The politics of East Asian Olympics: a post event review of PyeongChang 2018, Tokyo 2020, and Beijing 2022

The era of the East Asian Olympics in the early twenty-first century is finally over. It is noteworthy to observe that three consecutive Olympics were held in the cities and provinces in East Asia. Before these Games, most Winter and Summer Olympics were staged in the Western countries, and only occasionally the major sporting event went to non-Western nations. During the five years from 2018 to 2022, the Olympic cauldron stayed in the Far East region for the first time in the history of the Olympic Movement. This exceptional situation may indicate the increasing political and economic influence of South Korea, Japan and China on world affairs (Kobayashi, Horne, Cho, & Lee, 2024). Equally, the multiple Olympics in East Asia may reflect the rivalry of the three nations in their soft power exercise through the sport mega-events. Additionally, increasing Olympic scepticism in the West, particularly concerning the huge environmental cost that the hosting of the Winter Olympics incurs, created relatively less competitive slots in the Olympic calendar where ambitious East Asian nations subsequently occupied (Horne, Kobayashi, Cho, & Lee, 2023). Whatever the case, few would deny that the concentration of the three successive Olympic Games in Northeast Asia marks an outstanding development.

PyeongChang 2018

From the viewpoint of international relations, the Olympic Games in PyeongChang, Tokyo and Beijing display a series of political episodes and diplomatic incidents. As to the 2018 Winter Olympic Games in PyeongChang, North and South Korean relations and peace promotion in the Korean Peninsula were the key political narratives at this event (Lee, 2021a; Rowe, 2019). Until a few months before this Olympics, diplomatic tensions between the US and the DPRK were constantly escalating. They hurled provocative and aggressive condemnation at each other so fervently that the region seemed to be on the verge of war. Even some nations began to reconsider sending their Winter Olympic team to the South Korean town of PyeongChang over the political instability in the region (Etchells, 2017). However, on New Year’s Day in 2018, the North Korean leader, Kim Jung-un unexpectedly announced that his nation would support the Olympic Games to be held in the South and he would send its delegations to PyeongChang. South Korea welcomed this friendly gesture from the North. From this moment, the security concerns in the Korean Peninsula began to improve (Cho, 2021).

The communication channel between the two sides reponed and they held a series of bilateral talks in the border town of Panmunjom to discuss the North Korean delegations’ visit to the Olympic venues in South Korea (Rowe, 2019). The IOC and the representatives from the North and South Korean Olympic Committees convened a meeting in Lausanne to discuss the collaboration between the two Korean teams in PyeongChang (Lee, 2021a). This three-party talk led to the agreement on the “Olympic Korean Peninsula Declaration” which states that North and South Korea would march together as one at the opening ceremony and the two sides would field a unified Korean female ice hockey team at this Winter Olympics (IOC, 2018). This news of inter-Korean connections in sport subsequently made the Olympic Games a political drama celebrating peace and unity between the two Koreas. Reflecting this mood, the IOC President, Thomas Bach (2018), claimed at the closing ceremony that the two Korean Olympic teams “have shown how sport brings people together in our fragile world; you have shown how sport builds bridges.” He further noted that Olympic Truce was observed in PyeongChang with the affirmation that the IOC would continuously strive to make a peaceful world through sport after this Olympics.

The 2018 Olympic Winter Games in PyeongChang presents an exemplary case where a major international sporting event mitigates political tensions and facilitates inter-state dialogues that can result in reconciliation between the nations in conflict. The diplomatic functions of a major sporting occasion include representation, negotiation and communication amongst the nations that dispatch their delegations to the international competition in question (Rofe, 2016). A series of incidents related to inter-Korean relations at this Olympics clearly demonstrate these diplomatic impacts of a major sporting event. Inter-Korean peace is arguably the most distinctive legacy of this winter sport mega-event. Although the relationship between the two Koreas froze again in 2020, the Olympics surely initiated nearly two years of amity that North and South Korea enjoyed. It is no surprise to see, therefore, that the Olympic Museums in South Korea and Switzerland house the section that commemorates the union of the two Korean teams in PyeongChang.

Tokyo 2020

Tokyo 2020 recorded the first postponed Olympics in peacetime. Due to the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic, the opening of this Summer Olympics was delayed for one year, and eventually took place in 2021. It was a time when the COVID-related travelling restrictions were still in place. As a result, Olympic athletes from different countries needed to follow strict quarantine procedures, and no spectators were permitted to enter the Olympic stadium. Alongside the athlete delegations from the participating nations, only a limited number of essential individuals from the IOC, the Local Organising Committee and the Japanese Government attended the opening and closing ceremonies of this Olympics (McCurry, 2021). Politically, the 2020 Tokyo Olympics was part of the Abenomics project, and Japan intended to utilise fully the economic opportunities that the Olympics generated such as the promotion of event-related consumption and tourism (Huang, Huang, Tan, & Cho, 2022; Ito, 2013). The outbreak of a pandemic abruptly paused most economic activities in the world. Japan was no exception. The COVID-19 lockdown simply shattered the Japanese desire to revitalise its economy through the Olympics.

This Olympic Games was, by no means, immune to geopolitics in East Asia. Due to the dispute over the interpretation of the colonial past, the relationship between Japan and South Korea became severely strained from 2019 onwards. After nearly two years of diplomatic stalemate, the then South Korean President, Moon Jae-in proposed his visit to Japan during the Summer Olympics. A major sporting event often involves a pseudo-diplomatic conference where international VIPs meet and greet, and the South Korean leader attempted to exploit this unofficial interstate forum at the Olympics in order to reestablish the Japan-Korea links (Lee, 2021b). Nevertheless, Japan was lukewarm about this signal from Korea, and Moon Jae-in withdrew his plan to travel to Tokyo in response to Japan’s reluctance. The Taiwan issue at Tokyo 2020 also deserves attention. At the opening ceremony of the Olympic and Paralympic Games, the Chinese Taipei delegations were introduced as the ‘Taiwan’ team (Chen & Tan, 2023; Everington, 2021). The Chinese state media vehemently criticised this naming incident arguing that Japan should not politicise this Olympics (Global Times, 2021). With the voice for the independence recently gaining momentum in Taiwan, China sensitively reacted to the display of a separate Taiwanese identity in a formal international domain (Chen & Tan, 2023). Amidst this Sino-Taiwan tension, Tokyo sided with Taipei. Beijing’s rather assertive response to this nomenclature problem at the Olympics probably reflects this geopolitical division.

Although some economic and political concerns affected the game, this Summer Olympics was a remarkable sporting occasion. It was the first proper sport mega-event taken place since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, and consequently, the event organisers had to face significant logistical challenges mainly due to the domestic and international travel restrictions in place. Despite this situation, Tokyo delivered the Olympics without major technical and practical problems (Huang, Huang, Tan, & Cho, 2022). Moreover, the Olympic ceremonies in Tokyo displayed a restrained sense of festivity and showed some sentiments of sympathy for those who lost their life during the pandemic (Akbar, 2021). Yet, the message that this Olympics relayed to international audiences was evident. Not only did this event symbolise the unity of humanity against the viral disease, but it also gave hope that we could overcome the global health crisis. At the closing ceremony, the IOC President proclaimed that “for the first time since the pandemic began, the entire world came together. … The Olympic Games Tokyo 2020 are the Olympic Games of hope, solidarity and peace” (IOC, 2021). Normally, the closing speech of this type contains several cliché, rhetoric and conciliatory phrases. At this time, Thomas Bach’s address demonstrated some elements of truth.

Beijing 2022

When the 2022 Olympic Winter Games in Beijing raised its curtain, many countries were gradually reopening their borders and the life of most people on earth was also steadily returning to normal. China still maintained international travel bans but, at least, the domestic residents were allowed to visit the Olympic sites and were permitted to watch the sporting competitions at the venues (McDonell, 2022). Seemingly, Beijing 2022 took place in the transition period between the pandemic and the post-Covid times. Despite this betterment, the political circumstances surrounding this winter sport mega-event were far from optimistic. While there was a clear sign of the amelioration of health risks posed by the viral disease, ironically there also existed a symptom of the deterioration in the relations between the established and emerging powers at this late stage of the COVID-19 pandemic (Brands & Gavin, 2020). In effect, this Olympics was held amidst escalating tensions in world politics, and more problematically, China, the host nation, was deeply involved in this geopolitical struggle.

The rise of China economically, technologically and militarily gives rise to the shifting of power balance in the twenty-first century world politics (Mahbubani, 2020). Particularly, with this increasing international influence, China has been attempting to revise the structure of South and East Asian geopolitics in its favour. The US has been a regional hegemon in this part of the world since the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, but the recent Chinese empowerment poses challenges to the American strategic interests in this region (Kagan, 2018). This situation compelled Washington to change its perception of Beijing from an economic partner to a strategic competitor. The Winter Olympics clearly mirrored the worsening relations between the People’s Republic of China and the United States of America. Before the commencement of this Olympics, the US questioned the legitimacy of China as an event host largely due to poor human rights records and undemocratic practices in the communist state (Lee, 2021c). The authority in Beijing denied such ­criticisms and blamed the US government for politicising the Olympics. Unable to mitigate this ­contention, the US called for a diplomatic boycott of the games, and in the end, no Western political leaders attended the Beijing Olympic ceremonies.

With the absence of statesmen from the West, one distinctive individual who was watching the opening ceremony at the VIP terrace in the Beijing Olympic Stadium attracted noticeable media attention internationally. He was Mr Vladimir Putin. When he arrived in the Chinese capital, the Russian President also had a meeting with the Chinese Premier Mr Xi Jinping. His visit to China appears to demonstrate the union of the two major authoritarian regimes while the Anglo-Saxon nations organised a group of democratic alliances. Also, it should be noted that Russian armies were gathering their forces on the Western Front when the Olympic Games unfolded (Reuters, 2022). This aggressive gesture posed a serious security threat to neighbouring Ukraine. When Ukraine athletes marched into the stadium, Mr Putin seemed to fall asleep as if he showed no respect to the Ukraine delegations (Field, 2022). With the Russian threat of invasion on the horizon, some members of the Ukraine Olympic team protested against the Moscow’s military provocation in Beijing (Associated Press, 2022). Recognising this dreadful conflict, the IOC President appealed to the international community, saying “Give peace a chance” at the opening and closing ceremonies (IOC, 2022). Despite this call for a peaceful resolution, Russia invaded Ukraine a few days after the Olympics.

Implications

The three Olympics in East Asia from 2018 to 2022 present yet another evidence of a close intersection between global sport and world politics. Four distinct patterns of this sport-politics nexus can be identified here. First, the opening and closing ceremonies create a chance for holding an informal diplomatic convention where international leaders interact, and this interaction can catalyse the arrangement of a more formal inter-state dialogue. Second, a major sporting event also offers a platform for political protest against a specific regime, and both state and non-state actors can utilise this demonstration opportunity to disseminate their cause. Third, the operation of an international sport governing body such as the IOC cannot be free completely from political affairs surrounding their flagship competitions despite the non-political principles enshrined in their charters. Finally, sport mega-events including the Olympic Games can act as both a force for international peace and a cause of international dispute under the right geopolitcal conditions. The cases of the three Olympics in East Asia show the relative autonomy of global sport where it can intervene in some political situations and facilitate positive changes. At the same time, these occasions also indicate the vulnerable position of international sport where the organisation of the event is significantly influenced by the wider political climate, especially the voice of the major powers within this environment.

The 2024 editon of the APSS special issue

This special issue contains eight papers. The first four articles are about this special issue theme, and the rest are generic submissions. Dongye Ryu, Emanuel Leite Junior and Carlos Pulleiro Méndez examine the media representation of Eileen Gu. With critical discourse analysis as a key analytical tool, they discuss the construction of Chinese identity in the media coverage of the performance of the naturalised Chinese ski jumper during the 2022 Winter Olympic Games in Beijing. The next article is about the emblem of the 2022 Winter Paralympic Games. Here, Xiaoqian Richard Hu and Xiameng Summer Zhang investigate the policy process of finalising the logo of the major sporting event employing the advocacy coalition framework as a theoretical approach. After this, Hung-Ju Chiu, Ping-Chao Lee, Yu-Yuan Chiu and Ren-Shiang Jiang look at the case of the cancellation of the 2019 Taichung East Asian Youth Games. In this study, they reveal how the political relations between Taiwan (Republic of China) and mainland China (People’s Republic of China) affected the decision-making process of the East Asian Olympic Committee. The last article in this thematic section deals with the long-term effect of hosting the Olympic Games. Shushu Chen, Xiao Liang, Xiaoqian Richard Hu and Xiaoyan Xing compare the 2008 and 2012 Summer Olympics in Beijing and London focusing on the port participation legacy in the two cities.

The next four articles are about sport in Asia Pacific society. First, Xuefei Han and Huan Xiong explore the culture of Chinese sports fans supporting European professional football clubs. From the viewpoint of glocalisation, this study shows how class and gender identities intersect in the female fandom of men’s transnational football teams in China. The second article is also about sport fandom. In this work, Ganda/Max D. López Toledano examines the social meaning of the English Premier League fanbase in South Asia. Particularly, Mr Toledano explains how this emerging fan culture in South Asia symbolises the notion of modernity in the region. In the following essay, Ka Chun Au & David Holland-Smith investigate the migration of Hong Kong elite athletes and coaches to the United Kingdom. They interviewed the recent settlers in the UK and discussed how the political situation affected their decision to relocate in Britain. Jinming Zheng, Wen Wu, Patrick Wing Chung Lau and Cheng Zhen also contribute their research article to this special issue. They delve into the notion of a “policy window” in the context of elite sport development in Hong Kong.

We believe that the eight articles in this special issue can be seen as a valuable set of academic literature about the social and political aspects of sport in Asia Pacific. We also hope that these essays can further facilitate academic discussion about sport in this dynamic and energetic region. Scholars and students whose interests lie in the social scientific understanding of sport in Asia would benefit from reading the eight essays in this special issue. No doubt, these papers will stimulate their academic imagination also. As the editors, we are happy to receive any comments on this collection. The editorial process of the 2024 edition of the Asia Pacific Sport and Social Science special issue took longer than we initially anticipated, but we agree that it was a very thrilling academic journey. It was so satisfactory that we already look forward to the publication of the next year’s special issue. Finally, we thank all referees who gave their valuable time to the production of the special issue in this hectic post-COVID academic world.

Jung Woo Lee
Moray House School of Education and Sport, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK
Tien-Chin Tan
Graduate Institute of Sport, Leisure and Hospitality Management, National Taiwan Normal University, Taipei, [email protected]

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).