Nationalism in Turkey: Political Violence and Identity

Abstract

This article explores the relationship between Kurdish nationalist and official Turkish nationalist identities and considers the effects of political violence. In this context, the study argues that the relationship between Kurdish nationalism and its official Turkish counterpart is problematic in nature and that these ideologies have tried to exist by referring to their opposite number as “the other” and engaging in political violence. In the 21st century, this clash has spread to the grassroots level of both circles, leading to tension between Kurds and Turks. The study is restricted to official Turkish nationalism and does not evaluate (Turkish) ultra-right nationalism. The paper begins by evaluating the psychological, sociological and political dynamics of the situation. It then examines the concept of political violence in relation to ethnic and national social identities. The second section sheds light on the relationship between official Turkish nationalism and Kurdish nationalism by tracing origins to the Ottoman Empire in order better to understand the role of violence in the formation of both Kurdish and Turkish nationalist identities. These aspects provide insight into why, in the 1980s, Kurdish nationalism evolved into ethnic terrorism. The final section seeks to discover why the Kurdish issue has been transformed into an ethnic backlash for both Kurds and Turks, and considers the relevance to the case of the European Union integration process and the US-led invasion of Iraq.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Dr Muhittin Ataman and Gokhan Telatar for their positive criticism of the initial draft of the study.

Notes

1. Throughout this study, the author uses the acronym PKK, although the organization”s name was changed in April 2002 to Kurdish Freedom and Democracy Congress (KADEK) and, in late 2003, to the Freedom and Democracy Congress of Kurdistan (Kongra-Gel).

2. The PKK not only represented Kurdish nationalism but helped Kurds to realize their ethnic identity. Kurds have sympathy for the PKK due to their ethnic identity and Turkish state repression of any other Kurdish democratic organization that would rival the PKK.

3. In this study, the location of the eastern part of the country refers geographically to both south-east Anatolia and eastern Anatolia.

4. The system, consisting of various communities each with different laws and social systems, was called the millet system. These communities developed and practised their own laws without state intervention and, in this respect, every community was autonomous. The leaders of these communities were responsible to the state; Ottoman policy made these groups dependent on the state (Mahçupyan, 1998. p. 59).

5. In his article, “Transformation of Nationalism: The Old and Current Nationalism ”, Muhuttin Ataman (2001–2002) distinguishes ethno-nationalism from nation-state (macro) nationalism in three ways. First, ethno-nationalism is a reactionary movement to modernity, which entails the homogenization of cultural, historical and religious differences to form smaller units. Second, macro-nationalism transformed into a popular mass movement in the 20th century, but the prominent agents were the middle, urbanized class; in contrast, ethno-national movements spread at the grassroots level, with the lower class and rural elements gaining importance. Last, unlike macro-nationalists, ethno-nationalists stress the concept of ethnos, which means that culture is innate from birth and is separatist in nature.

6. In the Ottoman Empire, the state gave autonomy to Kurdish tribes in their regions and made them responsible to the state in terms of tax and military duties.

7. To control traumatic images of tormentors, Kurdish nationalists often used TC (Turkish Republic) to denigrate the regime in their daily discourses.

8. The creation of boundaries is essential in separating a subordinate group from others and creating a feeling of togetherness. For any subordinate group, boundary-making can be realized by withdrawing from the values and structures of the dominant player in the public sphere and constructing new self-asserting values and structures (Taylor & Whitter, 1992. pp.105, 111–113).

9. In the September 1980 coup d'état, harsh methods were used on prisoners, mainly in Diyarbakir prison, resulting in them becoming militants in the PKK (Cemal, 2004, pp. 15–34, 515).

10. In the 1983 national elections, ANAP came to power and the SHP became the main opposition party. ANAP represented “right” electorates while “left” electorates were represented by the SHP. In the September 1980 military intervention, the Islamist party MSP (National Salvation Party) and the Nationalist Party MNP (National Order Party) were banned by the state and both Islamists and Nationalists found an ideological home in ANAP. The Kurdish nationalist party, HEP (People's Labour Party), with no chance of entering parliament because of the 10% vote threshold, allied with the SHP in the 1991 national elections; the SHP used this opportunity to broaden its support base. Economic instability, the military elite's negative approach to HEP as the legal branch of the PKK and the insufficiency of liberal ideology in representing Islamists combined to end this coalition.

11. In official discourse, Kurds were not recognized in the public sphere. Kurds were referred to as “mountain Turks”, with the word Kurd derived from the sound made by feet when walking on icy snow.

12. Owing to the PKK's armed militia and anti-democratic stance, using violence against the state and other Kurds, no other party wanted to represent Kurdish nationalism.

13. Özgür Politika is a newspaper close to the terrorist organization. The framework of the newspaper is not only patterned on Kurds in Turkey but also in Iran, Iraq and Syria.

14. MED TV, run by the PKK and broadcast in the eastern part of the country, serves the Kurdish nationalistic identity. In the 1980s, Kurdish folk songs became politicized in the context of ethno-politics. For example, Kemal Burkay, an exiled Kurdish political activist, wrote about the Dersim uprising: “Dersim is an old story, as you know; something left over from fairy tales; a secret melancholy song in the centre of my country” (Burkay, 1975; 45).

15. The Sevres Agreement, signed after World War I with the European powers such as France, England and Greece, signalled the collapse of the Empire. This agreement reminds nationalist circles in Turkish society of unpleasant collective memories and the wills of the “sinister” West. The National Independence War (1920–1923) and the establishment of the Republic was a response to the Sevres Agreement and subsequent occupation by Imperial powers.

16. Mainstream magazines, media and popular music serve to diffuse nationalism in Turkey (Yumul & Ozkırımli, 2000; Konyar, 2001).

17. The chief executive of the police force, Gaffar Okan, became a symbol of Diyarbakır and established strong bonds with ordinary citizens and elites in the city until he was murdered by an Islamic terrorist organization, the Party of God (Hezbollah).

18. People migrated from the east to the big cities of Turkey and formed crime organizations, causing a security problem for the National Security Council. A leader of a prominent criminal organization located in Istanbul motivated members of the organization by saying that mugging, a common practice, was a right of Kurds as the Turks had stolen from them.

19. These were positive signs for Kurds, being acknowledged in the public sphere with a collective identity, but these developments did not satisfy them. Educational courses were closed due to a lack of interest and the state placed restrictions on Kurdish names for children.

20. The Turkish Lausanne Agreement, signed in 1923, granted full citizenship rights as well as ethno- cultural and religious diversity to non-Muslim communities, but negatively affected minorities in that the imagined unity of the Muslim millet system remained intact against the position of non-Muslims (Icduygu & Soner, 2006). Minorities enjoyed full citizenship rights, although they were discriminated against by society and by the state.

21. A Muslim who dies in a war against the enemy is called a martyr.

22. After the US invasion of Iraq, the Turkish press tried to reveal the close bonds between Kurds and Jews, who are the ultimate “others” of the Muslim identity (Yeğen, 2006).