The role and relationship of science and ethics in the evaluation of fairness in sport

Abstract

This paper will entail a critical analysis of the relationship between sport science and ethics by analysing various forms of ‘fairness’ rules and policies. The relationship between science and ethics can have an impact on professional careers and competitive balance. The generation and adjudication of some of the more traditional formal rules and policies utilized to authenticate fairness, and thus support prevailing concepts of fair play, will be challenged from a philosophical and feminist perspective.

Notes

1. The term ‘fairness’ instead of ‘fair play’ is used here because in this article we are more concerned with formal fairness issues, and not so much with the behaviouristic side of the fair play concept. Although there are different uses of the fair play concept (Loland 2002; Butcher and Schneider 2007), and it is also concerned with formal fairness, but it is broader for the most part.

2. Although it is not possible in the scope of this article to includes all feminist works on the philosophy of science, the seminal work of Okruhlik (1994) applied in the area of biological sciences is drawn on for the philosophy of science and feminist critiques of science utilized in the application to sport sciences. There are many other good sources as well, for example, feminism that originates from the thinking of philosophers such as Donna Haraway.

3. This is particularly true in North American Universities and Colleges.

4. Similarly, it can be argued that gender studies have also appeared to be pseudo-science to hegemonic disciplines within sport academia; which means that the reverse statement is hard to make (that biological science is pseudo-science).

5. The work of Matt Waddell (2016) in the area of para-sport and human rights is drawn on for the application in sport sciences in this paper.

6. Most recently, see for example the work of Charlene Weaving on pregnancy and sport participation presented at the 2017 annual conference of the International Association for the Philosophy of Sport held in Whistler, Canada.

7. Of course, from a feminist perspective, one understands the irony of using the term ‘seminal’ to describe ‘work that strongly influences later developments’ in this context or recognizing the significant authorship of women. However, the only analogous term would perhaps be ‘ovumal’. But, perhaps less exclusive is the use of ‘seed’ from Old French seminal or Latin seminalis, from semen (where ‘seed’ is the root) dating from the mid seventeenth century (OED).

8. Posthumanism is sometimes used as a synonym for, and confused with, ‘transhumanism’ due to its proposal to transition to a ‘posthuman future’ by applying technological advancements to expand human capacities (Ferrando 2013). Dissimilar to ‘postmodernism’ because ‘post’ allows the category of ‘human’ to ontologically disappear, whereas postmodernism does not propose that ‘modernism’ disappear (James 2017). Posthumanism arose with the first wave of postmodernism and was developed by feminist theories in the Nineties within literary criticism, which was later defined as ‘critical posthumanism’ (Ferrando 2013).

9. In this case, as generally described by Harding’s original work in 1987.

10. Once again, as generally described by Harding (Harding 1987).

11. The term ‘advantage’ is used here, because, based on this standpoint, women know more than men on gender verification in women’s sport. This knowledge gives women more perceived reliability to critique the gender verification system, just as a black-skinned athlete would be perceived to have more reliable testimony on racism in sport. By contrast, men, or white-skinned people, are disadvantaged because they do not have the personal experience to draw on.

12. The history of western ethical theory has been filled with attempts to answer this kind of problem, is that, to find ‘good ethics’, we have to be able, by communicating, to understand something else than ourselves. ‘Good ethics’ is based on what everyone should do, it is based on a common ground. Therefore, it has been argued extensively that radical relativism breaks down our hopes for ‘good ethics’.

13. These implications have been drawn out from Okruhlik (1994).

14. From an ethical theory perspective, we are unsatisfied with the feminist postmodernism theory because in fairness and in most accounts of fair play in sport, we are trying to find the common ground, what everyone should do, what ‘good ethics’ comes down to, and this theory makes it impossible to find. That is why postmodern analysis tends to obscure any promising possibility. In other words, it is bad news for ‘fair play’ policies or for fairness, if we can’t find a common ground with the theory.

15. Once again, there are many versions of posthumanism (i.e. transhumanism, new materialism, antihumanism, tetahumanism, metahumanity), so the intent here is to try to select what could be deemed the most relevant. Posthuman discourse is ongoing, a process of divergent standpoints and movements resulting from modern attempts to redefine the human condition (Ferrando 2013).

16. For example, at least not being based on completely irrational assumptions like, for instance, ‘the earth is flat’.

17. Specific examples of marginalized communities are too numerous to go into, and too complex as individual examples, to go over as part of a primarily philosophical discussion. However, the history of sport and its evolving ‘standards of excellence’ is replete with changes that were forced upon insular communities of practice from determined outside forces desirous of more socially just sporting institutions. Previously, and some currently, excluded communities from certain sport practices in North America include: (1) women; (2) persons of ‘non-white’ ethnic, racial or cultural heritage; (3) individuals with disabilities; and, (4) individuals unwilling or unable to subscribe to a binary view of gender. In many of these cases sporting institutions have mirrored wider societal norms as we have moved towards more universal and inclusive definitions of personhood, individuality, and human rights. However, this article also aims to draw attention to the role that our philosophical definitions and models of sport and sport science play in maintaining athletic practices that do not need to be responsive to the needs of marginalized individuals.