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Abstract
This article is a contribution to the debate about eudaimonism started by Kashdan et al. and Waterman in a previous issue of The Journal of Positive Psychology [Kashdan, T.B., Biswas-Diener, R., & King, L.A. (2008). Reconsidering happiness: The costs of distinguishing between hedonics and eudaimonia. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 3(4), 219–233; Waterman, A.S. (2008). Reconsidering happiness: A eudaimonist's perspective. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 3(4), 234–252]. We point out that one thing that is missing from this debate is an understanding of the problems with subjective theories of well-being that motivate a turn to objective theories. A better understanding of the rationale for objective theories helps us to see what is needed from a theory of well-being. We then argue that a suitably modified subjective theory can provide what is needed and that this is the theory that ought to be favored by psychologists.
Notes
1. When philosophers use the word ‘normative’ they mean, roughly, ‘having to do with what ought to be rather than what is’; ‘normative’ is opposed to ‘descriptive’ and does not refer to what is statistically normal. We follow the philosophical usage throughout this article.
2. We do not mean to assume that a personally good life (the life of well-being) and the morally good life are identical. There is a sense of the goal or end of life that corresponds to well-being, however, which is what we mean to invoke here.
3. Ryan and Huta (Citation2009) and Keyes and Annas (Citation2009) also make a distinction between happiness (as a feeling) and well-being (as the end or goal of human life) in their responses to Kashdan et al. (Citation2008). We want to keep this distinction because a significant proportion of the debate within philosophy and psychology concerns whether or not happiness is well-being – whether or not having well-being just amounts to having these positive mental states – and such a debate can seem trivial without a careful distinction between these terms.
4. Our point here does not apply to Waterman's notion of ‘feelings of personal expressiveness’ insofar as these feelings are defined in evaluative terms. For Waterman, feelings of personal expressiveness arise from the development of a person's significant potentials and strivings for excellence (Waterman, Citation1993), which suggests that normativity is built into the account of these feelings from the outset. As we hope will become clear, our own account has some similarities to Waterman's interpreted this way. We thank Alan Waterman for helpful comments on this point.
5. For a related critical discussion of happiness as a policy goal see Brittan (Citation2001). According to Brittan, an economic commentator and columnist for the Financial Times, ‘… the pursuit of happiness is and should remain a personal matter’.
6. A similar criticism is implied in Diener and Suh (Citation2000, p. 4).
7. Keyes and Annas (Citation2009, p. 197) make this point in a footnote, though they dismiss the charge of elitism without argument.
8. At least not necessarily. Aristotle himself was notoriously elitist, but current Aristotelians have rightly abandoned this aspect of his theory (e.g., Nussbaum, Citation2000).
9. Cf. Ryan and Huta (Citation2009, p. 203): ‘considering the functions and processes through which subjective states accrue’ is not ‘elitist; it is simply good clinical practice.’
10. Indeed, one of the authors of this article has defended a different idealized subjective theory, the narrative capacity theory of well-being (see Hall (Citation2008)).
11. This is a modified version of an example from Railton (Citation1986).
12. One could argue that ‘informedness’ is a value that is presupposed by these theories, though it at least seems to be a value in a different domain from typical well-being values.
13. The following is a summary of the view explored in greater detail in Tiberius and Plakias (in press).
14. The view is similar to a subjective theory of happiness defended provisionally by Kraut (Citation1979), according to which the standards for happiness must be the agent's own standards. Kraut moved away from subjectivism in later work (1994). VBLS also has echoes in the work of psychologists (see, e.g., Diener and Suh (Citation2000), pp. 4–5).
15. The assumption here is that well-being is, as a matter of the concept, relatively stable. We think this is a fair assumption: well-being is supposed to be attributed on the basis of how well someone's life is going overall and should not change significantly with small changes such as changes in the weather. See Tiberius and Plakias (2010), for discussion of the psychological literature on the context sensitivity of life satisfaction judgments and its relevance to the philosophical arguments.
16. See Tiberius (Citation2000, Citation2008) for a more fully developed picture.
17. We do not think that this is an objection to our theory; rather, it is a natural result of distinguishing between the prudential and moral good.
18. Granted, we cannot get beyond our own perspective, but the gap still matters. For one thing, it opens the door to getting advice from others about what would make one's life better (by one's own lights) even if one cannot see this from one's own point of view at the time.
19. We do not think this criterion begs the question against eudaimonist theories, because the best such theories do take account of subjective experience.
20. Feldman (Citation2008) raises a similar objection.
21. Of course, even if we think someone would be better off with more education, a more equal marriage, and life in a more just society, this does not mean we ought to force these things on him or her. Whether or not paternalistic actions are ever justified is a different question from the question about the nature of well-being.
22. Thus, we agree with Sumner (Citation1996) that real experiences are privileged only for those who value them.
23. For example, in the current controversy over the (critically endangered) Red Wolf and the (‘of least concern’) Gray Wolf, the biological species concept has been used to argue against any conservation efforts for wolves. After all, red wolves can interbreed with gray wolves, coyotes, and dogs, so, if they are by that fact the same species, red wolves are clearly in no way endangered (International Union for Conservation of Nature, Citation2009a, Citation2009b; Kyle, Johnson, Patterson, Wilson, & White, Citation2008; Wayne, Citation1995; Wayne & Gittleman, Citation1995).