Cover Driving Gracefully. On the Aesthetic Appreciation of Cricket

Abstract

In this essay I argue against what I call ‘functionalist claims’ that the aesthetic appreciation of cricket, and sport more generally, can be reduced to or is subordinate to the putative purpose of the game, namely winning. Such claims, I contend, rest on a certain dubious Kantian-inspired dichotomy between aesthetic and functionalist values that ought to be rejected. In the course of criticizing these views I discuss the nature of aesthetic versus non-aesthetic assessments, including the salient differences and similarities between art and sport; the relationship between the cognitive and affective elements involved in the aesthetic appreciation of cricket; and the normative nature of the aesthetic judgements made. Appealing to the concept of ‘play’ and to Kant's account of aesthetic appreciation I argue, firstly, that the essential nature of cricket appreciation, qua cricket, just is aesthetic; secondly, that a proper, full appreciation of the game requires a particular type of aesthetic understanding, kinaesthetic and imaginative in nature, which, I suggest, can be illuminated further by appealing to the rich account of C.L.R. James.

Notes

 [1] Cardus, The Essential Neville Cardus, 154–6. Or again:

when does a batsman who commands all the strokes and plays them rapidly and scores 300 in a day in a Test match, when does he cease to be an artist and degenerate into a ‘machine’? I suppose this unintelligent objection to Bradman is much the same as the objection to Bach; it is excusable in fallible humanity to regard the illusion of mastery as bloodless and remote and automatic. But Bradman, like Bach … is full of blood; no other batsman today is as audacious as Bradman … Bradman has not allowed enormous skill to ruin the salt touch of his original self.' (Ibid.)

And compare C.L.R. James on the same topic: ‘George Hedley has explained to me that people speak of Sir Donald's heavy scoring as if each and every great batsman was able to do the same, but refrained for aesthetic or chivalrous reasons which Sir Donald ignored’ (James, Beyond a Boundary, 189).

 [2] There was, for instance, some doubt about Bradman's ability on bad or ‘wet’ pitches.

 [3] See James, Beyond a Boundary, Chapter 16.

 [4] And, where relevant, first-class cricket, as shall be made clear in the course of the discussion.

 [5] Kant, The Critique of Judgement, #4 Akadmie 207. Not that for Kant, the good here applies to (a) moral good, (b) instrumental worth – when the object serves as the means to satisfy some purpose that we desire – and (c) the perfection of an object – when we value an object as a good one of its kind.

 [6] Cohen, ‘Sports and Art: Beginning Questions’, 263.

 [7] Cf. James, Beyond a Boundary, 208f.

 [8] Best, ‘The Aesthetic in Sport’, 205.

 [9] For an in-depth discussion of the various aspects of this problem, see Cohen, ‘Sports and Art: Beginning Questions’.

[10] This is a relatively neglected field in aesthetics. For some relevant literature see McAllister, ‘Recent Work on Aesthetics of Science’.

[11] Note, however, the value-laden connotations of terms such as ‘orthodox’ and ‘classic’.

[12] Sibley, ‘Aesthetic Concepts’, 64.

[13] This is combined with the condition that a particular non-aesthetic description of a work might imply that a particular term could not be correctly applied aesthetically. We shall not discuss this condition here. These claims are made throughout Sibley, ‘Aesthetic Concepts’, and ‘Aesthetic and Non-aesthetic’. See in particular ‘Aesthetic and Non-aesthetic’, 136–40.

[14] Compare Urmson's interesting observation: ‘If a thing looks to have a characteristic which is desirable from another point of view, its looking so is a proper ground of aesthetic appreciation. What makes the appreciation aesthetic is that it is concerned with a thing's looking somehow without concern for whether it really is like that.’ Quoted in Cohen, ‘Sports and Art: Beginning Questions’, 265.

[15] For a more detailed account of the relevant similarities and differences, see Roberts, ‘Sport, Art, and Particularity’.

[16] See Cordner, ‘Grace and Functionality’.

[17] See Cordner, ‘Grace and Functionality’, 305.

[18] Kupfer, ‘Sport – The Body Electric’, 460. Cf. James, Beyond a Boundary: ‘There have been many bowlers whose method of delivery has seemed to spectators the perfection of form, irrespective of the fate which befell the balls bowled’ (207).

[19] See Kupfer, ‘Sport – The Body Electric’, 458ff for fuller discussion: ‘But this is sports, after all, and not dance, so we have an eye for results. Because appearance is connected with measurement, we implicitly judge that the herky-jerky performer would have done even better were he more fluid. Grace really is efficient; the aesthetic value of continuous rhythmic movement has a measurable payoff.’

[20] See also Best, ‘The Aesthetic in Sport’, 204f:

However successful a sportsman may be in achieving the principal aim of his particular activity, our aesthetic acclaim is reserved for him who achieves it with maximum economy and efficiency of effort … Nevertheless, the highest aesthetic satisfaction is experienced and given by the sportsman who not only performs with graceful economy but who also achieves his purpose … Maximum aesthetic success still requires the attainment of the end, and the aesthetic in any degree requires direction on to that end.

[21] The argument occurs most clearly in Best, ‘The Aesthetic in Sport’, but see also Best, ‘The Aesthetic and the Artistic’. I have endeavoured here to make the argument clearer than Best himself manages in these two papers.

[22] That is, he thinks that aesthetic interest is equivalent to interest in the manner, or way something is done: ‘when we are considering a work of art from the aesthetic point of view we are not considering it in relation to some external function or purpose it serves. The work of art cannot be evaluated aesthetically according to its degree of success in achieving some such extrinsic end. By contrast when a painting, for instance, is considered from the point of view of an investment, then it is assessed in relation to an extrinsic end.’ (Best, ‘The Aesthetic in Sport’, 198).

[23] ‘Now in cases where such an extrinsic end is the primary consideration, evaluation does depend on it’ (Ibid., 199).

[24] It is ‘a relatively unimportant aspect of the activity’ (Ibid., 201).

[25] It is ‘a relatively unimportant aspect of the activity’ (Ibid., 201), 199.

[26] It is ‘a relatively unimportant aspect of the activity’ (Ibid., 201), 201.

[27] To take just one example, Ricky Ponting in a recent interview places a firm emphasis on the value of entertainment – though of course not at the expense of winning. In any case, unlike others not so fortunately placed, he has the luxury of being able to think of entertaining while winning looks after itself: http://uk.cricinfo.com/db/ARCHIVE/ CRICKET_NEWS/2004/SEP/036771_WCM_03SEP2004.html. See also Kupfer, ‘Sport – The Body Electric’, 461f. Moreover, it could be argued that participants themselves would generally prefer to win playing well, and in an aesthetically pleasing manner – whether or not this is because of inherent competitive advantages that an aesthetically pleasing manner may or may not instil.

[28] For note that Best holds that where the ends cannot be identified apart from the means, as in art, assessment of the ends just will be assessment of the means, and hence will be necessarily aesthetic; for ‘aesthetic interest’ here means no more than ‘interest in the manner in which something is achieved’. In this way, aesthetic evaluation of cricket – defined as the assessment of the means – could be held to be necessarily subordinate to the attainment of the end. The very nature of the activity, qua purposive, would logically discount the possibility of aesthetic evaluation being the primary type of evaluation in our appreciation of competitive sports. This could be used to justify either of his two conclusions. Of course, if ‘aesthetic’ simply means here the way the game is played, we might legitimately baulk at such a usage given that the way the game is played might refer to moral qualities, such as the manifestation of the virtues of sportsmanship and virtuous play, or other elements of appreciation that are not necessarily aesthetic. See below.

[29] A point made well by Roberts, ‘Sport, Art, and Particularity’.

[30] As Roberts has pointed out, the ‘description “that a goal was scored” tells us no more about the goal scored than does the description “sadness is expressed” tell us about the sadness expressed’. Roberts, ‘Sport, Art, and Particularity’, 502.

[31] As Roberts has pointed out, the ‘description “that a goal was scored” tells us no more about the goal scored than does the description “sadness is expressed” tell us about the sadness expressed’. Roberts, ‘Sport, Art, and Particularity’, 502, 499.

[32] Kupfer, ‘Sport – The Body Electric’, 460.

[33] Kupfer, ‘Sport – The Body Electric’, 460, 460f. ‘Scoring/winning is not … an end which could be accomplished by some other means … because what it means ‘to score’ depends upon the particular kind of game being played … Obviously, scoring in tennis is defined by the structure of the game of tennis, and so on for other sports.’

[34] Kupfer, ‘Sport – The Body Electric’, 460, 461. Scoring is not a purpose of sport but is an end within the play of the game, in fact, created as part of the game. By confounding these two sorts (and loci) of purpose, people falsely conclude that the play in competitive sport is purposeful in the sense of serving an end external to it. See also: ‘It is just because competitive sports have internal purposes whose final result is scoring or the thwarting of a score that we come to think of them as purposeful – aimed at winning by outscoring the opponent(s).’ (460)

[35] Kupfer, ‘Sport – The Body Electric’, 460, 461. Scoring is not a purpose of sport but is an end within the play of the game, in fact, created as part of the game. By confounding these two sorts (and loci) of purpose, people falsely conclude that the play in competitive sport is purposeful in the sense of serving an end external to it. See also: ‘It is just because competitive sports have internal purposes whose final result is scoring or the thwarting of a score that we come to think of them as purposeful – aimed at winning by outscoring the opponent(s).’ (460), 462

[36] Kupfer, ‘Sport – The Body Electric’, 460, 461. Scoring is not a purpose of sport but is an end within the play of the game, in fact, created as part of the game. By confounding these two sorts (and loci) of purpose, people falsely conclude that the play in competitive sport is purposeful in the sense of serving an end external to it. See also: ‘It is just because competitive sports have internal purposes whose final result is scoring or the thwarting of a score that we come to think of them as purposeful – aimed at winning by outscoring the opponent(s).’ (460), 462, 463.

[37] Kupfer, ‘Sport – The Body Electric’, 460, 461. Scoring is not a purpose of sport but is an end within the play of the game, in fact, created as part of the game. By confounding these two sorts (and loci) of purpose, people falsely conclude that the play in competitive sport is purposeful in the sense of serving an end external to it. See also: ‘It is just because competitive sports have internal purposes whose final result is scoring or the thwarting of a score that we come to think of them as purposeful – aimed at winning by outscoring the opponent(s).’ (460), 462, 463, 461.

[38] Cf. Cohen, ‘Sports and Art: Beginning Questions’, 261: ‘a desire to win is an analytical component in playing a game. Of course this doesn't deny that you are playing baseball when you really don't care whether you win, or even when, as with me in a weekly game I play with children, you actually want the other team to win. It does mean that spectators and players understand the efforts of the players in terms of a presumed wish all round that the players win.’

[39] Kupfer, ‘Sport – The Body Electric’, 457.

[40] Both quoted in Tim De Lisle, ‘Not part of the modern world? You're joking’. Available at: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,13810-1126690,00.html.

[41] ‘As a result, like the nation's art galleries, no-one will ever be in the four-day game for money... The days when England's virtues could be encapsulated in terms of “cricket on the village green”, and “the tinkle of the hammer on the anvil” have long since vanished. And yet, as a nation, many still hanker after that image, and even to the non-aficionados, cricket remains a central tenet of the idyll.’ Andrew Miller, ‘Time for aesthetes to have their say’. Available at: http://content-usa-cricinfo.com/ci/content/story/138096.html

[42] A helpful way of realizing this, I think, is to supplement Kant's narrow notion of disinterestedness – which all too easily gives rise to the conservative, escapist, indulgent views of cricket cited above – with John Dewey's more comprehensive notion of aesthetic experience. I shall not, however, discuss this further.

[43] See James, Beyond a Boundary: ‘Cricket, of course, does not allow that representation or suggestion of specific relations as can be done by a play or even by ballet and dance’ (198).

[44] See James, Beyond a Boundary: ‘Cricket, of course, does not allow that representation or suggestion of specific relations as can be done by a play or even by ballet and dance’ (198), 196.

[45] See James, Beyond a Boundary: ‘Cricket, of course, does not allow that representation or suggestion of specific relations as can be done by a play or even by ballet and dance’ (198), 196, 197.

[46] Though they are of course in some sense less intense, just as are our emotional responses to fictional characters and situations.

[47] Though they are of course in some sense less intense, just as are our emotional responses to fictional characters and situations, 198. Cf. Tim de Lisle, directly countering the views of Henderson and Dodd just cited:

Test cricket today makes many series of the past … look turgid. Batsmen attack, fielders dive and slide, bowlers use reverse swing and mystery balls … It's a sport, not a bulwark against modernity … nostalgia has its place, but if it dominates, the game suffocates. To view cricket as an antidote to the crassness and superficiality of the modern world is to misread both the game and the world. Crassness and superficiality are not recent inventions. The snobbery of the mid-20^th century, with amateurs and professionals occupying separate dressing-rooms, was superficial to the point of being ugly. The batting was often cagey to the point of being crass … Hussain – obsessive, intense, outspoken, astute, sometimes self-absorbed – wasn't an antidote to the modern world. He was part of it. Available at: http://content-usa.cricinfo.com/columns/content/story/134945.htm.

[48] Though they are of course in some sense less intense, just as are our emotional responses to fictional characters and situations, 196.

[49] Nor, of course, need such sentiments be overwhelmingly positive. After all, cricket may equally be seen as a symbol of racial or political oppression, as elitist, and particular games might be held to be representative or expressive of various moral or political or social attributes, character or national virtues and vices.

[50] Take as an example a prima facie non-aesthetic judgement as to the laziness or indifference of Gower, as demonstrated by his customary waft outside off stump in the middle of an England batting collapse. This seems to be, and indeed is, a moral judgement, but one that only makes sense as part of the aesthetic context of the play, and hence premised on the understanding and appreciation appropriate to this play. Cordner has some interesting things to say about the relationship between the moral and aesthetic aspects of ‘grace’. See Cordner, ‘Grace and Functionality’, 311.

[51] James, Beyond a Boundary, 35. See also 178, 197–8, and especially, 204–7. ‘Cricket is an art. Like all art it has a technical foundation.’

[52] Cohen, ‘Sports and Art: Beginning Questions’, 265.

[53] Unlike art, those who have endeavoured to play cricket can (kinaesthetically) appreciate the basic movements required to succeed in the game. The same sort of egalitarian conditions of understanding do not occur as straightforwardly in art, as has been suggested above.

[54] Cf. Cohen, ‘Sports and Art: Beginning Questions’, 267.

the proximate requirement is that one be able to imagine doing something oneself, or trying to, with enough vividness to achieve an estimate of the difficulty in doing it. It may be that this act of imagination, sometimes for some people, requires an actual attempt. There is a connection here with R. G. Collingwood's fie idea that all genuine appreciation of art, where appreciation entails understanding, is built upon an auditor's act of imagination in which he achieves the virtual creation of the work.'

[55] James, Beyond a Boundary, 207. ‘What is not visible is received in the tactile consciousness of thousands who have themselves for years practiced the same motion and know each muscle that is involved in each stroke.’ Interestingly, recent psychological evidence seems to some extent to confirm this. For as Currie and Ravenscroft discuss, motor imagery, which involves the imagined sense of moving one's body, corresponds in important ways to real motion, such as the duration of an actual movement mirroring a correlated imagined movement. Cf. Currie and Ravenscroft, Recreative Minds, 72–88.

[56] James, Beyond a Boundary, 206.

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Cain Todd

Cain Todd, Department of Philosophy, Lancaster University.