Informal Ethnopolitics and Local Authority Figures in Osh, Kyrgyzstan

Abstract

The contribution examines local-level ethnopolitics in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan, particularly in the southern city of Osh, in 1990 site of one of the bloodiest inter-communal conflicts of the late Soviet era. First, instruments of managing multi-ethnicity are briefly introduced, with particular attention being paid to territorial autonomy, also a pillar of Soviet ethnofederal structure. Next, the contribution focuses on Uzbek ethnopolitics in Osh as a case study which illustrates how formal and informal politics shape state–minority relations in an ethnically mixed and post-conflict setting. The contribution argues that local authority figures and patron–client relations are key to understanding how Uzbek ethnopolitics unfolds and violence is prevented from re-occurring. A combination of informal and formal institutions accounts for preserving inter-ethnic stability in post-Soviet Osh.

Acknowledgements

The author wishes to acknowledge the support from the Economic and Social Research Council, the British Academy, the British Association for Slavonic and East European Studies and the British International Studies Association for their generous support to this research. The author is also grateful to Scott Radnitz, Indraneel Sircar, the editors and the anonymous reviewers of Ethnopolitics for their valuable comments to earlier drafts of this paper.

Notes

1. By riot is meant here a kind of conflict involving ‘no structured armed forces and organized long-term fighting’ (Tishkov, 1995, p. 148, fn. 1).

2. Kirghizia was better suited to Russian pronunciation. Since independence the country has been known as either Kyrgyzstan or Kyrgyz Republic (used interchangeably).

3. The conflict spread to other villages in the surroundings of Osh and Uzgen (Tishkov, 1999, p. 581).

4. In Soviet parlance this indicates the community after which the country was named.

5. There are three main clusters of clans in the country: Ong (concentrated in the south), Sol (north and west), and Ichkilik (south) (Dukenbayev & Hansen, 2003, pp. 25–26).

6. Studies discussing the perspectives of Kyrgyz, Russians and other groups include Faranda & Nolle (2003), Alisheva et al. (1999) and Elebayeva et al. (2000).

7. Clientelism can be defined as a form of social interaction that derives from “a specific, personally stratified relationship, […] bound to fixed roles and dominance structures” (Lauth, 2000, p. 27).

8. See Megoran (2000a) for a critique of this “Ferghana Valley conflictology”.

9. I am grateful to one of the reviewers of the journal for raising this point.

10. Units at the higher end of the hierarchy (the 15 union republics) enjoyed greater cultural and political autonomy than those subject to them (e.g. autonomous republics, autonomous provinces, etc.).

11. Originally Soviet Kirghizia enjoyed the status of autonomous province (oblast') within the Russian Soviet Republic, being two degrees lower in terms of autonomy compared to Uzbekistan along the Soviet hierarchy of territorial autonomy. Kirghizia was finally upgraded to full Union status (SSR) in 1936.

12. Koichiev (2003) and Haugen (2003) extensively cover the territorial disputes over Osh in 1926–1927.

13. Of course this was not the case in practice where all the republics were tied in an economic specialization.

14. In her insightful research on border-making in Soviet Central Asia, Francine Hirsch (2005) shows how claim-making was made in the name of nationality, contributing to embedding national consciousness in the minds of populations that until then had hardly viewed themselves as members of clearly distinct communities.

15. There is a considerable debate as to the appropriate term to be used in this circumstance: Collins seems to prefer the more popular “clan” (2002 and 2003) whereas Radnitz opts for “strategic groups” (2005) and Olivier Roy for regionally-based kin networks (1997).

16. This paradox is illustrated by the emphasis given by Kyrgyzstani authorities to both Manas as historical figure and hero of the Kyrgyz people and the inclusive concept of “Kyrgyzstan our common home”, which implies a non- ethnic substratum in state ideology (Megoran, 2002).

17. The balance shift is evident when one compares the ethnic composition of the country in 1989 (Uzbeks: 12.9%; Russians: 21.5%) with that of 1999 (1999 Census).

18. Not that this is anymore valid in Western context any way.

19. Declaration of the Uzbek Kurultai in Jalalabad 2002 (Khamidov, 2002).

20. About four, as of summer 2003 (interviews held with lawyers working at the Osh judiciary, 16 July 2003).

21. Pravda (1990) and Sovetskaya Kirghizia (1990) quoted in Asankanov (1996).

22. This is also examined elsewhere in Fumagalli (2007b, forthcoming).

23. Interviews held with members of the Uzbek community in southern Kyrgyzstan (June–July 2003 and August 2005).

24. I am grateful to Scott Radnitz for pointing out this aspect to me.

25. As outlined earlier in the text the survey was conducted in the city of Osh from June to August 2003. Respondents included 61 members of the Uzbek community. Again, the sample was not representative of the community itself, and thus generalizable inferences are not possible. Data seem, nevertheless, to suggest a clear trend which was also confirmed in follow-up interviews.

26. Although “informal rules may be embedded within [these] organizations”, the two should not be conflated (North, 1990, p.4; Helmke & Levitsky, 2004, p. 727). Informal institutions are defined as “socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels” (ibid.).

27. Fumagalli (2005).

28. Interview held with Davron Sabirov (Osh, 17 July 2003).

29. Interviews with Alisher Toksonbaev (Osh, 19 July 2003) and with Almaz Kalet (Osh, 17 July, 2003).

30. Following his election in 2000, Sabirov's tones softened and visibly became less interested in confronting the authorities (he was threatened of being stripped of his control of KyrgyzGas, which did eventually occur) and more interested in the construction sector (among the other things he owns a series of complexes on the right bank of the city, including the well-known hotel “Stary Gorod”.

31. The sample included 540 Uzbeks from the Osh region. Thanks go to Makhmud Kazakhbaev for sharing these data with me.

32. Sabirov's campaign was marked with accusations of frauds and bribes. Essentially Sabirov was accused of “buying” his victory, not just thanks to their philanthropic activities, but also because they handed out 200 soms (about 5 US dollars) to interested voters (interview with a local journalist in Osh, 22 July 2005).

33. Interviews held with Alisher Sabirov (Bishkek, 14 June 2003) and Sabirov's aide in Osh Ergeshbaev (Osh, on repeated occasions in June and July 2003).

34. Here I am simply using a term (“revolution”) which has entered the popular and scholarly parlance and I am not referring to the proper meaning of the term.

35. Interview with the editor of Jalalobod Tongi (Dawn of Jalalabad), (Jalalabad, 11 July 2003).

36. Interviews held with local academics and students at an Osh University (Osh, June 2003).

37. Interview with a local Uzbek journalist (Osh, July 2003).

38. This is done elsewhere (Fumagalli, 2005, particularly Ch. 7).

39. For contrasting views see Saipjanov (2005) and Saipov (2005).

40. Interview with local journalist (Osh, 25 July 2005).

41. Interview with Davron Sabirov (Osh, 17 July 2003).

42. I am grateful to one of the reviewers for emphasising this point.