European–Mediterranean Security and the Arab Spring: Changes and Challenges

Abstract

The policy of the European Union (EU) toward the Mediterranean has undergone two main metamorphoses during the last 25 years. In 1995, it started from a collective security idea with the Barcelona Process, but due to the poor success of this collective approach, it underwent a “realist turn” with the creation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2004. The Arab Spring in 2011, by questioning authoritarianism, influenced the perception of what is recognized as a security problem and who can define it. The authoritarian rulers and their supporting security forces are now challenged by their populations, and societal circumstances are so unstable that nearly every domestic problem can be politically given a spin to become a security risk. Aside from this, violent conflicts and civil wars demand an answer from the EU. In this situation, the EU's answer to the Arab Spring does not directly respond to the changing security situation in the Mediterranean. It emphasizes domestic democracy and civil society but does not take up the potential risk discourses. Concerning violent conflicts, the EU as a community is not at all active in the region but leaves this field to its member states, NATO, the Arab League, and the United Nations. Thus, the perceptions, ideas, and needs of Mediterranean security between the EU and the Southern partner states still differ harshly and seem to disregard the risk dimension of the Mediterranean security problems in this period of Arab transition.

Keywords:

• Arab Spring
• European Neighbourhood Policy
• European Union External Relations
• Mediterranean Security

Notes

1. A coherent and vibrant debate about democracy and security in the Mediterranean is largely absent; rather, we find three different strands, relevant for the academic understanding of the problem but unconnected in their debates: First, the area studies debate about authoritarian rule in the Arab countries and the upheavals against it; see, e.g., Ann M. Lesch, “Democracy in Doses: Mubarak Launches His Second Term as President.” Arab Studies Quarterly 11: 87–107 (1989); Ann M. Lesch, “Egypt's Spring: Causes of the Revolution.” Middle East Policy 18: 35–48 (2011); Karl Yambert, ed., The Contemporary Middle East: A Westview Reader (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2006); Oliver Schlumberger, ed., Debating Arab Authoritarianism: Dynamics and Durability in Nondemocratic Regimes (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007); Holger Albrecht and Oliver Schlumberger, “‘Waiting for Godot’: Regime Change without Democratization in the Middle East.” International Political Science Review 25: 371–392 (2004); Bahgat Korany and Rabab El-Mahdi ed., “Arab Spring in Egypt: Revolution and Beyond” (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2012). Related is the paradigm of the missing third wave of democratization in the Arab world; see Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). Second, the debate about the more or less effective democracy and value promotion by EU politics toward the region; see, e.g., Richard Gillespie and Richard Youngs, eds., The European Union and Democracy Promotion: The Case of North Africa (London: Cass, 2002); Richard Gillespie, A Political Agenda for Regional-Building? The EMP and Democracy Promotion in North Africa (Brussels: Institute of European Studies, 2004); Michelle Pace, “The Construction of EU Normative Power.” Journal of Common Market Studies 45: 1041–1064 (2007); Federica Bicchi, “‘Our Size Fits All’: Normative Power Europe and the Mediterranean.” Journal of European Public Policy 13: 286–303 (2006); Annette Jünemann and Michèle Knodt, eds., Externe Demokratieförderung durch die Europäische Union = European External Democracy Promotion (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2007); Federica Bicchi, “Democracy Assistance in the Mediterranean: An Overview.” Mediterranean Politics 14: 61–78 (2009). Third, the discussion about the Mediterranean as a security region or as a security community with special security risks and a distinct interest constellation, which is led but sporadically; see, e.g., Attinà (this issue); Raffaella A. Del Sarto, Contested State Identities and Regional Security in the Euro-Mediterranean Area (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Antonio Marquina, “From Cooperative Security to Security Partnership in the Mediterranean,” in Hans Günter Brauch et al., ed., Security and Environment in the Mediterranean: Conceptualising Security and Environmental Conflicts (Berlin: Springer, 2003), 309–317; Peter Seeberg, ed., EU and the Mediterranean: Foreign Policy and Security (Odense: University Press of Southern Denmark, 2007); Fred Tanner, “The Euro-Mediterranean Security Partnership: Prospects for Arms Limitation and Confidence-building.” Mediterranean Politics 5: 189–206 (2000).

2. See Ernst-Otto Czempiel, Friedensstrategien: Eine systematische Darstellung außenpolitischer Theorien von Machiavelli bis Madariaga (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1998), 147–148.

3. This article assumes that any security situation is based on the perceptions of the participating actors and thus a function of all actors and interests involved. In this respect, we follow a constructivist idea. But these actors not only create a framework of perceptions; these perceptions lead to rhetorical and political actions that re-form reality and constitute new circumstances of security. In this perspective, any security perception leads to manifestations in real actions and can be reflected in accordance with non-constructivist theories.

4. See W. B. Gallie, “Essentially Contested Concepts.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56: 167–198 (1956).

5. See Paul D. Williams, ed., Security Studies: An Introduction (London: Routledge, 2008); Christopher Daase, Der erweiterte Sicherheitsbegriff (Working Paper 1/2010, Frankfurt am Main: Projekt Sicherheitskultur im Wandel, Goethe-Universität, 2010).

6. See Ole Wæver, “Securitization and Desecuritization,” in Ronnie D. Lipschutz, ed., On Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 46–86.

7. See Hans Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Knopf, 1948); Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

8. European Council, A Secure Europe in a Better World—The European Security Strategy, approved by the European Council held in Brussels on December 12, 2003 and drafted under the responsibilities of the EU High Representative Javier Solana (Brussels, 2003). http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf (accessed February 14, 2013).

9. This article relies empirically on 43 structured interviews, which mainly took place in Egypt between September 2008 and January 2012. Most interviews for this article took place during 2011. The author interviewed officials of the EU's embassy (before the introduction of the EEA: delegation of the Commission); Egyptian officials from the ministry of foreign affairs, Egyptian political and economic experts (journalists and university professors), citizens (of vigilante committees and small businessmen), and youth activists.

10. See Dominic Fenech, “The Relevance of European Security Structures to the Mediterranean (and Vice Versa).” Mediterranean Politics 2: 149–176 (1997); Andreas Marchetti, ed., The CSCE as a Model to Transform Western Relations with the Greater Middle East (Bonn: ZEI, 2004).

11. Marquina, “From Cooperative Security to Security Partnership in the Mediterranean.”

12. See Interviews with Egyptian Officials from the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on February 15, 2010, December 9, 2010, and October 17, 2011; Interviews with Egyptian Experts on Egyptian and International Politics on June 2, 2008, September 17, 2009, and October 3, 2011.

13. See Huntington, The Third Wave.

14. See Fulvio Attinà, “The Barcelona Process, the Role of the European Union and the Lesson of the Western Mediterranean,” in Michael Bonner, Megan Reif, and Mark Tessler, eds., Islam, Democracy and the State in Algeria: Lessons for the Western Mediterranean and Beyond (London: Routledge, 2005), 140–152; Fulvio Attinà, “EU Relations with the Southern Mediterranean Neighbours.” Intereconomics 42: 196–200 (2007).

15. See Steffen Wippel, The Agadir Agreement and Open Regionalism (Lisbon: EuroMeSCo, 2005).

16. See Karl W. Deutsch, Political Community at the International Level (New York: Doubleday, 1954); Joseph S. Nye, “Collective Economic Security.” International Affairs 50: 584–598 (1974); Barry Buzan, People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991).

17. This behavior cannot even be described as realist since it lacks clear orientation toward national interest. It rather indicated that many Arab states used the Israel–Palestine conflict as an ideological tool to avoid serious political cooperation.

18. See Commission of the European Communities (2004) European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper, Communication from the Commission, COM(2004) 373 final (Brussels, 12 May 2004).

19. President of the European Commission, Sharing Stability and Prosperity. Speech by Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission, at the Tempus MEDA Regional Conference, Alexandria, October 13, 2003. http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/03/458 (accessed February 14, 2013).

20. European Council, A Secure Europe in a Better World.

21. See Commission of the European Communities, A Strong European Neighbourhood Policy, Communication from the Commission, COM(2007) 774 final (Brussels, December 5, 2007).

22. See Thomas Demmelhuber, “The Trap of Competing Policy Concepts: The European Union and Illegal Migration in the Southern Mediterranean.” International Journal of Human Rights 15: 813–826 (2011); Christian Kaunert, “The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: The Construction of a ‘European Public Order.’” European Security 14: 459–483 (2005).

23. See interviews with EU officials from the embassy of the EU/delegation of the European Commission on December 18, 2010 and March 23, 2011.

24. While a broad approach of political cooperation, including the human rights and democratization agenda, was still part of the European Neighborhood Policy, economic cooperation and trade liberalization unfolded considerably more impact than political dialogue. The latter was channeled by the domestic partners in the ministries, and thus a deeper impact on core institutions like the Ministry of the Interior could not be reached (interview with EU official from the embassy of the EU, April 16, 2011 and June 16, 2011).

25. Interviews with EU officials from the embassy of the EU/delegation of the European Commission on December 28, 2010 and June 16, 2011.

26. President of the European Council, Statement by Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council, on the Developments in the EU's Southern Neighbourhood, Press, PCE 048/11 (Prague: European Council, February 23, 2011).

27. European Commissioner Responsible for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy (2011) Statement by Commissioner Štefan Füle on Egypt, SPEECH/11/111 (Strasbourg: Plenary Session of the European Parliament, February 16, 2011).

28. President of the European Commission, Statement by President Barroso on the Situation in North Africa, SPEECH/11/137 (Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, March 2, 2011).

29. European Commission High Representative, Remarks by the EU High Representative Catherine Ashton at the Senior Officials' Meeting on Egypt and Tunisia, Press, A 069/11 (Brussels: European Union, February 23, 2011).

30. European Commission High Representative, A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean, Joint Communication to the European Council, the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM(2011) 200 final (Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, March 8, 2011).

31. European Commission High Representative, A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood, Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM (2011) 303 (Brussels: May 25, 2011).

32. See interviews with EU officials from the embassy of the European Union/delegation of the European Commission on December 18 2010, March 23, 2011, April 14, 2011, June 18, 2011, March 7, 2011, March 22, 2011 and interviews with former EU officials on May 24 2011 and January 5, 2012.

33. See interviews with Egyptian officials from the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on October 19, 2011; with former Egyptian diplomat March 3, 2010; Interview with Egyptian Expert on Egyptian and International Politics on April 18, 2011; interview with EU official from the embassy of the European Union/delegation of the European Commission on June 19, 2011.

34. Western perceptions question in how far the Egyptian upheaval of January and February 2011 can be characterized as a revolution. It is also a major point of discussion in Egyptian political science whether the year 2011 can be seen to mark the start of a revolutionary phase in Egyptian history. However, this article applies the most common known phrase used by Egyptians themselves who call their protests for democracy and dignity a “revolution” or the “Egyptian revolution.”

35. Interview with the head of the German KfW Development Bank, Cairo Branch, September 18, 2008, who elaborated on the important role of Egypt for the German and European initiatives on water, renewable energies, and wind power. He underscored the economic relevance of Egypt for the European export business in the sectors mentioned.

36. The notorious Egyptian State Security Investigations Service (SSI; Mabahith Amn ad-Dawla) was the highest-ranking national investigating authority in Egypt, reporting to the Ministry of the Interior and assigned to control all kind of opposition groups. SSI was dissolved on March 15, 2011 and replaced by the Egyptian homeland security.

37. Two salient examples for abuse and torture by the security forces, directed at females in particular: First, the virginity tests imposed on female demonstrators from Tahir Square from March 2011, which became an issue of public discussion by the prosecution relying on the case of Ms. Samira Ibrahim (Egypt Independent, January 3, 2012); second, the arrest of the journalist and blogger Mona Eltahawy in November 2011, who was kept in the Ministry of the Interior for 12 hours and was released with a broken arm and a broken hand and testified that she was harshly sexually harassed (The Guardian, November 24, 2011).

38. Interviews with Egyptian Experts on Egyptian Politics, January 21, 2012 and March 12, 2012.

39. Several interviews with Egyptian citizens active in vigilante committees in various Cairo districts on their experiences in neighborhood watches, i.e., El Maadi, March 21, 2011, Garden City, April 9, 2011, Heliopolis, March 4, 2011, Mohandessin, March 10, 2011, Doqqi, February 19, 2011, Giza, May 2, 2011.

40. Interview with Egyptian activist on February 21, 2011 and members of an El Maadi vigilante committee on March 21, 2011; both sources state independently that the arms trade in the first days of the revolution must have increased the possession of small arms by Egyptian private persons considerably; there are still no estimations how many private persons and households possess small arms now. They assume that most arms were sold by members of the security forces.

41. Official data on crime rates for Egypt in the years 2010 to 2012 are as of yet unavailable, neither from national authorities, nor from international sources, like the UN, governmental and non-governmental organizations. After the revolution, rumors about a considerable increase in crime during the first months after the revolution have been circulating, and transparency concerning sexual harassment, rape and the abuse of power by police forces has increased. As an effect of the economic downturn, the rate of petty crime appears to have risen. Still, currently there is no hard evidence for a significantly higher crime rate since the revolution.

42. Several interviews with Egyptian citizens on September 11, 2011, September 26, 2011, October 4, 2011, October 21, 2011, November 9, 2011, November 23, 2011, December 2, 2011; the call for more security and protection comes especially from small and medium sized enterprises who call for calmer circumstances and a stop of protests; interviews with entrepreneurs on November 18, 2011, November 22, 2011, November 25, 2011, November 26, 2011.

43. International Monetary Fund (IMF), Middle East and North Africa: Economic Outlook and Key Challenges, Deauville Partnership Ministerial Meeting, April 20, 2012, Washington, DC.

44. Estimation by several Egyptian economic experts, interviews on June 24, 2011, October 17, 2011, December 23, 2011.

45. Interviews with several Egyptian citizens on the increased numbers of strikes for higher wages (November 16, 2011 and December 18, 2011 and with Egyptian economic experts, interviews on June 24, 2011, October 17, 2011, December 23, 2011.

46. See Al Arabiya News, June 21–22, 2012, BBC World News,June 18, 2012, Al Jazeera English, June 19, 2012.