. On the rationale behind the banning of ETA's political wing, see Rogelio Alonso and Fernando Reinares, “Terrorism, Human Rights and Law Enforcement in Spain,” Terrorism and Political Violence 17, no. 1/2 (2005): 265–278, 270–272. On the damaging effect that the banning has had for ETA, see Rogelio Alonso, “The Challenges for Democracy and Legitimacy while Confronting Terrorism in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country,” in The Consequences of Counterterrorist Policies in Democracies, ed. Martha Crenshaw (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2010), 213–254.

27. To this extent, the involvement of certain figures who have shown a deep lack of knowledge of the causes and consequences of ETA's terrorism has been notorious. Consequently, they have aligned themselves with ETA's agenda, becoming conveyors of the terrorist group's propaganda. Father Alec Reid, who acted as an intermediary between the IRA and the British government, and Brian Currin, who was part of the board that supervised the early release of terrorist prisoners in Northern Ireland, are probably the best examples. On their damaging role in the Basque Country, see Rogelio Alonso, “Pathways Out of Terrorism in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country: The Misrepresentation of the Irish model,” Terrorism and Political Violence 16, no. 4 (2004): 695–713; and Rogelio Alonso, “Políticas Antiterroristas y procesos de paz: ¿Qué papel y qué consecuencias para las víctimas del terrorismo?,” in Las víctimas del terrorismo en el discurso politico, ed. Rogelio Alonso and Cristina Cuesta (Madrid: Editorial Dilex, 2006).

28. Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights, Report by Mr Alvaro Gil Robles, Commissioner for Human Rights, On His Visit to Spain and the Basque Country, 5–8 February 2001, for the Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, CommDH, March 9, 2001), 2.

29. In 1991, ETA activist Ángel María Ezquerra Andueza was arrested in possession of one of these documents (Kemen, no. 37, 1978). More documents on this issue were found in possession of other ETA activists arrested in March 1998.

30. Civil and Political Rights, Including the Question of Torture and Detention. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Question of Torture, Theo van Boven. Addendum. Visit to Spain (Geneva: United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Sixtieth session, E/CN.4/2004/56/Add.2, February 6, 2004).

31. It should be mentioned that ETA has often used television footage to identify their targets. Spanish police discovered TV footage of a raid in Cahors (France) in which three ETA members were arrested with 500 kilos of explosives. The policemen who were coming in and out of the raided house had been identified as targets by ETA's activists.

32. The exchange of messages between ETA and the Spanish government delivered by Pérez Esquivel is summarized in Domínguez, Josu Ternera. Una vida en ETA, 248–252.

33. In March 2006 ETA declared a “permanent ceasefire” that was “officially” ended in June 2007. For the duration of the truce the terrorist group had remained active, continuing with the economic extortion of individuals and the acquisition of weapons and explosives. In December 2006 a bomb detonated by ETA at Madrid's international airport killed two people.

34. Javier Pagola, “Sectores de Batasuna alardean de la ‘victoria de ETA’ tras el apoyo de la UE al ‘proceso’,” Abc, November 1, 2006.

35. John Bew, Martyn Frampton, and Iñigo Gurruchaga, Talking to Terrorists. Making Peace in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country (London: C. Hurst & Company, 2009); Alonso, “Pathways Out of Terrorism in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country.”

36. Alonso, “Pathways Out of Terrorism in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country.”

37. These were the words of prominent IRA figures. See An Phoblacht/Republican News, December 17, 1998; and The Guardian, July 13, 1999. Some examples of the distorted interpretation of the Northern Ireland process put forth by Basque nationalists with the aim of adopting a favorable model for the Basque context can be seen in Iker Gallastegi, “Sinn Féin y Herri Batasuna,” Gara, February 22, 2004; Teresa Toda, “Si por Garzón fuera, en Irlanda no habría paz,” Gara, February 19, 2002; and “ETA censura la falta de una declaración de Downing Street,” Gara, January 30, 2002.

38. Alonso, The IRA and Armed Struggle.

39. One of Batasuna's leaders stated in the past that “Ireland was a mirror for us,” adding that “so was the Republican movement,” because although “negotiation was always regarded here in the Basque Country as suspect ... Sinn Féin and the Republican movement showed us that negotiation did not have to lead to political treachery. If it could happen in Ireland, why not in the Basque Country?” Paddy Woodworth, “Basque Leader Sees Peace Process as Way Forward,” The Irish Times, October 31, 1998.

40. David Sharrock, “ETA Sets Foot on Road That Led to Ulster Deal,” The Guardian, August 22, 1998.

41. George Mitchell, Making Peace. The Inside Story of the Making of the Good Friday Agreement (London: William Heinemann, 1999); Mary-Alice C. Clancy, Peace Without Consensus: Power Sharing Politics in Northern Ireland (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2010).

42. David Sharrock and Mark Davenport, Man of War. Man of Peace? The Unauthorised Biography of Gerry Adams (London: Macmillan, 1997), 319–31; Clancy, Peace Without Consensus.

43. Vasco Press, Crónica de Documentacion y Actualidad, no. 1281, 2006. At the same time, the Basque president, nationalist Juan José Ibarretxe, set up various groups of “international experts and mediators” to lobby in favor of negotiating with ETA and Batasuna.

44. Author's interview with member of Spanish intelligence service, Madrid, September 2010.

45. Adrian Guelke, “‘Comparatively Peaceful’: South Africa, the Middle East and Northern Ireland,” in A Farewell to Arms? From ‘Long War’ to Long Peace in Northern Ireland, ed. Adrian Guelke (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 223–233; Padraig O'Malley, “Northern Ireland and South Africa: ‘Hope and History at a Crossroads,’” in Northern Ireland and the Divided World. Post Agreement Northern Ireland in Comparative Perspective, ed. John McGarry (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 276–308.

46. See, for example, Henry Patterson, Ireland Since 1939 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 128–31, 160–61, 192–99; Bob Purdie, Politics in the Streets. The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement in Northern Ireland (Belfast: The Blackstaff Press, 1990), 156–157, 245–246.

47. Quoted in Mark Hennessy, “Republicans Woo Young Voters with Softer Image,” The Irish Times, July 31, 2001.

48. See for example, Florencio Domínguez, “Currin, el enterao,” El Correo, August 17, 2010.

49. Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos, Sección quinta, Asunto Herri Batasuna y Batasuna c. España. Demandas, nos. 28503/04 et 25817/04. Sentencia Estrasburgo, June 30, 2009.

50. Jone Lurgain,“El proceso en Batasuna es irreversible,” Deia, February 24, 2010.

51. Jone Lurgain, “No es esencial la declaración pública de un alto el fuego de ETA, asumidos los principios Mitchell,” Deia, February 25, 2010.

52. These principles were not respected by the parties to which they applied. An Independent Monitoring Commission was set up to assess the terrorist group's adherence to their ceasefires and to guarantee that the political parties linked to the terrorists groups collaborated actively so that decommissioning was achieved. However, the Commission constantly refused to respect its own guidelines, thus accepting the terrorist group's constant breach of their ceasefires and the parties' lack of collaboration with the Commission. The Commission, very much like the Mitchell principles, was mainly a fig leaf for the British government to get off the hook for the demand for real decommissioning. At the same time, decommissioning became a very useful tool for Gerry Adams to try to extract concessions from the British government. See Ed Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA (London: Penguin, 2002).

53. See, for example, “El precio de la paz,” El País, May 14, 2005, and “¿Una salida para el conflicto vasco?,” El País, January 20, 2007. Both articles were written by Vicenç Fisas, who claims, implausibly, to have analyzed “all the negotiation processes that exist in the world.”

54. Data reported in Euskobarómetro, a regular survey conducted by the Department of Political Science and Public Administration at the University of the Basque Country, at http://www.ehu.es/euskobarometro/ (accessed April 19, 2011). The survey conducted in 2008 revealed that full explicit support for ETA amounted to only 1%; even among those who declared themselves to be voters of the political wing of ETA, such support was extremely low at 2%. This very low percentage has remained since then.

55. Francisco Llera, Los Vascos y la Política. El proceso político vasco: elecciones, partidos, opinión pública y legitimación en el País Vasco, 1977–1992 (Bilbao: Universidad del País Vasco, 1994), 97–119; Juan J. Linz, Conflicto en Euskadi (Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 1986), 617–665.

56. This is the unambiguous verdict reached by regular surveys and studies of Basque public opinion. See Euskobarómetro. Estudio periódico de la opinión pública vasca, Political Science and Public Administration Department, University of the Basque Country, Bilbao.

57. From 1983 to 1987, a terrorist campaign was carried out against suspected members and supporters of ETA by a shadowy organization known as GAL (Grupo Antiterrorista de Liberación), resulting in the killing of 27 individuals. This illegal group was secretly formed by police officials who recruited mercenary assassins from among organized criminals in France and Portugal. Spain proved to be a functioning democratic regime, and the rule of law was finally applied to the policemen, gangsters, and some politicians belonging to the Socialist Party who were involved. They received severe court sentences for their illegal activities as part of GAL. Families of their victims received monetary compensation through funds from the State budget, the same procedure as in the case of relatives whose loved ones were killed by other terrorist organizations, including ETA. For an analysis of GAL, see Paddy Woodworth, Dirty Wars, Clean Hands: ETA, the GAL and Spanish Democracy (Cork: Cork University Press, 2001).

58. See, for example, how in January 2007 a report by the Northern Ireland Police Ombudsman found that officers from the Royal Ulster Constabulary's (RUC) Special Branch protected informants inside Loyalist terrorist groups and failed to stop them committing up to 15 murders. In March 2008 an independent police team investigating this web of collusion between Loyalist terrorists and the Special Branch discovered that the amount of murders could be higher. In 2001 Canadian judge Peter Cory was commissioned to investigate controversial killings in which collusion of security forces in Northern Ireland was suspected. The murder of Pat Finucane in February 1989 was one of the cases. In 2003 the Stevens Inquiry, headed by Sir John Stevens, the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, had already declared that there had been collusion and that the death could have been prevented. Judge Cory also looked into killings committed by the IRA that gave rise to allegations that republicans had been assisted by security leaks from the Republic of Ireland.

59. Michael Ignatieff, The Warrior's Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience (London: Vintage, 1998), 104.

60. Examples of these erroneous generalizations can be found in Fisas, “El precio de la paz,” and “¿Una salida para el conflicto vasco?.”

61. Interview with Father Alec Reid published in El Periódico de Cataluña, March 23, 2007. Father Alec Reid was implausibly described as “a key figure in the attempts to prevent the peace process from collapsing” in Alfonso Daniels, “ETA Now Ready to Give Up the Gun,” The Observer, March 19, 2006. Reid's pronouncements have frequently legitimized ETA at the expense of its victims; see interviews with Reid in El Mundo, January 30, 2007; El Correo, May 20, 2002; and El Correo, December 28, 2005.

62. See, for example, José Zalaquett, “Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation: Lessons for the International Community,” in Comparative Peace Processes in Latin America, ed. Cynthia J. Arnson (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1999), 341–61.

63. See Ramón Sola, “Los consejos de expertos que Zapatero no quiso oír,” Gara, June 6, 2007.

64. Ibid.

65. Gara, October 31, 2004.