Cumulative disruptions: interdependency and commitment escalation as mechanisms of illicit network failure

ABSTRACT

Disruptions can take many forms resulting from both internal and external tensions. How illicit networks fail to adapt to a wide range of disruptions is an important but understudied area of network analysis. Moreover, disruptions can be cumulative, constraining the possible set of subsequent adaptations for a network given previous investments. Drawing from a multi-national/multi-year investigation of a prominent Chinese human smuggling network operated by Cheng Chui Ping (‘Sister Ping’), we find that the network’s failure was a product of two interrelated factors. First, efforts to scale the network to meet increased demand made the network more interdependent, adding new members and increasing vulnerabilities to internal disruptions. Second, internal and external disruptions during a shipment cumulatively constrained the network’s ability to adapt, forcing the network to escalate their commitment rather than abandon the transit. The results suggest network disruptions should be examined holistically to improve our understanding of network failure.

KEYWORDS:

• Criminal networks
• network failure
• escalation of commitment
• interdependency
• human smuggling
• cumulative disruption

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Supplementary material

Supplemental data for this article can be accessed here.

Notes

1. Bright, “Disrupting and Dismantling Dark Networks,” 39–51; Bright and Delaney, “Evolution of a Drug Trafficking Network,” 238–60; Lozano and Arenas, “A Model to Test how Diversity Affects Resilience,” 1–8; Malaviya et al., “Multi-Period Network Interdiction Problems,” 368–80; Malm and Bichler, “Networks of Collaborating Criminals,” 275; Morselli and Petit, “Law-Enforcement Disruption of a Drug Importation Network,” 109–130; Washburn, “Continuous Network Interdiction,” 1–22. Whether or not an interdiction is “successful” depends on the goal it is trying to achieve (see Williams, “Transnational Criminal Networks,” 61–97.).

2. Eilstrop-Sangiovanni and Jones, “Assessing the Dangers of Illicit Networks,” 7–44.

3. Bright and Delaney, “Evolution of a Drug Trafficking Network,” 238–60; Lozano and Arenas, ‘A Model to Test how Diversity Affects Resilience,” 1–8; Malm and Bichler, “Networks of Collaborating Criminals,” 275; and Morselli and Petit, “Law-Enforcement Disruption of a Drug Importation Network,” 109–130.

4. Bright and Delaney, “Evolution of a Drug Trafficking Network,” 238–60.

5. Helfstein and Wright, “Covert or Convenient?” 785–813; and Podolny and Page, “Network Forms of Organization,” 57–76.

6. Adler, “Wheeling and Dealing”; Erickson, “Secret Societies and Social Structure,” 188–210; Chin, “Smuggled Chinese”; Chin and Kelly, “Human Snakes”; Kleemans, “Organized Crime, Transit Crime, and Racketeering,” 163–215; Stephenson, “Gangs of Russia”; Venkatesh, “Off the Books”; Williams, “Transnational Criminal Networks,” 61–97; Zhang, “Smuggling and Trafficking in Human Beings”; Zhang, “Chinese Human Smuggling Organizations”; Zhang, “Snakeheads and the Cartwheel Network”; and Zhang and Chin, “Enter the Dragon,” 737–768.

7. Eilstrop-Sangiovanni and Jones, “Assessing the Dangers of Illicit Networks,” 7–44; Morselli, “Hells Angels in Springtime,” 145–158; and Williams, “Transnational Criminal Networks,” 61–97.

8. Ibid., 97.

9. Bright and Delaney, “Evolution of a Drug Trafficking Network,” 238–60; Bright et al., “Criminal Network Vulnerabilities and Adaptations,” 424–441; Bright, Koskinen, and Malm, “Illicit Network Dynamics,” 1–22. One exception to this is Duxbury and Haynie, “Criminal Network Security,” 314–342.

10. Bright and Delaney, “Evolution of a Drug Trafficking Network,” 238–60; Malaviya et al., “Multi-Period Network Interdiction Problems,” 368–80; and Washburn, “Continuous Network Interdiction,” 1–22.

11. Podolny and Page, “Network Forms of Organization,” 57–76. Podolny and Page define a network as “any connection of actors (N > 2) that pursue repeated, enduring exchange relations with one another, and at the same time lack a legitimate organizational authority to arbitrate and solve disputes that may arise during the exchange.” This definition broadly encompasses any group or organisation, including illicit groups, organisations with hierarchical structures, and loosely grouped individuals (see Bright & Delaney, “Evolution of a Drug Trafficking Network,” 238–260).

12. Bright and Delaney, “Evolution of a Drug Trafficking Network,” 238–260; Bright et al., “Criminal Network Vulnerabilities and Adaptations,” 424–441; Bright, Koskinen, and Malm, “Illicit Network Dynamics,” 1–22.

13. Xu and Chen, “The Topology of Dark Networks,” 65. See also Watts and Stogatz, “Collective Dynamics of “Small-world” Networks” 440–442.

14. Malm and Bichler, “Networks of Collaborating Criminals,” 275; Xu and Chen, “The Topology of Dark Networks,” 65.

15. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Jones, “Assessing the Dangers of Illicit Networks,” 7–44.

16. Ibid.

17. Bouchard, “On the Resilience of Illegal Drug Markets,” 325–344.

18. Bakker, Raab, and Milward, “A Preliminary Theory of Dark Network Resilience,” 33–62; Eilstrop-Sangiovanni and Jones, “Assessing the Dangers of Illicit Networks,” 7–44.

19. Williams, “Transnational Criminal Networks,” 61–97.

20. Ibid.

21. Kleemans, “Organized Crime, Transit Crime”; and Williams, “Transnational Criminal Networks,” 61–97.

22. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Jones, “Assessing the Dangers of Illicit Networks,” 7–44; Malm and Bichler, “Networks of Collaborating Criminals,” 275; Morselli and Petit, “Law-Enforcement Disruption of a Drug Importation Network,” 109–130; and Williams, “Transnational Criminal Networks,” 61–97.

23. Bakker, Raab, and Milward, “A Preliminary Theory of Dark Network Resilience,” 33–62; Bright and Delaney, “Evolution of a Drug Trafficking Network,” 238–60; Bouchard, “On the Resilience of Illegal Drug Markets,” 325–344; Eilstrop-Sangiovanni and Jones “Assessing the Dangers of Illicit Networks,” 7–44; Malm and Bichler, “Networks of Collaborating Criminals,” 271–297; Morselli and Petit, “Law-Enforcement Disruption of a Drug Importation Network,” 109–130.

24. See note 21 above.

25. See note 15 above.

26. Morselli and Petit, “Law-Enforcement Disruption of a Drug Importation Network,” 109–30.

27. Adler, “Wheeling and Dealing”; Erickson, “Secret Societies and Social Structure,” 188–210; Chin, “Smuggled Chinese”; Chin & Kelly, “Human Snakes”; Kleemans, “Organized Crime, Transit Crime, and Racketeering,” 163–215; Venkatesh, “Off the Books”; Zhang, “Snakeheads and the Cartwheel Network,” 111–125; and Zhang and Chin, “Enter the Dragon.”

28. Adler, “Wheeling and Dealing,”

29. Bouchard and Malm, “Opportunistic Structures of Organized Crime,” 288–302; Erickson, “Secret Societies and Social Structure,” 188–210; Kleemans, “Organized Crime, Transit Crime, and Racketeering,” 163–215.

30. Ibid.

31. Chin & Kelly, “Human Snakes”; and Zhang, “Snakeheads and the Cartwheel Network,” 111–25.

32. Zhang, “Snakeheads and the Cartwheel Network,” 111–25.

33. Ibid.

34. One exception is Zhang, “Snakeheads and the Cartwheel Network,” 111–125.

35. Bright, Koskinen, and Malm, “Illicit Network Dynamics,” 1–22; Bright et al., “Criminal Network Vulnerabilities and Adaptations,” 424–41.

36. See note 26 above.

37. Erickson, “Secret Societies and Social Structure,” 188–210.

38. Zhang, “Snakeheads and the Cartwheel Network,” 116–130.

39. Brockner, “The Escalation of Commitment to a Failing Course of Action,” 39–61.

40. Zyglidopoulos et al., “Rationalization, Overcompensation and the Escalation of Corruption in Organizations,” 65–73; Southerland, Mittie, and Potter, “Applying Organizational Theory to Organized Crime,” 251–267; Vaughn, “The Dark Side of Organizations,” 271–305.

41. Kilgannon and Singer, “A Smuggler of Immigrants Dies in Prison.”

42. Keefe, The Snakehead: An Epic Tale; and USA v. Ping, [1994].

43. Barnes, “Two-Faced Woman.”

44. Lusher, “At Least 10,000 People Died.”

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.

47. Keefe, The Snakehead: An Epic Tale.

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid.

51. Guo Liang Qi went into hiding shortly before the shootout and was one of two gang members that were not arrested or killed. Qi was arrested in August of 1993 in Hong Kong. The other gang member and one of the instigators of the shootout, Shing Chung, was never caught.

52. Keefe, “The Snakehead.”

53. Keefe, The Snakehead: An Epic Tale; USA v. Ping, [1994].

54. U.S. Attorney”s Office, “Sister Ping Sentenced to 35 Years in Prison.”

55. Keefe”s book was selected as a primary source because it includes detailed source information that could be used to verify and triangulate relationships and network activities.

56. Each node in the final network represents an individual actor, apart from the passengers of the Golden Venture. These have been grouped together as a single node for ease of visualisation.

57. A directed relationship is a one-direction relationship that does not assume two people mutually know each other. For example, if person A paid person B, then it would be assumed that person A had a “relationship” with person B, but it is not necessarily true that person B would have a “relationship” with person A.

58. Personal ties and transactions were not assumed to be mutual or bi-directional and so were coded separately as directional ties.

59. For example, if two people, A and B worked together to move a group of immigrants for 3-months, then they would be coded as “related” for the 3-months of the job and the start and end dates would be recorded.

60. See Baker and Faulkner “The Social Organization of Conspiracy,” 837–60.

61. Wasserman and Faust, Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications.

62. Ibid., 174.

63. Ibid., 188–191.

64. See note 61 above.

65.. Though the network operationally failed in June 1993, Sister Ping continued to evade law enforcement until 2003. From 1993 to 2003, she attempted to operate a smaller network from the Fujian province with little success.

66. USA v. Ping, [1994].

67. See note 52 above.

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid.

70. Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks.

71. Constraints can take different forms – the number of directions forward can be reduced or the relative weight of priorities for the network can change in response to the disruption. In either case, the network”s decision-making will be constrained by the available options or perceived options.

72. Woolrich, Bohoko, and Dobson, “Immigrants Escape in High Seas Drama” 1–3.

73. See note 47 above.

74. Ibid.

75. Bernstein, “The Empire of Sister Ping.” Changing the name and registration information of a ship is a way of avoiding detection by international authorities.

76. See note 72 above.

77. See note 47 above.

78. Zhang, “Snakeheads and the Cartwheel Network,” 121.

79. See note 19 above.

80. Bright, Koskinen, and Malm, “Illicit Network Dynamics,” 1–22.

81. Bright, “Disrupting and Dismantling Dark Networks,” 39–51; Kleemans, “Organized Crime, Transit Crime, and Racketeering,” 163–215; Zhang, “Snakeheads and the Cartwheel Network,” 111–25.

82. See Molm et al., “Fragile and Resilient Trust,” 1–32; and Von Lampe and Johanssen, “Organized Crime and Trust,” 159–84.

83. Von Lampe and Johanssen, “Organized Crime and Trust,” 159–84.

84. Zhang and Chin, “Enter the Dragon,” 737–68.

85. Dujin et al., “The Relative Ineffectiveness of Criminal Network Disruption,” 1–15.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security [HSHQDC‐13‐J00368] and the National Science Foundation [#1348416].

Notes on contributors

Michelle D. Fabiani

Michelle D. Fabiani is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Social Sciences, Homeland Security Program at DeSales University. Her research focuses on developing new theories and methods to better understand international and transnational crimes. Her work focuses on several themes: behavioral dynamics in transnational crime; developing methods to disrupt and prevent transnational crimes; structural and developmental patterns in illicit economies. Recent studies have focused on identifying spatio-temporal patterns in archaeological looting through the framework of routine activity theory and examining the relationship between antiquities looting and armed conflict temporally. She received her PhD in Criminology and Criminal Justice at the University of Maryland, College Park.

Brandon Behlendorf

Brandon Behlehndorf is an Assistant Professor in the College of Emergency Preparedness, Homeland Security, and Cybersecurity at the University at Albany (State University of New York). Dr. Behlendorf's research utilizes interdisciplinary approaches to address policy-relevant problems within homeland and national security, drawing on theories and methods from social and computational sciences. Funded by a number of federal agencies (Department of State, Justice, and Homeland Security; National Science Foundation) his research focuses on several themes, including: geospatial modeling of criminal and terrorist activity: network vulnerabilities of illicit trafficking networks; game theoretic approaches to border security; public perceptions of security-related authorities; and criminal decision-making processes of violent non-state actors. His work has been published in Policing, Journal of Quantitative Criminology, and Studies in Conflict and Terrorism. He received his PhD in Criminology and Criminal Justice at the University of Maryland, College Park.