Antitrust restriction on football governance: the case of European Super League

ABSTRACT

The European Super League case has been widely discussed by EU regulators, football associations, clubs, players, supporters and legal practitioners. This article intends to explore the legal reasoning of the Court of Justice regarding the intervention of EU competition law in football governance in this case. This article accordingly analyses the interpretation of the rules and exemptions stipulated in Articles 101 (1) and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and gives comments on the antitrust assessment by the Court of Justice regarding the common rules of prior approval and sanctions. It follows that the Court of Justice stressed the importance of transparent, objective and non-discriminatory procedures in the rule-making of football associations and saw this as a significant condition for the enforcement of EU competition law and antitrust exemption.

KEYWORDS:

• Football governance
• EU competition law
• European super league
• breakaway league
• sport autonomy

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 Stefaan Van den Bogaert, ‘The Rise and Fall of the European Super League: A Case for Better Governance in Sport’ (2022) 59 Common Market Law Review 25, 25–31.

2 Case C-333/21 European Superleague Company, S.L. v Unión de Federaciones Europeas de Fútbol (UEFA) and Fédération internationale de football association (FIFA), EU:C:2023:1011, para. 45; Case C-124/21 P International Skating Union v Commission, EU:C:2023:1012, para. 137.

3 Ibid, paras. 185–86 and 207–208.

4 See e.g. Stephen Weatherill, ‘Saving Football from Itself: Why and How to Re-make EU Sports Law’ (2022) 24 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 4.

5 Erika Szyszczak, ‘Competition and Sport: No Longer So Special?’ (2018) 9 Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 188, 196.

6 See infra, discussions accompanying note 18.

7 See infra, discussions accompanying note 127. See also, Antoine Duval, ‘Landmark Decisions by the Court of Justice of the European Union Will Reshape Transnational Sports Governance’ Asser Institute, 21 December 2023, < https://www.asser.nl/about-the-asser-institute/news/landmark-decisions-by-the-court-of-justice-of-the-european-union-will-reshape-transnational-sports-governance/> (last visited 14 February 2024).

8 See infra, discussions accompanying note 15.

9 The Athletic, ‘Twelve European Clubs Confirm they have Agreed to Establish New Super League’, 18 April 2021, <https://theathletic.com/4217028/2021/04/18/twelve-european-clubs-confirm-they-have-agreed-to-establish-new-super-league/?redirected=1> (last visited 2 February 2024). The founding clubs are AC Milan, Arsenal, Atletico Madrid, Chelsea, Barcelona, Inter Milan, Juventus, Liverpool, Manchester City, Manchester United, Real Madrid and Tottenham Hotspur.

10 UEFA, ‘Statement by UEFA, the English Football Association, the Premier League, the Royal Spanish Football Federation (RFEF), LaLiga, the Italian Football Federation (FIGC) and Lega Serie A’, 18 April 2021, <https://www.uefa.com/insideuefa/mediaservices/mediareleases/news/0268-12121411400e-7897186e699a-1000--statement-by-uefa-the-english-football-association-the-premier-/> (last visited 2 February 2024).

11 FIFA, ‘FIFA Statement’, 19 April 2021, <https://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/organisation/media-releases/fifa-statement-x3487> (last visited 2 February 2024).

12 FIFA, ‘Respect and Dialogue Needed to Restore Normality as Breakaway League is Strongly Disapproved’, 20 April 2021, <https://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/president/news/respect-and-dialogue-needed-to-restore-normality-as-breakaway-league-is-strongly> (last visited 2 February 2024).

13 Article 71 of the FIFA Statutes provides that “[t]he Council shall be responsible for issuing regulations for organizing international matches and competitions between representative teams and between leagues, club and/or scratch teams. No such match or competition shall take place without the prior permission of FIFA, the confederations and/or the member associations in accordance with the Regulations Governing International Matches.” Article 51 of the UEFA Statutes similarly reads: “No combinations or alliances between UEFA Member Associations or between leagues or clubs affiliated, directly or indirectly, to different UEFA Member Associations may be formed without the permission of UEFA.”

14 Case C-333/21 Opinion of AG Rantos, ECLI:EU:C:2022:993 (hereinafter AG Rantos Opinion for ESL), para. 15.

15 Nonetheless, then Juventus chairman Andrea Agnelli admitted that “I don’t think [the ESL] is now still up and running”. Barca Blaugranes, ‘Barcelona and Real Madrid are the only two teams left in the Super League’, 21 April 2021, <https://www.barcablaugranes.com/2021/4/21/22396096/barcelona-and-real-madrid-are-the-only-two-teams-left-in-the-super-league> (last visited 2 February 2024). Finally, on 13 July 2023, Juventus confirmed in an official statement that the club had “initiated the procedure” to withdraw from the ESL. ESPN, ‘Juventus Starts Procedure to Leave Super League Project’, 14 July 2023, <https://www.espn.com.sg/soccer/story/_/id/38007290/juventus-start-procedure-leave-european-super-league-project> (last visited 2 February 2024). In fact, most of previous attempts to organize breakaway competitions have not been successful. See generally, Katarina Pijetlovic, EU Sports Law and Breakaway Leagues in Football (Springer 2015). One of the successful examples within UEFA’s traditional structure is the formation of the Royal League, which included four teams of Sweden, Denmark, and Norway. Robby Houben, Jan Blockx and Steve Nuyts, ‘UEFA and the Super League: Who is Calling Who a Cartel?’ (2022) 22 The International Sports Law Journal 205, 209.

16 Request for a preliminary ruling from the Juzgado de lo Mercantil n.° 17 de Madrid (Spain) lodged on 27 May 2021 – European Super League Company, S.L. v Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) and Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) O.J. 2021, C 382/10.

17 Ibid. See also, FIFA Statues and UEFA Statues.

18 The questions referred to the Court in ESL also address exploitation of rights by UEFA and FIFA and whether the freedom to provide services stipulated in Article 56 TFEU precludes UEFA and FIFA Statutes. However, for the purpose of this Article, these two topics will not be covered.

19 Generally, AG Rantos Opinion for ESL.

20 CJEU, ‘The FIFA and UEFA Rules on Prior Approval of Interclub Football Competitions, such as the Super League, Are Contrary to EU Law’, 21 December 2023, <https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2023-12/cp230203en.pdf> (last visited 2 February 2024).

21 ESL, para. 144.

22 Ibid.

23 Barcelona is “[satisfied] with the sentence of the [ECJ] assessing the Super League project”. FC Barcelona, ‘FC Barcelona Assesses Super League Project Following the Sentence by the ECJ and Invites the Parties to Engage in New Phase of Discussions’, 21 December 2023, <https://www.fcbarcelona.com/en/club/news/3830692/fc-barcelona-assesses-super-league-project-following-the-sentence-by-the-ecj-and-invites-the-parties-to-engage-in-new-phase-of-discussions> (last visited 3 February 2024); and Real Madrid president Florentino Peréz stated that “[f]rom Real Madrid we welcome with great satisfaction the decision taken by the [ECJ]”. Florentino Peréz, ‘Full Florentino Peréz Speech’, 21 December, 2023, <https://twitter.com/MadridXtra/status/1737777782585700658?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw> (last visited 3 February 2024). Meanwhile, UEFA reacted with an official statement in which they stated “[t]his ruling does not signify an endorsement or validation of the so-called ‘super league’ […] UEFA is confident in the robustness of its new rules, and specifically that they comply with all relevant European laws and regulations”. The ambiguity on matters of importance in ECJ’s rulings may be a result of the fact that “there are no dissents or separately concurring judgments, the divergent views of different judges may be contained within the language of the judgment”. See Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (4th edn., OUP 2008) 72.

24 In 2022/23, the twelve founding clubs of the ESL represent 68.2% of the top 20 European club’s worldwide revenues. Statista, ‘Soccer Clubs with the Highest Revenue Worldwide in 2022/23’, 29 January 2024, <https://www.statista.com/statistics/1028798/europe-leading-professional-football-clubs-by-enterprise-value> (last visited 2 February 2024). The political and commercial reasons for the opposition to the ESL range from the endangerment of the European sports pyramid to the impact on the sale of tickets, broadcasting rights and merchandising. Supra note 15, Houben et al., 209. For a general discussion on the motivations behind the ESL project, see Paul Brannagan, et al., ‘The 2021 European Super League Attempt: Motivation, Outcome, and the Future of Football’ (2022) 14 International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics 169.

25 See, for example, Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36, para. 116; Case 66/86 Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen and Silver Line Reisebüro GmbH v Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs e.V., ECLI:EU:C:1989:140, para. 37.

26 Katarina Pijetlovic, ‘EU Competition Law and Organisational Rules’, in Antoine Duval and Ben Van Rompuy (eds) The Legacy of Bosman: Revisiting the Relationship between EU Law and Sport (Springer 2016) 127.

27 ESL, para. 115. For a detailed discussion on assessing whether sports associations are considered undertakings or associations of undertakings, see Ben Van Rompuy, ‘The Role of EU Competition Law in Tackling Abuse of Regulatory Power by Sports Associations’ (2015) 22 Maastricht Journal of European Comparative Law 179.

28 Case AT.40208 – International Skating Union’s Eligibility Rules (Decision of 8 December 2017), paras. 146–147.

29 Commission Decision of 23 July 2003 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 81 of the EC Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (COMP/C.2-37.398 – Joint selling of the commercial rights of the UEFA Champions League) O.J. 2003 L, 291/25; Case T-193/02, Laurent Piau v Commission of the European Communities, ECLI:EU:T:2005:22, par. 72.

30 AG Rantos Opinion for ESL, para. 60.

31 ESL, para. 115. See also, Case 36/74 B.N.O. Walrave and L.J.N. Koch v Association Union cycliste internationale, Koninklijke Nederlandsche Wielren Unie et Federación Española Ciclismo, EU:C:1974:140, para. 4; and Case C-325/08 Olympique Lyonnais SASP v Olivier Bernard and Newcastle UFC, EU:C:2010:143, para. 27.

32 See also, Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association and others v. Bosman and others, ECLI:EU:C:1995:463, para. 106; and Case C-176/96 Jyri Lehtonen and Castors Canada Dry Namur-Braine ASBL v Fédération royale belge des sociétés de basket-ball ASBL (FRBSB), ECLI:EU:C:2000:201, para. 33.

33 ESL, para. 104.

34 Ibid, paras. 102, 103, and 144.

35 See e.g. Case C-377/20, Servizio Elettrico Nazionale SpA and Others v Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2021:998, paras. 124–127.

36 ESL, para. 139.

37 Ibid, para. 149.

38 Supra note 4, Weatherill, 12.

39 ESL, para. 145.

40 Ibid, para. 131.

41 Ibid, para. 133.

42 Case C-49/07, Motosykletistiki Omospondia Ellados NPID (MOTOE) v Elliniko Dimosio, ECLI:EU:C:2008:376, para. 51.

43 Case AT.40462 – Amazon Marketplace (Decision of 20 December 2022), para. 197.

44 See also, Case T-93/18, International Skating Union v. Commission, EU:T:2020:610, para. 126.

45 In MOTOE, the Court stated that in the circumstance where the governing body has both the regulatory and commercial functions, it had “an obvious advantage over its competitors”, and its gatekeeping right allowed it to “distort competition by favoring events which it organizes or those in whose organization it participates”. MOTOE, para 52.

46 MOTOE, para. 51.

47 Stephen Weatherill, ‘Article 82 EC and Sporting “Conflict of Interest”: The Judgment in MOTOE’, in Stephen Weatherill (ed) European Sports Law: Collected Papers (Springer 2014) 480.

48 See Case C-1/12 Ordem dos Técnicos Oficiais de Contas v Autoridade da Concorrência, EU:C:2013:127, paras. 84 to 86, 90, 91 and 99 (hereinafter OTOC).

49 ESL, para. 135.

50 See, for example, Case 41/83 Italy v. Commission, EU:C:1985:120; and Case C-202/88 France v. Commission, EU: C:1991:120.

51 ESL, para. 137.

52 Ibid, para. 138.

53 Ibid, para. 152. Nonetheless, it is to be noted that the Court makes it up to the Commercial Court of Madrid to determine if UEFA and FIFA’s rules are to be categorized as abuse of a dominant position. ESL, para. 150.

54 ISU, para. 118.

55 ESL, paras. 155–170.

56 Kieron Beal, ‘Competition Law and European Law in Relation to Football’, in Nick De Marco (eds) Footbal and the Law (2nd edn., Bloomsbury 2022) 53.

57 ESL, para. 165.

58 Giorgio Monti, ‘Sports Governance after the Opinions of Advocate General Rantos in Superleague and International Skating Union’ (2023) TILEC Discussion Paper, DP 2023-001, 27 <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4316259> (last visited 2 February 2024).

59 ESL, para. 175.

60 Ibid, para. 178.

61 Supra note 23, Craig and De Búrca, 70.

62 AG Rantos Opinion for ESL, paras. 76.

63 Ibid, paras. 63–78.

64 ESL, para. 177.

65 Ibid, para. 177.

66 Case C-309/99, J. C. J. Wouters, J. W. Savelbergh and Price Waterhouse Belastingadviseurs BV v Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten, ECLI:EU:C:2002:98, para. 97. In ISU, the European Commission stated that the following objectives might constitute legitimate objectives that could justify a restriction of competition by a sports governing body: the integrity of sport, the protection of health and safety, the organization and proper conduct of competitive sport, solidarity between participants and the protection of the volunteer model of a sport. Case AT.40208 - International Skating Union’s Eligibility Rules, paras. 222 and 223.

67 Case C-519/04 P, Meca-Medina and Majcen v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2006:492, para. 47.

68 Case T-93/18, International Skating Union v. Commission, para. 92.

69 AG Rantos Opinion for ESL, para. 121.

70 Stephen Weatherill, ‘Bosman Changed Everything: The Rise of EC Sports Law’, in Miguel Maduro and Loic Azoulai (eds), The Past and Future of EU Law: The Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty (Hart 2010) 480–87; Stefaan Van den Bogaert, ‘Bosman: The Genesis of European Sports Law’, in Miguel Maduro and Loic Azoulai (eds), The Past and Future of EU Law: The Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty (Hart 2010) 488–98.

71 Pablo Ibáñez Colomo, ‘Competition Law and Sports Governance: Disentangling a Complex Relationship’ (2022) 45 World Competition 323, 336.

72 In Wouters, the ECJ ruled that restrictive rules on competition could reasonably be considered “necessary” and “proportional” to ensure the proper practice of the legal profession. Wouters, para. 105. The pyramid structure of European sports indicates a division of labor between separate organization at local, regional, national, European and global levels, with the bottom being made up of amateurs and the submit being made up of professionals. Supra note 72, Colomo, 330. See also, White Paper on Sport (European Commission, 2007), COM/2007/0391 final, [4.1].

73 Supra note 1, Van den Bogaert, 35.

74 ESL, para. 186.

75 Ibid, para. 183.

76 Case C-124/21 P International Skating Union v Commission, para. 113; Case C-680/21 UL and SA Royal Antwerp Football Club v Union royale belge des sociétés de football association ASBL, EU:C:2023:1010, para. 115.

77 Or Brook, Non-Competition Interests in EU Antitrust Law: An Empirical Study of Article 101 TFEU (CUP 2022) 257–59.

78 Wouters, para. 100.

79 Ibid.

80 Wouters, para. 97; Meca-Medina, para. 42; OTOC, paras. 93–96.

81 Supra note 15, Pijetlovic, 182.

82 United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 281 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d, Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).

83 Wouters, para. 97.

84 ESL, para. 183.

85 Ibid.

86 Ibid.

87 Ibid, paras. 185–86.

88 Ibid, paras. 178 and 147.

89 AG Rantos Opinion for ESL, para. 118.

90 Ibid, para. 90.

91 Ibid, para. 118.

92 ESL, paras. 133, 151–52 and 178–79.

93 Ibid, paras .185–86.

94 Supra note 71, Colomo, 341.

95 Ibid, 342–43.

96 Ibid, 343.

97 ESL, para. 186.

98 Ben Van Rompuy, ‘A Motor of Change? EU Antitrust Law and Sports Governance from Meca-Medina to the European Super League’, in Jacob Kornbeck (ed), EU Antitrust Law and Sport Governance: The Next Frontier? (Routledge 2022) 38; Thomas B. Nachbar, ‘Less Restrictive Alternatives and the Ancillary Restraints Doctrine’ (2022) 45 Seattle University Law Review 587, 592–93.

99 Supra note 71, Colomo, 325.

100 ESL, para. 186.

101 Joined Cases C-184/13 to C-187/13, C-194/13, C-195/13 and C-208/13 API – Anonima Petroli Italiana SpA and Others v Ministero delle Infrastrutture e dei Trasporti and Others, EU:C:2014:2147, paras. 55–56.

102 Ibid, paras 43–44.

103 Ibid, para. 49.

104 Case 66/86 Opinion of AG Lenz, EU:C:1989:5, para. 41.

105 Case T-286/09, Intel v. Commission, EU:T:2014:547, para. 140; Niamh Dunne, ‘Public Interest and EU Competition Law' (2020) 65 The Antitrust Bulletin 256, 267; Sandra Marco Colino, Competition Law of the EU and UK (8th edn., OUP 2019) 340.

106 ESL, para. 185.

107 MOTOE, para. 53.

108 MOTOE, paras. 51–52.

109 Holger Jakob, ‘The Super League, the European Sports Model and Antitrust Law’ (2023) 23 The International Sports Law Journal 259, 261.

110 Houben called the dual role double-hatting. See Robby Houben, ‘Sports Governance (in Football) under Attack’ (2023) 23 The International Sports Law Journal 271, 278–79.

111 ESL, para. 185.

112 Art. 165 (1) TFEU. Also, Richard Parrish, ‘Social Dialogue in European Professional Football’ (2011) 17 European Law Journal 213, 219.

113 AG Rantos Opinion for ESL, paras. 93–94.

114 Supra note 110, Houben, 277.

115 Case C-680/21 Opinion of AG Szpunar, EU:C:2023:188, paras. 50–55.

116 ESL, paras. 184–86.

117 Supra note 71, Colomo, 333–34.

118 Supra note 4, Weatherill, 9.

119 Sports governing bodies should be able to maintain a high degree of autonomy in fulfilling their role in all fields of sport. See e.g. Conclusions of the Council and of the representatives of the governments of the Member States meeting within the Council on combating corruption in sport, O.J. 2019, C 416/3, para. 15; Organization of sport in Europe is based on the fundamental right of freedom of association. It is also based on values, such as solidarity between different levels in sport, in particular between professional and grassroots sport, fairness, integrity, openness, gender equality and good governance. See Resolution of the Council and of the representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council on the key features of a European Sport Model, O.J. 2021, C 501/1, para. 7.

120 Supra note 4, Weatherill, 15.

121 Katarina Pijetlovic, ‘EU Sports Law: A Uniform Algorithm for Regulatory Rules’ (2017) 17 The International Sports Law Journal 86, 88–94.

122 Ibid, 95–97.

123 ESL, paras. 183–86.

124 Mislav Mataija, Private Regulation and the Internal Market: Sports, Legal Services, and Standard Setting in EU Economic Law (OUP 2016) 173–76; Stephen Weatherill, Principles and Practice in EU Sports Law (OUP 2017) 27.

125 These cases include Royal Antwerp (Case C-680/21), Diarra (Case C-650/22), Swift Hesperange (Case C-209/23) and ROGON (Case C-428/23). See Tim Lichtenberg, ‘FIFA’s Football Agents Regulation Violates Competition Law’ (Kluwer Competition Law Blog, 20 July 2023) <https://competitionlawblog.kluwercompetitionlaw.com/2023/07/20/fifas-football-agents-regulation-violates-competition-law/> (last visited 30 January 2024). See also, supra note 110, Houben, 285.

126 Case C-650/22 Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) v BZ, Request for a preliminary ruling from the Cour d’appel de Mons (Belgium) lodged on 17 October 2022.

127 See e.g. supra note 110, Houben, 281. See also, Case C-49/07 Opinion of AG Kokott, EU:C:2008:142, para. 96.

128 Supra note 58, Monti, 25–26.

129 Ibid, 27.

130 Antoine Duval, ‘Football’s Bad Governance in the Dock: The Court of Arbitration for Sport and FIFA’s Policing of Football Officials’, in Antoine Duval and Antonio Rigozzi (eds), Yearbook of International Sports Arbitration 2018–2020 (T.M.C. Asser Press 2024) 4–6; supra note 4, Weatherill, 16–17.

131 Supra note 110, Houben, 289.

132 Ibid, 288.

133 John Welsh, ‘The European Super League Debacle: Why Regulation of Corporate Football is Essential’ (2023) 24 Soccer & Society 172, 173.

134 Luca Marruzzo, ‘UEFA’s monopoly v the European Super League: Chronicle of An Already Written Ending?’ (2023) 43 European Competition Law Review 219, 223.

135 Supra note 4, Weatherill, 13.

136 Supra note 15, FC Barcelona.

137 See e.g. ESL, para. 136.

138 Generally, Borja García, ‘UEFA and the European Union: From Confrontation to Co-operation?’ (2007) 3 Journal of Contemporary European Research 202.

139 Jan Zglinski, ‘Constitutionalising the European Sports Model: The Opinion of Advocate General Rantos in the European Super League Case’ (LSE EUROPP Blog, 16 December 2022) <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2022/12/16/constitutionalising-the-european-sports-model-the-opinion-of-advocate-general-rantos-in-the-european-super-league-case/> (last visited 31 January 2024).

140 See supra, discussions accompanying note 15.

141 Supra note 4, Weatherill, 21. See also, European Commission, ‘European Citizens’ Initiative: Commission Decides to Register Initiative on European Football and Sports’ 2 February 2022, <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_683> (last visited 31 January 2024).

142 See Arnout Geeraert, Jeroen Scheerder and Hans Bruyninckx, ‘The Governance Network of European Football: Introducing New Governance Approaches to Steer Football at the EU Level’ (2013) 5 International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics 113, 121.

143 Supra note 4, Weatherill, 22; Supra note 110, Houben, 284–86; Supra note 1, Van den Bogaert, 38–39.

144 UK Department for Culture, Media & Sport, ‘A Sustainable Future – Reforming Club Football Governance’ (CP799, February 2023) paras. 2.28 and 11.2.

145 David J. Gerber, Competition Law and Antitrust (OUP 2020) 21.

146 AG Rantos Opinion for ESL, paras. 30–31.