Rules for Rebels: The Science of Victory in Militant History

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Correction Statement

This article has been republished with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

Notes

1. Paul V. Collier, V. L. Elliott, Håvard Hegre, Anke Hoeffler, Marta Reynal-Querol, and Nicholas Sambanis, Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy (Washington, DC: World Bank; Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).

2. Max Abrahms, “Why Terrorism Does Not Work,” International Security 31, no. 2 (2006): 42–78.

3. Max Abrahms and Matthew S. Gottfried, “Does Terrorism Pay? An Empirical Analysis,” Terrorism and Political Violence 28, no. 1 (2016): 72–89.

4. Max Abrahms, “What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism Strategy,” International Security 32, no. 4 (2008): 78–105.

5. Max Abrahms and Philip B.K. Potter, “Explaining Terrorism: Leadership Deficits and Militant Group Tactics,” International Organization 69, no. 2 (2015): 311–342.

6. Max Abrahms, Rules for Rebels: The Science of Victory in Militant History. (New York: Oxford University Press), 18–19.

7. Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy M. Weinstein, “Handling and Manhandling Civilians in Civil War,” American Political Science Review 100, no. 3 (2006): 429–447.

8. Jeremy M. Weinstein, Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

9. Max Abrahms, Rules for Rebels: The Science of Victory in Militant History. (New York: Oxford University Press), 8, 26–39.

10. Ibid., 55–60.

11. Ibid., 9, 101–112.

12. Max Abrahms, “What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism Strategy,” International Security 32, no. 4 (2008): 78–105.

13. Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy M. Weinstein, “Handling and Manhandling Civilians in Civil War,” American Political Science Review 100, no. 3 (2006): 429–447.

14. Max Abrahms, Rules for Rebels: The Science of Victory in Militant History. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 101–112.

15. Ibid., 115–123.

16. Ibid., 126–149.

17. Ibid., 9, 169–180.

18. Ibid., 9, 181–197.

19. Virginia Page Fortna, “Do Terrorists Win? Rebels’ Use of Terrorism and Civil War Outcomes,” International Organization 69, no. 3 (2015): 519–556.

20. Stathis N. Kalyvas, “The Paradox of Terrorism in Civil War,” The Journal of Ethics 8, no. 1 (2004): 97–138.

21. Laia Balcells and Stathis N. Kalyvas, “Does Warfare Matter? Severity, Duration, and Outcome of Civil Wars,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 58, no. 8 (2014): 1390–1418.

22. Virginia Page Fortna, “Do Terrorists Win? Rebels’ Use of Terrorism and Civil War Outcomes,” International Organization 69, no. 3 (2015): 519–556.

23. Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

24. T. David Mason, “Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, and the Rational Peasant,” Public Choice 86, no. 1–2 (1996): 63–84.

25. Benjamin A. Valentino, “Why We Kill: The Political Science of Political Violence against Civilians,” Annual Review of Political Science 17, (2014): 89–103.

26. Reed M. Wood, “Rebel Capability and Strategic Violence against Civilians,” Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 5 (2010): 601–614.

27. Benjamin A. Valentino, “Why We Kill: The Political Science of Political Violence against Civilians,” Annual Review of Political Science 17, (2014): 89–103.

28. Virginia Page Fortna, “Do Terrorists Win? Rebels’ Use of Terrorism and Civil War Outcomes,” International Organization 69, no. 3 (2015): 519–556.

29. Paul Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001).

30. Audrey Kurth Cronin, “The ‘FTO List’ and Congress: Sanctioning Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” (Library of Congress Washington D.C. Congressional Research Service, 2003).

31. Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006).

32. Julie B. Shapiro, “The Politicization of the Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations: The Effect of the Separation of Powers,” 6 Cardozo Public Law, Policy, & Ethnics Journal 547, (2008): 554–556.