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Abstract
Trade and investment liberalisation in the post-1980 period allowed the penetration of transnational tobacco companies into the Turkish market. State control over the market was gradually removed and tobacco farming, manufacturing, trade and consumption were reshaped in line with the needs of transnational tobacco companies. The resultant increase in product proliferation and aggressive marketing strategies led to a dramatic rise in cigarette consumption in the 1990s, making Turkey a market with one of the sharpest consumption increases in the world. While Turkey implemented demand-side tobacco control policies to reduce consumption after 1996, it continued to stimulate manufacturing and trade in a conflicting way. The Turkish case verifies that the liberalisation process facilitated by the state under the auspices of international institutions conflicts with tobacco control. Liberalisation paves the way for market expansions of transnational tobacco companies that resist tobacco control in their drive for profit. Current global tobacco control policies, with no interest in controlling manufacturing, have limited effect on consumption. The Turkish case indicates the necessity of establishing public control over tobacco manufacturing and trade from a public health perspective.
Acknowledgements
I want to thank Efza Evrengil and Professor Elif Dagli for their comments on this manuscript. Also, I want to thank the anonymous referees for their insightful comments on an early version of this paper.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1. MPOWER is an abbreviation consisting of the initial letters of the following six measures:
Monitor tobacco use and prevention policies
Protect people from tobacco smoke
Offer help to quit tobacco use
Warn about the dangers of tobacco
Enforce bans on tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship
Raise taxes on tobacco.
2. On 24 January 1991, the head of state vetoed a tobacco control law by arguing that advertising bans would be against free trade.
3. Meanwhile, accredited laboratories, which were stipulated in 2002 by the Tobacco Law (No. 4733, Article 3), have not been established for 12 years.
4. For example, see the SSUK webpage for its congress proceedings at: http://www.ssuk.org.tr/search.php?text=kongre
5. Regarding the tobacco industry interference in Turkey, see Mutlu and Seydiogulllari (Citation2014) and Kilinc (Citation2014).
6. In 2013, Philsa, the Philip Morris-Sabancı Holding joint venture, was 20th in a list of the top 100 corporate tax-payer companies in Turkey (see Revenue Administration of Turkey, http://www.gib.gov.tr/index.php?id=1216&uid=2606).
7. In Turkey, for example, SCT revenues of the government from tobacco products continuously increased between 2003 and 2012, from 4.5 to 20 billion Turkish Liras, so that their share in total SCT reached 27% in 2012 (Keklik, Citation2014, p. 124).
8. For example, regarding improved health conditions after the legislation for 100% smoke-free areas, see Salepci (Citation2014); see also ‘Smoking bans in closed areas started to reduce cariovascular and asthma diseases’ (Kapalı Alanlarda Sigara Yasağı, Kalp ve Astım Hastalıklarını Azaltmaya Başladı), http://www.haberler.com/kapali-alanlarda-sigara-yasagi-kalp-ve-astim-2152215-haberi/
9. One can add more supply-side policy suggestions to the list. A detailed discussion of supply-side policies for a tobacco endgame and their applicability in different national contexts will be the issue of a forthcoming paper. As an initial attempt on this issue, see Gultekin-Karakas (Citation2014b).