Football and cultural citizenship in China: a study in three embodiments

Abstract

In this study, we present three ‘embodiments’ of post-reform footballing China. Starting in 2015, the Chinese Football Association (CFA) initiated a series of reforms to advance player development, increase international success, and broaden the cultural appeal and commercial aspects of the sport. During this time, key footballing bodies have been incorporated into mediatization processes as a way of apprising the public about the state of these initiatives. In this study, we examine how individual players, national teams, and the commercial status of the game – as positioned in political and public discourse – articulate back to narratives and framings of: 1) what it means to represent China; 2) China’s ascendency in the global political economy; and 3) how sport as political technology is leveraged in debates about sovereignty and cultural belonging. These three body types reveal a heterogenous, complex, and contested relationality of bodies, cultural representation, and the political mediatized of the footballing State.

Keywords:

• Embodiment
• national identity
• cultural citizenship
• naturalization
• People’s Republic of China

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1 The term ‘post-post-socialism’ is often used in the Chinese context to refer to a condition whereby, following a period of opening up (kai fang) to foreign investment and commercial ties from the late 1970s until the early 2010s – a period defined by ‘post-socialism’ – there has been a turn back toward domestic market insularism, tighter government regulation and intervention, and intensified nationalism under the Xi Jinping government (for a more detailed discussion of what this has meant for sport, see Yu et al. 2019).

2 The identity and cultural politics forged under the football spectacle often elicit histories of privilege, subordination, colonization, and oppression – often re-affirming the power relations and subjectivities installed over centuries of imperialist praxis. Scholars from around the world have sought to link practices of colonization to contemporary identity politics as constructed and contested in sport, including but not limited to the contexts of South Africa (Billings 2015; Hyde-Clarke 2014; von Scheve 2014), the colonial legacies in Kenya (Njororai 2009), Zimbabwe (Ncube 2014), and Cameroon (Vidac), and in other former and current colonial contexts (see Dimeo 2001).

3 Such as the Chinese central government’s 36-point code of conduct policy to regulate outbound capital investment (2017), the Chinese Football Association’s new initiatives on limiting the number of foreign football players whilst increasing the appearance of domestic U23 players (2017), tattoo ban (2018), as well as the notice of removing corporate title in club names and a new salary cap policy for domestic and foreign players (2020).

4 Considering the conflicted former Hong Kong’s men’s national team captain Wai Ho Chan on media during the series of national anthem fans’ booing incidents at home matches, it would be unreachable to grasp what De Landa (2006) refers as the ‘contingently obligatory’ relations that characterize such footballing body-state assemblage without taking the prevalent geopolitical conditions into account, which are constituted by and manifested as anti-China sensation, colonial legacy of Hong Kong identity, and the ongoing Hong Kong-mainland conflicts. Likewise, as the retired Argentinian striker Ezequiel Lavezzi, who played for the Hebei CFFC in the Chinese Super League, generated wide-spread controversies for posing a ‘slant eye’ gesture during an official photo session, a glaring rift emerged too: one that is between the dominant cultural norm and ‘apolitical inclusiveness’ doctrine within today’s globalized sport governance (Jedlicka, 2018, p. 7). Both cases illuminate what the encompassing social and political changes are capable of as multiple flows of affect—including facilitating the formation of new footballing body-state assemblages.

5 It should be noted that the embodiment of the nation in team sports is more overt and tends to remain more securely in relation to individual sports (such as tennis) which seems to be more influenced by the market reform and opening up.

6 Wu’s diminutive stature as a youth can be related to the Chinese concept of wu, which is often translated as ‘martial’, and is associated with the physical strength and ability of an individual. In 21^st Century China, it is argued that the dichotomy of wen (cultural attainment) and wu has shifted, with greater focus on physical prowess as Chinese compare themselves with their Western counterparts (Louie 2014). There are a number of media reports with similar themes regarding Wu Lei physicality that inform our analysis, including:

上海上港亚冠逆转靠武磊？身体素质成“武球王”软肋！[Shanghai SIPG’s Comeback owed to Wu Lei? Physicality becomes “King Wu”’s Weakness!]

替补! 哑火! 低分! 让武磊单挑巴萨后防线, 真把他当梅西用？ [Bench! Scoreless! Low Rating! Playing Wu Lei Like Messi, Letting Him One-on-One Barca’s Defense?]

没有武磊, 国家队会怎样？ [What Would It Be for the National Team without Wu Lei?]

妖刀！武磊8球领跑射手榜 国家队谁为他送饼？[Insane Striker! Wu Lei Leading Best Striker with Eight Goals, Who Feeds Him Ball in the National Team?]

当年又矮又小的武磊如何修成运动员体格, 只是靠吃这些吗？ [How Did the Once Small Wu Lei Evolved into a Body of Athlete? Eating these Only?]

武磊4场后再为国足进球 打满全场是里皮锋线首选 [Scoring after Four Games, Wu Lei Now the First Pick for Lippi in Striker Position].

7 Importantly, with respect to ‘embodying the nation’, it was reported by some media sources that Ai Kesen was required to either cover-up his tattoos or have them photoshopped out to conform to a CFA regulation that players representing the national team are not to have, or display, body markings of this nature.

8 In addition, it seems that naturalized players did not really bring the Chinese National Team much success on the field. For example, China ended in a 0-0 draw in the 2022 World Cup Asian qualifier against the Philippines. The Chinese media blamed the naturalized players for the failure (GoalChina 2019b). For instance, a journalist lambasted Elkeson for not performing well, ‘our Elkeson, someone who’s supposed to be a savior, disappointed us and failed to save our team’ (Meng 2019).

9 Consider as one final example: the complex image of Hao Haidong, one of the most decorated players in Chinese men’s national team history. During his playing days, the former national team captain came to embody, or certainly perform, the role of docile state subject. He featured widely on state media via interviews and telecasts of his matches throughout the 1990s and 2000s. However, in recent years Haidong forged an alliance with well-known anti-China, Western public figures such as former US President Donald Trump adviser Steve Bannon. In a summer 2020 YouTube video, Haidong proclaimed ‘The Communist Party’s totalitarian rule in China has caused horrific atrocities against humanity’ (“A Chinese ­soccer legend has called for the downfall of the Communist Party in shock videos” 2020). He went on to denounce the Party as a ‘terrorist organization’ that has ‘trampled over democracy, violated the rule of law and dishonored lawful agreements’ (Shih, 2020, para 1). If nothing else, this anecdote signals a shift toward a more heterogenous and messy performance of State-sport-athlete-political ideology relations.