ABSTRACT
This article asks whether some forms of collective action against criminal rule can mitigate or reduce violence. Focusing on the case of Michoacán, Mexico, this study examines the aftermath of an armed mobilisation against criminal governance that occurred between 2013 and 2014. It argues that the emergence of vigilante groups known as autodefensas was part of a regional cycle of violence where the rise to power of armed actors in Michoacán has repeatedly generated the conditions for their violent displacement by new actors. The autodefensas therefore failed to bring lasting public security as the cooptation and institutionalisation of the movement empowered new criminal groups in the region. Using municipal-level homicide data from 2015 to 2020, this study finds that municipalities where vigilante groups formed have experienced increasing levels of violence.
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Notes
1. Martínez Elorriaga, “Emboscan y asesinan.”
2. Martínez Elorriaga, “Larga balacera.”
3. The video can be found on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CT3Uty52q1g (last accessed 27 March 2021).
4. Herrera and Martinez-Alvarez, “Diversifying Violence.”
5. Arias, “Social Responses.”
6. For example, Durán-Martínez, The Politics; Lessing, Making Peace.
7. Moncada, “Resisting Protection.”
8. Álvarez-Rodríguez, “The Moral Economy”; Fuentes Díaz and Fini; Defender al pueblo; Gil Olmos, Batallas de Michoacán; Guerra, “Organización armada”; Guerra Manzo, “Las autodefensas”; Hernández Navarro, Hermanos en armas; Le Cour Grandmaison, “Vigilar y Limpiar”; Lemus, Tierra sin Dios; Pérez-Armendáriz and Duquette-Rury, “The 3 × 1 Program”; Phillips, “Inequality”; Wolff, “Insurgent Vigilantism”; and Zepeda Gil, “Violencia.”
9. Del Rio, “Do Vigilante Groups”; Maldonado, La ilusión; and Guerra, “De actores armados.”
10. Interviews were conducted as part of a larger project in Michoacán between July 2019 and February 2020. Most interviews were conducted in the cities of Morelia, Uruapan, and Apatzingán. Security concerns limited access to small communities. For this reason, the nature of interview data obtained is fragmentary. Informants include journalists, civil society actors, autodefensa leaders, public security officials, and schoolteachers who have lived and worked in towns and municipalities where vigilante groups emerged. The names of informants are omitted for security reasons, save for former vigilante leaders who are vocal public figures.
11. Arias and Goldstein, Violent Democracies; Koonings and Kruijt, Armed Actors; Müller, “Governing Crime.”
12. Bergman, Illegal Drugs.
13. Trejo and Ley, Votes.
14. Astorga, El Siglo; Atuesta and Ponce, “Meet the Narco;” Calderón et al., “The Beheading;” Durán-Martínez, The Politics; Jones, Mexico’s; Herrera, “Cultivating Violence;” Lessing, Making Peace; Osorio, “The Contagion;” Phillips, “How Does;” Rios, “Why did Mexico” .
15. Arias, Criminal Enterprises.
16. Arias, “The Dynamics; Blume, “The Old Rules;” Ernst, “From Narcotrafficking;” Trejo and Ley, Votes.
17. Lessing, “Conceptualizing Criminal Governance.”
18. Arias, Criminal Enterprises; Arias, “Criminal Organisations;” Felbab-Brown, Militants; Magaloni et al., “Killing in the Slums;” Wolff, “Building Criminal Authority.”
19. Davis and Denyer Willis, “Anticrime Movements;” Moncada, Cities.
20. See note 5 above.
21. Ibid.
22. See note 7 above.
23. Ley et al., “Indigenous Resistance.”
24. Moncada, “Varieties of Vigilantism.”
25. Schuberth, “The Challenge.”
26. Ibid.
27. Guerra, “Organización armada”; Phillips, “Inequality.”
28. Anderson, “Vigilantes”; Smith, “Rejecting Rights.”
29. Smith, “The Bakassi Boys.”
30. Romero, Paramilitares y autodefensas.
31. Taussig, Law.
32. Anderson, “Vigilantes”; Schuberth, “Challenging.”
33. Le Cour Grandmaison, “Vigilar y Limpiar”.
34. Tierra Caliente encompasses the municipalities of Apatzingán, Aguililla, Buenavista, Carácuaro, Churumuco, Gabriel Zamora, La Huacana, Huetamo, Múgica, Nocupétaro, Nuevo Urecho, Parácuaro, San Lucas, Tepalcatepec, Tiquicheo, Turicato, and Tuzantla.
35. Guerra Manzo, “La violencia”; Maldonado, Los márgenes.
36. Maldonado, “Drogas.”
37. Gil Olmos, Batallas de Michoacán, 80–7.
38. The Valencia criminal organisation was also known as the Milenio Cartel.
39. Los Zetas were originally composed of deserters from an elite special forces unit in the Mexican Army.
40. Maldonado, “Drogas,” 28–19.
41. Guerra, “Vida cotidiana,” 18–9; Lemus, Tierra sin Dios, 44–8.
42. Lemus, Tierra sin Dios, 60–4.
43. Guerrero Gutiérrez, “La dictadura criminal.”
44. Lemus, Tierra sin Dios, 66.
45. Ernst, “From narcotrafficking,” 223–4.
46. Zepeda Gil, “Violencia,” 117–19.
47. Guerra, “Vida cotidiana,” 22; Navarro, Hermanos en armas, 311–2; Lemus, Tierra sin Dios, 174.
48. CNDH, Informe especial.
49. Le Cour Grandmaison, “Vigilar y Limpiar”; Pansters, “Drug trafficking.”
50. Gil Olmos, Batallas de Michoacán, 247–8; Mireles, Todos somos autodefensas, 171–80.
51. Guerra Manzo, “Las autodefensas.”
52. Maldonado, “Los retos,” 752–3.
53. Hernández, “Con todo y ‘virrey.”’
54. Interview with José Manuel Mireles, November 2019.
55. Martínez Elorriaga, “Mireles, destituido.”
56. Le Cour Grandmaison, “Vigilar y Limpiar.”
57. Curry and Ansems de Vries, “Violent Governance.”
58. Maldonado, “Los retos,” 754–5.
59. Guerra Manzo, “Las autodefensas,” 24.
60. Interview with José Manuel Mireles (November 2019); schoolteacher B (December 2019).
61. Abrego, “Rechaza Silvano.”
62. de Mauleón, “Los secretos de Michoacán.”
63. When the autodefensas would capture a town or village, they would convene the locals to convince them to form their own vigilante groups. They would also turn over any captured Templars for the locals to stage a trial and decide their fate. Pardons were not uncommon since rank-and-file Templars were often members of these communities (interview with journalist A, September 2019).
64. Espino and Ortiz, “Infiltrados.”
65. See note 56 above.
66. Guerra, “Vida cotidiana,” 22.
67. Álvarez-Rodríguez, “The Moral Economy”; Le Cour Grandmaison, “Vigilar y Limpiar.”
68. Maldonado, “Los retos,” 756.
69. Interview with journalist A (September 2019), C (December 2019), and E (February 2020).
70. Muedano, “La intensa cacería.”
71. García Tinoco, “Los Viagras expanden.”
72. Interview with journalist A, September 2019.
73. Tuckman, “Mexican vigilante leaders.”
74. Interview with Hipólito Mora, February 2020.
75. See note 72 above.
76. Translations for criminal group names as they appear: The New Michoacán Family, The Whites of Troy, The Crazy Ones of the Sierra, The Vigilantes, The Avengers, The Old Guard, and The Five of the Mountain.
77. Interview, journalist A, September 2019.
78. Guerra, “De actores armados.”
79. Maldonado, La ilusión, 225–6.
80. García Tinoco, “Comisionado deja Michoacán.”
81. Maldonado, “Los retos,” 758.
82. Flores Pérez, “Cártel Jalisco.”
83. Sánchez Valdés, “La nueva configuración.”
84. For example, Castillo García, “CJNG”; Sieff, “Mexico’s.”
85. Jones, “The Strategic Implications.”
86. Dittmar, “Why the Jalisco Cartel.”
87. “¿Quiénes son?”
88. González, “Tememos más al narco.”
89. “Quien es ‘El Abuelo’?”
90. ‘“El Abuelo’, el autodefensa.”
91. Martínez, “CJNG busca afianzarse.”
92. Castellanos, “El CJNG reparte despensas”; Ernst, “Mexican criminal groups.”
93. INEGI, Registros administrativos.
94. Calderón et al., “The Beheading.”
95. INEGI; Censo … 2010; Encuesta Intercensal 2015; Censo … 2020.
96. SESNSP, Datos abiertos.
97. It is also important to note that the SESNSP data cannot be disaggregated by age groups.
98. See note 48 above.
99. Velázquez, “Michoacán, rey de narcolaboratorios.”
100. MUCD, Datos abiertos.
101. See note 4 above.
102. INEGI, Registros administrativos; IMF, Primary Commodity Price System.
103. See note 93 above.
104. CONEVAL, Medición de la pobreza.
105. INAFED, Sistema Nacional de Información Municipal.
106. Phillips, “How Does.”
107. Franzese and Hays, “Interdependence,” 758.
108. See note 104 above.
109. INEGI, Censo … 2010; Encuesta Intercensal 2015; Censo … 2020.
110. The only viable proxy for criminal governance currently available is the one proposed by Trejo and Ley (2021): municipal government vulnerability to criminal capture, which is measured as the number of high-profile criminal attacks against political actors. But these data are limited to the 2007–2012 period.
111. See note 4 above.
112. See note 56 above.
113. Anderson, “Vigilantes”; Smith, “Rejecting Right” and Smith, “The Bakassi Boys.”
114. Interview with journalist A (September 2019); journalist B (December 2020); schoolteacher A (November 2019); and schoolteacher B (December 2019).
115. Interview with public security official A, November 2019.
116. Hamilton and Fernández-Flores, “On the Front Line.”
117. Arrieta, “Denuncian desplazamiento”; Hamilton and Fernández-Flores, “On the Front Line.”
118. CNDH, Informe especial, 279–85.
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Joel Salvador Herrera
Joel Salvador Herrera is a PhD Candidate at the University of California, Los Angeles. His research focuses on drug trafficking, violence, and state formation in Mexico. His work has appeared in World Development and Latin American Politics & Society.